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i 
Abstract 
 
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant 
violence during war. Social psychology and criminology theories can help to develop the 
necessary conflict-specific behavioural regulations. This is because social psychology and 
criminology theories can explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by psychological 
processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in so doing, 
fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect 
civilians. This thesis uses legal doctrinal methodology to establish the current status of IHL 
application to armed groups and existing IHL protections for civilians, which are based largely 
on peacetime protections for individuals (e.g., prohibitions on assault, murder, rape, etc.). It 
demonstrates the need and utility of turning to academic disciplines beyond law, specifically 
social psychology and criminology, to understand combatant violence toward civilians. Through 
the use of case studies focusing on the Sierra Leone civil war and the numerous ongoing 
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this thesis identifies two common combatant 
behaviours that contribute to the perpetration of IHL violations against civilians, but are 
currently unregulated by IHL: (1) combatant use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language toward civilians and (2) combatant use of nicknames, particularly violent or heroic 
nicknames. The thesis proposes two new IHL regulations to address these behaviours and to 
inhibit the ability of these behaviours to contribute to violence toward civilians during armed 
conflict. Ultimately, the thesis demonstrates how combatant psychology can be used to develop 
the substantive content of IHL for the protection of civilians. 
 
Keywords:  
 
International humanitarian law; non-state armed groups; combatants; civilian protection; 
dehumanization; diffusion of responsibility; social psychology; criminology 
 
 
 
 
   
 
ii 
Summary for Lay Audience 
 
This thesis argues that there is a need for new laws regulating the behaviour of members of 
armed groups in order to improve protection for civilians during war. Current protections for 
civilians are largely based on the same protections for individuals in peacetime (e.g., no murder, 
no stealing, no rape), but new laws focusing on behaviour which, in the context of war, places 
civilians in danger. The behaviour in need of regulation can be identified through an improved 
understanding of the psychology causes of acts of direct violence toward civilians by members of 
armed groups. This thesis uses social psychology and criminology to understand the psychology 
of fighters. It then applies this understanding to case studies examining violence toward civilians 
in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The thesis develops two new legal rules 
to regulate the use of demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing language by fighters and the use of 
nicknames by fighters. The dehumanization of civilians leads to violence towards civilians. 
Nicknames allow fighters to feel anonymous and not responsible for their actions toward 
civilians. Targeting these behaviours through the law will prevent the patterns of thought that 
lead to civilian harm. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
1 War and Peace 
 
War and peace: What's the difference? … [W]ar is violent and 
peace is, well, peaceful; in other words, peace is the antithesis of 
war. 
                -David Keen1 
 
 
Peace is the absence of war or, as Keen puts it, “peace is the antithesis of war.”2 In peace, there 
is a seemingly never-ending amount of law, both domestic and international, that governs most 
aspects of day-to-day life. By contrast, war often epitomizes “the breakdown of legal systems” 
and the existence of “unleashed violence means the obliteration of standards of behaviour and 
legal systems.”3 However, war is not an ungoverned space. War, referred to as ‘armed conflict’ 
under international law, is governed by an entire body of law: international humanitarian law 
(IHL).4  
 
IHL has, for more than a century, sought to protect and minimize harms to, among others, 
civilians during conflict.5 IHL has continued to develop in the face of terrible violence directed 
 
1 David Keen, “War and peace: What’s the difference?” (2000) 7:4 International Peacekeeping 1 at 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Frédéric Maurice, “Humanitarian Ambition” (1992) 289 International Review of the Red Cross 363 at 371. 
4 IHL is also referred to as the law of armed conflict (LOAC). These terms (IHL and LOAC) can and are often used 
interchangeably; however, the former, IHL, tends to be preferred by those who wish to emphasize the humanitarian 
aims of the body of law, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, while the latter, LOAC, is often 
preferred by states and their armed forces. 
5 See, e.g., “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,Geneva, 22 
August 1864” in D Schindler & J Toman, eds, (Leiden, NLD: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 280; Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949 [Geneva 
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention, Relative to the 
Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 [Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
8 June 1977 [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 [Additional Protocol II]; 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (Cambridge, UK: 
ICRC and Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
  
   
  
2 
toward civilians in an effort to improve the protection it provides to civilians. For example, in the 
wake of World War II, states negotiated the four Geneva Conventions of 19496 and, in the 
shadow of the Vietnam War, they negotiated the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.7 More recently, the aim of civilian protection and the prevention of civilian 
suffering has been the catalyst behind treaties prohibiting the use of anti-personnel landmines 
and cluster munitions.8  
 
Unlike in peace, it is legal and encouraged that combatants injure and kill enemy combatants 
during armed conflict.9 The generally absolute prohibition on murder during peace time is 
eroded during war. Despite permitting combatants to use lethal force against enemy combatants, 
IHL prohibits combatants from directly targeting civilians.10 Apart from this rule requiring 
combatants to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to take precautions to avoid 
excessive indirect harm to civilians during conflict, and to ensure that any indirect harm to 
civilians is proportionate to the military advantage acquired, the specific acts prohibited under 
IHL for the protection of civilians are acts equally prohibited during peace such as murder, 
assault, torture, and rape.11 The basic rules of IHL, including rules for the protection of civilians, 
are widely known among civilians and combatants around the world.12 Even so, in most 
contemporary armed conflicts, the majority of casualties are civilians who take no part in the 
hostilities.13  
 
 
6 Geneva Convention I, supra note 5; Geneva Convention II, supra note 5; Geneva Convention III, supra note 5; 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5. 
7 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5. 
8 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction, United Nations, 18 September 1997 [Landmine Treaty]; Convention on Cluster Munitions, 3 
December 2008 [Convention on Cluster Munitions]. 
9 See, e.g., Marco Sassoli, Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 2003); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A 
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977) at 34, 41. 
10 See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 1 (distinction); Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at 
Articles 48, 51(2), 52(2); Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 13(2). 
11 See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at 
Article 4(2); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 87-98. 
12 Daniel Muñoz-Rojas & Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War, Understanding and Preventing IHL 
Violations (Geneva: ICRC, 2004) at 5. 
13 See, e.g., Valerie Epps, “Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral Damage Rule” 
(2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 307 at 329; Sobhi Tawil, “International 
Humanitarian Law and Basic Education” (2000) 82 International Review of the Red Cross 581; Walter C Clemens 
& J David Singer, “A Historical Perspective: The Human Cost of War” (2000) 282 Scientific American 56. 
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Since World War II, the nature of conflicts has drastically changed: the preponderance of armed 
conflicts today are of a non-international character – sometimes referred to as civil wars – in 
which at least one of the parties to the conflict is a non-state armed group (more commonly 
referred to as rebels, guerrillas, or insurgents).14 Statistics show that, since 2000, armed groups 
have accounted for the majority of the direct violence toward civilians in armed conflicts around 
the world.15 Conflicts, such as those in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), have become synonymous with widespread civilian harms committed by members of 
armed groups in direct violation of IHL.16 This violence has included assault; murder; torture; 
and cruel, inhumane, humiliating and degrading treatment of civilians by combatants.17 News 
reports often provide horrifying details of women whose babies are cut from their wombs by 
combatants only to be killed,18 or people trapped in their homes by combatants and burned to 
death.19 With such appalling details, it is easy to dismiss these combatants as psychopaths, 
sadists, or monsters; however, the number of perpetrators of violence toward civilians during 
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) far exceeds societal prevalence rates of sadism and 
psychopathy,20 personality disorders that, during peace, are sometimes used to explain how 
 
14 In fact, of the 49 conflicts worldwide in 2017 only one was an inter-state conflict, the conflict between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir: Kendra Dupuy & Rustad, Siri Aras, Trends in Armed Conflict (Oslo: Peace Research 
Institute Oslo, 2018). 
15 Sebastian von Einsiedel, Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict, United Nations 
University Centre for Policy Research Occasional Paper 10 (United Nations University, 2017) at 7. 
16 Other conflicts known for widespread violence toward civilians since the end of the Cold War have included the 
wars in the Central African Republic (2012-ongoing), Colombia (1964-ongoing), Darfur (2003-ongoing), Guatemala 
(1960-1996), Rwanda (1990-1994), Somalia (1991-ongoing), Sri Lanka (1983-2009), South Sudan (2013-ongoing), 
Syria (2011-ongoing), Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999). 
17 While these acts of violence have been common in many armed conflicts, chapter 7 of this thesis examines these 
acts in the specific context of the Sierra Leone Civil War and armed conflicts in the DRC since the mid-1990s. 
18 Human Rights Watch, “We’ll Kill You if You Cry” Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict, Vol 15, No 1 (A) 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003) at 35. 
19 “Casualties of War - Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms”, (1 February 1999), online: Human 
Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/02/01/casualties-war/civilians-rule-law-and-democratic-freedoms>; 
Mark Tran, “Northern Congo civilians ‘need urgent aid’”, (15 October 2009), online: The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/15/northern-congo-civilians-urgent-aid>; UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of a Mission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
– accounts of Congolese fleeing the crisis in the Kasai region, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Geneva: 
United Nations, 2017) at paras 30, 37-38, 40, 43. 
20 The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders records the 12-month prevalence 
rates of antisocial personality disorder, which includes psychopathy and sociopathy, at between 0.2% and 3.3%: 
American Psychiatric Association, “Personality Disorders” in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th ed (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013); A 2001 study based on 2053 adults in 
Oslo, Norway found prevalence rates of sadism at 0.2% and antisocial personality disorder at 0.7%: S Torgersen, E 
Kringlen & V Cramer, “The prevalence of personality disorders in a community sample” (2001) 58:6 Archives of 
General Psychology 590. 
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individuals come to commit acts of extreme violence against individuals.21 In reality, more often 
than not, combatants who harm civilians are ordinary people who, before they took up arms, 
were law-abiding citizens and who, after they lay down their arms, return to ordinary law-
abiding lives, although often plagued by the trauma of their war experiences.22  
 
This transition from law-abiding citizen to law-breaking combatant raises questions as to why 
laws prohibiting certain behaviours for the security of individuals provide, more often than not, 
sufficient protection from extreme violence in peace but these same prohibitions often offer 
insufficient protection for civilians during armed conflict. Insight into this transition from law-
abiding individual during peacetime to law-breaking individual in wartime can be found in 
criminology and social psychology theories.23 These two disciplines have examined the 
psychological processes associated with ordinary individuals who come to commit war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, acts of genocide, and other violent acts toward civilians during armed 
conflict. They demonstrate how, for example, the dehumanization of civilians reframes how 
combatants view civilians and how they view rules for the protection of civilians.24 
Psychological processes such as dehumanization reframe combatant conceptions of right and 
 
21 See, e.g., David J Cooke, “Psychopathy, Sadism and Serial Killing” in Adrian Raine & José Sanmartin, eds, 
Violence and Psychopathy (New York; London, UK: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001) 123; Rebecca 
Taylor LaBrode, “Etiology of the Psychopathic Serial Killer: An Analysis of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
Psychopathy, and Serial Killer Personality and Crime Scene Characteristics” (2007) 7:2 Brief Treatment and Crisis 
Intervention 151; Hilda CP Morana, Michael H Stone & Elias Abdalla-Filho, “Personality disorders, psychopathy, 
and serial killers” (2006) 28:2 Brazilian Journal of Psychiatry 74. 
22 See, e.g., Alette Smeulers, “Perpetrators of International Crimes: Towards a Typology” in Alette Smeulers & 
Roelof Haveman, eds, Supranational Criminology: towards a criminology of international crimes (Antwerp, BE: 
Intersentia, 2008) 233 at 233–34; James Waller, Becoming Evil How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass 
Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 55–87; Sara Reardon, “Colombia: after the violence” (2018) 
557:7703 Nature: International Journal of Science; RJ Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (New York: Basic Books, 1986); 
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking, 1963). 
23 For example, the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to 
authority discussed in chapter 7. See, e.g., Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of 
Inhumanities” (1999) 3:3 Personality and Social Psychology Review 192; Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: 
How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves (New York: Worth Publishers, 2016); Philip Zimbardo, The 
Lucifer Effect Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007); Herbert C Kelman & 
V Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Stanley Milgram, Obedience to authority: An experimental view (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974); Alexander Alvarez, “Adjusting to Genocide: The Techniques of Neutralization and the 
Holocaust” (1997) 21:2 139; Emily Bryant et al, “Techniques of Neutralization and Identity Work Among Accused 
Genocide Perpetrators” (2017) spx026 Social Issues 1. 
24 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23 at 167; Bandura, supra note 23 at 84–89; Bandura, supra note 23 at 201–203; 
Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 18–19; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 17, 222–24. 
  
   
  
5 
wrong such that their conceptions of right and wrong are no longer the same as during peace 
time. 
 
The continued excessive suffering of civilians during conflicts demands reflection on the current 
content of IHL and how the protection of civilians during NIACs may be improved. IHL 
discussions of, and approaches to, improving civilian protection in recent years have focused 
predominantly on engagement with armed groups for the promotion of compliance with existing 
rules as the best means of improving civilian protection.25 The assumption inherent in this focus 
on engagement and enforcement of existing IHL rules is that existing IHL provides sufficient 
protection for civilians and, consequently, engagement, education, and training are all that is 
needed to improve armed group respect for civilians during armed conflict.26 Advocacy for new 
 
25 See, e.g., Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Hyeran Jo, “Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State 
Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?” (2016) 19 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 63; Liam 
Elphick, “A Model of Amnesty: Inducing Armed Groups to Comply with International Humanitarian Law” (2016) 1 
Perth International Law Journal 10; Jann Kleffner & Liesbeth Zegveld, “Establishing an individual complaint 
procedure for violations of international humanitarian law” (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
384; Marco Sassoli, “Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law” (2010) 1:1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5; Olivier Bangerter, 
“Disseminating and Implementing International Humanitarian Law within Organized Armed Groups: Measures 
armed groups can take to improve respect for IHL” in International Institute of Humanitarian Law, ed, Non-State 
Actors and International Humanitarian Law (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010) 187; Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of 
Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, “Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trial or Summary Justice?” (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 489; Heike Krieger, ed, Inducing Complliance with International Humanitarian Law, 
Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Cedric 
Ryngaert & Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, “Enhancing and Enforcing Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: an Inquiry into some Mechanisms” (2011) 3:1 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 443; Michelle Mack, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Geneva: ICRC, 2008). 
26 See, e.g., ICRC, Enhancing Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 2d ed 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2012) at 7; Marco Sassoli, “The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and 
Inherent Challenges” (2007) 10 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 45 at 46, 73; Inter-Parliamentary 
Union & ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 25 (IPU & ICRC, 2016) at 24; 
Gabor Rona, “Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the ‘War on Terror’” (2003) 
27:2 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 55 at 69. 
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IHL rules has largely been limited to the use of new technology in armed conflict such as lethal 
autonomous weapons (colloquially referred to as ‘killer robots’)27 and cyberwarfare.28  
 
This thesis examines the issue of civilian protection under IHL and whether existing IHL 
protection provisions do, in fact, provide adequate protection for civilians during armed conflict 
or whether, contrary to dominant opinions, there is a need for further regulation. This thesis 
questions the view that IHL currently provides all of the necessary protections for civilians. This 
thesis argues that, in understanding the psychological processes that contribute to violence 
toward civilians in armed conflict, it is possible to determine that new IHL regulation is needed 
and the content required in that new IHL regulation. 
1.1 Objectives 
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant 
violence during war. Rather than mirror peacetime protections for individuals, the regulation of 
combatant behaviour under IHL must include behavioural regulation specific to conflict that 
address behaviours which, in conflict, pose a risk to the safety of civilians. Social psychology 
and criminology theories can help to develop the necessary conflict-specific behavioural 
regulations because they explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by psychological 
processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in so doing, 
fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect 
civilians. 
 
 
27 See, e.g., Denise Garcia, “Killer Robots: Why the US should Lead the Ban” (2015) 6:1 Global Policy 57; Vincent 
C Müller & Thomas W Simpson, Killer robots: Regulate, don’t ban (Blavatnik School of Government Policy, 
University of Oxford, 2014); Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); John Lewis, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons” (2015) 124 
Yale Law Journal 1309 at 1319–25; Peter Asaro, “On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, 
automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making” (2012) 94:886 International Review of the Red 
Cross 687 at 709. 
28 See, e.g., Jeffrey K Walker, “The Demise of the Nation-State, The Dawn of New Paradigm Warfare, and a Future 
for the Profession of Arms” (2001) 51 Air Force Law Review 323 at 337–38; Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global 
Regime for Cyber Warfare” in Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers, eds, The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on 
Cyber Warfare (Amsterdam, NLD: IOS Press, 2009) 106 at 115. 
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Although there are a number of academic disciplines which examine and analyze past crimes or 
IHL violations against civilians during armed conflict,29 this thesis focusses on theories from the 
fields of criminology and social psychology to identify possible psychological factors that 
contribute to crimes directed against civilians during armed conflict. These disciplines were 
chosen because both address the subject of deviant behaviour. One key topic examined by 
criminology is the “exploration of what causes some people to commit crimes”.30 Social 
psychology “stud[ies] how people behave in real-world situations” including “why [people] 
commit crimes”.31 Together, these disciplines provide a rich body of literature that explores how 
and why ordinary people commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.32 The 
theories considered for this thesis specifically focus on individual behaviour within that 
individual’s “immediate social or physical environment” (social context).33 This thesis focuses 
on the social context of war. In my discussion, I address four dominant theories within the social 
psychology and criminology literature: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, 
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. It is necessary to note that the theories used in this 
thesis do not suggest that the behaviours they identify are deterministic.34 The presence of one or 
 
29 For example, work in the fields of history, philosophy, political science, and literature have all addressed the 
subject of war and, most frequently, genocide. See, e.g., Arendt, supra note 22; Christopher Browning, Ordinary 
Men (New York: Harper Collins, 1998); Pascal Boniface, Les guerres de demain (Paris: Seuil, 2001); Erich-Maria 
Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (New York: Fawcett, 1967). 
30 Ronnie Lippens, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Studying Criminology 
(London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, 2009) at 2. 
31 Chris Woodford, “Psychology: An introduction to the science of human behavior”, online: 
<https://www.explainthatstuff.com/introduction-to-psychology.html>. 
32 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23; Bryant et al, supra note 23; Bandura, supra note 23; Bandura, supra note 23; 
Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23; Milgram, supra note 23; Zimbardo, supra note 23; Stanley Cohen, States of 
Denial Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2001); Daniel Maier-Katkin, Daniel P 
Mears & Thomas J Bernard, “Towards a criminology of crimes against humanity” (2009) 13:2 Theoretical 
Criminology 227; Dawn L Rothe & Christopher W Mullins, “Toward a Criminology of International Criminal Law: 
An Integrated Theory of International Criminal Violations” (2009) 33:1 International Journal of Comparative and 
Applied Criminal Justice 97; Alette Smeulers & Roelof Haveman, “International Crimes and Criminology: An 
Agenda for Future Research” in Alette Smeulers & Roelof Haveman, eds, Supranational criminology: towards a 
criminology of international crimes (Antwerp, BE: Intersentia, 2008) 487; Alette Smeulers, “What Transforms 
Ordinary People into Gross Human Rights Violators?” in SC Carey & SC Poe, eds, Understanding human rights 
violations: New Systematic Studies (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004) 239; Waller, supra note 22; Ervin Staub, The 
Roots of Evil The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); 
Ervin Staub, Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict, and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Roy F Baumeister, Evil Inside Human Cruelty and Violenc (New York: WH Freeman and Company, 1997); Lt Col 
Dave Grossman, On Killing The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Back Bay 
Books, 2009). 
33 “Social Context definition | Psychology Glossary | alleydog.com”, online: 
<https://www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Social+Context>. 
34 See, e.g., Lippens, supra note 30 at 2–3. 
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more of these behaviours does not guarantee that an individual will violate IHL; however, they 
can have a profound impact on the psyche of a combatant that culminates in violence toward 
civilians. For this reason, throughout the thesis, these behaviours are referred to as possibly, 
potentially, or capable of contributing to or facilitating violations of IHL. This distinction is 
important: these theories are not intended to excuse or justify deviant actions, nor are the 
situational and psychological effects identified intended to minimize the degree of personal 
accountability an individual bears for committing deviant acts.35 
 
In order to demonstrate the existence of a gap between the current regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals during peace and the behavioural regulations necessary to provide 
protection for civilians during war, and the need to address this with new IHL regulation, this 
thesis develops six key arguments. First, it demonstrates that armed groups and their members 
are bound by IHL and, therefore, would likely be subject to new regulations of IHL. Second, it 
argues that the humanitarian goals of IHL warrant consideration of possible avenues by which to 
improve civilian protection during non-international armed conflicts, including through the 
ongoing development of the substantive rules of IHL for the protection of civilians. Third, it 
demonstrates that the specific acts prohibited under IHL for the protection of civilians, such as 
murder, assault, and rape, are the same protections offered to individuals during peace. Fourth, 
through an examination of case study conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC, the thesis argues 
that the mere existence of widespread IHL violations in practice provides little to no insight into 
why legal protections that are largely sufficient during peace offer insufficient protection for 
civilians during war. Fifth, it argues that combatant psychology understood through 
criminological and social psychological theories developed and applied to the specific context of 
violence toward civilians during conflict can help explain some of the underlying causes of IHL 
violations. Sixth, it argues that these theories of criminology and social psychology help to 
identify behaviours that are legal during peace (e.g., the use of dehumanizing language and the 
use of nicknames) but which pose a sufficient risk to the safety of civilians during armed conflict 
that they should be regulated under IHL. The thesis recommends the adoption of two new IHL 
regulations - to address the use of dehumanizing language toward civilians and the use of 
nicknames by combatants - in order to inhibit psychological processes that contribute to violence 
 
35 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 230–313. 
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toward civilians during armed conflict. This thesis concludes that the flawed application of IHL 
to armed groups, as well as the gap between the legal protections offered to individuals during 
peace and those needed to protect civilians during war, can be addressed through new regulations 
based on problematic behaviours identified through the use of social psychology and 
criminology theories. 
 
There is a certain internal tension to the suggestion that the failure to comply with existing legal 
protections for civilian protection should be resolved through the development of new laws. 
However, there is a critical difference between existing IHL rules for the protection of civilians 
and the two new IHL rules recommended in this thesis. The rules recommended in this thesis 
target psychological processes that contribute to violations of existing IHL laws. These 
psychological processes, for example dehumanization or the displacement of responsibility for 
one’s actions, critically alter how combatants view civilians, how combatants view themselves, 
and how combatants view existing laws for civilian protection. The adverse effects of the 
psychological processes discussed in this thesis and targeted by the new rules developed in the 
thesis increase over time. The effects of psychological processes such as dehumanization or 
displacement of responsibility intensify, thereby increasing the combatants’ disassociation from 
both civilians who will become victims and from their own actions. There is a meaningful and, 
in terms of civilian protection, a critical difference between the question of compliance before 
psychological processes have been used by combatants to reframe their psyches and way of 
thinking and the question of compliance after these psychological processes have been employed 
and begun to operate on combatant psyches.36 Through the use of these  psychological processes, 
combatants create an obstacle or impediment to compliance with existing IHL rules for civilian 
 
36 I have developed an analogy to demonstrate the issue that arises from the use of these psychological processes and 
the point at which legal intervention can have the most effect. You ask two people to sort through boxes of pens that 
are identical except for the colour of ink. You instruct them to divide their box of pens into a pile of blue pens and a 
pile of red pens. Once the sorting has been carried out, you observe that person A has perfectly sorted his pens into 
two piles: one pile of blue pens and one pile of red pens. Person B has made two piles of pens, but the blue pens and 
red pens have not been sorted and remain mixed in both piles. It would seem, and it is easy to assume, that person A 
has chosen obedience, while person B has chosen disobedience. However, if person B is colour blind, the task set 
was critically different for them than for person A. Person B faces a critical obstacle to performing the task of 
sorting the pens according to the instructions provided. Person A represents the combatant prior to the reframing of 
right and wrong based on behaviours such as the dehumanization of civilians or the displacement of responsibility 
through the use of nicknames. Person B represents the combatant after they have employed dehumanization or 
nicknames to reframe their understanding of the task before them: whether or not to target civilians for acts of 
violence.  
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protection. Consequently, the current problem of non-compliance is not a pure enforcement issue 
and will be difficult to remedy without addressing the root psychological processes contributing 
to acts of direct violence toward civilians. 
 
The new rules proposed in this thesis are designed to address the risk posed to civilians when 
combatants begin to employ certain psychological processes but before combatants have altered 
their psyches and reframed how they view civilians, their own responsibility and actions, and 
existing laws. These new rules represent an upstream intervention, that can decrease the problem 
of direct violence toward civilians and non-compliance with existing IHL rules downstream. 
1.2 Scope 
The primary objective of this thesis is to improve civilian protection during armed conflict by 
identifying behavioural regulations needed in the specific context of armed conflict for the 
protection of civilians and addressing this problem through the development of new IHL 
regulations. In doing so, the thesis focuses on IHL as the body of international law designed for 
the regulation of armed conflict and the protection of civilians during armed conflict and on the 
further development of the substantive content of IHL. This section will address the scope of the 
thesis and why it is important to concentrate on law development within IHL, in addition to 
IHL’s current focus on armed group engagement. It will also explain why it is important to focus 
on non-state armed groups and NIACs as well as on IHL, rather than other bodies of 
international law, namely international criminal law and international human rights law, that 
overlap in some ways with the protection of individuals during armed conflict. 
 
As noted, the dominant approach of scholars and practitioners of IHL to improving civilian 
protection during armed conflict is through engagement with armed groups for the promotion of 
compliance with existing rules.37 A much smaller body of work has focused on the development 
of new rules of IHL.38 This thesis takes the approach that attention does need to be paid to ways 
of further developing civilian protection through new regulations, which can complement and 
 
37 See, e.g., Jo, supra note 25; Jo, supra note 25; Elphick, supra note 25; Kleffner & Zegveld, supra note 25; 
Sassoli, supra note 25; Bangerter, supra note 25; Zegveld, supra note 25; Sivakumaran, supra note 25; Krieger, 
supra note 25; Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 25; Mack, supra note 25. 
38 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 27; Müller & Simpson, supra note 27; Krishnan, supra note 27; Lewis, supra note 27 
at 1319–25; Asaro, supra note 27 at 709; Walker, supra note 28 at 337–38; Hughes, supra note 28 at 115. 
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facilitate the work of practitioners on engagement with armed groups for the purpose of 
promoting compliance with IHL protections for civilians. The psychological factors that are 
discussed in this thesis, in particular the dehumanization of civilians and the displacement of 
responsibility by combatants for their actions, reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and 
wrong and, in so doing, reframe the way in which combatants view IHL rules intended to protect 
civilians. When practitioners seek to promote IHL compliance with protections for civilians who 
have been subjected to dehumanization, they first need to re-humanize the civilians in the eyes of 
the combatant. This renders the practitioners’ task of securing improved IHL compliance 
significantly more difficult. New rules that seek to prevent the dehumanization of civilians will 
enhance civilian protection by decreasing IHL violations. Additionally, education on these new 
rules could, in the medium- and long-term, make ongoing IHL engagement with armed groups 
on compliance more effective. It is for this reason that this thesis focusses on the development of 
new rules of IHL rather than the enforcement of existing rules. Theories of criminology and 
social psychology demonstrate how combatant psychology makes compliance more unlikely and 
promoting compliance more difficult for practitioners, therefore there is great value in focusing 
on law development that could ultimately enhance compliance. 
 
The thesis focuses its analysis and discussion on the behaviour of members of non-state armed 
groups as opposed to the behaviour of soldiers in national armed forces. Further, a focus on 
members of non-state armed groups requires a focus on NIACs because, unless an armed group 
is under the overall control of a state,39 an armed conflict against that armed group will be a 
NIAC.40 The focus on non-state armed groups and NIACs is important for three reasons. First, 
the majority of contemporary armed conflicts are NIACs involving one or more non-state armed 
group.41 Further, the majority of direct armed violence against civilians in armed conflicts has 
 
39 The ‘overall control’ test was adopted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic. The ICTY distinguished its 
‘overall control’ test from the ICJ’s earlier ‘effective control’ test in Nicaragua: “the ICTY holds that it is important 
to distinguish between the control for individual persons (effective control) and the control for militarily organized 
groups (overall control).” (Djemila Carron, “When is a conflict international? Time for new control tests in IHL” 
[2016] 98:3 International Review of the Red Cross 1019 at 1025). 
40 An international armed conflict (between two or more states) and a NIAC (between a state and an armed group or 
between armed groups) can occur concurrently. On the typology of armed conflicts under IHL, see Sylvain Vité, 
“Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations” (2009) 91:873 
International Review of the Red Cross 69. 
41 See, e.g., Dupuy & Rustad, Siri Aras, supra note 14. 
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been attributed to non-state armed groups.42 Consequently, efforts to develop ways to reduce and 
prevent direct violence toward civilians during armed conflict should logically target these 
actors. Second, IHL treaty law is significantly more developed in the context of international 
armed conflicts as compared to NIACs: between the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions there are 475 substantive provisions governing 
international armed conflicts as compared to 19 provisions between Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II that govern NIACs.43 Although customary IHL has developed the content 
of substantive rules governing NIACs,44 NIACs remain subject to fewer IHL rules than 
international armed conflicts.45 Third, although the academic literature on NIACs and non-state 
armed groups has grown significantly in the past two decades,46 academic literature focusing on 
international armed conflicts and state armed forces continues to far exceed the academic 
literature addressing the regulation of non-state armed groups.47 For the three aforementioned 
reasons, a focus on members of non-state armed groups in this thesis can provide both the 
practical attention required to prevent harms against civilians and contribute to an area of IHL 
literature that receives comparatively limited attention. 
 
 
42 See, e.g., von Einsiedel, supra note 15 at 7. 
43 Geneva Convention I, supra note 5; Geneva Convention II, supra note 5; Geneva Convention III, supra note 5; 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5; Additional Protocol I, supra note 5; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5. 
44 See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5. 
45 The ICRC customary IHL study suggests that 136 of 161 rules identified apply in non-international armed 
conflicts ibid; however, states, such as the U.S. have challenged the application of some of these rules to NIACs see, 
e.g., Letter from John B Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, US Dep’t of State, and William J Haynes, Gen Counsel, US 
Dep’t of Def, to Jakob Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross regarding Customary 
International Law Study (2006). 
46 See, for example, important works devoted entirely to NIACs and non-state armed groups, such as Lindsay Moir, 
The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Zegveld, supra note 25; 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Dieter Fleck, “The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts” in Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 581; Yoram Dinstein, Non-International Armed 
Conflicts in International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
47 ICRC, Bibliography 3rd Issue 2018 (Geneva: ICRC, 2019); ICRC, Bibliography 2nd Issue 2018 (Geneva: ICRC, 
2018); ICRC, Bibliography 1st Issue 2018 (Geneva: ICRC, 2018); ICRC, Bibliography 4th Quarter 2017 (Geneva: 
ICRC, 2018); ICRC, Bibliography 3rd Quarter 2017 (Geneva: ICRC, 2017); ICRC, Bibliography 2nd Quarter 2017 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2017); ICRC, Bibliography 1st Quarter 2017 (Geneva: ICRC, 2017); ICRC, Bibliography 4th 
Quarter 2016 (Geneva: ICRC, 2017); ICRC, Bibliography 3rd Quarter 2016 (Geneva: ICRC, 2016); ICRC, 
Bibliography 2nd Quarter 2016 (Geneva: ICRC, 2016); ICRC, Bibliography 1st Quarter 2016 (Geneva: ICRC, 
2016); ICRC, Bibliography 2015 International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2016); ICRC, Bibliography 
2014 International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2015). 
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In addition to focusing on non-state armed groups in NIACs, this thesis limits itself to 
consideration of IHL as a distinct body of international law. This is because IHL provides the 
most direct regulation of the conduct of war in international law and is aimed at the prevention of 
harm to civilians. Other areas of international law have a different focus. For example, IHL is 
distinct from international criminal law, the body of international law that provides for individual 
criminal accountability for the commission of the most serious international crimes: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.48 International criminal law, therefore, 
emphasizes accountability after harm has occurred rather than prevention. In addition to its 
preventative focus, this thesis limits its focus to IHL rather than international criminal law for 
three key reasons.  
 
The first reason this thesis puts IHL at the centre of its analysis is because IHL captures more 
combatant deviance than international criminal law. While some violations of IHL are 
considered war crimes under international criminal law,49 not all IHL violations are crimes under 
international criminal law. As Sivakumaran notes, “a war crime amounts to a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law.”50 War crimes under international criminal law “are derived 
primarily from the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and 
II of 1977, and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.”51 The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, the most recent codification of war crimes under international 
criminal law provides two categories of war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts: (1) “serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949” including violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, taking 
hostages, and “[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees”,52 and 
(2) “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
 
48 See, e.g., Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3d ed (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 3. 
49 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict” (2011) 22:1 European 
Journal of International Law 219 at 238. 
50 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 81. See also Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 156. 
51 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (Geneva: United Nations, 2010). 
52 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 [Rome Statute] at Article 8(2)(c). 
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international character, within the established framework of international law,” such as the use of 
child soldiers, attacks intentionally directed at the civilian population, forced displacement of the 
civilian population and pillage.53 The Rome Statute does not include other IHL prohibitions 
addressing tactics such as the use of human shields or of certain weapons prohibited under IHL 
like chemical weapons or anti-personnel landmines. IHL therefore provides a broader scope of 
regulations for armed conflict than that found under international criminal law. 
 
A second important reason for limiting the thesis’ scope to IHL is that the scope and application 
of rules of international criminal law are “not always coterminous with [those of] international 
humanitarian law.”54 For example, on the issue of child soldiers, the prohibition under 
international criminal law criminalizes the use of children under fifteen years of age to 
“participate actively in hostilities”.55 By contrast, the prohibition in IHL, as articulated in 
Additional Protocol II applicable only to NIACs, prohibits such children from “tak[ing] part in 
hostilities”56  - a complete ban on their participation not restricted to “active” participation as in 
the international criminal law rule. Sivakumaran also notes the difference between the 
prohibition on disproportionate attacks under international criminal law and IHL:57 IHL bans 
“attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”58 The international criminal 
law prohibition is comparatively narrower as it bans only attacks that are “clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”.59 Violations of IHL 
captured by international criminal law will often “require[] consideration of additional principles 
[as compared to IHL] before personal guilt may be assigned.”60 For example, the threshold of 
mens rea for international crimes tends to be quite high due to the severity of the acts being 
punished as well the stigma that a conviction for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
 
53 Ibid at Article 8(2)(e). 
54 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 79. 
55 Rome Statute, supra note 52 at Article 8(2)(e)(vii). 
56 Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 4(3)(c). 
57 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 79–80. 
58 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 14. 
59 Rome Statute, supra note 52 at Article 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added). 
60 Darryl Robinson, “The Identity crisis of International Criminal Law” (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 925 at 995 fn 164. 
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war crimes carry.61 By contrast, it has been suggested that the threshold for IHL violations is 
lower than that for war crimes under international criminal law.62  
 
Finally, IHL is the focus of the thesis because its enforcement through the internal disciplinary 
systems of national armed forces and armed groups can be applied with greater temporal 
proximity to the occurrence of a violation than a criminal prosecution through an international 
criminal institution. Although there are indications that international criminal law has a deterrent 
effect on combatants,63 there is also evidence that the likelihood of punishment affects deterrence 
more than the severity of potential punishments.64 The need to address disciplinary issues 
quickly and efficiently is one reason for separate military justice systems in some Western 
countries.65 The use of internal disciplinary systems can enforce disciplinary and IHL rules at an 
individual level in a direct and timely manner as well as in a manner visible to other combatants 
that will produce a positive deterrent effect. 
 
While this thesis focuses on the realm of IHL, reference to international criminal law will be 
made as case law from international criminal courts and tribunals have contributed significantly 
to the development of IHL.66 This is particularly the case with the identification of customary 
international law applicable to NIACs.67 Although a separate body of law, international criminal 
 
61 See, e.g., William Schabas, “The Jelisic ́ Case and the Mens Rea of the Crime of Genocide” (2001) 14:1 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 125 at 138–39; Patricia M Wald, “Genocide and Crimes against Humanity” (2007) 6 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 621 at 627, 629; The Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Appeal 
Judgment, 19 April 2004, IT-98-33-A at para 36. 
62 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 264. 
63 See, e.g., Hyeran Jo & Beth Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” (2016) 70:3 
International Organization 443; Courtney Hillebrecht, “The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: 
Evidence from Libya” (2016) 42:4 International Interactions 616; Benjamin A Appel, “In the Shadow of the 
International Criminal Court, Does the ICC Deter Human Rights Violations?” (2018) 62:1 Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 3; Yvonne M Dutton & Tessa Alleblas, “Unpacking the Deterrent Effect of the International Criminal 
Court: Lessons from Kenya” (2017) 91 St John’s Law Review 105. 
64 Tibamanya Mwene Mushanga, Criminology in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya: Law Africa, 2011) at 10, 122, 266. 
65 See, e.g., R v Généreux, [1992] [1992] 1 SCR 259 (Supreme Court of Canada) at section 3(c); Ex parte Milligan, 
at 123; GR Rubin, “United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification” (2002) 65:1 Modern 
Law Review 36 at 43; CF Blair, “Military Efficiency and Military Justice: Peaceful Co-Existence” (1993) 42 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 237 at 240; “Due Process in Criminal Courts Martial” (1953) 20:3 
University of Chicago Law Review 700 at 703–704. 
66 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 49 at 228–32. 
67 See, e.g., ibid; Anthony Cullen, “Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law” (2005) 183 Military Law Review 66; Theodor Meron, “Revival of Customary 
Humanitarian Law” (2005) 99:4 American Journal of International Law 817; Yusuf Aksar, Implementing 
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law provides an important means of enforcing IHL and the application of international criminal 
law has necessitated that international courts and tribunals apply and interpret for the first time 
some of the provisions and concepts of the law of NIACs, such as when a NIAC comes into 
existence.68  “[W]ar crime[s] [are] based” upon “underlying provision[s] of international 
humanitarian law”; therefore, the prosecution of war crimes require the interpretation and 
application of these underlying IHL provisions.69 Consequently, international criminal courts and 
tribunals have therefore helped to “flesh[] out” the rules applicable in NIAC.70 The judgments of 
these courts and tribunals have come to be widely relied upon by IHL scholars as one of, if not 
the, most important sources for understanding the substantive content of certain IHL rules for 
NIACs.71 
 
Another body of international law with some overlap with IHL is international human rights law. 
International human rights law is the body of international law that protects the fundamental 
rights and freedoms, such as the right to life or the right to freedom of religion, of individuals 
from infringement by states.72 There is overlap between some of the behaviours addressed by 
IHL and international human rights law.73 For example, both bodies of law prohibit torture and 
 
international humanitarian law: from the ad hoc tribunals to a permanent International Criminal Court (London, 
UK: Frank Cass, 2004). 
68 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka “Dule” (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction), 2 October 1995, IT-94-1. 
69 Sivakumaran, supra note 49 at 233. 
70 Ibid at 234. 
71 See, e.g., ibid; Jann Kleffner, “From ‘Belligerents’ to ‘Fighters’ and Civilians Directly participating in Hostilities - 
On the Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years after the Second Hague 
Peace Conference” (2007) 54 Netherlands International Law Review 315 at 326–27; David Turns, “At the 
Vanishing Point of International Humanitarian Law: Methods and Means of Warfare in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts” (2002) 45 German Yearbook of International Law 115 at 127–31; David Kretzmer, “Civilian Immunity in 
War: Legal Aspects” in Igor Primoratz, ed, Civilian Immunity in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 86, 
100; Jelena Pejic, “The protective scope of Common Article 3: more than meets the eye” (2011) 93:881 
International Review of the Red Cross 189 at 192, 197–98; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, “Civil War, Custom and 
Cassese” (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1095 at 1100–03; Christine Byron, “International 
Humanitarian Law and Bombing Campaigns: Legitimate Military Objectives and Collateral Damage” (2010) 13 
Yearbook of international humanitarian law 175 at 188–91, 2004–07; Yasmin Naqvi, “Enforcement of Violations of 
IHL: The ICTY Statute: Crimes and Foms of Liability” (2014) 33:1 University of Tasmania Law Review 1. 
72 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 108–109. 
73 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, 1996 ICJ Reports, 
226; Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Oxford: Hart, 2016); Katharine 
Fortin, The accountability of armed groups under human rights law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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cruel treatment.74 Traditionally, international human rights law has been seen as the peacetime 
equivalent of IHL and not as law applicable during times of war.75 While this is no longer a 
completely accurate depiction of the temporal application of international human rights law, IHL 
remains the primary source for rules governing the protection of civilians during armed conflict. 
 
The first important reason why this thesis limits its scope to IHL rather than international human 
rights law is, as noted, the manner in which international human rights law applies during armed 
conflict. International human rights law is no longer considered inoperative during armed 
conflict.76 International human rights law is now considered to operate during armed conflict.77 
During armed conflict, international human rights law can serve as both a tool to aid in the 
interpretation of IHL78 and a means of filling legal gaps if an issue arises in which IHL is 
silent.79 Where there is direct conflict between a provision of IHL and a provision of 
 
74 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Article 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 4(2); Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984 [Torture 
Convention]. 
75 See, e.g., Jean Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 
1975) at 15; Christopher Greenwood, “Historical Development and Legal Basis” in Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook 
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 1 at 12; GIAD Draper, 
“The Relationship between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed Conflicts” (1971) 1 Israel Yearbook 
of Human Rights 191 at 191–96; W Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties” (1953) 30 British Yearbook of 
International Law 401 at 446; AH Robertson, “Humanitarian Law and Human Rights” in C Swinarski, ed, Studies 
and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles (Geneva; The Hague: ICRC/Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1984) 793; Robert Kolb, “The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Convention” (1998) 
324 International Review of the Red Cross 409. 
76 See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at para 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, 2004 ICJ Reports, 136 at para 106; 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), 19 December 2005, 
2005 ICJ Reports, 168 at para 216; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, No 74/92, Commission 
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad, 9th Annual Activity Report at para 21; Human Rights 
Committee, 05/27/2008, HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. I), General Comment No 31 at para 11. 
77 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at para 25; ICJ Wall Case, supra note 76 at para 106; ICJ, 
Congo v Uganda, supra note 76 at para 216; Yoram Dinstein, “Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International 
Humanitarian Law” in Theodor Meron, ed, Human Rights in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984) at 345; Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vité, “International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” 
(1993) 33:293 International Review of the Red Cross 94; Cordula Droege, “The Interplay between International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict” (2007) 40:2 Israel Law 
Review 310. 
78 Droege, supra note 77 at 322–23. 
79 Ibid at 343. 
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international human rights law, the IHL rule will generally prevail due to its more specialized 
nature in the context of armed conflict.80 
 
The second important reason to limit the thesis’ scope to IHL rather than international human 
rights law is that international human rights law traditionally only governs the relationship 
between states and individuals, rather than relationships between non-state actors (such as armed 
groups) and individuals.81 Some scholars have argued that international human rights law now 
creates obligations for armed groups in NIACs;82 however, the extent to which international 
human rights law might apply to armed groups remains a debated topic.83 Since this thesis 
focuses on armed groups under IHL, limitations on the applicability of international human 
rights law to these actors limits the utility of considering international human rights law in this 
thesis. 
 
This thesis will, however, make reference to international human rights law where relevant. 
International human rights law is discussed in chapter 5, which considers the question of whether 
international human rights law creates obligations for armed groups and, if so, the extent of these 
obligations during armed conflict. International human rights law is also addressed in chapter 8, 
which advances recommendations for two new IHL regulations. In chapter 8, due to the ongoing 
application of international human rights law during armed conflict, there is value in considering 
whether, where existing IHL is silent on the regulation of, for example, the use of dehumanizing 
 
80 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at para 25; ICJ Wall Case, supra note 76 at para 106; Droege, 
supra note 77 at 340; Martti Koskenniemi, Study on the Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the 
Question of ‘Self Contained Regimes’’’, UN Doc. ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1 and Add.1 (2004) at 4. 
81 Zegveld, supra note 25 at 53; Moir, supra note 46 at 194; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
02/26/1999, OEA/Ser.I/V/II.102, Doc 9 rev 1, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Columbia at Ch 4, 
para 13; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 11/18/1997, Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, OEA 
ser.L/V/ll.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998, Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, Inter-Am CHR 271 at para 174. 
82 Murray, supra note 73 at 120–54; Annyssa Bellal & Ezequiel Heffes, “‘Yes, I Do’: Binding Armed Non-State 
Actors to IHL and Human Rights Norms through their Consent” (2018) 12:1 HHuman Rights & International Legal 
Discourse 120 at 129; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) at 280; G Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict. Law, Practice, Policy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 211; Sivakumaran, supra note 49 at 253; Cedric Ryngaert, “Human Rights 
Obligations of Armed Groups” (2008) 41 Belgian Review of International Law 355 at 358; UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Question of Human Rights in Cyprus, A/HRC/25/21 (2014) at para 
11. 
83 See, e.g., Fortin, supra note 73 at 209–39. 
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language, existing international human rights law can fill the gap in lieu of creating a new IHL 
regulation.   
 
The scope of this thesis is largely limited to the legal development of IHL, drawing on the related 
fields of international criminal law and international human rights law where these bodies of law 
can help clarify the interpretation and application of IHL. The focus of this thesis on IHL and its 
further development provides a deep look at how IHL protections for civilians can be 
strengthened. This leads to the identification of regulations that can both decrease harm to 
civilians and facilitate the work of other scholars and practitioners who focus on engaging armed 
groups for the purpose of compliance.  
1.3 Contributions to Existing IHL Literature  
This thesis draws on theories of social psychology and criminology to develop more conflict-
specific behavioural regulation for civilian protection in an effort to better realize the 
humanitarian goals of IHL to prevent, in as much as possible, the suffering of people who do not 
take direct part in armed conflict. This thesis adds to existing IHL literature in four important 
ways: (1) by introducing an in-depth examination of combatant psychology into the IHL 
literature; (2) by identifying a gap within current IHL regulation and literature on combatant 
behaviour toward civilians; (3) by demonstrating that there are ways that IHL protection for 
civilians can and should be substantively developed; and, (4) by developing and recommending 
new IHL regulations to address the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by 
combatants during conflict as well as the use of non-diminutive and non-derivative nicknames by 
combatants during war. This section will discuss each of these contributions to existing IHL 
literature and practice. 
 
The first way in which this thesis contributes to existing IHL literature is by providing an in-
depth examination of combatant psychology that explains how combatants come to commit acts 
of violence against civilians during armed conflict. There is a developing body of literature 
applying socio-legal approaches, including social psychology, to international criminal law;84 
 
84 See, e.g., Alette Smeulers, “Why Serious International Crimes Might Not Seem ‘Manifestly Unlawful’ to Low-
level Perpetrators A Social Psychological Approach to Superior Orders” (2019) mqz001 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1; Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass 
Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019); 
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however, similar literature using social psychology to develop the substantive content of IHL 
does not exist. There is a small body of literature that employs psychology to analyze and reflect 
on public perceptions of IHL,85 public support for going to war,86 and how governments 
convince people to go to war.87 Other articles have focused on the psychology of war victims88 
or public perceptions of humanitarian organizations.89 On the specific question of combatant 
 
Kerstin Bree Carlson, “Agents and Agency in International Criminal Law: Intent and the ‘Special Part’ of 
International Criminal Law” in Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the 
Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2019) 115; Matilde Gawronski, “International Criminalisation as a Pragmatic Institutional Process: The Cases of 
Dominic Ongwen at the International Criminal Court and Thomas Kwoyelo at the International Crimes Division in 
the Situation in Uganda” in Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of 
Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019) 
47; Anette Bringedal Houge, “Explaining (Away) Individual Agency: A Criminological Take on Direct Perpetrator 
Re-Presentations at the ICTY” in Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the 
Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2019) 181; Elies van Sliedregt, “Regional Criminal Justice, Corporate Liabiity and the Need for Non-Doctrinal 
Research” in Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass 
Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019) 219; 
Herman van der Wilt, “Breaking the Cycle of Collective Violence: International Criminal Law’s Contribution” in 
Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: 
Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019) 237; Colleen 
Rohan, “The Hybrid System of International Criminal Law: A Work in Progress or Just a Noble Experiment?” in 
Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: 
Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019) 95; Stefan 
Harrendorf, “Social identity and international crimes: legitimate and problematic aspects of the ‘ordinary people’ 
hypothesis” in Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass 
Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019); 
Christopher Harding, “The Biology and Psychology of Atrocity and the Erasure of Memory” in Marina Aksenova, 
Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-
Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019) 27. 
85 Brad A Gutierrez, Sarah DeCristofaro & Michael Woods, “What Americans Think of International Humanitarian 
Law” (2011) 93:884 International Review of the Red Cross 1009. 
86 Josh R Klein, “Toward a Cultural Criminology of War” (2012) 38:3 Education, Militarism, and Community 86; 
Douglas V Porpora & Alexander Nikolaev, “Moral muting in US newspaper op-eds debating the attack on Iraq” 
(2008) 2:2 Discourse & Communication 165; John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser & Anna Hanson, Iraq and Crimes of 
Aggressive War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kjell Follingstad Anderson & Ingrid Veiden 
Brakstad, “The Impossibility to Protect? Media Narratives and the Responsibility to Protect” (2016) 9:3 Genocide 
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 96; Leigh Dickey, Citizen’s Engagement with Torture: An Analysis 
of Neutralizations (Honors Thesis Project, University of Tennessee,; Alfred L McAlister, Albert Bandura & Steven 
V Owen, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military Force: The Impact of Sept. 11” [2006] 25:2 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 141; Jeannie Grussendorf et al, “Resisting Moral Disengagement in 
Support for War: Use of the ‘Peace Test’ Scale Among Student Groups in 21 Nations” [2002] 8:1 Peace and 
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 73. 
87 Paul G Kooistra & John S Mahoney, “The Road to Hell: Neutralization of Killing in War” (2016) 37:7 Deviant 
Behavior 761; Rosanna E Guadagno et al, “Social Influence in the online Recruitment of terrorists and terrorist 
Sympathizers: Implications for Social Psychology Research” (2010) 23 Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 
25. 
88 Guy Elcheroth, “Individual‐level and community‐level effects of war trauma on social representations related to 
humanitarian law” (2006) 36:6 European Journal of Social Psychology 907. 
89 Dennis Dijkzeul & Claude Iguma Wakenge, “Doing good, but looking bad? Local perceptions of two 
humanitarian organisations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2010) 34:4 Disasters 1139. 
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psychology, although a body of literature examining this issue exists within the disciplines of 
criminology and social psychology,90 very minimal consideration has been given to combatant 
psychology by scholars and practitioners in IHL literature.91 Within this IHL literature that 
considers combatant psychology, there has been no consideration of theories of criminology that 
explain combatant violence toward civilians and only a limited discussion of social psychology 
theories that address combatant deviance.92 This thesis considers both criminology and social 
psychology and identifies four theories that are repeatedly referenced in both fields: techniques 
of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority. This thesis 
further provides a detailed discussion of these four theories that emphasizes how certain 
behaviours, such as the dehumanization of civilians, affect combatant psychology and result in 
civilian harm. This discussion plays an essential role in this thesis by helping to identify and 
address gaps in existing IHL regulation of combatant behaviour; however, it also provides a 
useful resource for IHL practitioners to better understand the psyches of combatants with whom 
they engage. 
 
The second important contribution made by this thesis to existing IHL literature is through the 
identification a need within the current regulation of combatant behaviour for the protection of 
civilians during armed conflict for new behavioural regulation addressing conflict-specific 
behaviours that pose a risk to civilians. This need is the result of current reliance within IHL on 
many of the same protections afforded to individuals during peace as the means to provide 
protection to civilians during war. Extensive bodies of literature exist on the protection of 
individuals during peace under international law93 as well as under domestic law in different 
 
90 See, e.g., Bandura, supra note 23; Bandura, supra note 23; Waller, supra note 22; Baumeister, supra note 32; 
Rothe & Mullins, supra note 32; Maier-Katkin, Mears & Bernard, supra note 32 at; Smeulers, supra note 32; 
Smeulers & Haveman, supra note 32; Zimbardo, supra note 23; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23; Milgram, 
supra note 23; Cohen, supra note 32; Grossman, supra note 32; Alvarez, supra note 23; Bryant et al, supra note 23; 
Staub, supra note 32; Staub, supra note 32; Ervin Staub, The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, 
and Groups Help and Harm Others (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
91 Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra note 12; Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War, A Survey of the 
Literature (Geneva: ICRC, 2004); Ben Clarke, Christian Rouffaer & François Sénéchaud, “Beyond the Call of Duty: 
Why Shouldn’t Video Game Players Face the Same Dilemmas as Real Soldiers” (2012) 94:886 International 
Review of the Red Cross 711; Frida Castillo, Playing by the Rules: Applying International Humanitarian Law to 
Video and Computer Games (Geneva & Zurich: Pro Juventute & TRIAL, 2009). 
92 Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra note 12; Frésard, supra note 91; Clarke, Rouffaer & Sénéchaud, supra note 91. 
93 See, e.g., Louis B Sohn, “The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States” 
(1982) 32 American University Law Review 1; Thomas Buergenthal, Dinah Shelton & David P Stewart, 
International Human Rights in a Nutshell, 4th ed (St Paul, MN: West, 2009); Alexander Orakhelashvili, “The 
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countries.94 There is also an extensive body of literature examining existing IHL protections for 
civilians during armed conflict.95 Scholars have reflected on the similarities between 
international human rights protections for individuals and IHL protections for civilians in terms 
of their overlap on certain subjects (e.g., prohibition on torture) and on the manner in which 
international human rights law applies during armed conflict.96 The fact that protections for 
civilians during conflict are largely the same as those for individuals under domestic criminal 
law97 is rarely acknowledged or discussed in IHL literature. The 1958 Commentary for the 
Geneva Conventions notes that notes that the specific prohibited behaviours in armed conflict, 
such as torture and mutilation, apply regardless of whether an armed conflict exists because they 
are “essential rules which [a state] in fact observes daily, under its own laws, even when dealing 
with common criminals.”98 The work of Clarke et al. has drawn on psychology to argue “that, for 
the sake of realism, IHL and [international human rights law] rules on the use of force should be 
 
Position of the Individual under International Law” (2000) 31 California Western International Law Journal 241; 
MW Janis, “Individuals as Subjects of International Law” (1984) 17 Cornell International Law Journal 61; Carl 
Wellman, “Solidarity, the Individual, and Human Rights” (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 639; Anne Peters, 
Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) at 436–71; Bjarte Thorson, Individual Rights in EU Law (Switzerland: Springer 
International, 2016). 
94 See, e.g., Steven Gow Calabresi et al, “Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018: What Rights Are 
Deeply Rooted in a Modern-Day Consensus of the States” (2018) 94 Notre Dame Law Review 49; Paul Van 
Aerschot, Activation Policies and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Critical Assessment of the Situation in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden (London, UK: Routledge, 2010); William J Brennan, Jr, “State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights” (1976) 90:3 Harvard Law Review 489; William J Brennan, Jr, “The Bill of Rights 
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights” (1986) 61:4 New York 
University Law Review 535; Robert A Sedler, “Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada: The 
Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1983) 59 Notre Dame Law Review 1191; Judith S 
Kaye, “Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights” (1991) 
23 Rutgers Law Journal 727. 
95 See, e.g., Miriam Bradley, Protecting Civilians in War: The ICRC, UNHCR, and their Limitations in Internal 
Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Hitoshi Nasu, “The Protection of Civilians from Violence and the 
Effects of Attacks in International Humanitarian Law” in David W Lovell & Primoratz, Igor, eds, Protecting 
Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2016) 65; Jamie A Williamson, “Protection of Civilians under International Humanitarian Law” in Haidi Willmot et 
al, eds, Protection of Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 160; R Charli Carpenter, “Innocent Women 
and Children” Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006) at 131–62. 
96 See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega & Johanna Herman, War, Conflict and Human Rights: 
Theory and Practice (London, UK: Routledge, 2017) at 54–69; Doswald-Beck, Louise & Sylvain Vité, 
“International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” (1993) 293 International Review of the Red Cross 94; 
Droege, supra note 77; Dinstein, supra note 77. 
97 The requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians and the general requirement to take precautions 
to prevent civilian harm are the only distinct protections for civilians during conflict that do not have a peace time 
equivalent. 
98 Jean Pictet, Commentary IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva: ICRC, 1958) at 36. 
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applied to scenes in video games that portray realistic battlefields”.99 Clarke et al.’s work focuses 
on the regulation of a risk, impunity for IHL violations when playing video games, during peace; 
however, the idea that behaviour considered innocuous in peace can lead to IHL violations is 
similar to this thesis’ approach to identifying forms of speech and nicknames as risks requiring 
regulation within the context of armed conflict. Therefore, this thesis adds to the literature by 
identifying that the adoption of peacetime protections for individuals in IHL as protection for 
civilians has created a gap in how behaviour jeopardizing civilian safety in war is conceived. 
This thesis demonstrates that there are behaviours in peace, such as the use of dehumanizing 
language or nicknames, that are legal, but which threaten civilian safety during armed conflict in 
a manner which demands regulation. 
 
The third important contribution this thesis makes to existing IHL literature is that it 
demonstrates that, contrary to existing IHL literature, there are ways in which the substantive 
content of IHL can be further developed to enhance civilian protection. As already discussed, 
practitioners and scholars currently seek to address violence toward civilians during armed 
conflict through engagement with armed groups to promote compliance and provide IHL 
education and training.100 Other literature discussing individual protection in peace under 
national law has drawn on psychology with respect to members of the security sector and law 
enforcement to advocate for improved education and training.101 This thesis therefore adds to the 
literature by demonstrating how combatant psychology, or the psychology of violence toward 
civilians, can be used not only to improve current IHL engagement and training, but also to 
identify weaknesses in existing IHL and as a tool to guide the substantive development IHL to 
address these weaknesses.  
 
99 Clarke, Rouffaer & Sénéchaud, supra note 91 at 723. 
100 Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra note 12 at 110; Daniel Muñoz-Rojas & Jean-Jacques Frésard, “The roots of 
behaviour in war: Understanding and preventing IHL violations” (2004) 86:853 International Review of the Red 
Cross 190 at 203–204; Elizabeth Stubbins Bates, “Towards effective military training in international humanitarian 
law” (2014) 96:895/896 International Review of the Red Cross 795; ICRC, supra note 26 at 7; Sassoli, supra note 
26 at 46, 73; Inter-Parliamentary Union & ICRC, supra note 26 at 24; Rona, supra note 26 at 69; Amelia Hoover 
Green, Learning Restraint: The Role of Political Education in Armed Group Behavior Toward Civilians (School for 
International Studies, Simon Fraser University). 
101 Danielle Celermajer & Kiran Grewal, “Preventing Human Rights Violations ‘From the Inside’: Enhancing the 
Role of Human Rights Education in Security Sector Reform” (2013) 5:2 Journal of Human Rights Practice 2434; 
Gutierrez, DeCristofaro & Woods, supra note 85; Anja Bienert, “Action, Not Just Words: The Practical Implications 
of Human Rights Law for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials” (2016) 27 Security and 
Human Rights 200. 
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The fourth way in which this thesis contributes to IHL literature is through the specific 
recommendation of new IHL regulations to address the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language by combatants during armed conflicts and the use of non-diminutive or 
non-derivative nicknames by combatants during armed conflict. While the use of dehumanizing 
language or nicknames by combatants has been widely recorded in conflicts such as the conflicts 
in Sierra Leone and the DRC,102 there has been no discussion in IHL literature of a need to 
regulate these behaviours. The one exception is where the use of dehumanizing language 
constitutes the international crime of incitement to genocide or persecution as a crime against 
humanity.103 This thesis contributes to existing IHL literature by demonstrating that not only do 
 
102 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v Lubanga, Trial Transcript, ICC, 9 November 2006 [Lubanga Trial Transcript ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-30-EN 53/195 SZ PT] at 33; The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Trial Hearing Transcript, ICC, 2 
September 2015 [Ntaganda Trial Transcript ICC-01/04-02/06-T-23-ENG ET WT 02-09-2015 61/67 SZ T] at 61; The 
Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Confirmation of Charges Hearing Transcript (2014), ICC, 11 February 2014 
[Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-02/06-T-8-Red-ENG WT 11-02-2014 42/53 SZ PT] at 41; The 
Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Trial Hearing Transcript, ICC, 20 June 2016 [Ntaganda Trial Hearing, P-0888 ICC-
01/04-02/06-T-105-Red-ENG WT 20-06-2016 51/96 SZ T] at 58; The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina 
Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Trial Transcript, SCSL, 25 November 2004 [The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, 
Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Trial Transcript] at para 11; Myriam Denov, Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone’s 
Revolutionary United Front (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 127; “BBC News | AFRICA | 
Congo’s war within a war”, online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/648044.stm>; Lucia, Civilian, in James 
Higbie & Bernard S Moigula, Sierra Leone Inside the War History and Narratives (Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2017) at 
103; David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005) at 76; Kieran Mitton, 
Rebels in a Rotten State (Oxford:OUP, 2015) referencing] “Sierra Leone Web - Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: The 
Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision”, online: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/RUF-
051199c.html>; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone 
Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Vol 3A (Accra, Ghana: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, 
2004] at paras 52, 473; SA, RUF Child Soldier, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Statement [SA, 
TRC Statement]; The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Trial Transcript, ICC, 21 September 2016 [Ntaganda Trial 
Transcript, ICC-01/04-02/06-T-136-Red-ENG WT 21-09-2016 36/72 NM T] at 36; Prosecution Memorandum to 
Accompany Indictment [Alex Tamba Brima], SCSL, 6 March 2003 [SCSL Prosecution Memo [Alex Tamba Brima]] 
at para 1; Baby Seiya, Civilian, in Higbie & Moigula, supra note; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 14 
November 2012, S/2012/838 at para 26; Lotte Vermeij, ‘The Bullets Sound Like Music To My Ears’ Socialization of 
Child Soldiers within African Rebel Groups Wageningen University, 2014] [unpublished] at 74; Katrien Pype, 
“Fighting Boys, Strong Men and Gorillas: Notes on the Imagination of Masculinities in Kinshasa” (2007] 77:2 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 250 at 264; Nina Strochlic, “Congo’s Army of Jack Bauers”, 
online: <https://www.thedailybeast.com/congos-army-of-jack-bauers>. 
103 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Appeal Judgment, 28 
November 2007, Case No ICTR-99-52-A; The Prosecutor v Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, 
Sylvain Nsabimana, Alphonse Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi, Élie Ndayambaje, Trial Judgment, 24 June 2011, 
Case No ICTR-98-42-T; The Prosecutor v Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, Sylvain Nsabimana, 
Alphonse Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi, Élie Ndayambaje, Appeal Judgment, 14 December 2015, Case No ICTR-
98-42-A; MICT, 04/11/2018, MICT-16-99-A, Prosecutor v Vojislav Seselj, Appeal Judgment. 
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nicknames and dehumanizing language pose a threat to civilians during armed conflict, they can 
be addressed through the development of new IHL rules. 
 
This thesis challenges the dominant paradigm in existing IHL scholarship and practice, which 
suggests that current widespread IHL violations of civilian protection during armed conflict by 
armed groups requires only engagement with armed groups and training and education for these 
armed groups on existing IHL. Instead, this thesis advances the claim that the current application 
of IHL to armed groups is flawed due to a gap between the protection afforded to individuals 
during peace and the protections that are required to ensure civilian protection during armed 
conflict. The thesis demonstrates how social psychology and criminology theories help to 
develop an understanding of combatant psychology that leads to violence toward civilians during 
armed conflict and recommends new regulations to inhibit the behaviours currently contributing 
to violations of existing IHL protections for civilians. In doing so, this thesis develops and adds 
to a very limited body of existing IHL literature that considers combatant psychology and 
demonstrates a way forward in the ongoing substantive development of IHL. The contributions 
made by this thesis to IHL literature and practice will not only enrich IHL scholarship but will 
also facilitate and improve the engagement of IHL practitioners with armed groups. Further, it 
will provide states with insight into possible behaviours to be cognizant of among their own 
national armed forces and an improved understanding of armed groups that can be used to 
develop rules of engagement and guidelines for interactions with armed groups during conflict. 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
The preceding sections in this chapter have been used to introduce the reader to the objectives 
and key concepts used in this thesis.  This section will provide an outline as to how the thesis 
proceeds to develop its argument to support the claims that: (1) the application of IHL to armed 
groups is flawed due to a gap between protection for individuals in peace and the protections 
necessary for civilians during armed conflict, and (2) theories of social psychology and 
criminology can be used to develop substantive IHL rules to fill this gap. 
 
In chapter 2, this thesis introduces the methodological approaches employed in the thesis. 
International legal doctrinal methodology is the dominant method used in thesis. The chapter 
introduces this methodology as well as the core sources of international law relied upon under 
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this method. The chapter then explains how the case study countries, Sierra Leone and the DRC, 
were selected. It describes the qualitative methodology employed in the fieldwork interviews 
conducted for the thesis. It provides demographic data for the interviewees and testimonies 
collected in each case study location. Finally, it addresses the method of data analysis and 
identifies limitations of the research methods employed in the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 begins the deeper discussion of IHL. It defines armed groups as a legal concept in IHL 
based on the requirement of organization. This identifies the specific actor, non-state armed 
groups, whose members are the primary focus of the thesis and the recommendations made in 
chapter 8. argues that armed groups, despite being non-state actors who cannot be party to IHL 
treaties, are nonetheless bound by IHL through a variety of different legal means. These means 
include the state’s ability to bind its citizens by consenting to international law, limited 
international legal personality, and, in some cases, the state-like exercise of authority over 
territory by an armed group. The chapter argues that, despite arguments from some scholars that 
armed groups should only be bound to IHL to which they have consented to be bound, consent is 
not a legal requirement and armed groups are bound by IHL regardless of whether they consent 
or not. The chapter then addresses the relationship between IHL and international human rights 
law touched on in chapter one. It argues that at least some armed groups are also bound by 
international human rights law as it applies during armed conflicts. The fact that armed groups 
are bound by existing IHL and international human rights law protections for civilians during 
armed conflict means that armed groups would be likely to be bound by the new substantive 
rules of IHL developed in chapter 8 of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the principles and rules of IHL for the protection of civilians in NIACs. It 
begins with a discussion of the concept of humanity and humanitarian goals of IHL that, 
although balanced with military necessity, have provided and continue to provide the impetus for 
the protection of civilians during armed conflict. It argues that the humanitarian objectives of 
IHL support a review of existing IHL protections for civilians as well as the possible 
development of new rules in an effort to increase their protection. It then examines core IHL 
principles of distinction, precaution, proportionality, and humane treatment. Next, the chapter 
turns to more specific prohibited acts for civilian protection such as violence to life, torture and 
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cruel treatment, humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, and pillage. Knowledge of existing 
rules binding on armed groups for the protection of civilians is important because chapter 8 
identifies specific gaps in behavioural regulation for the protection of civilians during armed 
conflict. The chapter argues that the existing specific protections represent acts that are equally 
prohibited or criminalized during peacetime in the national laws of states. It further argues that 
this suggests there may be a need to consider whether there are behaviours which, although legal 
during peace, pose a risk to civilians during war such that they warrant regulation. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the protection of civilians during armed conflict in practice using the two 
case studies of the Sierra Leone civil war and the series of conflicts in the DRC since the mid-
1990s. The chapter provides some basic information about these conflicts; however, the focus of 
the chapter is on the violations committed during these conflicts by members of armed groups. 
Two key points are made in this chapter. First, the widespread violations of IHL protections for 
civilians during these conflicts indicate that the current status quo of IHL in practice is not 
providing sufficient protection for civilians during armed conflict. It would be easy to assume 
that these violations are purely an issue of non-compliance with existing IHL that can be 
addressed through engagement, education, and training with armed groups. However, the second 
key point of the chapter is that the violations do not in and of itself provide much, if any, insight 
into the psychology of combatants committing these IHL violations and that drives the 
commission of these IHL violations. This is important because the theories of social psychology 
and criminology discussed in chapter 7 explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by 
psychological processes, such as dehumanization and the abdication of responsibility for one’s 
actions, that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in doing so, fundamentally 
alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect civilians. This 
reinforces the fact that combatant psychology can provide information not otherwise readily 
available or apparent from mere awareness of the occurrence of IHL violations. 
 
Chapter 6 examines three legal theories: Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, 
and Socialization and International Law. Legal theory does not traditional examine the 
psychology of deviance. Rather, the psychology of deviance is generally left to the disciplines of 
social psychology and criminology. However, the three theories discussed in this chapter all 
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attempt to develop behavioural or psychological models to explain legal compliance or deviance. 
This chapter examines each of the three theories to demonstrate why they do not provide an 
adequate tool for understanding combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict and, 
consequently, why a turn to theories of social psychology and criminology can provide the 
necessary theoretical framework for addressing the regulation of combatant behaviour for the 
protection of civilians. The chapter argues that Law and Economics theory bases its 
understanding of legal deviance on significantly flawed assumptions about human behaviour. 
While Behavioural Law and Economics attempts to address the flawed assumptions of Law and 
Economics, its consideration of human psychology is very limited and ill-suited to application in 
the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict. Socialization and International Law draws upon 
some theories from the field of sociology, including cognitive dissonance which is foundational 
to many of the social psychology and criminology theories employed in chapter 7. However, 
Socialization and International Law theory fails to explore how cognitive dissonance operates in 
detail. In particular, the theory fails to examine the psychological processes used by people to try 
to resolve cognitive dissonance. Consequently, Socialization and International Law, like Law 
and Economics and Behavioural Law and Economics, provides an inadequate theory to explore 
and understand combatant psychology in armed conflict.  
 
Chapter 7 turns to theories of social psychology and criminology. Although the legal theories 
discussed in chapter 6 do not provide adequate models to explain combatant psychology, this 
chapter demonstrates how social psychologists and criminologists have spent decades exploring 
the question of how law-abiding citizens become law-breaking combatants who commit 
violations of IHL protections for civilians during armed conflict. Chapter 7 discusses the theories 
of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to 
authority. The chapter argues that these theories, which are referenced broadly in the literature, 
provide a deep and nuanced understanding of combatant psychology that can be used to fill the 
gap between the protection of individuals during peace and the protections needed for civilians 
during conflict. The chapter identifies two key themes across the four theories: dehumanization 
and responsibility. These two themes are used to review the research and fieldwork on the 
conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC as well as existing IHL in chapter 8.    
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Chapter 8, guided by the themes of dehumanization and responsibility established in the 
preceding chapter, identifies the manifestation of these themes in two behaviours common in the 
conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC: 1) the use of degrading, othering, or dehumanizing 
language to refer to or address civilians, and (2) the use of nicknames by combatants as a 
possible means of abdicating responsibility for any IHL violations they commit. The chapter 
explains how these behaviours are representative of the themes of dehumanization and 
responsibility in the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, 
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. The chapter explores whether the use of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language or the use of nicknames are already adequately covered by 
existing IHL or international human rights law rules applicable during armed conflict. The 
chapter argues that neither of these behaviours are adequately captured by existing protections 
for civilians and proposes new rules and regulations to fully address these behaviours under IHL 
and prevent harms to civilians.  
 
Finally, chapter 9 provides the conclusion to the thesis. It restates the research problem 
introduced in chapter 1 and revisits the key findings and contributions of each chapter of the 
thesis. It reiterates that international legal theories do not sufficiently consider or address factors 
that contribute to legal deviance in IHL and the potential to use theories of criminology and 
social psychology to address this weakness. The expertise of these other disciplines that are 
experienced in explaining deviant behaviour can be used as a lens to review IHL and such a 
review can help identify problematic combatant behaviours, some of which are suitable for 
regulation under IHL. The final chapter then addresses some of the limitations of this research 
and propose avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2 Methodology 
 
The research conducted for this thesis employs multiple methodologies. This thesis uses legal 
doctrinal analysis to consider existing IHL protections for civilians during NIACs as applied to 
non-state armed groups. Given that this analysis forms the centre of the thesis, the primary 
methodology of the thesis is the legal doctrinal method. Legal doctrinal methodology provides 
the means of identifying, interpreting, and applying existing rules of IHL relevant to both civilian 
protection and the regulation of armed groups during NIACs. In addition to legal doctrinal 
methodology, this thesis uses qualitative case study analysis to examine violations of IHL rules 
for civilian protection committed by members of armed groups in practice. The two case study 
conflicts relied on in the thesis are the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and the multiple 
armed conflicts that have occurred and remain ongoing in the DRC. These case studies are 
complemented by field research and data collection conducted by the author in Sierra Leone and 
the DRC. The thesis is further complemented by the use of theories and quantitative research 
drawn from the disciplines of social psychology and criminology to develop an understanding of 
legal deviance by combatants from IHL rules protecting civilians. 
 
The aims of this thesis are three-fold. First, this thesis aims to demonstrate the need for different 
behavioural regulations in IHL in order to protect civilians during conflict as compared to 
peacetime behavioural regulation for the protection of individuals. The second aim of this thesis 
is to elucidate common behaviours during armed conflict that can result in violations of IHL 
rules for the protection of civilians, using social psychology and criminology theories. Third, this 
research aims to advance recommendations for new substantive rules of IHL to address 
behaviours that pose a particular risk to civilians during conflict with the goal of enhancing the 
overall protection of civilians during war. 
 
This chapter explains the methodology employed in this thesis to achieve the three above-
mentioned aims. The first section discusses legal doctrinal methodology, which serves as the 
primary methodology and framework for this thesis. Next, the chapter turns to the case studies 
  
   
  
31 
that are the focus of practical IHL application and violations in the thesis. Although the case 
studies and qualitative fieldwork interviews are secondary methodologies in this thesis employed 
within the larger legal doctrinal methodology framework, this discussion of these secondary 
methodologies comprises the majority of this chapter. This is due to the fact that legal doctrinal 
methodology is not as technical as qualitative methodology applied to fieldwork. Therefore, the 
qualitative methodology requires more extensive description to achieve full transparency. The 
discussion of case studies and qualitative methodology begins with consideration of my research 
in Sierra Leone, including the reasons for selecting this case study and details on the data 
collection and research population explored in the fieldwork. This is followed by a discussion of 
the DRC case study, which similarly sets out the reasons for selection of the case study, data 
collection and research population. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the data analysis 
process employed, with the goal of transparency. 
2.1 Legal Doctrinal Methodology  
The primary methodology employed in this thesis is legal doctrinal. Legal doctrinal methodology 
is the “dominant legal method in the common law world”.104 However, it is common for legal 
research to include non-doctrinal methods in addition to doctrinal methods.105 In such instances, 
non-doctrinal methods are generally “infus[ed] within … [a] doctrinal research framework.”106 
 
Doctrinal methodology is a “normative and interpretive discipline that looks at legal practices 
from a strong internalist point of view.”107 Legal scholars employing doctrinal methodology 
“work from conceptions on how the elements of the law fit together in their respective fields, and 
this qualifies them for assessing whether current developments can be reconciled with the given 
normative structures of law.”108 The purpose of doctrinal methodology is to identify what the law 
is in a given context.109 In order to accomplish the identification of the law, legal doctrinal 
 
104 Terry Hutchinson, “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law” 
(2015) 8:3 Erasmus Law Review 130 at 131. 
105 Ibid at 133–34; Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research” (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83 at 99. 
106 Hutchinson, supra note 104 at 138. 
107 Matyas Bodig, “Legal Doctrinal Scholarship and Interdisciplinary Engagement” (2015) 8:2 Erasmus Law Review 
43 at 46. 
108 Ibid at 45. 
109 Paul Chynoweth, “Legal Research” in Andrew Knight & Les Ruddock, eds, Advanced Research Methods in the 
Built Environment (Chichester, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 28 at 30. 
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methodology conducts an “interpretive, qualitative analysis” of the sources of law.110 Therefore, 
within legal doctrinal methodology, “the primary data consist of the sources of the law.”111 
 
The task of an academic employing legal doctrinal methodology is to take the sources of 
international law and “organise, analyse and re-present this information in such a way as to 
persuade [others] to follow their line of thought.”112 Chynoweth has noted that “the validity of 
doctrinal research must inevitably rest upon developing a consensus within the scholastic 
community, rather than on an appeal to any external reality.”113 The persuasiveness or strength of 
arguments based on legal doctrinal methodology require consideration of the normative 
persuasiveness of the argument as well as the concreteness of the argument grounded in the 
realities of the legal system.114 Normative persuasiveness can be grounded in foundational 
concepts, such as humanity, but is grounded even more strongly by drawing on the “formal 
legal” sources (i.e., treaties, custom, and general principles) and “precedents and writings of 
publicists” (i.e., case law and scholarly literature).115 Arguments must also take into 
consideration the realities of the legal system, in particular the “will and interests of international 
actors”; however, one must not adhere too rigidly to the will and interests of states because legal 
argumentation must also “must also provide a standpoint from which present power may be 
criticized and international transformation may be sought.”116 
 
The authoritative sources of international law are those indicated above: treaties, custom, general 
principles, case law, and scholarly literature. The identification of these sources as the 
authoritative sources of international law stems from their articulation in Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.117 Treaties are legally binding written agreements 
 
110 Ibid. 
111 Terry Hutchinson, “Doctrinal research: Researching the jury” in Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton, eds, Research 
Methods in Law (London, UK: Routledge, 2017) 8 at 18. 
112 Philip Langbroek et al, “Methodology of Legal Research: Challenges and Opportunities” (2017) 13:3 Utrecht 
Law Review 1 at 2. 
113 Chynoweth, supra note 109 at 30. 
114 Martti Koskenniemi, “Methodology of International Law” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford Public International Law (Online) (2007). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Statute of the International Court of Justice, [1946] 33 UNTS 993, UKTS 67 (1946) Cmd 7015, 3 Bevans 1179, 
59 Stat 1055, 145 BSP 832 at Article 38(1). 
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between states.118 The key treaties relied on in this thesis are the core treaties of IHL: the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949119 and the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.120 The second formal source of international law is custom, commonly referred to 
as customary international law, which is unwritten law identified based on widespread state 
practice accompanied by the belief on the part of states that this practice is legally required 
(referred to as opinio juris).121 The case law of international courts and tribunals is often relied 
upon for the identification of rules of customary international law.122 In the context of IHL, the 
2005 International Committee of the Red Cross’ Customary IHL Study is, in addition to 
international case law, an important source relied on to identify customary IHL rules.123 The 
third formal source of international law is general principles of international which are “cardinal 
principles of the legal system, in the light of which international . . . law is to be interpreted and 
applied.”124 General principles of international law may be identified within specific bodies of 
international law or treaty regimes.125 Kleffner has suggested that, in the context of IHL, “[t]he 
principles of distinction, proportionality and protection as well as the prohibition of using means 
and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering” are general principles of IHL.126 Other key sources of international law are case law 
and scholarly literature. This thesis draws extensively on the case law of the International Court 
of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International 
Criminal Court to aid in the identification, interpretation, and application of existing IHL. 
 
118 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 6th ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 88. Treaties 
are also referred to by many other names such as Statutes, Charters, Conventions, and Protocols. 
119 Geneva Convention I, supra note 5; Geneva Convention II, supra note 5; Geneva Convention III, supra note 5; 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5. 
120 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5. 
121 Shaw, supra note 118 at 73–84. 
122 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 1st ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 159; Lori Fisler 
Damrosch et al, eds, International Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed (St Paul, MN: West Group, 2001) at 134–35. 
123 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5. 
124 Bin Cheng, “The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice” 
(1953) 38 Grotius Society Transactions for the Year 1952 125 at 132. 
125 Jann Kleffner, “Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict” in R Liivoja & T McCormack, eds, Routledge Handbook 
of the Law of Armed Conflict (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016) 71 at 79; Rüdiger Wolfrum, “General International 
Law (Principles, Rules, and Standards)” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford Public 
International Law (Online) (2010); Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic and others, Trial Judgment, IT-95-16-T, 14 
January 2000 at para 591. 
126 Kleffner, supra note 125 at 79. 
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Finally, this thesis makes extensive use of scholarly literature to engage with existing 
interpretations of IHL as well as ongoing debates about existing IHL.  
 
The sources of international law provide both the object of doctrinal scholarship as well as the 
“conceptual framework” that must be employed to “make sense of the legal practice.”127 
Consequently, legal doctrinal methodology is often said to operate “from a strong internalist 
point of view.”128 In legal doctrinal methodology, “[m]ore than in the exact sciences, the only 
form of ‘objectivity’ one may reach is the intersubjective consensus among legal scholars.”129 
 
Legal doctrinal methodology has been criticized because it differs in method from the social 
sciences;130 however, this criticism, as noted by Van Hoecke, “start[s]from false assumptions 
(unity and similarity of all scientific disciplines)”.131 Legal doctrinal methodology is more 
similar to methodologies employed in disciplines in the humanities with its emphasis on 
interpretation, rather than the methodologies employed in social science disciplines.132 
Nonetheless, Brouwer has described legal doctrinal methodology as being between the 
methodologies employed in the humanities and those employed in social sciences.133 
 
The legal doctrinal methodology employed in this thesis is appropriately situated between the 
humanities and the social sciences. It relies heavily on interpretation; however, in so doing it 
draws on research from the social sciences as supporting evidence. The thesis also uses 
qualitative case study analysis based on conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC to demonstrate 
the current status quo of IHL in practice and to find evidence in practice of the behaviours 
 
127 Bodig, supra note 107 at 46. See also Pauline C Westerman, “Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal 
Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate on Law” in Marck Van Hoecke, ed, Methodologies of Legal Research: 
Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 86 at 90–94. 
128 Bodig, supra note 107 at 46. 
129 Mark Van Hoecke, “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kiind of Discipline?” in Mark Van Hoecke, ed, 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 1 at 
18. 
130 See, e.g., R Cotterrell, “Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically” (1998) 25:2 Journal of Law and 
Society 171 at 173; JM Balkin, “Interdisciplinarity as Colonization” (1996) 53 Washington and Lee Law Review 
949; Bodig, supra note 107 at 504–505; Rob van Gestel & HW Micklitz, “Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in 
Europe: What About Methodology?” (2011) at 2. 
131 Van Hoecke, supra note 129 at 3. 
132 Langbroek et al, supra note 112 at 5; Chynoweth, supra note 109 at 32, 35, 37. 
133 Rene Brouwer, “The Study of Law as an Academic Discipline” (2017) 13:3 Utrecht Law Review 41 at 45–48. 
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identified within the social psychological and criminological theories and studies employed in 
the thesis. Though this thesis draws on work from the social sciences and includes the use of case 
studies, it remains motivated by the “normative perspective of ‘the law’.”134 The reliance on 
disciplines other than law, therefore, is both “heuristic” and “auxiliary”.135 The use of other 
disciplines is heuristic where the evidence from other disciplines is used merely to bolster or 
support the legal argument and interpretation of legal sources and auxiliary when a turn to social 
psychology and criminology is necessary to explain combatant psychology, a task that chapter 6 
will demonstrate cannot be accomplished by relying solely on legal theories. 
 
This section has explained the legal doctrinal methodology relied on in this thesis. Through the 
use of legal doctrinal methodology, this thesis grounds itself in the sources of IHL to identify the 
current IHL protections for civilians and how IHL applies to non-state armed groups. The 
reliance on formal sources of IHL, the formation of which is based on state consent to assume 
legal obligations, further grounds this thesis in the reality of the international system which is 
dominated by states who serve as the makers of international law. Where useful, recourse to 
sources from disciplines in the social sciences is made heuristically to bolster specific 
interpretations and applications of existing IHL. The thesis turns to the disciplines of social 
psychology and criminology for an understanding of combatant psychology and, more 
specifically, violence toward civilians in armed conflict. The insights provided by social 
psychology and criminology are then used within the normative legal framework of IHL, 
informed by the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC, to identify behaviours worthy of 
substantive legal attention for the further protection of civilians during armed conflict.  
 
The next section will turn to a discussion of fieldwork conducted for this thesis in Sierra Leone 
and the DRC. While the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC, along with the fieldwork data 
collection conducted in these countries, is a secondary methodology drawn on in this thesis, the 
intricacies of this method require a much lengthier explanation than has been devoted to 
 
134 Renee SB Kool, Jessy M Emaus & Daan M van Uhm, “The Victim’s Right to Intervene as an Injured party in 
Criminal Proceedings” (2017) 13:3 Utrecht Law Review 77 at 79. 
135 Sanne Taekema & Bart van Klink, “On the Border. Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research” in 
Sanne Taekema & Bart van Klink, eds, Law and method: interdisciplinary research into law (Tünberg, GE: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2011) 7 at 9–10. 
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explaining the comparatively straightforward legal doctrinal methodology that is the primary 
methodology of this thesis. 
2.2 Case Studies and Qualitative Fieldwork 
The aims of this thesis are grounded in the legal doctrinal methodology discussed in the previous 
section. As noted, the legal doctrinal method is complemented through the use of case studies 
and qualitative fieldwork. This section will introduce the case study and fieldwork 
methodologies employed in the thesis. 
 
Complete objectivity in qualitative research is not possible. Qualitative researchers must accept 
that their research is open to bias. As Galdas has noted, “[t]hose carrying out qualitative research 
are an integral part of the process and final product, and separation from this is neither possible 
nor desirable.”136 Instead, transparency “about the processes by which data have been collected, 
analyzed, and presented” should be a standard by which researchers are evaluated.137 
Consequently, this chapter and thesis aims for maximum transparency, in terms of conveying the 
manner in which research was conducted and data was collected, the approach used to analyze 
materials, and the presentation of the data collection. As with any research project, there are 
limitations to the methods and research choices made. These limitations have been identified and 
explained in the description of the methodology. 
 
The use of the case study method allows a researcher to “to investigate and understand complex 
issues in real world settings.”138 When using the case study method, “emphasis … is placed on 
exploration and description of a phenomenon.”139 The case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC 
in this thesis are illustrative of contemporary NIACs characterized by widespread IHL violations 
committed by armed groups against civilians. Illustrative case studies describe and demonstrate 
“what a situation is like” and can serve as tools to “help in the interpretation of other data”.140 
 
136 Paul Galdas, “Revisiting Bias in Qualitative Research: Reflections on Its Relationship with Funding and Impact” 
(2017) 16 International Journal of Qualitative Methods 1 at 2. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Helena Harrison et al, “Case Study Research: Foundations and Methodological Orientations” 18:1 Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research (Online). 
139 “Case Study Method - Center for Innovation in Research and Teaching”, online: 
<https://cirt.gcu.edu/research/developmentresources/research_ready/descriptive/case_study>. 
140 United States General Accounting Office Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, Case Study 
Evaluations, GAO/PEMD-91-10.1.9 (Washington, DC: US GAO, 1990) at 31. 
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Illustrative case studies can “[m]ake the unfamiliar familiar” for readers and help to “avoid 
oversimplification of reality”.141  
 
The Sierra Leone and DRC case studies in this thesis are developed through a combination of 
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include fieldwork interviews conducted in 
Sierra Leone and the DRC (discussed later in this chapter), statements made by victims, 
witnesses, and perpetrators to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and 
reports issued by institutions such as the UN Security Council contemporaneous to the events. 
Secondary sources are primarily scholarly accounts of these conflicts. Many sources provide a 
mixture of primary and secondary evidence. For example, the Final Report of the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission includes excerpts from first-hand accounts of the Sierra 
Leone civil war.142 Other secondary evidence includes Human Rights Watch news releases and 
reports written by field operatives during the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC, as well as 
the first-hand accounts of victims, witnesses, and perpetrators quoted in these documents from 
the conflict periods.143 
 
One limitation of this method “is in selecting the instances” to be used as case studies as they 
“should adequately represent the situation” being examined.144 This can be a challenge because 
sometimes, “[w]here considerable diversity exists, it may not be possible to select a ‘typical’ 
site”.145 In many ways, this was not a significant challenge in this thesis. There are, 
unfortunately, many contemporary NIACs in which armed groups have perpetrated extensive 
violations of IHL protections for civilians, such as the Taliban in Afghaniztan,146 the FARC in 
 
141 Ibid at 32. 
142 See, e.g., Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4, paras 22, 29-31, 43-46, 
51-52, 57, 62-64, 67-70, 75-77, 79-80, 90-92, 95-97, 99-102, 109-13, 125. 
143 See, e.g., Corinne Dufka, Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape New Testimony from Sierra Leone, Vol 
11 No 3(A) (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) at Section IV; Human Rights Watch, “Sexual Violence 
Rampant, Unpunished in DR Congo War”, (20 June 2002), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/06/20/sexual-violence-rampant-unpunished-dr-congo-war>; Human Rights 
Watch, “The Curse of Gold |”, (1 June 2005), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/06/01/curse-gold> at 25, 27–30, 43–44, 49. 
144 Linda G Morra & Amy C Friedlander, Case Study Evaluations, OED Working Paper No 2 (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1999) at 10. 
145 Ibid. 
146 See, e.g., Jessica A Stanton, Violence and Restraint in Civil War Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of 
International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016) at 84–88. 
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Colombia,147 Hezbollah in Israel,148 the NPFL in Liberia,149 the LTTE in Sri Lanka,150 and the 
LRA in Uganda.151 What did provide a challenge in the selection of case studies was the desire to 
conduct fieldwork in the case study countries, which consequently imposed certain selection 
restrictions based primarily on the security of both myself and my potential interviewees. 
Therefore, the greatest limitation in case study selection was personal safety considerations.  
 
Personal safety considerations, as well as other considerations discussed below, led to the 
selection of Sierra Leone and the DRC as case studies for this thesis. The qualitative fieldwork 
interviews conducted in Sierra Leone and the DRC were small-n studies with limited sample 
size. Small-n studies are essential in order to build larger studies. As Gerring notes, “[a] single 
case study is still a single shot – a single example of a larger phenomenon.”152 Rather than aim to 
provide a picture that is generalizable on a large-scale, case studies aim to provide what 
Rosemary Nagy has described as a “slice across the spectrum”.153 In the present study, the data 
provides a slice across the spectrum of a small sample of data on armed groups in two armed 
conflicts. The aim is not to provide outcomes generalizable to all armed groups in all conflicts, 
but to elucidate themes, points of interests, and gaps in existing law that may indicate useful 
patterns. This study attempts to explain the behaviour of a select number of members of armed 
groups in Sierra Leone and DRC by using theories of social psychology and criminology to help 
analyse and identify problematic behaviours not currently addressed by IHL. 
Beyond the case study method, the research employed a Folk Bayesian approach. This approach 
is loosely derived from Bayes Theorem, a mathematical formula that addresses conditional 
probabilities; however, a Folk Bayesian approach is “largely intuitive” and is “more a matter of 
making research decisions in the spirit of Bayes than of consciously applying Bayesian 
 
147 See, e.g., ibid. 
148 See, e.g., ibid. 
149 See, e.g., ibid. 
150 See, e.g., ibid. 
151 See, e.g., ibid. 
152 John Gerring, “The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does” in Carles Boix & Susan C Stokes, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Politic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 90 at 101. 
153 Rosemary Nagy, “The Scope and Bounds of Transitional Justice and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission” (2013) 7 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 52 at 59. 
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techniques.”154 Folk Bayesianism is a multidirectional approach to analysis where researchers 
“move back and forth between theory and data, rather than taking a single pass through the 
data.”155 Consequently, theory and data work together to generate the study’s hypotheses. In this 
study, I began with by considering a wide array of theories of criminology and social 
psychology, which might hold relevance for analysing the data collected through field interviews 
and other case study research. As the field data was collected, I went back and forth between the 
data and these numerous theories to identify the theories most applicable to the data collected. In 
this manner, the theories included in chapter 7 were narrowed to those relevant to the analysis of 
the data in subsequent chapters. This back-and-forth movement is critical to the Folk Bayesian 
approach, where “moving back and forth between theory formulation and empirical investigation 
– are all strategies that take into account the mutual dependence of understanding and 
observation.”156 In this vein, “the research task is viewed as akin to extending a web or network, 
while being prepared to modify the prior web in order to accommodate new findings.”157 This 
multidirectional process allowed for the refinement of theory and data to produce hypotheses that 
form the foundation of recommendations for the strengthening of international humanitarian law 
and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Each part of the process – theory and data – was 
essential to the identification and generation of hypotheses. 
2.3 Sierra Leone 
The selection of case study location for the research prioritized safety, feasibility, and the nature 
of the conflict. The Sierra Leone civil war began in 1991 and ended in 2002. The country has 
been peaceful since that time. With the exception of street crime motivated by poverty, the 
capitol, Freetown, is quite safe. This was an important deciding factor in selecting Sierra Leone 
as a location for fieldwork. The relatively high levels of safety for both myself and my potential 
interviewees could be largely assured by the peaceful climate that existed in the country during 
the research period. Second, the feasibility of conducting research in Sierra Leone was an 
 
154 Timothy J McKeown, “Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview” in Henry E Brady & David 
Collier, eds, Rethinking Social Inquiry, Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, 2004) 139 at 159. 
155 Timothy J McKeown, “Case studies and the statistical Worldview: Review of King, Koehane, and Verba’s 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research” (1999) 53:1 International Organization 
161 at 180. 
156 Ibid at 188. 
157 Ibid. 
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important consideration. In particular, the official language spoken in Sierra Leone is English 
and all interviews could be conducted in English, therefore eliminating any need for a translator 
in interviews. Furthermore, conducting research in Sierra Leone was economically feasible. 
While airfare was quite expensive, actual living costs while in country were very low, thus 
permitting research to be conducted at a reasonable cost. Finally, the nature of the conflict was a 
consideration in case study location selection. My aim in choosing case studies was to select 
countries in the same region and with the same nature of conflict, in this case, non-international 
armed conflicts. Consequently, the nature of the Sierra Leone civil war as a non-international 
armed conflict was a factor in its selection. 
2.3.1 Data Collection and Research Population 
The first fieldwork research was conducted in Sierra Leone over a period of three weeks in April 
2016. The first contact in Freetown, Sierra Leone was made via my Doctoral Supervisor. This 
contact was a former employee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and current employee of 
the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. This individual was interviewed at the offices of the 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and the interview lasted approximately one hour. Using 
the snowball method, this interviewee connected me with two further interviewees. The first 
interviewee was a victim of violence by armed groups, in particular the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF). This interview took place at the premises of the Residual Special Court and lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. The second interviewee was a child soldier158 who was interviewed at 
the premises of the YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Organization) in Freetown. This interview 
lasted approximately one hour. 
 
All efforts were made to conduct in person interviews in line with the Interview Guidelines 
established during the University of Western Ontario ethics review process. Interviews were 
conducted in English. This more structured interview style quickly revealed itself to be less than 
ideal. The structured questions interrupted the flow of the conversation, and literally interrupted 
 
158 The definition of child soldier relied on in this thesis is children under the age of fifteen years when recruited to 
the armed group. This is the traditional age distinction made in IHL in both of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions. The 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child addresses this 
subject and, at Article 2, prohibits the compulsory recruitment of persons under 18 years into armed forces. The 
qualification of “compulsorily recruited” suggests that children between the ages of 15 and 18 may still legally 
participate in hostilities. The position taken by the ICRC in its Customary IHL Study is that the only agreement 
among states vis à vis the minimum age requirement in IHL is that it should not be lower than fifteen years old. 
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the interviewee. Questions would sometimes result in one word or very brief answers. This 
required me to adapt interview techniques in the field. A much more unstructured approach was 
therefore adopted. I would first introduce myself, the research project, and what was expected of 
the participant. In brief, the letter of information was orally delivered in accessible, lay terms so 
as to make the interviewee comfortable, while also conveying the necessary information about 
the study. After the introduction, the interviewee was given the opportunity to ask me any 
questions they might have. Prior to the beginning of the actual interview, I confirmed orally that 
the interviewee consented to participating in the interview and to their testimonies being 
recorded by hand. No audio recording equipment was used in interviews with victims, former 
combatants, or local human rights activists. This was done for the comfort of interviewees and 
due to the sensitive nature of the content of interviews. In interviews conducted in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, I introduced the procedure of asking several thematic questions 
at the end of the interviewee’s testimony. This procedure was adopted in order to gain potentially 
useful information which was not elucidated in the general testimony of the interviewee. It was 
an approach formulated after, and in reaction to, preliminary analysis of the in-person former 
combatant and victim interviews conducted in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the thematic 
questions posed to interviewees in the Democratic Republic of Congo were not posed to the 
interviewees in Sierra Leone. 
 
Interview subjects were expanded to include victims and witnesses in addition to former 
combatants. This was due in part to difficulties in locating former combatants to interview 
through my existing contacts employing the snowball method. My interview with the RUF 
victim demonstrated to me that victims could provide a wealth of information about the external 
operations of armed groups and, in particular, their interactions with the civilian population. 
Unfortunately, a limitation of data from victims and witnesses is that they were unlikely to be 
able to provide insight into the internal operations, training, disciplinary measures, or other 
internal workings of armed groups. Nonetheless, I made the determination that the data and 
information they were able to provide was valuable to the project. 
 
As noted, I struggled to find subsequent interviewees from the initial three in-person interviews. 
A visit to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Archives at the Peace Museum in 
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Freetown provided an alternative source of data collection, which reqired a special permit to 
access the archives for research purposes. This permit took several business days to acquire and 
involved paperwork, visits to the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, and an access fee. 
Once the permit was received, I was granted three days of supervised access to the TRC 
Archives. There were limitations to the use of TRC testimonies in lieu of in-person interviews. I 
was limited to the information contained within the written testimony. I could not ask directed 
questions, including thematic questions like those posed to interviewees in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, or seek clarification from the testimony giver. However, there were also 
advantages to the use of TRC testimonies. They provided first-hand accounts taken in close 
temporal proximity to the conflict. They also eliminated the potential for re-traumatization of the 
testimonial giver, which is always a risk in the case of in-person interviews. 
 
The testimonies collected by the Sierra Leone TRC are kept in boxes in a storage room at the 
Peace Museum in Freetown. They are arranged by the district where the testimony was collected. 
I selected boxes at random and went through the files contained in that box. A particular effort 
was made to find testimonies from perpetrators or child soldiers. However, notes were also taken 
of testimonies of victims and witnesses. For the most part, testimonies were copied verbatim by 
hand. An attempt was still made to protect the identity of testimony givers. This was done by 
omitting certain information from the transcription of testimonies. This included the omission of 
names of the testimony giver, of family members, of locations of birth or habitation, and so on. 
A concerted attempt was made to select boxes from different districts of Sierra Leone. In total, 
seven districts are represented amongst the TRC files reviewed.159 The regional breakdown of 
the 36 TRC testimonies is as follows: 14 testimonies from Kailahun district; seven testimonies 
from Western Area 1 (Urban); four testimonies from Koinadugu district; four testimonies from 
Western Area 2 (Rural); three testimonies from Moyamba district; two testimonies from Pujehun 
district; and, two testimonies from Tonkolili district. The scope of this distribution is only 
minimally useful as it denotes where the individual was located at the time their testimony was 
collected for the TRC. It does not automatically correlate to the location of the events described 
within the individual’s testimony, nor of their actual habitation. Consequently, efforts to provide 
 
159 Kailahun (KAI); Western Area 1 (WA1); Tonkolili (TON); Koinadugu (KOI); Western Area 2 (WA2); 
Moyamba (MOY); and, Pujehun (PUJ). 
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regional representation through the random selection of boxes of testimonies from different 
regions added very little to the geographic robustness of the collection of testimonies. 
 
In total, 39 interviews or testimonies were collected in Sierra Leone. This includes one 
organizational interview with the former employee of the SCSL; two in-person interviews – one 
victim and one child soldier; and 36 TRC testimonials. Of the 39 testimonies collected, 38 were 
given by victims, witnesses, or perpetrators. Of these 38 testimonies, eight were given by 
females and 30 by males. In total, 20 testimonies fell under the category of victim, and three in 
the category of witness. The remaining 15 testimonies were given by perpetrators or child 
soldiers. Eight testimonies were given by child soldiers and seven by adult perpetrators. While 
there were 38 testimonies, individuals often reported interactions with more than one armed 
group during the conflict. Consequently, 49 interactions with armed groups were reported by the 
38 victims, witnesses, and perpetrators. Interaction with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
was most prolific with 24 reports of encounters with this group, or approximately 63% of 
respondents having interacted with the RUF. There were seven reports of encounters with the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); seven reports of encounters with the Kamajors; 
six reports of encounters with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA); and two reports of encounters with 
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). These were the largest fighting forces in the civil war. In 
addition, there were two reports of encounters with the forces of the Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group, and one report of an encounter with a Civil Defence 
Unit. The age breakdown amongst the 38 testimonies was ten people under the age of 15 years; 
12 people between the ages of 15 and 30 years; eight people between the ages of 31 years and 45 
years; two people between the ages of 46 years and 60 years; one person over 60 years; and, five 
adults of unspecified age. 
 
Among the 15 testimonies collected from child soldiers and perpetrators, one was the result of an 
in-person interview and 14 were testimonies pulled from the archives of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. All of the child soldiers and perpetrators were male. Of the seven 
adult perpetrators, five reported being forced recruits while two did not indicate whether they 
had been forcibly recruited or if they had joined the armed group willingly. Among the eight 
child soldiers, seven reported affiliation with the RUF while one reported affiliation with the 
  
   
  
44 
AFRC. Of the seven adult perpetrators, four were affiliated with the RUF, one with the AFRC, 
and two with the Kamajors. The age breakdown amongst the child soldiers and perpetrators were 
eight people under the age of 15 years; five people between the ages of 15 years and 30 years; 
and, two adults of unspecified age. 
2.4 Democratic Republic of Congo  
As described above, the selection of case study locations for the research prioritized safety, 
feasibility, and the nature of the conflict. An early organizational interviewee recommended that 
I consider an active conflict as one of my case studies in the project. This was difficult to 
accomplish, given the safety restrictions placed on me by my educational institution. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo was selected as a case study because of ongoing armed conflict 
in the country balanced with the relative safety of parts of the country, as compared to other 
active conflicts in Africa such as in the Central African Republic, Somalia, and South Sudan. 
Within the DRC, Goma, the Eastern capitol in the province of North Kivu and its immediate 
surroundings, is relatively safe and conflict free, while other areas of Eastern Congo still suffer 
from active conflict. In the interest of the safety of both myself and my interviewees, I restricted 
my research interviews to Goma and its immediate environs – towns that could be accessed as a 
day-trip from Goma. The second consideration for the selection of the DRC as a case study was 
the feasibility of conducting in situ research. This region consists mainly of French and Swahili 
speakers. I am fluent in French, which facilitated communication and ease of living in Goma. It 
also limited the occasions on which a translator would be necessary. Goma is also easily 
accessible by land from Rwanda, which made it more accessible because I could fly in and out of 
Kigali, Rwanda, therefore decreasing travel costs. Finally, the nature of the majority of conflicts 
in DRC as non-international armed conflicts was a consideration in selecting the DRC as a 
research location. 
2.4.1 Data Collection and Research Population 
Prior to conducting the first research trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo, I established a 
connection with the Human Rights Watch office in Goma, DRC. I relied on this office to help 
establish connections with local human rights activists and other local organizations working on 
armed group related issues, as well as to keep apprised of the security situation in the region. 
However, I did not have any official affiliation with Human Rights Watch during my research. I 
made a conscious decision not to affiliate with any organization during my research. This was a 
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decision made with the goal of preserving the integrity of the testimonies collected in the 
research. Organizations often have reputations amongst the local population. These reputations 
may be favourable or unfavourable. They may have a reputation for providing necessary services 
or resources to the community. An official affiliation with an organization may colour how the 
researcher is perceived and, consequently, colour the information an interviewee is willing to 
disclose or how they disclose information with the interviewer. An advantage of this decision 
was to minimize potential for bias in responses. A disadvantage of this approach was that it 
minimized the potential to access a greater number of interviewees. Ultimately, I chose to 
prioritize the quality of the interview responses over the potential for greater numbers of 
informants in the study. 
 
In total, two research trips were conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Initially, only 
one trip had been planned based on time and financial restrictions to the research project. 
However, the first trip in 2016 proved less fruitful than expected and a second trip was necessary 
in order to gather combatant interview data. The first research trip took place over three weeks in 
May 2016. Unfortunately, my arrival in Goma coincided with the kidnapping of three 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employees in Eastern DRC. This made 
meeting with the ICRC in Goma impossible. Further, it created a situation in which I did not feel 
safe traveling outside Goma to conduct interviews. I made the decision early on that a second 
research trip would be necessary. As a result, the first research trip was used primarily to 
improve my local knowledge about Goma and to familiarise myself with the city and local 
dynamics. During this first research trip, three organizational interviews were conducted. The 
first interview was conducted with an intelligence officer for the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) well-versed in the 
dynamics of armed groups operating in Eastern DRC. This interview lasted approximately one 
hour and took place at the MONUSCO base in Goma. The other two interviews were conducted 
with local DRC human rights activists. The first interview took place at the Human Rights Watch 
office in Goma and lasted approximately 90 minutes. The second interview was much more 
extensive and lasted approximately three hours. It took place at a quiet local café at the request of 
the interviewee. 
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The second research trip took place over three weeks in April 2017. It must be noted that 
interview numbers were hampered on this trip by illness (I fell ill early on in this trip) as well as 
by the insecurity of roads to travel to certain locations outside of Goma to conduct interviews. 
Interviews conducted outside of Goma were restricted to locations where interviews could be 
completed as a day excursion from Goma, as per my agreed personal security plan with my 
home institution. Again, Human Rights Watch in Goma was used as a primary point of 
connection to local advocates. In this case, one advocate (G2312CM) became the focal point for 
the snowball method and the connection to all subsequent combatant interviews. He was able to 
connect me with a number of former combatants in and around Goma and accompanied me on 
interviews, serving, where necessary, as Swahili-French translator.  
 
Combatant interviews were conducted in Goma, Sake, and Kibumba. In total, ten former 
combatants were interviewed. All ten interviewees were male. Two interviews with female 
combatants had been arranged, however, one fell ill and one had recently returned from a stay in 
hospital. I deemed these inappropriate conditions in which to conduct interviews and forewent 
the interviews. Of the ten combatants interviewed, two were former child soldiers, five joined an 
armed group by choice (though one of these was a child soldier), and five were forced recruits. 
Interviewees at the time of joining or being recruited into an armed group ranged in age from 13 
years to 42 years.160 Of the ten interviewees, two were under 15 years at the time of joining or 
being recruited into the armed group; five were between the age of 15 years and 30 years; one 
was between the age of 31 years and 45 years; and, two interviewees were adults but a specific 
age was not given. Among the ten interviewees, six different armed groups were represented. 
Some interviewees spent time in more than one armed group. The armed groups represented 
among the ten interviewees were the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la liberation du 
Congo (AFDL),161 Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre (APCLS),162 Forces armées de la 
 
160 Note two interviewees did not reveal their age at the time of joining/being recruited into an armed group. 
However, it is known that they were both adults at the time of joining or being recruited into an armed group. 
161 Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo. 
162 Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo. 
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République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC),163 Mai Mai,164 Mouvement du 23 mars (M23),165 
and, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD).166 The ten interviewees also 
represented different roles or ranks within the armed groups. Three interviewees were officers, 
six interviewees were foot soldiers or porters, and one interviewee’s rank was unclear. 
 
Building upon the lessons learned from in-person interviews conducted in Sierra Leone, I 
employed an unstructured interview model. I introduced myself, the research project, and what 
was expected of the participant. In brief, the letter of information was orally delivered in 
accessible, lay terms so as to make the interviewee comfortable while also conveying the 
necessary information about the study. After the introduction, the interviewee was given the 
opportunity to ask me any questions they might have. Prior to the beginning of the actual 
interview, I confirmed orally that the interviewee consented to participating in the interview and 
to their testimonies being recorded by hand. No audio recording equipment was used in 
interviews with victims, former combatants, or local human rights activists. This was done for 
the comfort of interviewees and due to the sensitive nature of the content of interviews. I took 
notes by hand in English and French. 
 
One-on-one interviews were conducted in French, while other interviews were conducted in 
French and Swahili where the local human rights advocate accompanying me served as a Swahili 
translator. There are limitations to using a translator for interviews. First, it interrupts the flow of 
the interview, as the interviewee must pause while their comments are translated and recorded by 
the interviewer. Second, there is the risk of information being lost in translation. However, since 
I do not speak Swahili, these were necessary limitations to incur in the research process.  
 
I stressed that the information important to my study was the collection of the interviewee’s own 
personal story and experiences – how they came to be in an armed group and their time as a 
member of an armed group. I would only ask essential clarification questions while the 
 
163 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. These are the national armed forces of the DRC. 
164 This is the general term used to refer to local militia groups. Consequently, it can refer to numerous different 
groups. Some Mai Mai groups have more specific names to designate their particular affiliation. For example, Mai 
Mai Simba, Mai Mai Kifuafua, etc. 
165 March 23 Movement. 
166 Rally for Congolese Democracy. 
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interviewee recounted their story. This approach led to more candid answers as well as 
unexpected information. All participants discussed the demobilisation process. This was 
originally not considered in the scope of the research and was not considered by the Interview 
Guide. Consequently, the decision to move to an unstructured interview style enhanced the 
quality and breadth of information gathered. After the interviewees had recounted their entire 
story, I asked permission to ask several more targeted questions, reiterating that they were not 
obligated to answer questions if they did not feel like answering and that they could end the 
interview without further questions if they chose to. This is where some structure was 
reintroduced to the interview process with similar thematic questions being posed to all 
interviewees if they had not already addressed the material in their personal statement.  
 
The first theme addressed whether or not any training was received by the interviewee from the 
armed group(s) in which they had been members. In particular, they were asked whether they 
had received any training in IHL. It is interesting to note that the interviewees were more likely 
to identify with or understand the term ‘human rights’ rather than ‘international humanitarian 
law’. For example, where training of this nature did occur, interviewees spoke of human rights 
training, not training in IHL or the laws of war. The second theme addressed whether there were 
internal rules within the armed group and, if so, what those rules were and what, if any, were the 
consequences if those rules were broken. In particular, interviewees were asked whether there 
were rules regarding the treatment of civilians. The third theme asked interviewees how the 
armed groups interacted with the civilian population, in particular how they sensitized the 
civilian population to their presence. Finally, interviewees were asked if they encountered or had 
interaction with organizations such as the DRC Red Cross or International Committee of the Red 
Cross during their time in the armed group. These themes were focused upon as potentially 
useful to drawing conclusions about the internal operations of armed groups, including internal 
rules and discipline, and organizational engagement and influence, from the perspective of 
combatants. 
 
Finally, one organizational interview was conducted during this research trip. It was the wish of 
the interviewee that the organization not be specifically named. The organization is a non-
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governmental organization (NGO) that works with armed groups. The interview took place at the 
offices of the NGO in Goma and lasted approximately one hour. 
2.5 Data Analysis 
Once all fieldwork was completed, interviews were transcribed. Following this, the data was 
analysed. The transcripts were canvassed for common themes or points of particular relevance or 
interest in relation to the analytical criminology and social psychology theories explored earlier 
in the research process. Once themes were identified, quotes were organized along these themes. 
Often a single quote fit into multiple thematic categories. The themes identified were narrowed 
down on the basis of alignment with the criminological and social psychological theoretical 
frameworks explored and identified earlier in the research. 
 
The first overarching theme emerging from the two countries was that of depersonalization and 
disassociation. This theme is related to both theories of social psychology and criminology, in 
particular the criminology theory of techniques of neutralization and the social psychology 
theories of deindividuation and moral disengagement. The data demonstrated the common 
practice of the use of anonymizing nicknames by members of armed groups, in particular 
nicknames that often evoke heroic or particularly violent self-images. This is a practice that 
disassociates the individual from their non-combatant identity. The use of anonymizing 
nicknames is shown to be common both to the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. A second overarching theme is dehumanization. Once again, this theme can 
be associated with both theories of social psychology and criminology. In fact, nearly all of the 
theories of criminology and social psychology considered in the research discussed 
dehumanization. Here, the information collected in the case study interviews revealed 
mistreatment of civilians by combatants and the failure to distinguish, as required by law, 
between combatant and civilian. In addition, another common theme was the use of denigrating 
and dehumanizing language and imagery to refer to the enemy, including civilians. Theories of 
social psychology have demonstrated that such practices facilitate participation in mass 
atrocities, in particular against the civilian population.167 
 
167 Bandura, supra note 23 at 201–203; Bandura, supra note 23 at 84–89; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 18–
19; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 17, 222–24; Albert Bandura, B Underwood & ME Fromson, “Disinhibition of 
aggression through diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims” (1975) 9 Journal of Research in 
Personality 253. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the methodology employed in this thesis. The methodology used is 
primarily legal doctrinal methodology, which relies on the sources of international law – treaties, 
custom, general principles, case law, and scholarly literature – to identify and interpret the 
existing content of IHL protections for civilians as they apply to armed groups in NIACs. The 
use of legal doctrinal methodology grounds this thesis in the normative framework of law. 
However, the thesis also makes use of non-doctrinal methods in the form of two illustrative case 
studies that describe the violation of IHL protections for civilians by members of armed groups 
in NIACs in Sierra Leone and the DRC. These two case study locations were selected based on 
prioritization of safety, feasibility, and the nature of the conflict. The Sierra Leone and DRC case 
studies are developed through a combination of primary and secondary data collection as well as 
primary and secondary sources. The primary data collection consists of qualitative fieldwork 
interviews and data collection in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Interviews conducted in Sierra 
Leone and the DRC were largely unstructured in order to gather the most authentic and complete 
account of each interviewee’s experiences. Some minimal structure was introduced in interviews 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo by means of thematic questions asked after the interviewee 
had provided their entire testimony in order to provide details for potential comparison among 
interviewees. While complete objectivity in a qualitative study such as this is not possible, a 
concerted effort was made to avoid tainting the response of interviewees. This was done 
primarily through the unstructured interview format that allowed interviewees to freely recount 
their experiences without questions affecting or leading their story and by my decision to remain 
independent from any official organizational affiliation. 
 
The legal doctrine and primary and secondary data used in this thesis lead to the construction of 
a legal argument that is both normatively persuasive and grounded in the realities of both the 
international legal system and the experiences of combatants and civilians in Sierra Leone and 
the DRC. Together, these methods permit this thesis to establish a problem with the current 
application of IHL to armed groups due to a gap between the protections currently afforded to 
civilians during conflict which are based largely on the protections afforded to individuals in 
peace and the protections necessary to achieve the humanitarian goal of civilian protection 
during NIACs.  
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The following chapter will begin the legal doctrinal analysis of IHL to establish the current 
content of the law. First, it establishes the legal concept of armed group, the regulation of whose 
members is the focus of this thesis. The chapter then proceeds to demonstrate the current legal 
basis for binding non-state armed groups under IHL and international human rights law. The fact 
that armed groups are bound by existing IHL indicates that new IHL regulations such as those 
recommended in chapter 8 are likely to affect the members of armed groups.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3 International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Armed Groups 
 
This thesis advances the claim that an analysis of the IHL protections for civilians applicable to 
non-state armed groups, as compared to peacetime law applicable to all individuals, shows gaps: 
conflict-specific regulation of combatant behaviour for the protection of civilians, distinct from 
peacetime behavioural regulation for the protection of individuals, is needed. This chapter 
addresses two key concepts central to this thesis: who is considered to be part of a non-state 
armed group under IHL and the fact that IHL applies to these individuals. The manner in which 
armed groups are bound by IHL can alter the scope of rules applicable to them. For example, 
some approaches posit that armed groups are only bound to treaty law, while other approaches 
contend that they are only bound to customary rules of IHL. 
 
This chapter begins by exploring the legal definition of an armed group under the law of NIACs. 
It is not all groups of persons with weapons who are the non-state addressees of IHL. Rather, 
only groups which fulfill the requisite legal elements of an organized armed group are bound by 
IHL.168 With this understanding of the non-state addressees of the law of NIACs, the chapter 
turns to a discussion of the principle of the equality of belligerents. This principle requires all 
parties to the conflict to be bound by the same IHL rules as each other.169 This principle is meant 
to create a sense of reciprocal obligations among parties to a conflict that will engender mutually 
reinforcing compliance with the law.170 If armed groups are only bound by a portion of IHL 
rules, as opposed to the entire body of law, it could create a conflict with the principle of equality 
of belligerents. Consequently, the principle of equality of belligerents is often an important 
consideration in assessing different approaches that have been advanced to explain how IHL 
binds armed groups. Seven different approaches have been articulated in literature as means of 
explaining the legal application of IHL to armed groups: (1) legislative jurisdiction; (2) national 
law; (3) third party treaty application; (4) de facto authority; (5) claims to represent the state; (6) 
 
168 See discussion in section 3.1 below. 
169 See discussion in section 3.2 below. 
170 See discussion in section 3.2 below. 
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customary international and international legal personality; and, (7) consent.171 Each of these 
approaches is examined in turn in this chapter. Finally, this chapter addresses the application of 
international human rights law during times of armed conflict and whether, like IHL, it creates 
binding obligations for armed groups. 
 
The establishment of how IHL is binding on armed groups in this chapter and what rules of IHL 
are binding (established in chapter 4) is critical in order to demonstrate that new rules or 
regulations proposed in chapter 8 would be likely to be applicable to these actors. Since IHL is 
binding on armed groups and their members, this justifies the focus on IHL in this thesis as a tool 
to address violence committed by armed groups toward civilians during NIACs. This chapter 
demonstrates that there are several solid legal bases for the binding application of IHL to armed 
groups. Armed groups are bound by the legislative jurisdiction of the states in which they operate 
and by their own limited international legal personality. A limited number of armed groups are 
also bound by IHL when they exercise de facto authority over civilians and/or territory. This 
chapter further demonstrates that international human rights law applies during armed conflict 
and creates binding obligations for some armed groups. Consequently, international human 
rights law must also be considered in the development of new IHL regulations in chapter 8.  
3.1 Non-State Actors in the International Legal System 
The question of how armed groups are bound by IHL has stemmed largely from the traditional 
structure of the international legal system, which, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, has 
been premised on states and state sovereignty.172 This means that, for over three centuries, 
“international law [has been] primarily a law for the international conduct of states, and not their 
citizens … [and] the subjects of the rights and duties arising from international law are states 
solely and exclusively.”173 Since the mid-twentieth century, the subjects of international law 
have been expanded beyond states to include non-state actors such as international 
 
171 See discussion in section 3.4 below. 
172 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 22–25. 
173 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed (Harlow, UK: Longman Group 
UK, 1992) at 16. 
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organizations174 and individuals.175 However, “states remain in ultimate control over the formal 
content of international law.”176 
 
The nature of international law is such that treaties can only be concluded between states, and, 
more recently, between states and international organizations.177 States remain the primary 
authors of international treaties. States parties to a treaty must provide their express consent to be 
bound by the terms of the treaty.178 This is done through signature and ratification, or 
accession.179 Critically, treaties generally do not apply to third parties.180 In order to bind a third 
party to obligations in a treaty, they must expressly consent to be bound.181 These foundational 
rules of treaty making raise questions about how non-state armed groups can be bound by 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Common Article 3)182 and the 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II).183 Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II are the two most important treaties governing NIACs and the 
protection of civilians during such conflicts. While Common Article 3 applies to all NIACs, the 
threshold for application of Additional Protocol II is, as will be discussed in this chapter, higher 
than that for Common Article 3. The rules applicable during an armed conflict may also come 
from customary international law:  Common Article 3, as well as the core provisions of 
Additional Protocol II, are now considered to be part of customary IHL.184 Further, the ICRC has 
 
174 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 1949, 1949 ICJ 
Rep, 174 at 178. 
175 International human rights law creates rights for individuals under international law and international criminal 
law creates responsibilities for individuals under international law. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 93 at 117–152, 175–
189. 
176 Peter Muchlinski, “Global Bukowina; Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational Law-
making Community” in Gunther Taubner, ed, Global Law without a State (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1997) 79 at 89. 
177 John Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 109. 
178 Ibid at 119–21. 
179 Ibid at 120–21. 
180 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “Third Parties and the Law of Treaties” (2002) 6 Max Plank UNYB 37 at 38–39; PCIJ, 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Germany v Poland, 25 May 1926, PCIJ Series A no 7, ICGJ 241 
(PCIJ 1926) at 13. 
181 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 177 at 120–21. 
182 See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5. 
183 Ibid; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5. 
184 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 68 at para 117. 
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suggested that the content of some treaty rules for international armed conflicts is now also 
applicable during NIACs because it has become customary international law.185  
3.2 The Definition of an Armed Group in International Humanitarian Law 
There is no codified legal definition of a non-state armed group in IHL treaty law. However, an 
armed group under IHL is more than simply a group of people in possession of weapons.186 
Groups which take up arms in a NIAC are not automatically considered to be armed groups and 
therefore non-state parties to the conflict. Instead, Additional Protocol II explicitly requires that a 
group be an “organized armed group[]” thereby requiring the armed group to possess a certain 
level of organization if it is to be considered a non-state party to a NIAC.187 While Common 
Article 3 does not explicitly refer to “organized armed groups”, this phrase has been interpreted 
to also require that an armed group possess a certain level of organization in order to be 
considered a party to a NIAC.188 The level of organization required under Common Article 3 is 
less than that required for the application of Additional Protocol II.189 The language of 
Additional Protocol II requires armed groups to be sufficiently organized to be able to control 
territory as well as to carry out “sustained and concerted military operations”.190 However, as 
discussed below, the exact degree of organization required under Common Article 3 is 
unclear.191 
 
The case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has 
provided guidance on how to assess the level of organization possessed by a group. The ICTY 
considered the issue of the requisite level of organization in judgments addressing the question of 
 
185 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5. 
186 Non-legal definitions of ‘armed group’ tend to simplify the definition in this manner and fail to appreciate the 
requisite organizational element discussed in this section. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs has defined non-state armed groups as “groups that: have the potential to employ arms in the 
use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; are not within the formal military structures of 
States, State-alliances or intergovernmental organizations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they 
operate.” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed 
Groups: A Manual for Practitioners (New York: United Nations, 2006) at 6. 
187 Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 1(1) [emphasis added]. 
188 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, (Trial Judgment), 30 November 2005, IT-03-
66-T at para 89; Sassoli, supra note 26 at 56. 
189 Sassoli, supra note 25 at 56. 
190 Sassoli, supra note 26 at 56. This is because Additional Protocol II Article 1(1) possesses additional qualifiers 
requiring that the armed group “exercise such control over a part of [the state’s] territory as to enable [the armed 
group] to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” 
191 Ibid. 
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whether the Kosovo Liberation Army was an “organized armed group”. The court concluded that 
an “organized armed group” would require sufficient organization so that “as a minimum…the 
basic obligations of Common Article 3… may be implemented”.192 This does not, however, 
mean that they are required to have the same degree of organization as state armed forces.193 
This is very important, because there is likely to be a significant difference between “an armed 
group that operates underground and state armed forces that are operating out in the open.”194 
 
The criterion of sufficient organization to implement IHL turns on whether the group has the 
capacity to implement and enforce IHL, not whether it actually does implement or enforce 
IHL.195 This consideration can be met by the existence of internal rules within the armed group 
as well as a process by which to enforce these rules. The process of enforcement - that is, an 
internal disciplinary system - “need not be greatly developed”; however, “at least a semblance 
[of internal discipline] is required”.196 A higher degree of organization is required for a group to 
be considered an ‘organized armed group” under Additional Protocol II than for Common 
Article 3 due to the “more detailed rules … that apply in Additional Protocol II conflicts”.197 The 
fact that an armed group commits frequent IHL violations does not inherently mean it lacks 
sufficient organization to fulfill this criterion.198 A group may be sufficiently organized and 
adopt a policy of committing IHL violations.199 The organization of a group may come into 
question, however, where “individual members act entirely on their own initiative, in total 
disregard of a countervailing policy espoused by the armed group”.200 This is because such 
independent individual IHL violations may suggest a lack of internal discipline within the group. 
 
While armed groups can also vary widely in the manner in which they are organized, two 
dominant forms of organization have been identified: (1) vertical chains of command that are 
 
192 The Prosecutor v Ljube Boskoski and Johan Tarculovski, Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 July 2008, IT-04-82-T at 
para 195. 
193 Ibid at para 197. 
194 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 172. 
195 Ibid at 178–79. 
196 Ibid at 179. 
197 ICTY, Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 192 at para 197. See also, Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 185. 
198 ICTY, Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 192 at para 205. 
199 See, e.g., Adrean Bianchi & Yasmin Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism (Oxford: Hart, 
2011) at 163. 
200 Dinstein, supra note 46 at 45. See also, ICTY, Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 192 at para 205. 
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clearly established, centralized, hierarchical, and very similar to those traditionally seen in state 
regular armed forces; and, (2) more horizontally structured command with decentralized power 
and, frequently, “less clearly delineated roles and responsibilities.”201 The level of organization 
of groups in the first category will likely be much more easily assessed, but groups within the 
second category are also capable of meeting the requirement to be considered an “organized 
armed group”.202 A good example of an armed group that fit the second category is the Taliban 
in Afghanistan.203 
 
The ICTY has also identified a non-exhaustive list of indicative factors to assess whether an 
armed group is sufficiently organized to be deemed an “organized armed group” under IHL. 
These factors are categorized into five broad groupings. The first set of factors looks for the 
existence of a command structure in the armed group, taking into consideration whether the 
group has a “chain of military hierarchy between the various levels of commanders”, whether the 
group has internal regulations, and how those regulations are disseminated to soldiers and 
commanders.204 The second set of factors focuses on the capacities of the group and examines 
whether “the group could carry out operations in an organised manner”.205 To determine this, one 
considers “the group’s ability to determine a unified military strategy and to conduct large scale 
 
201 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 172–73. 
202 Ibid at 173; Bangerter, supra note 25 at 188–89; Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds, 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Gen: ICRC, 
1986) at para 1352. 
203 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 173–74. 
204 ICTY, Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 192 at para 199. The first group of factors, as articulated by the ICTY 
Trial Chamber, in their entirety are “In the first group are those factors signalling the presence of a command 
structure, such as the establishment of a general staff or high command, which appoints and gives directions to 
commanders, disseminates internal regulations, organises the weapons supply, authorises military action, assigns 
tasks to individuals in the organisation,  and issues political statements and communiqués, and which is informed by 
the operational units of all developments within the unit’s area of responsibility. Also included in this group are 
factors such as the existence of internal regulations setting out the organisation and structure of the armed group; the 
assignment of an official spokesperson; the communication through communiqués reporting military actions and 
operations undertaken by the armed group; the existence of headquarters; internal regulations establishing ranks of 
servicemen and defining duties of commanders and deputy commanders of a unit, company, platoon or squad, 
creating a chain of military hierarchy between the various levels of commanders; and the dissemination of internal 
regulations to the soldiers and operational units.” . 
205 Ibid at para 200. The second group of factors, as articulated by the ICTY Trial Chamber, in their entirety are 
“Secondly, factors indicating that the group could carry out operations in an organised manner have been 
considered, such as the group’s ability to determine a unified military strategy and to conduct large scale military 
operations, the capacity to control territory, whether there is territorial division into zones of responsibility in which 
the respective commanders are responsible for the establishment of Brigades and other units and appoint 
commanding officers for such units; the capacity of operational units to coordinate their actions,814 and the 
effective dissemination of written and oral orders and decisions.” 
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military operations, the capacity to control territory,… the capacity of operational units to 
coordinate their actions, and the effective dissemination of … orders”.206 The capacity to control 
territory, although identified as a potential indicator of a group’s level of organization, is not a 
requirement under Common Article 3 for organized armed groups.207 The capacity to control 
territory is, however, required under Additional Protocol II.208 The consideration of capacity to 
control territory as an indicator of an armed group’s level of organization does not rest on a 
specific amount of territory being controlled but, rather, the ability of the armed group to carry 
out the requisite military operations and to implement the provisions of Additional Protocol II.209 
The amount of territorial control and location may vary during a conflict.210 The third set of 
factors deals with the “level of logistics” of the group, taking into consideration “the ability to 
recruit new members; the providing of military training; the organized supply of military 
weapons; [and] the supply and use of uniforms”.211 The fourth set of factors examines “whether 
an armed group possesse[s] a level of discipline and the ability to implement the basic 
obligations of Common Article 3”.212  Finally, the fifth set of factors looks at a group’s ability 
“to speak with one voice” such as “its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease 
fire or peace accords.”213 Responsible command is an important requirement and is closely 
 
206 Ibid. 
207 Lindsay Moir, “Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco 
Sassoli, eds, The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 391 at 407. 
208 Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 1(1). 
209 AP II Article 1 sets the requirement that a group “exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable [it] 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the … Protocol.” Articles 5 and 6 of AP II 
deal with persons detained or interned and the due process guarantees which requires some amount of territorial 
control: Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 186. 
210 Only two obligations under Additional Protocol II require an armed group to have control over territory: (1) 
detention and internment, and (2) due process guarantees: Ibid at 186–87. 
211 ICTY, Boskoski Trial Judgment, supra note 192 at para 201. The third group of factors, as articulated by the 
ICTY Trial Chamber, in their entirety are “In the third group are factors indicating a level of logistics have been 
taken into account, such as the ability to recruit new members; the providing of military training; the organised 
supply of military weapons; the supply and use of uniforms; and the existence of communications equipment for 
linking headquarters with units or between units.” 
212 Ibid at para 202. The fourth group of factors, as articulated by the ICTY Trial Chamber, in their entirety are “In a 
fourth group, factors relevant to determining whether an armed group possessed a level of discipline and the ability 
to implement the basic obligations of Common Article 3 have been considered, such as the establishment of 
disciplinary rules and mechanisms; proper training; and the existence of internal regulations and whether these are 
effectively disseminated to members.” 
213 Ibid at para 203. The fifth group of factors, as articulated by the ICTY Trial Chamber, in their entirety are “A 
fifth group includes those factors indicating that the armed group was able to speak with one voice, such as its 
capacity to act on behalf of its members in political negotiations with representatives of international organisations 
and foreign countries; and its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease fire or peace accords.” 
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linked to the degree of organization of a group.214 Responsible command merely requires that 
“there be some sort of relationship of effective control by which one individual has the power to 
control the acts of another, in particular the power to prevent or punish particular acts of that 
other individual.”215 It does not, however, require a hierarchical, military chain of command.216  
3.3 The Principle of Equality of Belligerents  
The previous section addressed the legal concept of an armed group under IHL. It explained that 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are both addressed only to organized armed 
groups, a category which does not include unorganized non-state groups bearing weapons. In a 
NIAC, IHL also applies to the armed forces of a state involved in fighting an armed group. This 
section will discuss the principle of the equality of belligerents that is fundamental to 
international humanitarian law.217 The fundamental nature of the principle of equality of 
belligerents is derived from the necessity that “each Party to the conflict … be bound to apply 
[IHL]”218 in order to realize the object and purpose of IHL: management of the problem of 
unrestrained violence between states and organized groups within states and the protection of 
individuals who do not directly participate in hostilities.219 
 
Equality of belligerents means that all parties to a conflict are subject to the same rights and 
obligations under IHL, regardless of which party is the aggressor and regardless of the nature of 
the cause for which they are fighting.220 Historically, this principle was tied to reciprocal 
 
214 The ICTY Appeals Chamber, addressing the issue of command responsibility, stated in The Prosecutor v 
Hadzihasanovic that “there cannot be an organized military force save on the basis of responsible command”. The 
Prosecutor v Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed Alagic and Amir Kubara, Appeals Chamber Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, IT-01-47-AR72, 16 July 
2003 at para 16. However, the ICTY Trial Chamber subsequently clarified that “some degree of organization by the 
parties will suffice to establish the existence of an armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as required for 
establishing the responsibility of superiors for acts of their subordinates”. ICTY, Limaj et al Trial Judgment, supra 
note 188 at para 89. 
215 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 175. 
216 Ibid at 175–76. 
217 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Limits of Operation of the Law of War” (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International 
Law 206; Christopher Greenwood, “The Relationship between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello” (1983) 9 Review of 
International Studies 221. 
218 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3. 
219 See, e.g., ICRC, “Fundamentals of IHL”, online: How Does Law Protect in War? Online Casebook 
<https://casebook.icrc.org/law/fundamentals-ihl>. 
220 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 243; Jonathan Somer, “Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality 
of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict” (2007) 89:867 International Review of the Red Cross 655; 
Adam Roberts, “The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle under Pressure” (2008) 90:872 
International Review of the Red Cross 931 at 932. 
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adherence to the law by parties to the conflict.221 However, the principle has developed such that 
there is now “a recognition that there is an obligation to respect the law that does not depend 
completely on reciprocity.”222 This is supported by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’ (ICRC) Customary IHL Study, which cited significant state practice demonstrating this 
shift away from reciprocity.223 
 
The principle of equality of belligerents applies equally to NIACs and international armed 
conflicts.224 However, the application of the principle in NIACs may be problematic. First, many 
states are strongly opposed to any suggestion within IHL of equal status between their own 
armed forces and an armed group, which the principle of equality of belligerents assumes.225 
Second, the members of an armed group have no legal right to take up arms against the state.226 
Rather, they are often considered to be criminals by states under domestic law from the moment 
they engage the state in armed violence.227 By contrast, the members of the state’s armed forces 
can legally take up arms to defend the state from such armed groups.228 
 
IHL does not provide legal authority for an actor to take up arms against a state because it only 
regulates conduct during an armed conflict and is indifferent as to how the conflict came to exist. 
The fact it is illegal to take up arms against the state is a matter of domestic law. Consequently, 
Sassoli has argued that this inequality vis à vis who may legally take up arms in a NIAC does not 
jeopardize the principle because this inequality arises at the level of domestic law, rather than 
under international law.229 IHL applicable to NIACs still treats state and non-state parties 
 
221 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 220 at 943. 
222 See, e.g., ibid. 
223 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 140. 
224 See, e.g., Sandoz, Swinarski, & Zimmermann, supra note 202 at para 1385; Francois Bugnion, “Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello and Non-International Armed Conflicts” (2003) 6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
167; Marco Sassoli, “Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello: The Separation between the Legality of the Use of Force and 
Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Warfare – Crucial or Outdated?” in Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic, eds, 
International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines, Essays in Honour of Yoram Dinstein (Amsterdam, 
NLD: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 241 at 254–57. 
225 See, e.g., Somer, supra note 220 at 656. 
226 See, e.g., Lindsey Cameron et al, “Conflicts not of an international character” in Knut Dörmann et al, eds, 
Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 126 at 186; 
Fleck, supra note 46 at 590. 
227 See, e.g., Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 186; Fleck, supra note 46 at 190. 
228 ICRC, “Non-international armed conflict | How does law protect in war? - Online casebook”, online: 
<https://casebook.icrc.org/law/non-international-armed-conflict#_ftn_i_001>. 
229 Sassoli, supra note 224 at 241. See also Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 243. 
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equally.230 It is logical to distinguish between equality under IHL and equality under domestic 
law as the principle of equality of belligerents is a principle of international law. While the fact 
that it is a principle of international law does not necessarily preclude its application to domestic 
law during armed conflict, the historical and current understanding of the principle is that it 
refers to equality specifically with regard to the application of jus in bello (i.e., IHL).231 The 
principle could nonetheless be inhibited at the international level if the scope of IHL applicable 
to armed groups is not the same as that which binds states in a NIAC. Consequently, the legal 
principle of equality of belligerents is an important consideration in evaluating different 
approaches that attempt to explain how IHL is binding on armed groups and the scope of the 
rules which are binding on these groups. 
3.4 Approaches to Explaining How Armed Groups are Bound by International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
The previous sections have identified the type of armed group that is addressed by IHL as well as 
the fundamental principle of the equality of belligerent, which provides that parties to an armed 
conflict should be bound equally by the rules of IHL applicable to the conflict. The principle of 
equality of belligerents is an important reason for the necessity of armed groups being bound by 
IHL. Academic literature has identified many reasons as to why armed groups might deny that 
they are bound by IHL.232 However, denial that one is bound does not prevent an individual or an 
armed group from, in fact, being bound by IHL.233 There does, however, remain disagreement 
over the precise legal explanation for the fact that armed groups are bound by IHL.234 This 
section will examine the seven approaches that exist to explain how armed groups are bound by 
IHL: 1) legislative jurisdiction; (2) national law; (3) third party treaty application; (4) de facto 
 
230 Sassoli, supra note 224 at 241; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 243. 
231 See, e.g., Somer, supra note 220 at 659; Nathaniel Berman, “Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the 
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authority; (5) claims to represent the state; (6) customary international and international legal 
personality; and, (7) consent.235 This section concludes that armed group consent to be bound is 
not legally required to explain the binding quality of IHL on them. This section suggests that the 
legislative jurisdiction and international legal personality are both solid legal explanations for the 
binding nature of IHL on armed groups and, through their application, provide an explanation for 
the binding effects of both treaty and customary IHL presumed by many academics, international 
organizations, and courts.  
3.4.1 Legislative Jurisdiction 
The approach of legislative jurisdiction relies on the argument that state ratification of a treaty 
“binds all individuals within its jurisdiction” to that treaty.236 Thus, according to this approach, 
members of armed groups are bound by IHL treaty law through the ratification of an IHL treaty 
by the state of which they are nationals.237 It is binding because treaty ratification is done “not 
just on behalf of the state but also on behalf of all individuals within its jurisdiction.”238 While 
this approach is generally used to explain the binding application of IHL treaty law to armed 
groups, Kleffner has noted that this reasoning could also be employed to explain the binding 
force of customary IHL to armed groups.239 Consequently, Murray has argued that this approach 
“ha[s] the potential to explain the direct—and immediate—attribution of the entire spectrum of 
international humanitarian law to all armed opposition groups”.240 
 
The legislative jurisdiction approach has been described by some to be the dominant approach in 
the literature.241 The approach received support from several states during the drafting of the 
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AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004 at 47; International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) at para 173. 
236 Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 417–18. See also, e.g., Fleck, supra note 46 at 597; Moir, supra note 46 at 53. 
237 Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 417–18. 
238 Ibid at 417. See also, e.g., Kleffner, supra note 234 at 445; Sivakumaran, supra note 235. 
239 Kleffner, supra note 234 at 445. 
240 Murray, supra note 234 at 103. 
241 See, e.g., Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 53–54; Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959) at 623; GIAD Draper, “The implementation and enforcement 
of the Geneva conventions of 1949 and of the two additional protocols of 1978” (1979) 64 The Hague Academy 
  
   
  
63 
Geneva Conventions,242 and again during the drafting of Additional Protocol II,243 as well as by 
the ICRC.244 This approach does not, however, necessarily mean that an armed group will be 
bound by all IHL treaties. That is because the approach requires that the relevant state be party to 
an IHL treaty in order for the armed group to be bound by that treaty’s rules. The Geneva 
Conventions, which contain Common Article 3, are universally ratified;245 however, Additional 
Protocol II is not.246 The content of Additional Protocol II, however, is now largely considered 
customary IHL; therefore, if the legislative doctrine argument is applied to customary IHL it 
would render the content of Additional Protocol II universally applicable. However, other IHL 
treaties, particularly those dealing with the prohibition or regulation of certain weapons are 
neither universally ratified nor are they necessarily customary IHL.247 For example, the 
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention,248 which has 164 states parties - though notably not the 
United States, Russia, China, Syria, Libya, and South Korea - is not yet considered to reflect 
customary IHL.249 The legislative jurisdiction approach is nonetheless a strong approach to 
explain how armed groups are bound by IHL as it is the only approach that, on its own, would 
explain the binding nature of both treaty and customary IHL to armed groups while also 
preserving the principle of equality of belligerents, discussed above, to the greatest extent among 
the seven approaches.250 
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The doctrine of legislative jurisdiction approach has been criticized for not differentiating 
between international and national law.251 The suggestion is that this approach relies on the 
binding applicability of national law to members of armed groups and, as a result, the approach 
fails to provide justification for the binding nature of IHL on armed groups as a matter of 
international law.252 The argument is that the binding quality of IHL with regards to armed 
groups relies on the implementation of these rules by the state into domestic law.253 This 
argument is flawed for two key reasons. First, the argument ignores the distinction between 
monist and dualist nations. In the former, international obligations are automatically incorporated 
into national law whereas in the latter implementing legislation is required.254 There are also 
variations on this dichotomy among states.255 For example, Canada takes a dualist approach to 
international treaties and a monist approach to customary international law.256 Second, it is not 
unprecedented for international law to create direct rights or obligations for individuals as a 
matter of international, rather than national, law.257 For example, this is the case under 
international human rights law and international criminal law. 
 
Other scholars have criticized the legislative jurisdiction approach because, in practice, armed 
groups may refuse “to comply with rules that have been formulated by the very governments 
with which they are in conflict.”258 It is possible that armed groups may take such a stance, 
however, in practice, there is little evidence that armed groups actually do advance this 
argument.259 Further, the application of a law to an individual does not rely on that individual’s 
acceptance that they are indeed bound.260 Many scholars often evaluate the various approaches 
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that have been advanced to explain how IHL binds armed groups based on how likely it is to 
engender compliance from armed groups, ignoring the fact that the force of a law does not rely 
on compliance. For example, speed limits remain legally binding on individuals regardless of 
how frequently they fail to observe them. Of course, if one accepts the argument that the 
requirement of consent to be bound under international law extends to non-state actors and not 
just states, then this argument takes on new meaning. However, as is argued in section 3.3.7, 
there is no evidence that such an extension of the consent requirement exists.  
 
While Kleffner has suggested that the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction may be the “natural 
choice” for some among the seven approaches to explain how armed groups of bound by IHL, he 
has also argued that the approach suffers from a “fundamental conceptual defect”.261 In his view, 
while this approach explains how individuals are bound by IHL, it does not explain how IHL can 
bind an armed group directly as a collective entity. This would be relevant for assigning 
responsibility for international wrongs to an armed group itself rather than one or more of the 
individual members of that group.262 Further, it is armed groups, not individual members of 
armed groups, who are the addressees of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II and 
certain IHL obligations are directed at the armed group generally rather than individual 
combatants and commanders.263 For example, the establishment of a “regularly constituted 
court” or the provision of education for children are collective rather than individual 
obligations.264 It is for this reason that this thesis argues in favour of the joint application of the 
legislative jurisdiction  and customary international law approaches to explain how IHL treaty 
law and customary law respectively bind armed groups. 
3.4.2 National Law 
The second approach advanced to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL argues that 
armed groups are bound through national law.265 Where treaties are automatically incorporated 
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into domestic law upon ratification or where the content of a treaty has been incorporated into 
domestic law through national procedures, armed groups will be bound by IHL based on the 
content of the national law.266 Further, customary international law is often automatically 
considered to be national law by many states; therefore, rules of customary IHL would be 
binding through national law in such states.267 Certainly, there is no question that a state may 
pass national legislation that binds actors on its territory to IHL norms. Also, this approach 
would ensure respect for the principle of equality of belligerents as both state armed forces and 
armed groups would be bound by the same national laws. However, if the national law approach 
is relied on as the sole explanation of how armed groups are bound by IHL then, if IHL treaty or 
customary international law were not implemented into domestic law, an armed group would not 
be bound to rules of IHL.268  As a result, relying solely on this approach to bind armed groups 
would limit the scope of IHL rules binding on armed groups in a manner contrary to “clear 
international opinion” that armed groups are bound by the vast majority, if not all, rules of IHL 
applicable in NIACs.269 
 3.4.3 Treaties and Third Parties 
The legal effect of treaties on third-parties is the third approach advanced to explain how IHL 
binds armed groups.270 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) codifies the rule 
of pacta tertiis, which is also a rule of customary international law and explains when and how a 
treaty can binding on a third-party.271 The rules require an intent, on the part of states parties to 
the treaty in question, to create binding rights or obligations for the third party272 and the consent 
of the third-party to assume the rights and/or obligations in question.273 The VCLT, however, 
only applies to states.274 Consequently, it is unclear whether the rule could be applied to non-
state armed groups.275 Since armed groups cannot legally be parties to IHL treaties, they would 
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necessarily be third parties to IHL treaties, though not third-party “states”.276 Cassese has 
suggested that, while the rules of the VCLT apply only in the context of third party states, the 
customary rule of pacta tertiis applies to “the effects of treaties on any international subject 
taking the position of a third party vis-a-vis a treaty.”277 He further argues that the “[the VCLT] 
does not rule out the applicability of its provisions to other international entities” such as armed 
groups.278 If either or both of these assertions are correct - and Cassese provides no supporting 
evidence for either assertion - then the requisite intent to bind third parties can indeed be found 
in Common Article 3, which addresses “each Party to the conflict”. Since armed groups are non-
state parties to a NIAC, it appears clear that they are one of the addressees of Common Article 
3.279 By contrast, Additional Protocol II does not explicitly address all the parties to a conflict 
nor was there any clear consensus among states during the drafting of the treaty as to whether 
they intended to bind armed groups or not.280 
 
Cassese has argued that, though not explicit, the language of Additional Protocol II nonetheless 
suggests an intent to bind armed groups.281 First, Additional Protocol II was intended to 
“develop[] and supplement[] Common Article 3”282 and, as a result, “only expands and broadens 
the protection granted by it.”283 It follows, therefore, according to Cassese, that since Common 
Article 3 clearly applies to armed groups, then Additional Protocol II also applies to these 
groups.284 This is a convincing argument as, if Additional Protocol was not intended to create 
obligations for armed groups, this would necessarily limit the application of Additional Protocol 
II vis-à-vis Common Article in direct contradiction of Article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol. 
Cassese has also argued that Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II, which places an obligation on 
the “authorities in power” at the end of hostilities, implicitly refers to both the State and armed 
group. The application of this provision to armed groups leads Cassese to conclude that “[i]f this 
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duty [in Art. 6(5)] is made incumbent on the rebels once they seize power in the territory or in 
part of the territory, it is logical to maintain that the other rules of the Protocol also bind the 
rebels before that final moment.”285 State parties to Additional Protocol II should therefore be 
understood to have intended the provisions of the treaty to apply to armed groups, thereby 
satisfying the first requirement of the VCLT test for third party application of treaties.286 
 
The second requisite element of the pacta tertiis rule is the consent on an armed group to be 
bound by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. As will be discussed further in chapter 
5,287 consent to be bound by international law on the part of non-state actors is not and should 
not be a requisite element to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL.  
 
In addition to the problem of the consent to be bound requirement, the third-party approach 
remains weak because it lacks solid support to explain why the rule should be extended to armed 
groups. Cassese’s unsupported assertion that the application of these rules can be extended to 
third-party non-state actors fails to distinguish between types of non-state actors. While his focus 
is on armed groups, it is not clear why extension of these rules beyond states would be limited to 
non-state armed groups.288 Application of this rule to individuals would, however, run contrary 
to the “widely accepted view that the consent of individuals is not required” for the acquisition of 
rights or obligations by individuals under international treaties.289 For example, individual 
consent is not required for the creation of individual rights under international human rights law 
or for the creation of individual obligations under international criminal law.   
 
Further, this approach would be inconsistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This is 
because, at minimum, the protections in Common Article 3 and customary IHL for civilians and 
persons not taking direct part in hostilities are absolute and not dependent on reciprocity.290 
Therefore, if the binding application of IHL, including Common Article 3 and customary IHL, 
relied on an armed group to consent to be bound, a state would be bound by rules that would not 
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be binding on the armed group. For this reason, and the reasons provided above, the third-party 
approach appears to lack a sufficient legal basis to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL. 
3.4.4 De Facto Authority 
The fourth approach is based on the factual circumstance of an armed group exercising de facto 
authority over territory.291 This approach argues that, where an armed group exercises de facto 
control over territory, it “is bound by certain obligations that attach to states”.292 This is because 
its exercise of control over territory renders it “akin to a state”.293 What is required is “stable 
territorial control” on the part of the armed group, which distinguishes it from situations during 
conflict where territorial control is constantly shifting between parties to the conflict.294 This 
approach also requires the armed group to implement some form of “civilian administration” in 
the territory it controls.295 This flows logically from the fact that treaties are binding on 
successive governments, even where they have gained power through armed conflict; the “legal 
personality of the State remains unchanged.”296 However, other discussions of this approach rely 
only on de facto authority over persons and territory and do not include a requirement to exercise 
state-like functions.297 
 
The ability to bind such armed groups to IHL is highly advantageous for the protection of 
civilians in NIACs because, while the law of international armed conflicts includes laws 
applicable to belligerent occupation, there are no equivalent rules of occupation for NIACs under 
either treaty or customary IHL.298 It is also logical to require an armed group that is operating as 
a de facto state or sovereign authority to be held to the same standards as states. However, this 
approach is incomplete on its own and cannot form the sole explanation for how armed groups 
are bound by IHL. A conflict in which an armed group has stable territorial control will be an 
Additional Protocol II conflict; however, in most contemporary NIACs armed groups do not 
meet this territorial control standard.299 Consequently, this approach would not explain how 
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armed groups in the majority of NIACs are bound by IHL.300 It would only capture and explain 
how IHL binds a very small portion of armed groups. Further, even where an armed group does 
have stable territorial control, that group may not attempt to exercise state-like functions on that 
territory, in which case they, too, would not be captured by this approach. Consequently, this 
approach is very strong as a partial explanation for how armed groups are bound by IHL, but it is 
unsatisfactory as the sole approach to explain IHL’s binding power on armed groups. 
 3.4.5 Claims of the Armed Group to Represent the State 
The fifth approach to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL only applies to armed groups 
that make claims to represent the state. Armed groups have also been said to be bound by IHL if 
they “claim to represent the state against which they are fighting.”301 Treaty ratification and 
customary international law bind not only the government which ratifies the treaty or is in power 
when a customary rule crystallizes, but also subsequent governments under the principle that 
“extraconstitutional changes to the government do not affect the person of the state.”302 Under 
this approach to binding armed groups, the group is bound by treaties ratified by the state not 
only if and when they win the conflict and form a new government, but before any victory if they 
“claim[] to be the government or to represent the state” and they “exercise effective 
sovereignty”.303 
 
There may be overlap between this approach and the previous approach based on de facto 
authority where the group making such claims also has stable territorial control and is exercising 
state-like functions. Since this approach relies solely on whether the armed group claims to 
represent the state, there is no requirement of territorial control or the exercise of state-like 
functions. This may mean this approach is capable of capturing some of the armed groups not 
captured by the de facto authority approach. However, it would not explain how armed groups 
who do not claim to represent the state would be bound by IHL (assuming they also do not have 
stable control over territory or exercise state-like functions).304 Many armed groups do not seek 
to take over the state’s government.305 For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, some 
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groups have clearly aspired to take over the government, such as the Alliance des Forces 
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, which ultimately did successfully take over 
the government. However, other groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo do not have 
political aspirations - for example, some have economic aspirations or seek only to protect their 
community or ethnic group.306 Consequently, this approach has a solid legal foundation, but 
would be unsatisfactory as the sole approach to explain how armed groups are bound by IHL. 
 3.4.6 Customary International Law  
This sixth approach considers customary IHL rules binding on armed groups by virtue of the 
rules’ status as customary international law. Consequently, it obviates any need to tie a non-state 
actor to treaty obligations. It does not face the same obstacles to binding non-state actors as 
treaty law. Dinstein has argued that, not only does customary IHL bind all states, it is also 
“capable of imposing obligations on all individuals”.307 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
considered the Revolutionary United Front bound by IHL based on customary rules of IHL and 
the International Court of Justice found the same with respect to the Contras in Nicaragua.308 
Common Article 3 and the norms which stem from its text are “unquestionably of a customary 
international law status.”309 This is supported by case law from the International Court of Justice, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Special Court for Sierra Leone, and numerous domestic courts.310 This approach is 
further supported by the ICRC 2016 Commentary on Common Article 3.311 It is also favoured by 
many respected academics.312 However, this approach again grounds its explanation, like the 
legislative jurisdiction explanation discussed earlier, in the fact that individual group members 
are bound by customary IHL. It fails to explain how customary IHL binds armed groups as 
collective entities.313 
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Other scholars have argued that the binding quality of customary IHL on armed groups rests on 
the fact that they have international legal personality.314 This approach would explain how armed 
groups are directly bound by customary IHL. This was also the position taken by the UN-
sponsored International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, though the Commission included a 
territorial control component. The Commission stated in its report that “all insurgents that have 
reached a certain threshold of organization, stability and effective control of territory, possess 
international legal personality and are therefore bound by the relevant rules of customary 
international law on internal armed conflicts”.315 Sassoli has argued that “IHL implicitly confers 
upon parties to non-international armed conflicts - whether they end up succeeding or not - the 
functional international legal personality necessary to have the rights and obligations foreseen by 
it”.316 Consequently, territorial control is not, according to Sassoli, a requirement for an armed 
group to possess international legal personality. Zegveld has also taken this approach, though 
noting that armed groups have only “limited legal personality”.317  
 
International legal personality is not limited to states. The International Court of Justice in 1949 
identified the potential for non-state actors to acquire international legal personality and found 
that an international organization, the United Nations, did in fact have international legal 
personality.318 The Court, in its 1980 Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 
25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, stated that “subjects of international law … are 
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law” by 
virtue of their status as a subject of international law.319 The Court has also noted that the extent 
and scope of rights and obligations possessed by subjects of international law could vary in 
different subjects of international law could vary based on the “needs of the [international] 
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supra note 172 at 154. 
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community.”320 This means the customary rules of international law applicable to states need not 
necessarily be identical to those of an armed group. This is important to explain how an armed 
group’s limited legal personality would not necessarily mean all of customary international law 
would apply to it.321 The case law of the International Court of Justice demonstrates that it is 
possible for armed groups to have limited international legal personality and, based on that legal 
personality, they are bound by customary IHL. 
 
An advantage of the customary international law approach to explain how armed groups are 
bound by IHL is that it binds the armed group directly as a collective entity as opposed to relying 
solely on the binding nature of rules on individual members of the group.322 This approach, 
however, would bind armed groups only to customary IHL and not IHL treaty law. Much of the 
content of the core IHL treaties (e.g., Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 
1977) are now customary international, therefore this would explain how armed groups are 
bound by most rules of IHL. However, not all IHL treaties have achieved customary legal 
status.323 Where there is no equivalent customary rule, states would nonetheless be bound by the 
treaty obligations they have assumed. This poses a problem for the principle of equality of 
belligerents.324 However, if we jointly consider both the legislative jurisdiction approach and 
customary international approach as explaining how armed groups are bound by IHL, this would 
mean armed groups would be bound by rules of customary IHL as well as treaty rules that have 
not achieved customary status where members of armed groups are citizens of a state party to 
such treaties.325 It is for this reason that the phrase “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties 
 
320 ICJ, Reparations Case, supra note 174 at 8. Murray has noted that “International legal persons and subjects of 
international law may be treated as equivalent.” Murray, supra note 234 at 106. See also Jan Klabbers, An 
Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 43. 
321 See, e.g., Fortin, supra note 73 at 205. 
322 Kleffner, supra note 234 at 455. 
323 Weapons treaties such as the Cluster Munitions Treaty and likely the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention have 
yet to achieve recognized customary international law status. 
324 See, e.g., Moir, supra note 46 at 86, 107–108. 
325 For example, strong statements were made by some states during negotiations for Additional Protocol II. Pakistan 
stated: “nothing in the Protocol should suggest that dissidents must be treated legally other than as rebels”. Official 
Records 1974-1977, supra note 244 at Vol VII, CDDH/SR.49, Draft Art. 1, 61, para 11 (Pakistan); The 
representative from Zaire used even stronger language during the same negotiations: “The mistake made in Protocol 
II, at least in some of its provisions> had been that of treating a sovereign State and a group of insurgent nationals, a 
legal Government and a group of outlaws, a subject of international law and a subject of domestic law, on an equal 
footing.” Ibid at Vol VII, CDDH/SR.49, Draft Art 1, 219, para 124. 
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to the conflict” was included in Common Article 3.326 Kleffner has argued that “[t]he fact that a 
given entity enjoys certain rights under international law and is subject to certain obligations 
does not necessarily confer legitimacy on that entity.”327 The question of whether entities are 
seen as “legitimate” “is divorced from the question of whether they are endowed with 
international legal personality.”328 Therefore, state opposition to conferring legitimacy on armed 
groups does not necessarily conflict with the possession of international legal personality on the 
part of armed groups.  
 
It is possible that the use of the phrase “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict” was the drafters’ attempt to distinguish organized armed groups from the concept of 
recognition of belligerency. Recognition of belligerency arose in the mid-19th century and 
allowed for a non-state armed group fulfilling certain criteria in a civil war, if recognized by a 
state, to be entitled to the full protection of the laws of war which, prior to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, only governed international armed conflicts.329 Recognition of 
belligerency accorded the members of the non-state armed group equal status with the state’s 
own soldiers.330 Corn et al. note that “resistance to this form of recognition that brought a special 
status to non-State actors was strong” and it was rarely employed by states.331 Indeed, by World 
War II, recognition of belligerency had fallen into disuse.332 After the failure to invoke 
recognition of belligerency during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), commentators declared 
that “‘the antiquated and inadequate character of recognition of belligerency [had] bec[o]me 
manifest’ and [they] demanded the development of fundamental humanitarian rules that would 
regulate internal armed conflicts”.333 In the wake of World War II, the international community 
 
326 Pictet, supra note 241 at 44, 60. 
327 Kleffner, supra note 234 at 455. 
328 Ibid. 
329 See, e.g., Yair M Lotsteen, “The Concept of Belligerency in International Law” (2000) 166 Military Law Review 
109 at 113–14; Geoffrey Corn, Ken Watkin & Jamie Williamson, The Law in War – A Concise Overview 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018) at 29. 
330 See, e.g., Lotsteen, supra note 329 at 110; Corn, Watkin & Williamson, supra note 329 at 29. 
331 Corn, Watkin & Williamson, supra note 329 at 29. 
332 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 192; Corn, Watkin & Williamson, supra note 329 at 29, 37. 
333 Tilman Rodenhäuser, Organizing Rebellion: Non-State Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, 
Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) at 32. See also, e.g., 
Richard Falk, “Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War” in James N Rosenau, ed, International 
Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) 185 at 191; Anthony Cullen, The Concept of 
Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) at 22. 
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came together to draft the Geneva Conventions, including the first ever regulation for NIACs, 
Common Article 3. The framework of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II sought to 
regulate NIACs without altering the “legal status” of non-state armed groups and their 
combatants.334 IHL rules applicable to NIACs do not accord non-state armed groups and their 
members equal status to Government soldiers.335 The phrase “shall not affect the legal status of 
the Parties to the conflict” in Common Article 3 is an attempt to prevent an interpretation of the 
Article that would invoke either the historical concept of belligerency or the altered legal 
relationship between state and armed group that belligerency had created.336  
 
Kleffner has argued that the reliance on legal personality to explain the binding nature of IHL on 
armed groups is problematic due to the argument’s “circularity”.337 The attribution of 
international legal personality relies on an entity possessing rights and obligations under 
international law.338 Therefore, Kleffner argues, an armed group’s legal personality relies on 
armed group having rights and obligations under IHL but this legal personality is also advanced 
as the reason for those same IHL rights and obligations.339 I believe this seeming circularity may 
be remedied by clarifying that the international legal personality explanation is advanced to 
explain how customary IHL, but not treaty law, binds armed groups. The International Court of 
Justice’s decision in the Reparations Case demonstrated that states may accord rights and 
obligations to a non-state actor that implicitly bestows that actor with international legal 
personality.340 That scope of that legal personality is limited to that which is necessary to allow 
the actor to carry out the duties that states have bestowed on them.341 The language of Common 
Article 3 that addresses armed groups and creates obligations for them under IHL may then 
 
334 See, e.g., Cameron et al, supra note 226 at paras 864-69. 
335 See, e.g., Zakaria Daboné, “International law: armed groups in a state-centric system” (2011) 93:882 
International Review of the Red Cross 395 at 397. 
336 ICRC, “Legal status of the parties | How does law protect in war? - Online casebook”, online: 
<https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/legal-status-parties>. 
337 Kleffner, supra note 234 at 456. 
338 ICJ, Reparations Case, supra note 174 at 178; Jan Klabbers, “The Concept of Legal Personality” (2005) 11 Ius 
Gentium 35; R Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2010); Murray, supra note 234 at 104. 
339 Kleffner, supra note 234 at 456. 
340 ICJ, Reparations Case, supra note 174 at 178–79. 
341 Ibid. 
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arguably be considered to have given armed groups limited international legal personality, as 
does subsequent customary IHL342 for NIACs and Additional Protocol II.343  
 
Fortin has advanced an explanation of armed group international legal personality that fits with 
the argument made above. She has argued, as I have, that legal personality is bestowed by 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II on armed groups.344 This legal personality is, 
however, “abstract” because, according to Fortin, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
do not “give[], or seek[] to give, specific armed groups legal personality.”345 Rather, the legal 
personality bestowed by these instruments is only activated, or becomes “concrete” when an 
armed group achieves the sufficient level of organization and participates in a NIAC against 
either a state or another armed group.346 Therefore, “the application of the international 
humanitarian law precedes, or coincides with, the application of international legal 
personality.”347 Fortin’s approach provides a logical means of understanding and assessing the 
existence of an armed group’s legal personality. This is consistent with the approach to 
international legal personality articulated by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations 
Case and limits the scope an armed group’s legal personality to that required to fulfill the 
obligations addressed to it under Common Article 3, Additional Protocol, and customary IHL. 
 
Some scholars have suggested that a benefit of the customary international law-based 
international legal personality is that is does not rely on actions of the state against which the 
armed group is fighting to explain how the armed group is bound by IHL.348 However, though 
this explanation is less obviously tied to the state, the fact the construction of rules of customary 
IHL rely on state practice and state opinio juris means that, in actuality, it is still the 
“international community of states at large that binds them.”349 Therefore, the customary 
 
342 Customary IHL for NIACs, by virtue of its intended application in a non-international armed conflict, implicitly 
addresses armed groups as an armed group will necessarily be party to any and all NIACs. 
343 Fortin, supra note 73 at 205. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ibid at 145. 
347 Ibid at 147 However, this approach, which limits legal personality to the norms or rules addressed to the entity, 
would be problematic for those who seek to bind armed groups to international human rights law whose treaties 
were conceived originally to only address states. 
348 See, e.g., Kleffner, supra note 234 at 454. 
349 Ibid. 
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international law explanation could still be perceived by armed groups as an imposition of the 
rules on the group rather than fostering “sense of ownership of those rules”.350 As noted earlier 
and discussed in greater detail in the following section, how an armed group feels about the legal 
explanation for how IHL is binding on them is not relevant to the legality of the explanation. 
However, the fact that armed groups play no role in the formation of customary IHL has led 
some scholars to argue that, in order for armed groups to be bound by customary IHL, their 
practice should be considered in developing rules of customary IHL.351 Further, others have 
argued that armed groups should only be bound by rules of customary international law whose 
creation armed groups played a role in.352  
 
The fact that states were traditionally both subject and creator of rules of customary international 
law does not necessarily mean that armed groups must participate in law creation in order to be 
bound by the law. The ICJ has stated that the fact an entity, such as an international organization, 
has legal personality does not mean “that its rights and duties are the same as those of a State.”353 
Consequently, it is “possible that certain subjects of international law possess the right to create 
law, while others do not.”354 For example, only state ratification is relevant to the entry into force 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations 
or between International Organisations, even though international organizations can legally 
become parties to that Convention.355 Finally, the ICJ Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 
March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, stated that “subjects of international law … are bound 
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law” not only by 
rules of international law that they have had a role in forming.356 
 
 
350 Ibid. 
351 See, e.g., Somer, supra note 220 at 661–62; Sassoli, supra note 25 at 21–22. 
352 See, e.g., ME Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden, NLD: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 104; Sivakumaran, supra note 235 at 373. 
353 ICJ, Reparations Case, supra note 174 at 179. See also, e.g., Portmann, supra note 338 at 8–9. 
354 Murray, supra note 234 at 107. See also, e.g., Portmann, supra note 338 at 8–9. 
355 Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties between States and International Organisations or between 
International Organisations, 16 December 1982 [VCLT States & IOs] at Articles 84(1), 85. 
356 ICJ, WHO & Egypt Opinion, supra note 319 at para 37. The Court used the phrase “general rules of international 
law” and not “customary international law”; however, Cassese has noted that these terms are often used 
interchangeably: Cassese, supra note 172 at 154. 
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The customary international law explanation based on international legal personality provides 
strong legal grounds to explain how rules of IHL bind non-state armed groups. If only one 
explanation could be given, this might be the preferred explanation if the goal is to ensure that 
the maximum number of rules possible apply to armed groups. However, there can be multiple 
explanations as to how IHL binds armed groups. Thus, the customary international law 
explanation of how IHL binds individual members, coupled with the international legal 
personality explanation of how IHL binds the armed group as a whole, can be used in 
conjunction with legislative jurisdiction, national law, de facto authority, and claims to represent 
the state explanations.  
 3.4.7 Consent of the Armed Group 
The final approach that has been advanced to explain how IHL binds armed groups is based on 
the consent of the armed group to be bound. It has been advanced as an explanation unto itself, 
but it is also the determinative element for explaining how groups are bound under the third-
party treaty application explanation discussed earlier. An armed group may consent to be bound 
by IHL rules or treaties either by unilateral declaration or through an agreement with the other 
party, or parties, to the conflict.357 While traditionally in international law the issue of consent 
focuses on state consent to be bound by international legal rules, the idea that an armed group’s 
consent can bind it to rules of IHL can be seen in Common Article 3. Common Article 3 
expressly urges parties to a conflict to “endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the [Geneva] Convention[s].” This provision is 
addressed to both state and non-state parties to a NIAC and implies that these special agreements 
are capable of creating legally binding obligations, not only for states parties, but also for non-
state armed groups.358 Further, as Common Article 3 can apply to conflicts between armed 
groups, this suggests that the binding nature of such special agreements is not dependent on the 
legal power or status of the state.  
 
In addition to special agreements, it has also been said that unilateral declarations issued by 
armed groups can both demonstrate their consent to be bound by rules referenced in such 
 
357 Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 420; Fleck, supra note 46 at 598. 
358 Dinstein, supra note 46 at 71; Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (RUF), 
Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, 26 October 2009 at para 49. For an argument that such agreements are 
treaties, see Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 25 at 454. 
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declarations and can explain how some rules of IHL bind armed groups.359 Some unilateral 
declarations are very formal, such as that issued by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October 
1992,360 while others take the form of more informal statements of commitment, codes of 
conduct, and internal laws. For example, the Kosovo Liberation Army stated, in 2001, that it 
“recognize[d] the Geneva Conventions and the conventions governing the conduct of war, even 
though it ha[d] not been offered the chance of signing them, as it would have done”.361 In 
practice, armed groups have often made “ad hoc commitments” to be bound by IHL generally or 
by certain rules of IHL.362 An example of an ad hoc commitment can be seen in the 1991 
declaration of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and the 2002 Agreement on the 
Protection of Civilians and Civilian Facilities between the Sudanese government and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).363 In practice, an armed group may or may not abide by 
its commitments made in this fashion.364 Groups, like some states, may make commitments to 
certain rules more for the reputational benefits than based on good faith.365 Sivakumaran has 
suggested that where the “commitment is followed” or where “it is followed to an extent”, it 
should be “taken seriously”.366 While not definitively established, the work of academics and 
international bodies appears to indicate that such declarations and agreements create legally 
binding obligations on armed groups and therefore can explain how they come to be bound by 
certain rules of IHL.367 Dinstein has, however, suggested that the obligations flowing from these 
agreements or declarations are not international legal obligations but, rather, “obligations under 
 
359 Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Lawmaking by Non-State Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the 
Creation of International Humanitarian Law” (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 107 at 141–42. 
360 For example, the Rwandan Patriotic Front issued such a declaration in 1992: Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, 
“Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Armed Non-State Actors in Africa” (2006) 88:864 International 
Review of the Red Cross 905 at 908. 
361 KLA spokesman cited in Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2001). 
362 Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 420. 
363 National Democratic Front of the Philippines, “NDFP Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 »”, (5 July 1996), online: <https://www.ndfp.org/ndfp-declaration-of-
undertaking-to-apply-the-geneva-conventions-of-1949-and-protocol-i-of-1977-3/>; “Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement to Protect Non-Combatant 
Civilians and Civilian Facilities from Military Attack | UN Peacemaker”, (31 March 2002), online: 
<https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-protection-civilians2002>. 
364 Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 421. 
365 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 108. 
366 Ibid. 
367 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 233 at 421; International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 235 at 
para 174; ICTR, Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 310 at para 627. 
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the domestic law of the State”.368 His argument appears to be that, because these agreements are 
not and cannot be treaties, a fact supported by international jurisprudence,369 they are incapable 
of creating international legal obligations.370 While I take no issue with the suggestion that these 
are not treaties, I do challenge the suggestion that, as a result, they can only bind armed groups 
under national as opposed to international law.371 Dinstein’s discussion appears to assume the 
agreements in question will always be between a state and an armed group.372 Yet, as noted 
above, the nature of these agreements is indicated by Common Article 3, which references the 
parties to the conflict and does not explicitly indicate that a state must be party to the agreement. 
Common Article 3 applies to all NIACs, including conflicts between armed groups without state 
involvement.  
 
While it is possible that consent can explain how IHL comes to bind armed groups, there is 
nothing to suggest that consent on the part of armed groups is legally required to explain how 
they are bound by IHL. First, several of the preceding sections have provided legally sound 
explanations for how armed groups come to be bound by IHL which do not include consent as a 
requisite element.373 Further, reliance solely on consent to explain how armed groups are bound 
by IHL could be highly problematic for the principle of equality of belligerents. In a NIAC 
between a state and an armed group, the state would remain bound by its own obligations under 
IHL, but the armed group could, in theory, withhold consent for any and all rules of IHL. Third, 
neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II contain language that suggests their 
binding authority on armed groups is dependent on those groups’ consent. Rather, an armed 
group is merely required to be capable of implementing the obligations they contain and, as such, 
 
368 Dinstein, supra note 46 at 71. 
369 SCSL, RUF Appeal Judgment, supra note 358 at para 49. 
370 Dinstein, supra note 46 at 71. 
371 Unilateral declarations can create legally binding obligations distinct from treaty obligations. See, e.g., Nuclear 
Tests (Australia v France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, 253 at 267, para 43; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v 
France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, 457 at 472, para 46. 
372 In his brief discussion Dinstein only refers to “Agreements between the incumbent Government and the 
insurgents”: Dinstein, supra note 45 at 71. 
373 Neither legislative jurisdiction nor national law require no consent. De facto authority and claims to represent the 
state also do not contain such a requirement, though it might be possible to argue that in behaving like or seeking to 
become a government the armed group is implicitly assuming state obligations. Only a small group of scholars 
suggest that the customary international law explanation should turn on armed group participation in the creation of 
the rules by which they are bound, which suggests a form of explicit or implicit consent is needed; however, consent 
is generally not considered a requirement of the customary international law explanation. 
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the groups’ willingness to comply is irrelevant to the question of whether they are bound.374 
Consent to be bound is necessary for a state to be bound by international law;375 however, there 
is nothing to suggest that consent is necessary on the part of non-state actors, such as armed 
groups. Certainly, under national law there is no requirement for express consent in order for 
individual citizens to be bound. Similarly, at the international level, individuals have been found 
to be bound, for example under international criminal law, without need for consent.376 However, 
it could be suggested that collective entities, such as armed groups, are subject to different rules 
than individuals. This suggestion would, however, be incorrect. Again, under national law, states 
often create obligations for collective entities, notably corporations, that do not require corporate 
consent to be bound.377 At the international level, international investment treaties can create 
rights for corporations.378 More broadly and more akin to the obligations of armed groups under 
IHL, the draft for an international treaty on business and human rights contains obligations for 
transnational corporations but only provides for states to be parties to the treaty.379 This all 
suggests that, while state consent to be bound is required under international law, consent to be 
bound is not required by either individuals or collective entities under international law. 
 
While many have argued in favour of the consent explanation, they largely base their arguments 
on the positive effects consent may have on armed group compliance.380 Yet, as already 
discussed, there is nothing in Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, or under international 
law more generally that suggests consent is a requisite element of being bound. So, while armed 
group consent may increase armed group compliance with IHL, it is widely considered not to be 
 
374 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 74, 188–89, 191. Additional Protocol II Article 1 requires armed groups 
to have territorial control that “enable them … to implement this Protocol.” There is no equivalent language in 
Common Article 3; however, many have argued that Common Article 3 requires armed groups to merely be capable 
of implementing its provisions: see, e.g., Sassoli, supra note 26 at 56. 
375 Express consent to be bound is required for treaties to be binding and for customary international law consent 
may be express but can also be tacit. See, e.g, Jutta Brunnée, “Consent” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford Public International Law (Online) (2010). 
376 See, e.g., Fortin, supra note 73 at 184. 
377 For example, in Canada, corporations have obligations to do many things, including keeping a registered office in 
Canada as well as records of shareholder meetings and corporate by-laws: Canada Business Corporations Act, 
(RSC, 1985, c C-44) [Canada Business Corporations Act] at Sections 19 & 20. 
378 Julian Ku, “The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law” (2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International 
Law 729 at 732–33. 
379 UN Human Rights Council, Report on the fourth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (2019) at 7–17. 
380 See, e.g., Bellal & Heffes, supra note 82 at 128; Heffes & Frenkel, supra note 262 at 55–58; Sassoli, supra note 
25 at 29–32. 
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essential for IHL application to non-state parties. An armed group’s “obligation [to respect IHL, 
specifically Common Article 3] is not only independent of an express acceptance of common 
Article 3 by the non-State Party, but also of whether an opposing Party in practice adheres to the 
provisions of common Article 3.”381 Further, regardless of the rules agreed to in a special 
agreement between parties to a NIAC, the parties to the conflict are bound by all applicable rules 
of IHL.382 In other words, parties to a NIAC cannot attempt to avoid being bound by rules of IHL 
through mutual agreement. Consequently, a limited agreement will not exempt or constrain the 
parties’ obligations under IHL. IHL clearly seeks to separate issues of compliance from 
questions of binding obligations. While developing approaches to engaging armed groups that 
will increase compliance is very important in IHL, the degree to which any of the seven 
explanations for how armed groups come to be bound by IHL increases compliance is not 
determinative of the legal soundness of the explanation.  
3.5 The Application of International Human Rights Law during Armed Conflicts 
The preceding sections established that armed groups are bound by IHL and that they are bound 
regardless of whether or not they have consented to be bound. This section examines the 
application of international human rights law (IHRL) during armed conflict and whether it, too, 
creates binding obligations for armed groups. Although the focus of this thesis is on IHL, it is 
necessary to consider IHRL when identifying gaps and weaknesses in existing IHL. This is 
because IHRL, historically thought to only apply during peacetime, is now considered to 
continue to apply during armed conflict.383 Historically, treaties and law beyond the scope of 
IHL were considered inoperative when armed conflict began.384 Under this approach, IHRL 
stopped applying upon the outbreak of war and did not resume its application until after the 
conclusion of hostilities.385 This approach to legal regulation during times of armed conflict was 
 
381 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 179. 
382 Ibid at 287–88. 
383 ICJ Wall Case, supra note 75 at para 106; ICJ, Congo v Uganda, supra note 75 at para 216; African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ACHPR, Chad case, supra note 75 at para 21; International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 4 Apr. 2006 at para 104; 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 72 at para 25; UN Human Rights Council, General Comment No 
31, HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. I), 27 May 2008 at para 11; Michael N Schmitt, “Green War: An Assessment of the 
Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict” (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law 1 at 37. 
384 See, e.g., Pictet, supra note 75 at 15; Greenwood, supra note 75 at 12; Draper, supra note 75 at 191–96; 
Robertson, supra note 75 at 793; Jenks, supra note 75 at 446; Kolb, supra note 75. 
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based on the view that IHL in its entirety was lex specialis and, as a result, operated in a position 
of priority over all other law between the parties to a conflict.386 It is no longer the case that 
IHRL is considered completely inoperative during armed conflict.387 Rather, armed conflict is 
now considered “a continuation of interstate relation[s] and, thus, subject to legal limits”388 and, 
therefore, IHRL continues to apply during armed conflict.389 Consequently, IHL is no longer 
considered to suspend the operation of IHRL. Instead, IHL and other bodies of law can operate 
concurrently,390 with IHL serving to “complement[ other areas of law] and [to] bring[] greater 
specificity to their applicability in conflict.”391 
 
The ongoing application of IHRL during armed conflict was specifically addressed in the 
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.392 In this opinion, 
the court clearly articulated its view that IHRL continues to operate during armed conflict. It 
stated: “The protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] does 
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain 
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”393 Under the ICCPR, seven 
provisions are protected from derogation in all circumstances, including national emergencies 
such as an armed conflict. Rights protected even during armed conflict include the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life,394 the right to not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
 
386 See, e.g., Nancy Prud’homme, “Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship” 
(2007) 40 Israel Law Review 356 at 358; Jenks, supra note 75 at 446; W Karl, “Treaties, Conflicts between” in R 
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388 Schmitt, supra note 383 at 37. 
389 See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 77 at 345; Doswald-Beck & Vité, supra note 77; Droege, supra note 77. 
390 See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at para 25; ICJ Wall Case, supra note 76 at para 
106; ICJ, Congo v Uganda, supra note 76 at para 216; Dinstein, supra note 77 at 345; Doswald-Beck & Vité, supra 
note 77; Droege, supra note 77. 
391 Kirsten Stefanik, Restoring Humanity to Humanitarian Law: Borrowing from Environmental Law to Protect 
Civilians and the Environment University of Western Ontario, 2013) [unpublished] at 124. 
392 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73. 
393 Ibid at para 25. 
394 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 999 [ICCPR] at Article 4(2). See also, e.g., 
Hans-Joachim Heintze, “On the relationship between human rights law protection and international humanitarian 
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International Law 917; Droege, supra note 77. 
  
   
  
84 
degrading treatment,395 the right to not be subjected to slavery,396 and the right to freedom of 
religion.397 
 
The ability to derogate from the protection of certain human rights during armed conflict is 
strictly interpreted in IHRL. Derogation, according to the UN Human Rights Committee, is 
limited “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”.398 This means that 
derogation measures must be proportional to the state of emergency in terms of the “duration, 
geographical coverage and material scope of the state of emergency”.399 Accordingly, the UN 
Human Rights Committee expressed the belief that “[i]n practice this will ensure that no 
provision of the Covenant, however validly derogated from, will be entirely inapplicable to the 
behaviour of a State party.”400 
 
The International Court of Justice has further clarified how provisions of IHL and IHRL operate 
together because some provisions, such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, will 
differ in meaning depending on whether one is in the context of peace or war. The principle of 
lex specialis remains relevant, however. The Court stated that, while the right to life continues to 
operate during armed conflict, the meaning of “arbitrary deprivation of life” in armed conflict 
“can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from 
the terms of the [ICCPR] itself.”401 In the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL, the ICRC has 
stated that, in the case of NIACs, the interplay of IHL and IHRL requires consideration of 
customary IHL in addition to IHL treaty provisions in determining the proper application of 
specific rules from these bodies of law.402 
 
395 ICCPR, supra note 393 at Article 7. Acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are also prohibited 
under IHL in Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at 
Article 4(2). 
396 ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 8. Slavery is explicitly prohibited under Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II, 
supra note 5. 
397 ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 18. 
398 UN Human Rights Council, CCPR General Comment No 29: State of Emergency (Article 4), 31 August 2001, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 11 at para 4. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Ibid. 
401 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at para 25. 
402 ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, Report (Geneva: 
ICRC, 2015) at 35; ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2011) at 13–20. 
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Traditionally, IHRL was considered to only apply to states,403 however, some have argued that it 
is now also applicable to armed groups during NIACs.404 Scholars who consider IHRL 
inapplicable to armed groups emphasize that, while IHL applicable to NIACs has always been 
intended to apply to armed groups, IHRL was developed to apply to states, not armed groups.405 
Fortin’s review of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, found 
no evidence that anything in those instruments conveyed an intent to bind armed groups.406 
There are two human rights treaties that do manifest an intent to bind armed groups: the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which addresses the participation of 
children in hostilities;407 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, which both explicitly address obligations to armed 
groups.408 Some scholars have argued that “intent is one of the main determinants of 
international rights and obligations”409 and that the absence of intent on the part of the drafters of 
IHRL treaties blocks the potential to bind armed groups to this body of law based on the 
legislative jurisdiction approach discussed earlier.410 By contrast, Clapham has stated that 
legislative jurisdiction “could … justify the application to individuals and non-state actors of 
 
403 Zegveld, supra note 25 at 53; Moir, supra note 46 at 194; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third 
Report on the Human Rights Situation in Columbia, OEA/Ser.I/V/II.102, Doc 9 rev 1, 26 February 1999 at ch 4, 
para 13; Abella et al v Argentina (La Tablada), Case No. 11.137, 18 November 1997,  OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98 doc. 6 
rev. 13, April 1998 at para 174. 
404 Murray, supra note 73 at 120–54; Bellal & Heffes, supra note 82 at 129; Clapham, supra note 82 at 280; 
Oberleitner, supra note 82 at 211; Murray, supra note 234 at 121; Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), Report on the Question of Human Rights in Cyprus, A/HRC/25/21, 22 January 2014 at para 11; 
Sivakumaran, supra note 49 at 253; Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, “International law and 
armed non-state actors in Afghanistan” (2011) 93:881 International Review of the Red Cross 47 at 47; B Rudolf, 
“Non-State Actors of Limited Statehood as Addressees of Public International Law Norms of Governance” (2010) 4 
Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 127; Heintze, supra note 394 at 271; Zegveld, supra note 25 at 
149; Ryngaert, supra note 82 at 358; UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in 
Sri Lanka (2011) at para 181. 
405 ICCPR, supra note 394; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 
[ICESCR]; Fortin, supra note 73 at 209–39. 
406 Fortin, supra note 73 at 209–39. 
407 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 25 May 2000 [CRC Optional Protocol] at Article 4(1). 
408 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(“Kampala Convention”), African Union, 23 October 2009 [AU Kampala Convention] at Article 7(5). 
409 Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
1996) at 68. 
410 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 73 at 109–10. 
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certain human rights obligations found in treaties” though he does not specify which human 
rights obligations could be justifiably applied to non-state actors.411  
 
It has been argued that, in exceptional circumstances, IHRL obligations can create binding 
obligations for armed groups.412 These arguments for the binding nature of IHRL on armed 
groups tend to rely predominantly on the “[armed group’s] relationship with the territorial 
State.”413 The exercise of de facto authority on the part of an armed group, through territorial 
control and some form of administration over that territory, is said to warrant the assumption of 
human rights obligations because the group has de facto taken the place of the state vis-à-vis the 
population in the territory under its control.414 It has been suggested that, when an armed group is 
a de facto authority, it is bound by “obligations of fundamental IHRL” because these 
fundamental rights, such as the right to life or the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, are customary international law.415 The de facto authority argument 
tends to be viewed as the strongest, and perhaps only, legitimate explanation of how some armed 
groups may be legally bound by IHRL.416 Indeed, even the ICRC, which has long taken the 
position that armed groups do not and cannot have human rights obligations, has recognized an 
exception to this position in “cases in which a group, usually by virtue of stable control of 
territory, has the ability to act like a state authority”.417 In that case, then “[that armed group’s] 
human rights responsibilities may therefore be recognized de facto.”418  
 
 
411 Andrew Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations” (2006) 88:863 
International Review of the Red Cross 491 at 499. 
412 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 73 at 120–54. 
413 Bellal & Heffes, supra note 82 at 129. See also, e.g., Clapham, supra note 82 at 280; Oberleitner, supra note 82 
at 211; Murray, supra note 234 at 121; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), supra note 
404 at para 11. 
414 See, e.g., Jochen A Frowein, “De Facto Regime” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Oxford Public International Law (Online); Pictet, supra note 241 at 37; Kleffner, supra note 234 at 452; 
Sivakumaran, supra note 235; Fortin, supra note 73 at 268–72. 
415 See, e.g., Heintze, supra note 394 at 271–75; Nadarajah Pushparajah, Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-
State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflicts (Oisterwijk, NLD: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2016) at 40. 
416 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 49 at 253; Bellal, Giacca & Casey-Maslen, supra note 404 at 47; Rudolf, 
supra note 404; Zegveld, supra note 25 at 149; Heintze, supra note 394 at 271; Ryngaert, supra note 82 at 358; UN, 
supra note 404 at para 181; Clapham, supra note 82; Murray, supra note 234. 
417 ICRC, supra note 402 at 14–15. 
418 Ibid. 
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The fact that many armed groups do not exercise de facto authority means that, beyond the 
possibility of being bound to fundamental IHRL obligations under customary international law, a 
worrisome gap may exist in the protection of human rights.419 It is well established that “the acts 
of unsuccessful insurrectional movements are not attributable to the State”.420 That means that 
the state will not be responsible for human rights violations committed by members of an armed 
group that does not exercise de facto authority. It has been suggested that IHRL obligations may 
apply to armed groups that do not meet the “control of territory and some form of 
administration” requirement for the exercise of de facto authority.421 This argument is made 
based on the fact that the acts of an armed group that successfully defeats the Government can 
incur international responsibility. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility state that, where an armed group goes on to form a new government, “[t]he 
situation requires that acts committed during the struggle for power by the [armed group] should 
be attributable to the state, alongside acts of the then established Government.”422 Murray has 
argued that this means that: 
the law of state responsibility accepts that international 
obligations can be directly imposed on a non-state armed group 
– including those existing below the de facto authority threshold 
– concurrent to the imposition of obligation son the territorial 
state.423 
 
Murray further argues that armed groups below the de facto authority threshold must still meet 
the threshold of being beyond the control of the state;424 however, this threshold can be met by 
the existence of a NIAC because this “[would] clearly indicate a state’s inability to reasonably 
impose its will”.425 He states that an armed group beyond the control of the state that “exercise[s] 
control over an area or population … should be regarded as a vertical authority” that is bound by 
IHRL obligations.426 He appears to adopt a very loose understanding of “control over … 
 
419 Murray, supra note 73 at 128–30, 133–34, 136, 145-46,159-60. 
420 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, International 
Law Commission, 2001 [ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility] at 50. The exception to this general rule is 
where the person or group is “exercising governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities” 
(Draft Article 9) or where the conduct of the group is directed of controlled by a state (Draft Article 8). 
421 Murray, supra note 73 at 131–34. 
422 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 420 at 51. 
423 Murray, supra note 73 at 132. 
424 Ibid at 133–34. 
425 Ibid at 138–39. 
426 Ibid at 153. 
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population” based on the ability of an armed group in a NIAC to “exert unregulated authority” 
due to the fact that it is beyond state control.427 It appears it is only the exercise of “government-
like functions” that Murray deems non-essential for an armed group to possess de facto 
authority.428  
 
Murray’s approach to the requisite elements of de facto authority provides a legal argument for 
the binding application of IHRL to armed groups under customary international law and 
international treaty law. However, Murray does not simply lower the traditional de facto 
authority threshold of territorial control and some form of administration: he essentially replaces 
it with the threshold for a NIAC. This would only require an armed group to have sufficient 
organization for the application of Common Article 3. Since an armed group under Common 
Article 3 need only have sufficient organization to implement its obligations under that provision 
and requires no territorial control whatsoever, its organizational capacity may be minimal. Some 
scholars have expressed concern that groups which lack territorial control or control over 
population are unlikely to have the capacity to implement many human rights beyond the basic 
ones under customary international law.429 The lack of sufficient capacity concern is also the 
ICRC’s primary argument against the suggestion that armed groups, other than de facto 
authorities, can have IHRL obligations.430 However, the lack of capacity does not necessarily 
mean that these armed groups could not be, or are not, bound by IHRL. Murray attempts to 
address this possible problem by advocating a “gradated application” of IHRL obligations to 
armed groups based on each group’s capacity to apply the rules of IHRL.431  
 
International practice appears to support the argument that armed groups operating as de facto 
authorities have IHRL obligations.432 For example, the UN Security Council has frequently 
 
427 Ibid. 
428 Ibid. 
429 See, e.g., Moir, supra note 46 at 194; Marco Sassoli & LM Olson, “The Relationship between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-
International Armed Conflict” (2008) 90:87 International Review of the Red Cross 599 at 622–23. 
430 ICRC, supra note 402 at 14–15. 
431 Murray, supra note 73 at 172–202. 
432 See, e.g., UN Security Council, Final Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Central African Republic, (22 December 2014) UN Doc S/2014/928; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Republic’ (15 August 2012) UN 
Doc A/HRC/21/50 at 47, Annex II; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International 
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called upon non-state parties to a conflict to “comply strictly with the obligations applicable to 
them under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law”.433 Fortin has 
noted that in international practice there are repeated references to the fact that “‘it is now 
increasingly accepted that non-state groups exercising de facto control over a part of a State’s 
territory must respect fundamental human rights of persons in that territory” international 
practice repeatedly references does not explicitly eliminate the requirement that an armed group 
exercise government functions in addition to territorial control in order to be bound as a de facto 
authority.434 These references in international practice rarely mention the exercise of government 
functions requirement.435 This would seem to suggest that, at the very least, territorial control 
accompanied by the exercise of government-like functions almost certainly leads to IHRL 
obligations for armed groups and it is possible, though not definitively established, that territorial 
control alone may be sufficient to bind armed groups to IHRL. 
 
The fact that at least some armed groups appear to be bound by IHRL warrants consideration of 
this body of law when assessing whether a particular combatant behaviour is or is not currently 
regulated during armed conflict. Rules and principles of IHRL remain relevant in the context of 
armed conflict with respect to both state and at least some non-state parties. The ability to 
derogate to a certain degree from certain rules of IHRL may mean that, in times of conflict, 
certain rights may be largely inapplicable or may operate in a restricted manner. However, it is 
unclear whether armed groups have the ability to derogate from certain IHRL obligations as 
states can. Even where IHRL does or might address the behaviours identified through 
 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahariya, (1 June 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/44 at 32–33; UN, supra note 404; UN Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ‘Human Rights In Palestine 
And Other Occupied Arab Territories, (23 September 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/48 at 80. 
433 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1894 (2009) (on Protection of civilians in armed conflict), 11 
November 2009, S/RES/1894 (2009)*. See also, e.g., A Constantinides, “Human Rights Obligations and 
Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups: The Practice of the UN Security Council” (2010) 4 Human Rights and 
International Legal Discourse 89 at 101–103; C Tomuschat, “The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent 
Movements” in Horst Fischer, ed, Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection (Berlin: Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004) at 573–91. 
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435 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in 
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psychological insights in this thesis, new IHL regulations or approaches may still be needed if 
the application of existing IHRL during conflict is ambiguous or insufficient. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the issue of civilian protection from abuses committed by members of 
armed groups during NIACs. The thesis advances the claim that behavioural regulations distinct 
from regulations for the protection of individuals in peacetime are needed to prevent violations 
of IHL protections for civilians. This chapter has demonstrated to whom current IHL applies and, 
therefore, which armed groups may be captured or affected by the new rules and regulations 
proposed in chapter 8. It has also demonstrated that IHRL applies during armed conflict 
generally and creates binding obligations for some armed groups. 
 
The chapter began by explaining that only armed groups that possess a requisite degree of 
organization are the addressees of this body of law. The object and purpose of IHL as well as the 
principle of equality belligerents necessitates that all parties to an armed conflict, including 
armed groups, be bound by IHL. The main focus of this chapter was the seven different 
explanations that have been advanced in the literature for the binding application of IHL to 
armed groups. The application of international law to armed groups is complicated by the fact 
that, traditionally, international law is made for and by states. Many discussions assessing the 
various explanations for how IHL binds armed groups have evaluated the explanations based in 
part on their anticipated effects on armed group compliance with the law. This is problematic 
because the strength of a legal explanation is distinct from the issue of compliance. Compliance 
is very important, but it is and should be considered separately from the question of legality. De 
facto authority and claims to represent the state will explain how IHL binds only a small portion 
of armed groups. They are good explanations, but should be used alongside other explanations 
rather than advanced as the sole explanation for the binding nature of IHL obligations for armed 
groups. The incorporation and implementation of IHL into national law can explain how armed 
groups are bound by many rules of IHL; however, it cannot explain how application of IHL 
binds directly as a matter of international, rather than national, law. Legislative jurisdiction 
provides a strong legal explanation for how armed groups are bound under international law 
based on state ratification and acceptance of IHL on behalf of its citizens. This explanation can 
also be used to explain how rules of customary IHL bind armed groups; however, the case law 
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from the International Court of Justice also supports the customary international law explanation 
based on the limited international legal personality. It is consistent with this case law to view 
Common Article 3 and subsequent regulation of NIACs also addressed to armed groups as 
creating the requisite international legal personality to fulfill the obligations assigned to them by 
states under IHL. There is nothing to prevent both legislative jurisdiction and international legal 
personality explanations from operating as legal explanations for how armed groups are bound 
by both treaty and customary IHL. This chapter has challenged the consent explanation and the 
third-party treaty application explanation (which turns on the issue of consent). The language of 
Common Article 3 suggests that consent may be a valid explanation for how some rules of IHL 
come to bind armed groups; however, it is by no means sufficient unto itself to fully explain how 
IHL more broadly binds armed groups. The suggestion from some scholars that consent is 
required for an armed group to be bound by IHL is unfounded. While consent is requisite for 
states to be bound by IHL, there is no evidence that the consent requirement extends to non-state 
actors. Finally, this chapter addressed the application of IHRL during armed conflict and 
demonstrated that it creates binding obligations for armed groups acting as de facto authorities. 
 
This chapter established that organized armed groups are bound by IHL. The fact they are 
currently bound by IHL, and some are also bound by IHRL, suggests they would likely be 
affected by new rules and regulations recommended in later chapters of this thesis. The next 
chapter will turn to the specific protections for civilians available in IHL. An understanding of 
existing protections is essential, as it provides the existing framework that will be examined in 
chapter 8 to identify combatant behaviours not currently captured by IHL, but which require 
regulation for the protection of civilians. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4 International Humanitarian Law Protections for Civilians in Non-
International Armed Conflicts 
 
IHL is designed to operate in situations where all other legal order has broken down. It is an 
attempt to instill a modicum of order into a situation of chaos. It represents the effort of the 
international community to balance military necessity with the dictates of humanity.436 
Unfortunately, and perhaps unsurprisingly, there is inherent tension between these two concepts. 
For example, whereas the dictates of humanity prohibits all harm to civilians unless the harm 
was unavoidable, the principle of proportionality permits harm to civilians that may be avoidable 
so long as it is incidental to an attack on a legitimate military target and the civilian harm does 
not outweigh the military advantage of the attack in question.437 In NIACs, this tension is 
exacerbated by further friction between the dictates of humanity and state sovereignty, which has 
traditionally allowed states the right to control all matters within their territory with limited 
outside interference.438 This right has been eroded in certain ways through the development of 
international law.439 For example, international human rights law erodes state sovereignty 
through its regulation of how a state may treat its citizens.440 
 
 
436 See, e.g., Michael N Schmitt, “Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance” (2010) 50:4 Virginia Journal of International Law 795; Yoram Dinstein, “The Principle of 
Proportionality” in Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Camilla Guldahl Cooper & Gro Nystuen, eds, Searching for a 
“Principle of Humanity” in international Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 72. 
437 See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 436. Dinstein has observed that if humanity “were the only factor to be weighed in 
hostilities, war would have entailed no bloodshed, no human suffering, and no destruction of property; in short war 
would not be war. IHL must be predicated on a subtle balance – and compromise – between conflicting 
considerations of humanity, on the one hand, and the demands of military necessity on the other.” (73). 
438 Daud Hussan, “The Rise of the Territorial State and The Treaty of Westphalia” (2006) 9 Yearbook of New 
Zealand Jurisprudence 62; Cassese, supra note 172 at 98–123. 
439 See, e.g., Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty” (2002) 6:1 International 
Journal of Human Rights 81; Mario Bettati, “The International Community and Limitations of Sovereignty” (1996) 
44:4 Diogenes 91; Louis Henkin, “That ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera” 
(1995) 68:1 Fordham Law Review 79; Temple Fett Kearns, “Breaking the Shackles of the Past: The Role and Future 
of State Sovereignty in Today’s International Human Rights Arena” (2001) 25:2 Nova Law Review 502; Ruth 
Lapidoth, “Redefining Authority” (1995) 17:3 Harvard Law Review 8. 
440 See, e.g., Ayoob, supra note 439 at 93; Bettati, supra note 439 at 92; Henkin, supra note 439 at 3–4; Kearns, 
supra note 439 at 522; Lapidoth, supra note 439. 
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Common Article 3 in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 represents the first international 
codification of IHL rules applicable to NIACs.441 These protections were elaborated upon and 
supplemented by Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention in 1977.442 This treaty law is 
complemented by, and protections for civilians expanded through, the application of customary 
IHL in NIACs.443 The previous chapter demonstrated to whom and how the rules of IHL are 
binding during these conflicts. This chapter explores the content of the rules in this body of law 
that aim to protect civilians from the worst effects of war. 
 
This chapter begins by examining the foundational principles of customary IHL and treaty law 
applicable to NIACs. First, the chapter considers the humanitarian foundations of civilian 
protections in IHL, including the principle of humanity and the requirement of humane treatment 
which are at the core of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. The chapter then turns to 
a consideration of the basis for all civilian protections in conflict: the principle of distinction. The 
principle of distinction requires parties to the conflict to distinguish between combatants, who 
are legal targets, and civilians, who may not be directly targeted.444 This chapter therefore 
reviews how ‘civilian’ is defined in IHL, and how civilians are distinguished from combatants 
under this principle. This section is followed by discussion of the principle of proportionality in 
which the effort to balance between military necessity and humanity is most evident. The final 
section of the first part of this chapter reflects on the requirement that military actors take 
precautions in military operations for the protection of civilians. 
 
The remainder of the chapter examines specific prohibited acts in the context of NIACs, such as 
murder, torture, and pillage. While the core prohibitions in Common Article 3 and AP II are 
identified, a more detailed discussion is only provided for the prohibitions most often violated in 
NIACs, in particular in the context of the two case study conflicts, Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, examined in this thesis. This section demonstrates how the 
 
441 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2d ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016) at para 
351. 
442 Additional Protocol II Article 1(1) states “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application”. 
443 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 1-24, 87-106, 134-35. 
444 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, “Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Conflicts” (2008) 
84 International Law Studies 183 at 183; Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 1. 
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existing specific protections for civilians largely prohibit behaviour that is also considered illegal 
under many domestic jurisdictions during peacetime. The chapter argues that there may be 
behaviours that have been accorded certain legal parameters in peacetime, and which may 
warrant IHL-specific regulation during armed conflict. 
 
It must be noted that much of the existing understanding of the principles and specific 
prohibitions examined in this chapter comes from international criminal law decisions and 
judgments. This case law is extremely useful and rightly relied upon to help practitioners, 
academics, and parties to conflicts understand the content of crimes identified in IHL. 
International criminal law has helped to provide detail to an otherwise limited body of rules for 
NIACs.445 However, it is critical to remember, particularly for the purposes of this thesis, that 
there is a distinction between IHL and international criminal law. First, not all violations of IHL 
are criminalized under international criminal law. Second, due to the nature of international 
criminal law, acts prohibited under IHL will often have more restrictive definitions and 
application under international criminal law: for example, a higher threshold of mens rea will 
often be required under international criminal law.446 This means that new IHL rules developed 
for NIACs will not necessarily also be considered to be crimes under international criminal law. 
Further, even if new IHL rules are considered to be international crimes, the elements of a 
prohibition under IHL need not align with all of the same standards that would be required in 
international criminal law. Therefore, due to the differences between IHL and international 
criminal law, the latter’s case law should be taken as “useful guidance in understanding the 
relevant international humanitarian law rule” rather than as a definitive expression of IHL.447 
 
This thesis advances the claim that an examination of existing civilian protection provisions in 
IHL reveals a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the protection of individuals in peace 
and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant violence during war. This chapter 
argues that the current framework for civilian protection in NIACs is based largely on 
 
445 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 49 at 233. 
446 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 78–81, 264 (discussing differences between IHL and international 
criminal law); Robinson, supra note 60 at 946–55 (discussing differences between IHL and international criminal 
law). 
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protections afforded to individuals during peacetime. It demonstrates that the substantive content 
of IHL is founded in the humanitarian objective of protecting individuals, in particular civilians, 
who do not take direct part in hostilities. Consequently, ongoing harm toward civilians in armed 
conflicts warrants consideration of whether the substantive content of IHL might be further 
developed in order to better achieve the humanitarian aim of protecting civilians during war. 
Ultimately, this chapter provides the framework that serves as the starting point for analysis in 
chapter 8 in order to determine what behaviours require regulation under IHL during NIACs. 
4.1 The Humanitarian Foundation of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict  
This section will discuss the humanitarian ideals that undergird much of modern IHL. These 
ideals serve as the basis in this thesis for the further substantive development of IHL in order to 
improve civilian protection during armed conflict. Inherent in the name ‘international 
humanitarian law’ is the idea of humanity. While some actors, particularly national armed forces, 
continue to refer to this body of law as the ‘law of armed conflict’,448 ‘international humanitarian 
law’ has gained greater traction outside of that realm, including recognition by the International 
Court of Justice.449 Similarly, the statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda refer to ‘international humanitarian law’.450 
 
The International Court of Justice has recognized the principle of humanity in IHL. The court 
first acknowledged the existence of a principle of humanity in war, albeit indirectly, in its 1949 
judgment in the Corfu Channel case.451 In that case, the court recognized an obligation of a 
principle of “elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in 
war”.452 The court has since addressed the principle of humanity during war more directly in its 
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention,453 its Nuclear Weapons 
 
448 For example, the national armed forces of both Canada and the United States: Office of the Judge Advocate 
General, Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 (Ottawa: Dept of 
National Defense (Canada), 2001); LCDR Rachel S Mangas, MAJ Matthew Festa & MAJ Laura O’Donnell, eds, 
Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, 16th ed (Charlottesville, VA: US Army, 2016). 
449 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at 257. 
450 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 3 May 1993 
[ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 November 955 [ICTR Statute]. 
451 Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits), 9 April 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports 4. 
452 Ibid at 22. 
453 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 
28 May 1951, 1951 ICJ Reports 15 at 15. 
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Advisory Opinion,454 and its decisions in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua455 and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide.456 In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the court 
stated that the provisions of Common Article 3 “constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to 
the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules 
which, in the Court's opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of 
humanity.'”457 More recently, in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the International Court 
of Justice noted the “intrinsically humanitarian character of legal principles [of IHL …] which 
permeates the entire law of armed conflict”.458 
 
Coupland has argued that a “fundamental and objective relationship exists between humanity, 
armed violence and international law and that this relationship has long been recognized.”459 
“[E]lementary considerations of humanity” have played a large role in the development of norms 
and “the elaboration of new standards”;460 however, humanity is not the only consideration in the 
development of IHL. Humanity is often counterbalanced in IHL with military necessity. Schmitt 
has described the relationship between military necessity and the principle of humanity as a 
“symbiotic relationship [that] determines in which direction, and at what speed, IHL evolves.”461  
This relationship requires parties to a conflict to take both military necessity and humanity into 
consideration during armed conflict.462 Consequently, “[a]n equilibrium between military 
necessity and humanitarian considerations underlies every norm of the law of international 
armed conflict”.463 
 
454 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at 226. 
455 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, supra note 235 at 14. 
456 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections), 11 July 1996, 1996 ICJ Reports 595. 
457 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, supra note 235 at para 218. 
458 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at para 86. 
459 Robin Coupland, “Humanity: What is it and how does it influence international law?” (2001) 83:844 
International Review of the Red Cross 969 at 988. 
460 Theodor Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law” (2000) 94:2 American Journal of International Law 
239 at 243. 
461 Schmitt, supra note 436 at 796. 
462 See, e.g., ibid. 
463 Yoram Dinstein, “Military Necessity” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford Public 
International Law (Online), 2015); Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 16–20; GIAD Draper, “Military Necessity 
and Humanitarian Imperatives” (1973) 12 Revue de Droit Penal Militaire et Droit de la Guerre 129 at 141; Marco 
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Some of the earliest origins of contemporary IHL have codified this desire to balance humanity 
and necessity. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration explicitly noted the need to “fix[] the 
technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of 
humanity.”464 The preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land voiced a “desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements 
permit.”465 The desire to balance these two concepts is, however, often easier said than done. 
Military necessity and humanity are often at odds with each other in armed conflict.466 Military 
necessity seeks to allow anything and everything necessary for military success,467 whereas 
humanity seeks to limit the destructiveness and suffering that can often accompany war. Military 
necessity can sometimes temper more humanitarian rules of IHL. For example, while the 
principle of distinction prohibits the direct targeting of civilians, the principle of proportionality 
allows for incidental injury or death to civilians when the military advantage outweighs the risk 
to civilians.468 While military necessity can restrict the humanitarian aims of certain rules of IHL, 
this does not negate the existence of a principle of humanity undergirding IHL. Most IHL rules 
are characterized by a “consistent sensitivity to the balance between military necessity and 
humanity.”469 
 
Meron has noted that the “growing protection [for civilians] extended by the laws of war … rests 
on the requirements of humanity”.470 Schmitt has suggested that the balance between military 
necessity and humanity has “gradually shifted in emphasis toward humanitarian 
 
Pertile, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory": A Missed 
Opportunity for International Humanitarian Law?” (2004) 14 Italian Yearbook of International Law 121 at 149–50. 
464 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 29 
November 1868 [1868 Declaration Explosive Projectiles] at preamble. 
465 Convention [No. IV] on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annex of regulations, 18 October 1907 
[1907 Hague Convention IV] at preamble. 
466 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 436 at 796. 
467 The American Military Tribunal defined ‘military necessity’ in its 1948 Hostage Case, stating “Military necessity 
permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete 
submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money.” United States v List 
(Wilhelm) and ors (Hostage Case), Trial Judgment, Case No 7, (1948) 11 TWC 757, (1950) 11 TWC 1230, (1948) 8 
LRTWC 34, ICL 491 (US 1948), (1948) 15 ILR 632, 19 February 1948. 
468 Schmitt, supra note 436 at 803. 
469 Ibid at 803–804. 
470 Meron, supra note 460 at 251. 
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considerations.”471 Not all states have embraced this shift. For example, the United States is not a 
state party to either Additional Protocol I or II, the Landmine Ban Convention, or the Cluster 
Munitions Convention.472 There has also been resistance to what some states have considered 
misapplications of IHL in an effort to advance humanitarian goals.473 For example, the United 
States has criticized the International Committee of the Red Cross’ customary IHL study, 
expressing the view that some of the rules lack sufficient evidentiary support.474 While the 
balancing of military necessity and humanity has been criticized at times, the fact that there is 
balancing required is generally accepted.475 
 
Humanitarian considerations for the protection of civilians continue to propel the development of 
IHL. States have continued to seek new agreements for the protection of civilians, for example, 
through treaties regulating or prohibiting the use of certain weapons, such as anti-personnel 
landmines and cluster munitions.476 Thus, not only is the principle of humanity firmly 
established as part of IHL, it continues to be a motivating factor in the continuing development 
of this body of law. 
4.2 International Humanitarian Law Protections for Civilians 
There are four general principles of IHL which apply regardless of the nature of the armed 
conflict: (1) the principle of distinction;477 (2) the principle of proportionality;478 (3) the 
requirement to take precautions to protect civilians;479 and, (4) the principle of humane 
treatment.480 While this thesis argues that specific prohibited acts, such as murder and torture, are 
 
471 Schmitt, supra note 436 at 796. 
472 See, e.g., discussion in ibid at 812–16. 
473 Ibid at 835–36. 
474 The United States’ did not specify which rules it took issues with in the study. note 45. 
475 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 436 at 837–39. 
476 Landmine Treaty, supra note 8; Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 8. 
477 See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 46 at 213–15; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 349–51; Henckaerts & Doswald-
Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 14; Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) at 300–66; Kleffner, supra note 71. 
478 See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 46 at 217–18; Dinstein, supra note 436; James Kilcup, “Proportionality in 
Customary International Law: An Argument Against Aspirational Laws of War” (2017) 17:1 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 244; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 349–51. 
479 See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 46 at 218; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 351–57; Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 
supra note 5 at Rules 15 & 22; Jean-François Quéguiner, “Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of 
Hostilities” (2006) 88:864 International Review of the Red Cross 793. 
480 See, e.g., Yves Sandoz, “International Humanitarian Law in the Twenty-First Century” (2003) 6 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3 at 7–8. 
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drawn from peacetime protections for individuals, the principles discussed in this section provide 
a necessary distinction in the regulation of behaviour during armed conflict. This distinction 
stems primarily from the first principle discussed, distinction, which is necessary for civilian 
protection in conflict due to the legality of killing enemy combatants, which erodes the generally 
absolute peacetime prohibition on murder. This section will examine the principles of distinction, 
proportionality, precaution, and humane treatment in turn. 
 4.2.1 Distinction  
The principle of distinction is a rule of customary international law applicable to both 
international armed conflicts and NIACs.481 It is also implicit in Article 13 of Additional 
Protocol II, which protects the civilian population and individual civilians.482 It has been said that 
there is no principle in IHL which is “more critical than the ‘principle of distinction’.”483 This is 
because the principle embodies the “overarching and all-encompassing need in IHL to preserve 
the principles of humanity from being completely subordinated to interests of military 
necessity.”484 It juxtaposes civilians and fighters, as opposed to civilians and members of armed 
forces, as it is sometimes articulated by the ICRC.485 
 
The principle of distinction can be difficult to apply in NIACs, as members of armed groups “do 
not usually wear uniforms or use other external marks identifying them as fighters.”486 Further, 
“[t]here is no authoritative guidance as to what an insurgent fighter is supposed to do in order to 
enable an adversary to tell him apart from civilians.”487 Whereas combatants in international 
armed conflicts are required to wear a “fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance” and to 
“carry[] arms openly”,488 there is no equivalent provision for NIACs. In spite of potential 
difficulties associated with distinction in NIAC, the principle is still applicable to such 
 
481 See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 1. 
482 AP II Article 13 (1) and (2) read: “1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules 
shall be observed in all circumstances. 2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be 
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited.” 
483 Dinstein, supra note 444 at 183. See also, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 73 at 257. 
484 Stefanik, supra note 391 at 16. 
485 Dinstein, supra note 444 at 183. For an example see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at 17. 
486 Dinstein, supra note 46 at 214. 
487 Ibid. 
488 Geneva Convention III, supra note 5 at Article 4. 
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conflicts.489 In other words, the principle of distinction is considered to apply at all times during 
a non-international armed conflict.490 In order to properly apply the principle of distinction 
between civilians and fighters, however, it is necessary to understand how ‘civilian’ is defined in 
IHL.  
  4.2.1.i Definition of Civilian in IHL 
The question of who is a civilian in an armed conflict can be a highly contested issue.491 The 
language of Common Article 3 “implies a concept of civilian comprising those individuals “who 
do not bear arms” on behalf of a party to the conflict.”492 The final text of Additional Protocol II 
did not include an explicit definition of ‘civilian.’ Nonetheless, the language of the final text, as 
interpreted by the ICRC, supports the premise that the “civilian population and individual 
civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations” 
conducted by “armed forces,” “dissident armed forces,” and “other organized armed groups,” 
“unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.493 While the legal definition of 
civilian as someone who is not a member of the armed forces or an armed group seems quite 
straightforward, in practice it is highly debated. For example, it is often questioned whether 
“civilian contractors working with the military, or terrorists, or certain part-time participants in a 
civil war, should or should not be considered civilians.”494 
 
The definition of ‘civilian’ applicable to NIACs is drawn from IHL treaties applicable to IACs. 
While the use of the term ‘civilian’ in IHL originated between 1874 and 1970;495 it was not until 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 
August 1949 (Geneva Convention IV) that robust protections for civilians were codified in 
IHL.496 The protection for civilians codified in this Convention focused on “the treatment of 
 
489 Fleck, supra note 46 at 591. 
490 See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 1; Kleffner, supra note 71 at 323. 
491 A Roberts, “The Civilian in Modern War” (2009) 12 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 13 at 20. 
492 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2009) at 28. 
493 Ibid at 29. In support of this interpretation, see Art. 13(1) and (3) of AP I. Additional support can be found in the 
contexts in which AP II refers to “civilians” (Articles 13, 14, 17 of AP II) and the “civilian population” (title Part IV 
AP II; Arts 5 [1] [b] and [e], 13, 14, 15, 17 and 18 of AP II). 
494 Roberts, supra note 491 at 20. 
495 Melzer, supra note 492 at 20 fn 11. 
496 Roberts, supra note 491 at 37. 
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civilians in the hands of the adversary, whether in occupied territory or in internment.”497 It 
defined civilians as “those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.498 Legal protection for civilians was 
expanded in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol I 
provided a new and broader definition of civilian which encompass all persons ineligible for the 
protection of prisoner of war status.499 Further, it created a presumption that, where there is doubt 
as to “whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”.500 It also 
included, at Article 48, a “Basic Rule” regarding civilian protection:  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives. 
 
Civilians who take part in hostilities may, however, be targeted while they participate 
actively/directly in hostilities.501 Consequently, civilian protection is not absolute. On 
ratification, many states issued declarations or statements of understanding regarding the 
interpretation of provisions protecting civilians and civilian objects. In particular, many states 
took the position that civilian protection was dependent on the information available to a 
commander at the time of an operation and that, where civilian objects are used for a military 
purpose, the objects would lose their protection.502  
 
While all armed conflicts inevitably place civilians in danger, certain tactics of modern armed 
conflicts, particularly non-international conflicts, present distinct risks of the direct targeting of 
civilians.503 For example, the increasing occurrence of urban warfare has significantly increased 
 
497 Ibid at 38. 
498 Note: this does not include individuals who already have protected status under one of the other Geneva 
Conventions of 1949: Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Article 4. 
499 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at Article 50. 
500 Ibid at Article 50(1). 
501 See, e.g., Melzer, supra note 492; Dinstein, supra note 444 at 188–91. 
502 For example, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain and the United 
Kingdom all issued declarations or reservations on this issue. 
503 Roberts, supra note 491 at 48–51. 
  
102 
the risks to civilians.504 Other tactics create significant ambiguity in the distinction between 
combatants and civilians, such as guerilla warfare and terrorism.505 Regardless of the challenges 
in applying the standard, however, civilian protection and the principle of distinction remain 
cornerstones of international humanitarian law. 
 
While the principle of distinction prohibits the direct targeting of civilians during armed conflict, 
not all civilian deaths or injuries during armed conflict amount to a violation of IHL: the 
principle of proportionality accepts the possibility of civilian death or injury under certain 
conditions. The next section will discuss the principle of proportionality in more detail. 
 4.2.2 Proportionality  
Where a military operation to attack a legitimate target poses the risk of death or injury to 
civilians, it will not necessarily be prohibited, provided the civilians are not directly targeted. 
The principle of proportionality provides guidance as to the circumstances in which such 
incidental death or injury will be an IHL violation. An attack on a legitimate military target will 
still be prohibited if it  
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.506 
 
The phrase “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” is the 
crux of the proportionality principle: it requires military actors to balance the risks to civilians 
with the advantages to the military and, only where the advantage is proportional to the risk, will 
the attack be legal. The proportionality of attacks must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.507 
The principle of proportionality “is by its nature imprecise” and complicated.508 This is because 
“[p]roportionality calculations are heterogeneous, … dissimilar value genres – military and 
humanitarian – are being weighed against each other.”509 Consequently, proportionality is often 
 
504 Nathalie Durhin, “Protecting Civilians in Urban Areas: A Military Perspective on the Application of International 
Humanitarian Law” (2016) 98:1 International Review of the Red Cross 177 at 186. 
505 Roberts, supra note 491 at 48–49. 
506 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at Article 51(5)(b). 
507 Michael Schmitt, Charles HB Garraway & Yoram Dinstein, The Manual on the Law of Non- International Armed 
Conflict With Commentary (San Remo: International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006) at 25. 
508 Byron, supra note 71 at 207. 
509 Michael Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare” (1999) 2:1 Yale Human Rights and 
Development Law Journal 143 at 150–51. 
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likely to be assessed differently depending on the position of the decision maker, that is, whether 
they are on the “winning or losing side” at the time the assessment is conducted.510 
 
There is nothing in Additional Protocol II that explicitly prohibits “excessive collateral 
damage”,511 which has led some commentators to suggest the principle does not, or may not, 
apply to NIACs.512 This assessment is widely considered to be incorrect. At minimum, the 
principle applies to NIACs as a rule of customary international law.513 This is confirmed by the 
ICRC 1987 Commentary on Additional Protocol II, which clearly notes that “[the principle of 
proportionality] appl[ies] irrespective of whether the conflict is an international or an internal 
one.”514 Furthermore, the Commentary on the San Remo Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict addresses the issue of proportionality, stating that: “[t]he relative 
absence of express mention of proportionality in instruments governing non-international armed 
conflict should not be construed as meaning that it is inapplicable in such conflict.”515 This is 
further confirmed by other IHL treaties,516 the ICRC Customary IHL Study,517 and academic 
literature.518  
 
 
510 Byron, supra note 71 at 207. 
511 Ibid at 206. 
512 See, e.g., Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 125; Moir, supra note 46 at 117 fn 140; Françoise Hampson, Study on Human Rights 
Protection during Situations of Armed Conflict, Internal Disturbances and Tensions (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
Steering Committee for Human Rights, 2002) at para 54. 
513 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 14; Harold Koh, “The Obama Administration and 
International Law, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 25 March 2010”, 
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Judgment, supra note 125 at para 524; The Prosecutor v Hadžihasanovic and Kubura, Trial Judgment, IT-01-47-T, 
15 March 2006 at para 45. 
514 Sylvie Junod, “Additional Protocol II” in Yves Sandoz, Christine Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds, 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Dordrecht, 
NLD: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at para 4772. 
515 Schmitt, Garraway & Dinstein, supra note 507 at 22 Rule 2.1.1.4. 
516 See, e.g., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(Protocol II) (As Amended on 3 May 1996), UN, 10 October 1980 [CCW Protocol II] at Article 3(8)(c); Second 
Protocol to The Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
UNESCO, 26 March 1999 [Second Protocol to 1954 Cultural Property Convention] at Article 7(3). 
517 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 14. 
518 See, e.g., Byron, supra note 71 at 207; Turns, supra note 71 at 145; Theodor Meron, “The continuing role of 
custom in the formation of international humanitarian law” (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 238 at 
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The assessment of proportionality turns on the “excessive” threshold: only attacks where the 
damage to civilians and/or civilian objects would “be excessive in relation to the ‘concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated’” are prohibited.519 It is essentially a standard of 
“reasonableness”: excessive damage would “indicate[] unreasonable conduct in light of the 
circumstances prevailing at the time.”520 It is both an objective and subjective assessment:  
if the attacker knew or should have known that the civilian 
damage or injury caused would be excessive relative to the 
anticipated military advantage, the rule will have been 
violated.521 
 
It is largely agreed that the ‘military advantage’ of the entire attack must be considered in 
proportion to anticipated damage and not the advantage of certain “isolated or particular parts of 
the attack.”522 The assessment may not be based solely on that attack’s immediate or short-term 
effects, but must also consider the long-term consequences of the act.523 Further, it will 
“include[] a broad range of issues extending from ‘force protection’ to diverting the attention of 
the enemy from an intended site of invasion.”524 Again, this is why proportionality must be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.525 The fact that proportionality must be assessed case-by-case 
does, however, leave some ambiguity in the law as “precise parameters of this zone of 
proportionality are very much in dispute amidst the complexity of modern armed conflicts”.526 
Even where an operation satisfies the proportionality requirement, a military commander will 
also need to take certain additional precautions to protect civilians. The next section will briefly 
elaborate on the precaution requirement in IHL. 
 
519 Schmitt, Garraway & Dinstein, supra note 507 at 23. 
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48; Joseph Holland, “Military Objective and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and Dynamics” (2004) 7 
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526 Michael A Newton, “Reframing the Proportionality Principle” (2018) 51 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
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 4.2.3 Precaution 
While not explicitly referenced in either Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II, 
precautions must also be taken in NIACs to protect civilians and the civilian population. 
Precautions are necessitated by both the principle of distinction and the principle of 
proportionality.527 Further, the customary nature of this rule precedes the adoption of Additional 
Protocol II.528 Parties must take “all feasible precautions”, which are defined as “those 
precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances 
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”529 This includes 
choosing, where multiple options are available, the “methods and means for conducting an 
attack… that [will] minimise civilian danger”.530 Precautions, therefore, ensure that even where 
an attack is legal, additional steps will need to be taken to minimize the risk to civilians from that 
attack. 
 4.2.4 Humane Treatment 
The final key principle of IHL is the principle of humane treatment, which is required explicitly 
in the language of Common Article 3(1) as well as in Additional Protocol II, where Part II of the 
Protocol is titled “Humane Treatment”.531 Humane treatment is not subject to a single exhaustive 
definition, but, rather, it is “context specific” and must be considered with due regard to “both 
objective and subjective elements, such as the environment, the physical and mental condition of 
the person, as well as his or her age, social, cultural, religious or political background and past 
experiences.”532 That “humane treatment” was left open to interpretation could be beneficial for 
civilian protection because it allows for such a contextual analysis. Unlike the ambiguity in the 
principle of proportionality, which can sometimes be skewed in favour of military necessity, the 
principle of humane treatment cannot be restricted: the ambiguity will either have no effect on 
civilian protection, or it could be interpreted in a manner that provides greater protection to 
civilians.533 This is because the principle of humane treatment, as codified in Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II, is accompanied by certain specific prohibited acts. These acts include 
 
527 Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Trial Judgment, IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003 at para 58. 
528 Junod, supra note 514 at para 4772. 
529 CCW Protocol II, supra note 516 at Article 3(10). 
530 Schmitt, Garraway & Dinstein, supra note 507 at 27. 
531 Humane treatment is also found explicitly in articles 4(1) and 5(3) of Additional Protocol II. 
532 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 193. 
533 See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 87. 
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torture and murder.534 These prohibited acts, which are listed as examples and not as an 
exhaustive list, provide guidance as to the types of treatment considered to be inhumane.535 
These prohibited acts also create a base level of protection for civilians: humane treatment 
cannot be interpreted in a manner that impinges on those specific prohibitions because they are 
expressly identified as being “prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”.536 However, 
the principle could be interpreted to include more protections for civilians than those specifically 
enumerated in these treaties because the specific prohibited acts are provided “[w]ithout 
prejudice to the generality of the [separate requirement that civilians ‘shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely]”.537 
 
Humane treatment is required “in all circumstances” under IHL for NIACs.538 While its precise 
nature may vary slightly based on different circumstances in different conflicts, the language of 
Common Article 3 indicates that there are no exceptions to its application in NIAC and that this 
requirement represents the “minimum standard of treatment to be accorded to all fellow human 
beings” in such conflicts.539 Parties to a conflict may, however, provide treatment above and 
beyond the minimum standard required under Common Article 3.540 The phrase “in all 
circumstances” has also been interpreted as indicating that “[m]ilitary necessity arguments … do 
not justify acts or omissions inconsistent with the requirements of humane treatment.”541 Further, 
“in all circumstances” serves to reinforce the fact that the rules of IHL, particularly those for the 
protection of civilians, are “non-reciprocal ” because they apply regardless of whether other 
parties to the conflict adhere to these rules or not.542 
 
 
534 See Common Article 3 at sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and Article 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II. 
535 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 193. 
536 This language is found in both Common Article 3(1) and Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II. 
537 See Article 4(1) and (2) of Additional Protocol II. Common Article 3(1) also states that civilians “shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely”. 
538 See Common Article 3(1) and Article 4(1) of Additional Protocol II. 
539 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 196. See also The Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski, Trial Judgment, IT—95-
14/1-T, 25 June 1999 at paras 168, 173. 
540 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 202. 
541 Ibid at 196. Jann K Kleffner, “Friend or Foe? On the Protective Reach of the Law of Armed Conflict: A Note on 
the SCSL Trial Chamber’s Judgment in the Case of ‘Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao’” in Mariëlle Matthee, 
Brigit Toebes & Marcel Brus, eds, Armed Conflict and International Law: In Search of the Human Face, Liber 
Amicorum in Memory of Avril McDonald (The Hague: Asser Press, 2013) 285 at 327. Kleffner discusses the 
interpretation of the phrase “in all circumstances” in the context of article 12 of Geneva Convention I. 
542 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 196–97. 
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The four core principles of IHL – distinction, proportionality, precaution, and humane treatment 
– further demonstrate the centrality of civilian protection in this body of law. The principle of 
distinction, as the cardinal principle of IHL, places civilian protection at the heart of IHL. While 
military necessity tempers the absolute protection for civilians by allowing for incidental death 
or injury to civilians if it is proportional to the military advantage, distinction, precaution and 
humane treatment indicate an effort on the part of states - the authors of this body of law - to 
protect civilians inasmuch as possible within armed conflict. This effort to protect civilians 
suggests that a review of IHL is warranted, particularly consideration of whether additional 
protections for civilians are necessary in order to implement the primary objectives of IHL. The 
next section will turn to an examination of some of the specific acts prohibited for the protection 
of civilians during armed conflicts. It will show that the acts, for the most part, are representative 
of existing domestic crimes during peace. 
4.3 Specific Prohibited Acts 
As noted above, the inclusion of the principle of humane treatment in Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II is accompanied by certain specifically prohibited acts as examples of 
inhumane treatment. This part of the chapter will focus on an examination of some of these 
prohibited acts, based on those acts which were most prevalent in the case study conflicts in 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The previous part of the chapter focused on 
general principles applicable to civilian protection during armed conflict. The aim of this part of 
the chapter is to outline certain specific protections for civilians, as well as to demonstrate that 
most of these prohibited acts exist in ordinary domestic criminal law.  
 
Jean Pictet’s 1958 Commentary on the fourth Geneva Convention noted that “[Common Article 
3] merely demands respect for certain rules, which were already recognized as essential in all 
civilized countries, and enacted in municipal law of the States in question, long before the 
Convention was signed.”543 Pictet further notes that the specific prohibited behaviours of 
Common Article 3, such as torture and mutilation, apply regardless of whether an armed conflict 
 
543 Pictet, supra note 98 at 36. ; Further evidence that these prohibitions are merely imported from domestic criminal 
law can be seen in the fact that certain countries, such as Canada and the UK, rather than explicitly list these 
prohibitions in domestic military law, incorporate these prohibitions by reference to their domestic criminal codes: 
National Defence Act, Canada [Canada National Defence Act]; Armed Forces Act 2006, United Kingdom [UK 
Armed Forces Act 2006]. 
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exists because they are “essential rules which [a state] in fact observes daily, under its own laws, 
even when dealing with common criminals.”544 Further evidence of the parallel between 
peacetime prohibited conduct and prohibited conduct during armed conflict can be seen in the 
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes and in the drafting process for the Elements of 
Crimes. If one examines the elements of the war crimes of murder, rape, torture, etc., it is 
possible to see that the key distinction between these acts in peace and during armed conflict is 
based on the protected status of the victim545 and on the context in which the act was committed, 
namely, the act was committed in the context of an armed conflict.546 Further, the perpetrator 
must be aware of the existence of the armed conflict; an element deemed necessary if an 
individual was to be subjected to “greater international stigma [for a war crime] than for an 
ordinary crime”.547 This last fact is extremely important as it indicates that the majority of states 
negotiating the Elements of Crimes felt that awareness of the existence of an armed conflict was 
crucial to the differentiation between the conduct prohibited in peacetime and the conduct 
prohibited during armed conflict. The fact that these existing specific IHL prohibitions for 
civilians are imported from domestic criminal laws for the protection of individuals establishes 
the starting point for the gap this thesis argues exists between the protections provided for the 
safety of individuals during peace and the additional protections required under IHL to protect 
civilians during war. 
 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are designed to protect those who do not, or are no 
longer, actively/directly participating in hostilities during a NIAC. Common Article 3 
accomplishes this primarily through prohibitions on certain acts, such as murder, torture, and 
outrages on personal dignity, in relation to these protected persons. Subparagraph 1 of Common 
Article 3 states: 
… the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: 
 
544 Pictet, supra note 98 at 36. 
545 ICC, Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: ICC, 2011) at Articles 8(2)(c)(i)-1 
(murder); 8(2)(c)(i)-2 (mutilation); 8(2)(c)(i)-3 (cruel treatment); 8(2)(c)(i)-4(torture); 
546 Ibid at Articles 8(2)(c)(i)-1 (murder); 8(2)(c)(i)-2 (mutilation); 8(2)(c)(i)-3 (cruel treatment); 8(2)(c)(i)-4(torture); 
8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (rape). 
547 Knut Dörmann, Eva La Haye & Herman von Hebel, “The Context of War Crimes” in Roy S Lee, ed, The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2001) 112 at 121. 
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(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
Additional Protocol II includes these prohibitions, as well as other explicit prohibitions, 
including on corporal punishment, collective punishments, acts of terrorism, slavery, and 
pillage.548 Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II states: 
… the following acts against the persons referred to in 
paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever: 
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being 
of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such 
as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; 
(b) collective punishments; 
(c) taking of hostages; 
(d) acts of terrorism; 
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of 
indecent assault; 
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; 
(g) pillage; 
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
 
With respect to the prohibition on violence to life and person in Common Article 3, Additional 
Protocol II extends this to also prohibit violence to health and mental well-being.549 It also 
explicitly prohibits threatening to commit any of the prohibited acts in article 4(2).550 
Threatening these prohibited acts would also likely be captured by the prohibition on violence to 
mental well-being.551 Much as Common Article 3 applies in “all circumstances”, the prohibitions 
contained in Additional Protocol II article 4(2) are “prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever”. Additional Protocol II also includes explicit protections for children,552 most 
 
548 Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 4(2). 
549 Ibid at Article 4(2)(a). 
550 Ibid at Article 4(2)(h). 
551 Junod, supra note 514 at 4543. 
552 Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 4(3). 
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notably it prohibits the recruitment or use in hostilities of children under 15 years of age under 
article 4(3)(c), which reads: 
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall 
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to 
take part in hostilities. 
 
Common Article 3 contains specific protections for civilians; however, it does not contain any 
explicit rules governing the manner in which military operations may be conducted.553 One 
possible exception to this is the “prohibition of murder which has been found in some cases to 
apply to unlawful attacks in the conduct of hostilities.”554 This exception does find some support 
in the literature,555 but is strongly contested in the ICRC 2016 Commentary on Common Article 
3, which notes that nothing in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 was intended to govern the 
conduct of hostilities.556 The Commentary’s position is supported by evidence of the intention of 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions and rearticulated during the drafting of Additional Protocol 
II.557 Consequently, for regulation of the conduct of hostilities in NIAC, actors must rely 
 
553 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 189; Turns, supra note 71 at 115–16. 
554 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 189. approach can be seen, e.g., in Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar,Trial Judgment, 
IT-01-42-T, 31 January 2005 at paras 234-40, 260-61, 277-83. 
555 James E Bond, “Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflict” (1973) 3:2 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 345 at 348; William H Boothby, The Law of Targeting (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) at 433; Antonio Cassese, “The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian law of Armed Conflict and 
Customary International Law” (1984) 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55 at 107; APV Rogers, Law on the 
Battlefield (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2012) at 301. 
556 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 190. 
557 Official Records 1974-1977, supra note 244 at Vol XV, at 363. Further support can be found in academic 
literature, e.g., GIAD Draper, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949” (1965) 114 Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law 59 at 84–85; Hans-Peter Gasser, “‘Remarks of Hans-Peter Gasser’  in The Sixth 
Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A 
Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions” 
(1987) 2:2 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 477 at 478; Theodor Meorn, “Application 
of Humanitarian Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts: Remarks by Theodor Meron” (1991) 85 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 83 at 84; Kenneth Watkin, “21st Century Conflict 
and International Humanitarian Law: Status Quo or Change?” in Michael N Schmitt & Jelena Pejic, eds, 
International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines, Essays in Honour of Yoram Dinstein (Leiden, 
NLD: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 265 at 271 fn 31; Zegveld, supra note 25 at 82–84; William Abresch, “A Human 
Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya” (2005) 16:4 European 
Journal of International Law 741 at 748 fn 22. 
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primarily on customary international law,558 though a few provisions of Additional Protocol II 
also regulate the conduct of hostilities.559 
 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II prohibit a number of specific acts directed toward 
civilians and there is considerable overlap between the prohibitions in each text. I will now turn 
to an examination of some of these specific prohibitions that were frequently violated in the 
conflicts in both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 4.3.1 Violence to Life and Person 
The prohibition on violence to life and person in subparagraph 1(a) of Common Article 3 is 
considered of “fundamental importance in ensuring humane treatment.”560 This prohibition is 
also found in Article 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II, prohibiting violence to health and mental 
well-being. The violence is prohibited against those who do not, or are no longer, actively 
participating in the conflict. Violence against such persons is not militarily necessary and would 
therefore be “gratuitous” and “is irreconcilable with the imperative of humane treatment”.561 
Violence is considered to refer to both injury and/or death and is considered to capture certain 
omissions, such as the failure to provide food or medical care to those under one’s control.562 
The provision contains a non-exhaustive list of acts captured by “violence to life and person”, 
such as “murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”. Since this list is non-
exhaustive, other acts may be captured by “violence to life and person”, “for example, [an act 
that] does not amount to torture or cruel treatment can still be prohibited as an act of violence to 
person.”563 While not explicit in Common Article 3, it is widely accepted that the “prohibition of 
torture and cruel treatment under Common Article 3 … includes acts detrimental to the mental 
integrity of the person” and is not limited to physical violence.564 Consequently, the 
 
558 See, e.g., Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 2, 5-21, 42-48, and 53-54. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in Tadic stated that “[C]ustomary rules have developed to govern internal strife. These rules [...] cover 
such areas as [...] [a] prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and [a] ban of 
certain methods of conducting hostilities.” Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 68 at para 520. 
559 For example, Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II embodies the principle of distinction, which places limits on 
who may be targeted in armed conflict. Additional Protocol II, supra note 5. 
560 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 203. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Ibid at 204–205. 
563 Ibid at 203. 
564 Ibid at 204. 
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interpretation of Common Article 3 captures the added prohibitions explicitly listed in Article 
4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II. 
 3.3.2 Murder 
Common Article 3(1)(a) prohibits “murder of all kinds”. This prohibition is also found in Article 
4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II and has long existed under customary international law.565 
Murder in this context refers to the “intentional, unjustified killings of those not actively 
participating in armed conflict”.566 Under Common Article 3, “murder clearly includes killings 
committed with direct intent, whether by act or omission, of both civilians and members of the 
armed forces taking no active part in hostilities who are physically captured, detained, or 
otherwise in the physical control of the relevant party to the armed conflict.”567 It is also likely 
that recklessness constitutes sufficient intent for a violation of the prohibition of murder to have 
occurred.568 While this suggestion has been contested by some,569 Knuckey has argued that 
“indirect intent or recklessness better comports with the broad protection for life provided by the 
language of Common Article 3, domestic criminal law, and early war crimes cases.”570 The 
inclusion of a standard of recklessness in this prohibition is supported by the ICRC’s 2016 
Commentary on Common Article 3.571 Further, both “acts and omissions are prohibited”.572 
What is not included under this prohibition, however, is “killing during the conduct of 
hostilities.”573 Such deaths must be considered with regard to the particular rules governing the 
conduct of hostilities, in particular “rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions.”574 
 
565 See, e.g., United States of America v Otto Ohlendorf et al (Einsatzgruppen Case), Trials of War Criminals before 
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10, Volume IV, October 1946-April 1949 
(Washington, DC: US Gov’t, , at 459; The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic et al (‘Celibici Case’), Appeals Judgment, IT-
96-21-A, 20 February 2001 at para 143; Constitutional Case No C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007 at 112; 
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 89. 
566 Sarah Knuckey, “Murder in Common Article 3” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassoli, eds, The 
1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 449–50. 
567 Ibid at 466. 
568 Ibid at 460, 466. 
569 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v Naser Oric, Trial Chamber Judgment, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006 at para 1020. For 
support of the inclusion of indirect intent or recklessness as sufficient intent, see, e.g., The Prosecutor v Sefer 
Halilovic, Trial Chamber Judgment, IT-01-48-T, 16 November 2005 at para 35 fn 80; The Prosecutor v Charles 
Taylor, Trial Chamber Judgment, SCSL-03-01-T, 18 May 2012 at para 412; UN, supra note 404 at paras 206, 251. 
570 Knuckey, supra note 566 at 460. 
571 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 207. 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid. See also, e.g., Knuckey, supra note 566 at 452–56. 
574 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 207. 
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 4.3.3 Mutilation 
Mutilation is also expressly prohibited as violence to life and person under Common Article 3, as 
well as being prohibited under customary international law.575 The term itself is not defined in 
international humanitarian law. The ICRC’s 2016 Commentary on Common Article 3 draws 
upon the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes document addressing mutilation to 
provide a basic definition for the purpose of Common Article 3.576 The Commentary defines 
mutilation as “‘permanently disfiguring the person or persons’ or ‘permanently disabling or 
removing an organ or appendage’”.577 It defines “permanent” as “lasting or remaining unchanged 
indefinitely, or intended to be so; not temporary” and concludes that this means the injury need 
not last forever.578 Disfiguring” is defined as “[t]o ‘spoil’” and “[it] requires a certain degree of 
severity.”579 Practices in recent conflicts that constituted mutilation include the “amputati[on] of 
hands or feet, cutting off other body parts, mutilation of sexual organs, or carving somebody’s 
body.”580 One exception would be medical grounds, “such as the amputation of a gangrenous 
limb.”581 Finally, the mutilation of dead bodies is not captured by the prohibition on 
mutilation.582 It is, however, captured by the prohibition on outrages on personal dignity in 
Common Article 3(1)(c) and under customary international law.583 
 
575 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 92. 
576 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 208–209. 
577 Ibid at 208.; Cameron et al. use the language as it appears in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes: ICC, supra note 544. 
578 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 208. 
579 Ibid at 209. Here, the Commentary also draws on reference to severity with regard to mutilation in international 
case law: Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Trial Judgment, SCSL-04-15-T, 2 
March 2009 at para 179; The Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, ICTR-95-1-T, 
21 May 1999 at para 108; The Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Appeal Judgment, ICTR-95-
1-A, 1 June 2001 at para 361; ICTR, Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 310 at paras 706-707. 
580 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 209. Cameron et al. draw on international case law: The Prosecutor v Johnny 
Paul Koroma, Indictment, Case No SCSL-03-01, 7 March 2003 at para 31; The Prosecutor v Juvénal Kajelijeli, 
Trial Judgment, ICTR-98-44A-T, 1 December 2003 at paras 935-36; The Prosecutor v Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien 
Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze, Anatole Nsengiyumva, Trial Judgment, ICTR-98-41-T, 18 December 2008 at para 2266. 
581 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 209. This exception draws on an explicit exception articulated in Geneva 
Convention III article 13(1) and AP I article 11(1) and (2), as well as The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (AFRC), 
Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, Trial Judgment, SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007 at para 725; SCSL RUF 
Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 181. 
582 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 210. 
583 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 113. 
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 4.3.4 Torture and Cruel Treatment 
Torture and cruel treatment or punishment are unquestionably prohibited under NIAC in both 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II article 4(2)(a) and (e).584 These acts are equally 
prohibited under customary international law and are considered to rise to the level of jus cogens 
norms.585 There are no exceptions, such as national security, to this prohibition.586 The definition 
of torture under Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture has been considered largely 
applicable to armed conflict.587 It defines torture as  
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.588 
 
The only element of this definition that has been considered unnecessary or not applicable to 
torture under IHL is the requirement of the “presence of a state official or of any other authority-
wielding person in the torture process”.589 The omission of this element is particularly important 
in the context of NIAC to ensure that armed groups are equally prohibited from committing acts 
of torture.   
 
 
584 Manfred Nowak & Ralph Janik, “Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” in Andrew 
Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassoli, eds, The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 317 at 335–36. 
585 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 90; ICTY Celibici Appeals Judgment, supra note 565 at para 
454. 
586 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 211. 
587 ICTY Celibici Appeals Judgment, supra note 565 at para 459; Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, Trial Judgment, IT-
95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998 at paras 160-61. 
588 Torture Convention, supra note 74. 
589 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac and Zoran Vukovic, Trial Judgment, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 
2001 at paras 496-97. See also Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Simo Zaric, Trial Judgment, IT-95-9-T, 
17 October 2003 at para 82; Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdanin, Trial Judgment, IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004 at para 
488; Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvocka, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub Prcac, Appeal Judgment, IT-98-30/1-A, 
28 February 2005 at para 284; ICTY, Limaj et al Trial Judgment, supra note 188 at para 240; Prosecutor v Mile 
Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, Veselin Sljivancanin, Trial Judgment, IT-95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007 at para 514; 
Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Retrial Judgment, IT-04-84bis-T, 29 November 2012 
at para 419; The Prosecutor v Jovica Stanisic, Franko Simatovic, Trial Judgment, IT-03-69-T, 30 May 2013 at para 
49. 
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While official involvement is not required, the act or acts must still be done for a “specific 
purpose or motive.”590 There is no exhaustive list of purposes or motives which will satisfy this 
requirement; however, the three purposes articulated in the definition of torture above – “(a) to 
obtain[] information or a confession, (b) punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third 
person, and (c) discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person” – are widely 
accepted.591 The purpose or motive that satisfies the requirement “need be neither the sole nor 
the main purpose of inflicting the severe pain or suffering”.592  
 
The threshold for pain and suffering under torture is “severe”, and is contrasted with the lower 
threshold of “serious” for cruel treatment.593 The severity of pain or suffering should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis with due consideration to “both the objective elements related to the 
severity of the harm and the subjective elements related to the condition of the victim.”594 In 
particular, consideration should be given to “‘the nature and context of the infliction of pain’, 
‘the premeditation and institutionalisation of the ill-treatment’, ‘the physical condition of the 
victim’, ‘the manner and method used’, and ‘the position of inferiority of the victim’.”595 Torture 
can consist of one act or it may be the consequence of multiple acts over time.596 It does not have 
a “durational requirement”,597 nor does it require permanent injury.598 Consequently, “evidence 
 
590 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 220–21. 
591 Ibid at 220; ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 485. 
592 Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvocka, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub Prcac, Trial Judgment, IT-98-30/1-T, 2 
November 2001 at para 153. See also Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdrakov Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo, Trial 
Judgment, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998 at para 470; Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, IT-97-25-
T, 15 March 2002 at 184; ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 155; ICTY, Limaj et al Trial 
Judgment, supra note 188 at para 128; ICTY Haradinaj Retrial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 418; ICTY, Limaj 
et al Trial Judgment, supra note 188 at para 239; Prosecutor v Milan Martic, Trial Judgment, IT-95-11-T, 12 June 
2007 at para 77; ICTY Mrksic Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 515; ICTY Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 
589 at para 487. 
593 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 216. 
594 Ibid at 217. On this point, Cameron et al. reference ICTY Kvocka Appeal Judgment, supra note 589 at para 140; 
ICTR, Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 310 at para 682. 
595 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 218. On this point, Cameron et al. reference ICTY Krnojelac Trial Judgment, 
supra note 592 at para182; ICTY Mrksic Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 514. 
596 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 218; ICTY Krnojelac Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 182; ICTY, Limaj 
et al Trial Judgment, supra note 188 at para 237. 
597 The Prosecutor v Mladen Naletilic, aka “Tuta”, Vinko Martinovic, a.k.a “Stela”, Appeal Judgment, IT-98-34-A, 
3 May 2006 at para 300. 
598 ICTY Kvocka Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at paras 148-49; ICTY Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at 
para 484; ICTY, Limaj et al Trial Judgment, supra note 188 at para 236; ICTY Mrksic Trial Judgment, supra note 
589 at para 514; ICTY Haradinaj Retrial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 417. 
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of the suffering need not even be visible after the commission of the crime”.599 Acts that have 
been deemed torture include “suffocation by or under water” and “mock executions”.600 
 
Cruel treatment and inhuman treatment are essentially indistinguishable from one another.601 
They have been defined as “[forms of] treatment which cause[] serious mental or physical 
suffering or injury or constitute[] a serious attack on human dignity”.602 Unlike torture, cruel or 
inhuman treatment does not require that the suffering or injury be inflicted with a specific 
purpose.603 The threshold for the severity of suffering under cruel or inhuman treatment is also 
lower than that under torture.604 More often than not, cruel treatment will consist of “a 
combination or accumulation of several acts which, taken individually, may not amount to cruel 
treatment.”605 In assessing whether an act or acts amount to cruel treatment, the ICTY has 
considered “the nature of the act or omission, the context in which it occurs, its duration and/or 
repetition, the physical, mental and moral effects of the act on the victim and the personal 
circumstances of the victim, including age, sex and health.”606 While the suffering does “not 
need to be lasting”, it does need to be “real and serious”.607 The duration of the effects of the 
cruel treatment may, however, contribute to the determination of seriousness.608 Examples of 
acts that have been deemed cruel treatment include beatings and attempted murder.609 Corporal 
 
599 ICTY Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 484. 
600 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 219. 
601 Nowak & Janik, supra note 584 at 321; Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 212. 
602 ICTY Delalic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 551. 
603 Nowak & Janik, supra note 584 at 321; Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 212. 
604 ICTY Delalic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 542. 
605 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 212. On this point, Cameron et al. reference Dougoz v Greece, Judgment, 
Application no 40907/98, 6 March 2001 at para 46; Iovchev v Bulgaria, Trial Judgment, Application no 41211/98 2 
February 2006 at para 137; UN Committee against Torture, Considerations of reports submitted by States parties 
under Article 19 of the Convention: Israel, UN Doc A/52/44, 10 September 1997 at para 257. 
606 ICTY Krnojelac Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 131. Some or all of these considerations are also relied 
on in other ICTY cases, ICTY Hadzihasanovic Trial Judgment, supra note 513 at para 33; ICTY Oric Trial 
Judgment, supra note 569 at para 352; ICTY Martic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 80; The Prosecutor v 
Rasim Delic, Trial Judgment, IT-04-83-T, 15 September 2008 at para 51; The Prosecutor v Milan Lukic, Sredoje 
Lukic, Trial Judgment, IT-98-32/1-T, 20 July 2009 at para 957; The Prosecutor v Zdravko Tolimir, Trial Judgment, 
IT-05-88/2-T, 12 December 2012 at para 854. 
607 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 213. Here Cameron et al. quote ICTY Krnojelac Trial Judgment, supra note 592 
at para 131. See also ICTY Martic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 80; ICTY Lukic Trial Judgment, supra 
note 606 at para 957. 
608 The Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Trial Judgment, IT-98-32-T, 29 November 2002 at para 235. 
609 On beatings as cruel treatment see The Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic, Trial Judgment, IT-95-10-T, 14 December 
1999 at paras 42-45; ICTY Oric Trial Judgment, supra note 569 at para 352; ICTY Hadzihasanovic Trial Judgment, 
supra note 513 at para 35. On attempted murder as cruel treatment see ICTY Vasiljevic Trial Judgment, supra note 
608 at para 239; ICTY Oric Trial Judgment, supra note 569 at para 352. 
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punishment is explicitly prohibited in Additional Protocol II as well as under customary 
international law.610 
 4.3.5 Outrages upon Personal Dignity and Humiliating and Degrading Treatment 
The prohibition on “outrages upon personal dignity” under Common Article 3 and Article 
4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II includes, but is not limited to, “humiliating and degrading 
treatment,” although “it is hard to conceive of ‘outrages’ which would not be humiliating or 
degrading.”611 This prohibition is also considered to be customary international law.612 While 
acts prohibited under outrages upon personal dignity may be related to cruel treatment or torture, 
it is its own distinct prohibition. Although the phrase is not defined in either the Geneva 
Conventions or the Additional Protocols, the ICTY defined “outrages upon personal dignity” as 
requiring that  
the accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or 
an omission which would be generally considered to cause 
serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise would be a serious 
attack on human dignity.613 
 
The assessment of whether an act satisfies this definition should consider both “subjective 
criteria related to the sensitivity of the victim” and “objective criteria related to the gravity of the 
act.”614 A violation of the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity may be the result of a 
single act or an aggregation of acts: “the seriousness of an act and its consequences may arise 
either from the nature of the act per se or from the repetition of an act or from a combination of 
different acts”.615 There is no need for the humiliation and degradation to be long-lasting; 
 
610 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 91. 
611 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 228. 
612 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 90. 
613 ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 514; Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, 
and Zoran Vukovic, Appeal Judgment, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002 at paras 161, 163. See also 
Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Trial Judgment, IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008 at para 132; 
ICTR Bagosora Trial Judgment, supra note 580 at para 2250; The Prosecutor v Tharcisse Renzaho, Trial Judgment, 
Case No ICTR-98-42-T, 24 June 2011 at para 809; ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgment, supra note 103 at para 
6178; SCSL Charles Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 569 at para 431; SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 
at para 175; SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at para 716. 
614 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 227. On this point Cameron et al. reference ICTY Aleksovski Trial Judgment, 
supra note 539 at para 556; ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 504; ICTY Kunarac Appeal 
Judgment, supra note 613 at paras 162-63. 
615 Cameron et al, supra note 225 at 227.; Here Cameron et al. are quoting ICTY Aleksovski Trial Judgment, supra 
note 538 at para 57. 
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however, it must be “real and serious”.616 It has been suggested that this threshold only applies to 
the prohibition under international criminal law and that, while a threshold must still be met 
under IHL, it is likely to be lower than that found in international criminal law. 617 
 
No distinction has been made between humiliating treatment and degrading treatment in 
international case law and “their ordinary meaning is nearly identical.”618 “[T]he severity of the 
suffering imposed is of less importance than the humiliation of the victim, regardless of whether 
this is in the eyes of others or those of the victim himself or herself.”619 Acts which have been 
considered to violate the prohibition include “forced public nudity”620 and “rape and sexual 
violence”.621 
 4.3.6 Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence 
Rape and other forms of sexual violence are not explicitly prohibited under Common Article 3; 
however, they are captured by both the prohibition on “violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” and the prohibition on “outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”.622 These prohibitions 
also exist under article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II, which includes explicit prohibitions on 
“rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”. While enforced prostitution and 
indecent assault are not explicitly noted in Common Article 3, they are listed as forms of 
inhumane treatment in article 27 of Geneva Convention IV and thus can be considered prohibited 
under Common Article 3’s requirement that all protected persons be treated humanely and 
without distinction. Rape and sexual violence were defined by the Trial Chamber of the 
International Criminal Court as: 
 
616 ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 501; ICTY Kvocka Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 
168. 
617 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 264. 
618 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 228. 
619 Nowak & Janik, supra note 584 at 322. Nowak and Janik reference Tyler v United Kingdom, Judgment, 25 April 
1978 at para 32; Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2d ed (Kehl: 
Norbert Paul Engel Verlag, 2005) at 165. 
620 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 228. See also ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at paras 766-74. 
621 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 228. See also paras 270-75 ICTY Furundzija Trial Judgment, supra note 587; 
The Prosecutor v Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Bizimungu, François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, Innocent 
Sagahutu, Trial Judgment, Case No ICTR-00-56-T, 17 May 2011 at para 2158. 
622 Patricia Viseur Sellers & Indira Rosenthal, “Rape and Other Sexual Violence” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta 
& Marco Sassoli, eds, The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 360 
at 360. 
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1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of 
the body.  
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent…623 
 
Circumstances which are coercive can include, but are not limited to, “force, threat of force, or 
coercion cause, for example, by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power.”624 Rape and sexual violence can constitute torture where the requisite elements 
of the prohibition on torture are met.625 
 
While historically this prohibition addressed the protection of women from sexual violence and 
rape,626 it is now understood to protect all persons, regardless of gender.627 This can be seen in 
the language of Additional Protocol II article 4(2)(e) and article 75(2)(b) of Additional Protocol 
I. The gender-neutral prohibition of rape and sexual violence is also a rule of customary 
international law.628 
 4.3.7 Collective Punishment 
Collective punishment is not prohibited under Common Article 3; however, certain acts 
commonly used as forms of collective punishment, such as taking hostages or outrages on 
personal dignity, are prohibited.629 Collective punishment is explicitly prohibited under Article 
 
623 ICC, supra note 544 at Articles 7(1)9g)-1, also see Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1; Situation in the Central African 
Republic in the Case of Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016 
at paras 99, 102. See also Phillip Weiner, “The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in International 
Criminal Law” (2013) 54:3 Boston College Law Review 1207. 
624 Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 237. 
625 ICTY Delalic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at paras 494-96. 
626 For example, the explicit language in Article 27(2) of Geneva Convention IV reads: “Women shall be especially 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent 
assault.” 
627 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict” (2007) 18 European Journal of 
International Law 253; Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 238, fn 614, noting “With the exception of forced 
pregnancy, forced abortion and forced inspection of virginity, which, by their nature, can only be committed against 
women and girls.” 
628 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 93. 
629 Shane Darcy, “The Prohibition of Collective Punishment” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassoli, 
eds, The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 1155 at 1164. 
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4(2)(b) of Additional Protocol II. It was also purposely included under Article 4, “Fundamental 
Guarantees”, as opposed to Article 6, “Penal Prosecutions”, to ensure that this prohibition was 
not limited to penalties issued by courts.630 The prohibition is also considered customary 
international law in NIACs.631 Collective punishment refers to “penalties of any kind inflicted on 
persons or entire groups of persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity, 
for acts that these persons have not committed”.632 The prohibition on collective punishment 
applies to “civilians in the hands of the enemy, both in occupied territories and in the territories 
of the parties” to the conflict.633 Collective punishment can be distinguished from other 
collective measures on the basis of the purpose for which the act is undertaken: the purpose is to 
punish in “response to a prior unlawful or hostile act”.634 Consequently, collective punishment 
may consist of a wide range of acts including “property destruction, murder of civilians, 
detention, prolonged curfews, and inhuman treatment”.635 
 4.3.8 Pillage 
Pillage is prohibited under Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II, as well as under customary 
international law applicable to NIACs.636 It has not been clearly defined in international 
humanitarian law; however, the ICTY Trial Chamber has provided this definition: 
all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict 
for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under 
international law, including those acts traditionally described as 
“pillage”.637 
 
The prohibition of pillage includes “both organized pillage and pillage resulting from isolated 
acts of indiscipline.”638 Even though this prohibition is firmly established in IHL, pillage tends to 
be quite prevalent in armed conflicts.639 While the ICTY definition above provides clarity, the 
 
630 Junod, supra note 514 at paras 4535-4536. 
631 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 103; UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915, 14 October 2000 at para 14. 
632 Oscar M Uhler & Henri Coursier, eds, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958) at 225. 
633 Darcy, supra note 629 at 1164. 
634 Ibid at 1170. 
635 Ibid. See also Junod, supra note 514 at paras 4535-4536. 
636 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 52. 
637 ICTY Delalic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 591. This definition was subsequently adopted by the 
Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Trial Judgment, IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 
2004 at para 79. Black’s Law Dictionary provides a very clear and concise definition of Pillage. 
638 Junod, supra note 514 at para 4542. 
639 See Section 5.3.1 in the following chapter.  
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question of whether pillage is limited to appropriation for personal or private use, thereby 
permitting appropriation for reasons of military necessity, is still under debate.640 This question 
arises due to the differences between international criminal law and IHL: this focus on personal 
or private use is an element of the crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court,641 but the idea that it applies to IHL has been strongly contested by some 
commentators.642 
 4.3.9 Recruitment or Use of Children under 15 Years Old 
Of the specific protection of civilians prohibitions in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 
II, the prohibition of the recruitment or use of children under 15 years in hostilities is the one 
most directly linked to the specific context of armed conflict. Although peacetime protections for 
children prohibit kidnapping and forced labour,643 the IHL prohibition captures the particular 
harm of causing a child to perform the functions of a soldier within an armed conflict, which has 
been labelled one of the “worst forms of child labour”.644 The prohibition on the recruitment and 
use of children under 15 years of age in hostilities is absolute in NIACs because children cannot 
directly participate in hostilities as a combatant, nor can they participate indirectly, such as to 
deliver food or to serve as a domestic servant for combatants.645 It is a rare example of a rule of 
IHL that seems to provide stronger protection in NIACs than in IACs. This is because, while the 
prohibition is absolute in NIACs, in international armed conflicts parties are only required to 
take “all feasible measures” to avoid the recruitment of children.646 Additionally, their “direct 
participation” is prohibited in international armed conflicts as opposed to any participation in 
hostilities in Additional Protocol II.647 Customary IHL applicable to both international armed 
conflicts and NIACs prohibits both the recruitment of children and participation of children in 
 
640 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 426–28; Kerrin Geoffrey Buck, “Displacement and dispossession: 
redefining forced displacement and identifying when forced displacement becomes pillage under international 
humanitarian law” (2017) 2 Journal of International Humanitarian Action Article 5 at 13. 
641 ICC, supra note 545 at Article 8(2)(e)(v). 
642 Buck, supra note 640 at 13; James G Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural 
Resources (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2011) at 19–22. 
643 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN, 20 November 1989 [Convention on the Rights of the Child] at 
Articles 32, 38; ICESCR, supra note 405 at Article 10(3). 
644 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, C182, International Labour Organization, 17 June 1999 [Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention, C182]. 
645 See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 317–17. 
646 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at Article 77(2). 
647 Ibid at Article 77. 
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hostilities.648 The Additional Protocol II prohibition includes not only conscription, but also the 
voluntary enlistment of children under fifteen years.649 The prohibition on participation in 
hostilities includes activities such as “gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting 
ammunition and foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage.”650   
 
The minimum age for participation in armed conflict set by Additional Protocol II was the 
subject of considerable debate during the drafting of the provision.651 Some felt that the age limit 
should be set at 18 years of age.652 Under international human rights law, persons under the age 
of 18 are considered children.653 While the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does not 
change the 15 year age limit in IHL, it states that, when recruiting children between the ages of 
15 and 18, “States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those [children] who are oldest.”654 
The 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict sets the age for 
recruitment and participation in armed conflict as 18 years.655 Eighteen years of age is also used 
in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups.656 Despite the wide ratification of this Protocol as well as domestic legislation 
implementing the 18 year old standard,657 the use of children under 18 years, as well as under 15 
years, continues to be common in armed conflicts, such as in the ongoing conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
4.4 Conclusion  
Protections for civilians in NIACs appear fairly robust given the extensive list of prohibitions in 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, and particularly their expansion through rules of 
customary IHL. Yet, while there are many examples of compliance with these protections by 
 
648 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 136 and 137. 
649 Junod, supra note 514 at para 4557. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Ibid at para 4556. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 643 at Article 1. 
654 Ibid at Article 38(3). 
655 CRC Optional Protocol, supra note 407 at Articles 2-4. As of November 4, 2018 there were 168 States Parties to 
the Protocol. Countries who are not party to the Protocol include Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, and Zambia. 
656 Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, UNICEF, 
February 2007 [Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children and Armed Forces or Armed Groups] at 2.0. 
657 Loi No 09/001 du 10 Janvier 2009 Portant Protection de l’enfant, DRC [Loi No 09/001 du 10 Janvier 2009 
Portant Protection de l’enfant] at Articles 2(1) and 71. 
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armed groups,658 there is also evidence of numerous violations.659 The first part of this chapter 
focused on the foundational principles and concepts of IHL. It demonstrated the centrality of 
humanitarian concerns, particularly for the protection of civilians. It also highlighted how 
military necessity will sometimes temper the extent to which civilians are protected in certain 
circumstances in armed conflict. This first part of the chapter also discussed the foundational 
principles of IHL applicable to NIACs: distinction, proportionality, precaution, and humane 
treatment. These principles limit both the methods and means by which conflicts can be 
conducted. These principles provide basic protection for civilians distinct from that provided to 
individuals during peace insofar as they require combatants to distinguish between legal targets 
in the form of enemy combatants and illegal targets in the form of civilians. However, military 
necessity means that this protection for civilians in conflict is not absolute. The second part of 
the chapter focused on some acts specifically prohibited in NIACs, such as murder, torture, and 
rape. The point was made that these prohibited acts, with the possible exception of the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, are drawn from acts criminalized in domestic criminal law. 
In other words, they provide civilians in armed conflict with the same protections afforded to 
individuals in peacetime.  
 
This thesis identifies a gap between the protections for individuals in peacetime and the 
protections needed to better protect civilians from combatant violence during armed conflict. The 
thesis argues that new substantive IHL rules are needed in order to address this distinction 
between peace and war and to better realize the humanitarian goals of IHL. This chapter has 
helped advance this argument by showing that: (1) a review of existing IHL is consistent with its 
humanitarian objective and (2) existing specific protections for civilians during conflict are 
largely imported from domestic criminal law protections for individuals in peacetime. Existing 
IHL protections fail to account for the exceptional context of armed conflict and, consequently, 
ignore certain problematic behaviours that pose a particular risk to civilians in conflict. Chapter 8 
will examine combatant behaviours that are regulated in some forms during peacetime but are 
currently unregulated under IHL and must be addressed for civilian protection. 
 
658 ICRC, “IHL in Action | Respect for the law on the battlefield”, online: IHL in Action <https://ihl-in-
action.icrc.org/>. 
659 For examples, see Section 5.3 in the following chapter. 
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The next chapter turns to the two case studies examined in this thesis, Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. It examines the widespread violations directed against civilians 
by non-state armed groups that occurred during the internal armed conflicts in these two 
countries. The mere existence of these violations does not usually provide any insight into 
psychological factors that may have contributed to their commission. However, an examination 
of cognitive factors that may be contributing to these violations could be one means of 
identifying new ways to realize the humanitarian objective of civilian protection in IHL. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5 International Humanitarian Law Violations in Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo  
 
The preceding chapter outlined the existing IHL rules for the protection of civilians during 
NIACs and demonstrated that existing IHL protections for civilians are based largely on 
protections equally afforded to individuals during peacetime. This chapter is intended to 
demonstrate the prevalence of violations of specific acts prohibited in IHL for the protection of 
civilians during armed conflict in practice. This chapter examines violations of these specific 
prohibited acts in case studies of two conflict-affected countries: Sierra Leone and the DRC. In 
the last three decades, these countries have experienced long-term armed conflict. First, Sierra 
Leone experienced a violent civil war from 1991-2002. In the DRC, escalating levels of violence 
in the early 1990s led to the First Congo War (1996-1997), the Second Congo War (1998-2003), 
and ongoing conflict between the national armed forces and armed groups or between multiple 
armed groups in the eastern provinces of the country. Chapter 2 discussed some of the reasons 
behind the selection of these two countries as case studies in this thesis. This chapter focusses 
specifically on the widespread IHL violations of civilian protections for which these conflicts 
have become known.  
 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the two countries, first Sierra Leone and then the 
DRC, and the conflicts they have experienced. These introductory sections provide basic 
demographic and geographic information, as well as brief histories of the conflicts in each of the 
two case study countries. This provides the context to explain the widespread IHL violations that 
are the focus of this chapter. The chapter then turns to an examination of IHL violations directed 
against civilians in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Although chapter 4 discussed existing specific 
IHL protections for civilians separately,660 during armed conflict violations of these IHL 
protections do not occur in isolation from one another. Rather, during conflict, some or all of the 
 
660 The specific prohibitions discussed in chapter 4 are violence to life and person, murder, mutilation, torture and 
cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity and humiliating and degrading treatment, rape and other sexual 
violence, collective punishment, pillage, and the recruitment or use of children under 15 years old. 
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civilian IHL protections may be violated concurrently during one military operation661 and/or the 
cumulation of different prohibited acts can amount to other violations, such as a violation of the 
prohibition on terrorizing the civilian population.662 Consequently, to structure the discussion of 
IHL violations, I have organized the violations that occurred in Sierra Leone and the DRC into 
three categories, which are inclusive of the prohibited acts discussed in chapter 4. The three 
categories I use are (1) theft of civilian and public goods; (2) forced recruitment of individuals 
for various tasks; and, (3) violation of bodily integrity and/or terrorization of civilians. The 
chapter examines IHL violations in each of these three categories in order to demonstrate how 
little insight mere knowledge of IHL violations provides to understand the psychology behind 
the violations. 
 
The discussion of IHL violations in this chapter serves two key purposes in this thesis. First, the 
chapter demonstrates the prevalence of violations of IHL protections for civilians, which 
indicates that, in practice, the current status quo of IHL is not providing sufficient protection for 
civilians during armed conflict. It would be easy to assume that these violations are purely an 
issue of non-compliance with existing IHL that can be addressed through engagement, education, 
and training with armed groups. However, the second key point of the chapter is that the 
prevalence of violations in practice does not in and of itself provide much, if any, insight into the 
psychology of combatants committing these IHL violations, even though that psychology 
influences the commission of these IHL violations. This is important because the theories of 
social psychology and criminology discussed in chapter 7 explain how combatant behaviour is 
adversely affected by psychological processes, such as dehumanization and the abdication of 
responsibility for one’s actions, that reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in 
so doing, fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to 
protect civilians. This reinforces the fact that combatant psychology can provide information not 
 
661 For example, in the DRC, an attack on Bogoro on 24 February 2003 included acts of direct attacks on civilians, 
murder, rape and sexual slavery, the use of children under the age of 15 years, destruction of property and pillage: 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Judgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014 at paras 809-41, 915-24, 925-32, 985-1019, 
1051-65. In Sierra Leone, the AFRC attack on Freetown beginning on 6 January 1999 included the unlawful killing 
of civilians, rape, outrages on personal dignity, violence to life, health and physical or mental suffering, the use of 
children under the age of 15 years, abductions and forced labour, pillage, and acts of terrorism. 
662 See, e.g., SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at paras 1579-84. Among other acts the cumulation of 
murder, looting, destruction of property, and mutilation during the AFRC’s attack on Freetown in January 1999 
were found to amount to a violation of the prohibition on terrorizing the civilian population. 
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otherwise readily available or apparent from mere awareness of the occurrence of IHL violations. 
Thus, this chapter’s discussion of the prevalence of IHL violations in the context of the Sierra 
Leone Civil War and the conflicts in the DRC, demonstrates that the psychology of IHL 
violations can provide a new means of examining such violations and can reveal deeper insight 
than mere knowledge of the existence of widespread IHL violations. 
5.1 Sierra Leone: Demographics and Civil War 
The first focus conflict in this thesis is the Sierra Leone Civil War. This section will provide 
some brief demographics for Sierra Leone and facts about the conflict to provide context for the 
subsequent discussion of IHL violations during this armed conflict. 
 
Sierra Leone, a former British colony that gained independence in 1961, is a small country in 
West Africa. It is bordered by Guinea to the northeast, Liberia to the southeast, and the North 
Atlantic Ocean to the southwest. It is divided into four provinces and one area,663 sixteen 
districts,664 and 190 chiefdoms.665 The capital, Freetown, is located in the Western Area on the 
coast of Sierra Leone. Its current population is approximately 7.4 million people.666 There are 
sixteen different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the largest of which are the Temne, located 
primarily in the north and around Freetown, and the Mende, who are predominantly located in 
southeastern Sierra Leone and the Kono district.667 The most recent figures on poverty in Sierra 
Leone date from 2011, when the World Bank found that over 50% of the country’s population 
was living in extreme poverty (i.e., living on U.S. $1.90 or less a day).668 According to data from 
 
663 Eastern Province, Northern Province, North West Province (created in August 2017), Southern Province, and the 
Western Area. 
664 Kailahun, Kenema, and Kono in Eastern Province; Bombali, Falaba (created in August 2017), Koinadugu, and 
Tonkolili in the Northern Province; Kambia, Karene (created August 2017), and Port Loko in the North West 
Province; Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba, and Pujehun in the Southern Province; and, Western Rural and Western Urban in 
the Western Area. 
665 Prior to August 2017 there were only 149 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. For a list of all chiefdoms see: “Sierra 
Leone Web - Districts and Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone”, online: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/chiefdoms.html>. 
666 BBC News, “Sierra Leone country profile - BBC News”, (5 April 2018), online: 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094194>. In 1991 at the beginning of the civil war, Sierra Leone’s 
population was around four million: “Sierra Leone - Population 1991 | countryeconomy.com”, online: 
<https://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/sierra-leone?year=1991>; “Population Pyramids of the 
World from 1950 to 2100 - Sierra Leone 1991”, online: PopulationPyramid.net 
<https://www.populationpyramid.net/sierra-leone/1991/>. 
667 The other ethnic groups are, in alphabetical order: Bullon, Creole (or Krio), Fula, Gola, Kissi, Koranko, Krim, 
Limba, Loko Madingo, Sherbro, Soso, Yalunka, and Vai: Human Rights Watch, supra note 18 at 9. 
668 World Bank, “Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) - Sierra Leone”, online: 
World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=SL>. 
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the International Monetary Fund published in 2018, Sierra Leone ranked as the tenth poorest 
country in the world.669 
 
In early 1991, a Sierra Leonean armed group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed into 
Sierra Leone from Liberia where it had been training for several months.670 The RUF was 
supported by members of the Liberian armed group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.671 
This marked the beginning of the Sierra Leone Civil War, which would last until 2002. Between 
1991 and 2002, as many as 75,000 people were killed, as well as a further 20,000 people 
mutilated, and approximately half the country’s population were displaced.672 Although the 
conflict began with only two parties, the RUF and the Sierra Leone Army, other armed groups 
emerged during the conflict. Many of these groups had their origins in local defense groups and 
traditional hunting societies,673 the largest of which were the Kamajors who fought on the side of 
the Sierra Leone government.674 Control of the government switched hands several times during 
the conflict. A successful coup d’état installed a military junta government in 1992,675 then a 
democratically elected government, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), in 1996.676 That 
 
669 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook (April 2019) - GDP based on PPP, share of world”, 
online: International Monetary Fund <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO>; Will Martin, 
“The poorest countries in the world - Business Insider”, (1 June 2018), online: Business Insider 
<https://www.businessinsider.com/poorest-countries-in-the-world-2018-5/?r=nordic>. 
670 See, e.g., Daniel Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA & 
Arlington, VA: RAND, 2001) at 74–75; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at para 
126; Ibrahim Abdullah, “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United 
Front/Sierra Leone” (1998) 36:2 Journal of Modern African Studies 203. 
671 Byman et al, supra note 670 at 74–75; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at 
para 126; Abdullah, supra note 670. 
672 Danny Hoffman, “The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy, and 
Humanitarian Intervention” (2004) 103:111 African Affairs 211 at 216; Mary Kaldor & James Vincent, Evaluation 
of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries (New York: United Nations Development Programme 
Evaluation Office, 2006) at 4. However, more conservative estimates place non-combatant deaths (as compared to 
all deaths, both soldiers and civilians, in Kaldor & Vincent) between 10,000 – 30,000 and displaced persons at 
approximately 1.5 million: Tammy Guberek et al, Truth and Myth in Sierra Leone: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Conflict, 1991-2000, A Report by the Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group and the American Bar 
Association (Benetech-ABA, 2006) at 4. 
673 See, e.g., Joe Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone: Liberators or Nihilists?” in David J Francis, ed, Civil 
Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace? (Abingdon, UK: Ashgate, 2005) 51 at 56; Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4, para 289; SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 
16. 
674 See, e.g., Alie, supra note 673 at 56; The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa (CDF), Trial Judgment, 
SCSL-04-14-T, 2 August 2007 at para 80. 
675 See, e.g., SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 13; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 3, paras 273-74. 
676 See, e.g., SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 18; Amnesty International, Sierra Leone Toward a 
future founded on human rights (New York: Amnesty International, 1996) at 2. 
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government operated in exile after a second coup d’état in 1997 by members of the national 
armed forces who formed the new armed group, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC).677 The local defence groups, including the Kamajors, came to be known collectively as 
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and were directed by the SLPP Government in exile. The CDF 
continued to fight on behalf of the SLPP Government after it was restored to power in 1998. The 
Lomé Peace Accord was signed between the SLPP Government, the AFRC, and RUF in 1999678 
and the end of the war was officially declared on 18 January 2002.679 The eleven year-long civil 
war was characterized by widespread IHL violations against civilians recorded by international 
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch,680 the Sierra Leone Truth Commission,681 and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone which tried the leaders of the three armed groups, the AFRC,682 
CDF,683 and RUF684 in the aftermath of the conflict. 
5.2 Democratic Republic of Congo: Demographics and Civil Wars 
The second case study in this thesis is the series of conflicts experienced in the DRC since the 
mid-1990s. This section will provide some brief demographics about the DRC and facts about 
these conflicts to provide context for the subsequent discussion of IHL violations during this 
civil war. 
 
 
677 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Sierra Leone, 1998 – a year of atrocities against civilians (Amnesty 
International, 1998) at 4; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 3, para 695. 
678 SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 41. 
679 See, e.g., ibid at para 44; Beth K Dougherty, “Sierra Leone” in Lavinia Stan & Nadya Nedelsky, eds, 
Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, Volume 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 426 at 427; 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 3, paras 1505-1506. 
680 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Shocking War Crimes in Sierra Leone”, (24 June 1999), online: Human Rights 
Watch <https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/06/24/shocking-war-crimes-sierra-leone>; Human Rights Watch, “The 
Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone”, (11 April 2012), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/armed-conflict-sierra-leone>; Human Rights Watch, supra note 18 at 10; 
Dufka, supra note 143; Human Rights Watch, “Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror - Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra 
Leone”, (July 1998), online: Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sierra/>. 
681 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth: Final Report of the TRC (Accra, Ghana: 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, 2004). See also, e.g., Rahmin Lamin, “Building Peace Through 
Accountability in Sierra Leone: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court” (2003) 38:2–3 
Journal of Asian and African Studies 295; Dougherty, supra note 679. 
682 SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581; The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima 
Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu (AFRC), Appeal Judgment, SCSL-2004-16-A, 22 February 2008. 
683 SCSL CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 674; The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa (CDF), Appeal 
Judgment, SCSL-04-14-A, 28 May 2008. 
684 SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579; SCSL, RUF Appeal Judgment, supra note 358. 
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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (formerly Zaire), in Central Africa, is a former 
Belgian colony that gained independence in 1960. It is the second largest country in Africa and 
the eleventh largest country in the world. Due to its size and location in Central Africa, it is 
bordered by numerous countries: Republic of Congo (and Atlantic Ocean) to the west; Angola to 
the southwest; Zambia to the south; the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north; 
and Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda to the east. It is divided into twenty-six 
provinces,685 though prior to the 2006 constitution it consisted of only ten provinces and one 
city.686 The capital, Kinshasa, is located in the far west of the country on the Congo River 
opposite the capital of the Republic of Congo, Brazzaville. The capital of the province of North 
Kivu, Goma, on the far east border with Rwanda is 1,573km (977 miles) by plane from Kinshasa 
or over 2,500km by road. The current population of the DRC is approximately 81.5 million.687 
There are over two hundred ethnic groups in the country and over two hundred languages, 
though many people speak one of the four “national” languages: Swahili, Tshiluba, Lingala, and 
Kongo.688 The official language used in the DRC is French. The most recent figures on poverty 
in the DRC date from 2012 when the World Bank found that over 77% of the country’s 
population was living in extreme poverty (i.e., living on U.S. $1.90 or less a day).689 According 
to data from the International Monetary Fund published in 2018, the DRC ranked as the seventh 
poorest country in the world.690 
 
 
685 Bas-Uele (Lower Uele), Equateur, Haut-Katanga (Upper Katanga), Haut-Lomami (Upper Lomami), Haut-Uele 
(Upper Uele), Ituri, Kasai, Kasai-Central, Kasai-Oriental (East Kasai), Kinshasa, Kongo Central, Kwango, Kwilu, 
Lomami, Lualaba, Mai-Ndombe, Maniema, Mongala, Nord-Kivu (North Kivu), Nord-Ubangi (North Ubangi), 
Sankuru, Sud-Kivu (South Kivu), Sud-Ubangi (South Ubangi), Tanganyika, Tshopo, Tshuapa. 
686 The ten provinces were Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Équateur, Kasai-Occidental, Kasai-Oriental, Katanga, Maniema, 
North Kivu, Orientale, and South Kivu. The one city (or city-province) was the capital of Kinshasa. 
687 BBC News, “DR Congo country profile - BBC News”, (1 August 2018), online: BBC News 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13283212>. “Population growth in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo”, online: WorldData.info <https://www.worlddata.info/africa/congo-kinshasa/populationgrowth.php>; In 
1996, at the official start of the First Congo War, the country’s population was approximately 43 million: 
“Democratic Republic of the Congo Population size - data, chart”, online: GlobalEconomy.com 
<https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Population_size/>. 
688 René Lemarchand et al, “Democratic Republic of the Congo | Culture, History, & People”, online: 
Britannica.com <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo> at 3. 
689 World Bank, “Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) - Congo, Dem Rep”, online: 
World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=CD>. 
690 International Monetary Fund, supra note 669; Martin, supra note 669. 
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Armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is extremely complex and has spanned 
decades. Beginning in the early- to mid-1990s,691 the violence continues today and seems, to 
some, destined to never end.692 These decades have encompassed multiple armed conflicts, both 
international and non-international in nature. Some of these conflicts have been between the 
national armed forces of numerous countries in the region, though the most involved has been, 
without question, Rwanda.693 The First Congo War was initiated in 1996 by the armed group 
Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo; AFDL), supported by Rwanda,694 and ended in 1997 with 
the successful overthrow of the government.695 The Second Congo War, also known as Africa’s 
World War due to the many foreign nations that were parties to the conflict, began in 1998 with 
a mutiny within the national armed forces (known currently as the Forces armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo or FARDC) that led to the formation of the armed group, 
the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy; RCD).696 
 
691 See, e.g., Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World Warm Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 37–72. 
692 Jason Burke, “‘The wars will never stop’ - millions flee bloodshed as Congo falls apart”, The Guardian (3 April 
2018), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/03/millions-flee-bloodshed-as-congos-army-steps-up-
fight-with-rebels-in-east>. 
693 See, e.g., David Shearer, “Africa’s Great War” (1999) 41:2 Survival 89; Herbert Weiss, “Civil War in the 
Congo” (2001) 38:3 Society 67; Jeremy Weinstein, “Africa’s ‘Scramble for Africa’: Lessons of a Continental War” 
(2000) 17:2 World Policy Journal 11; Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo 
and the Great War of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011) at 93–180; Roger Winter, “Lancing the Boil: 
Rwanda’s Agenda in Zaire” in Howard Adelman & Govind C Rao, eds, War and Peace in Zaire-Congo: Analyzing 
and Evaluating Intervention, 1996-1997 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004) 109; Ogenda Otunnu, “Uganda as 
a Regional Actor in Zairian War” in Howard Adelman & Govind C Rao, eds, War and Peace in Zaire-Congo: 
Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention, 1996-1997 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004) 31; Filip Reyntjens, The 
Great African War: Congo Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
at 45–57; Prunier, supra note 691 at 113–48. 
694 See, e.g., Stearns, supra note 693 at 93–180; Shearer, supra note 693; Weiss, supra note 693; Weinstein, supra 
note 693; Winter, supra note 693; Reyntjens, supra note 693 at 45–57. 
695 See, e.g., William G Thom, “Congo-Zaire’s 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military 
Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence”; Howard Adelman & Govind C Rao, “The Zairian War and Refugee 
Crisis 1996-1997: Creating a Culture of Conflict Prevention” in Howard Adelman & Govind C Rao, eds, War and 
Peace in Zaire-Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention, 1996-1997 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004) 
1; Heinrich Matthee, “State Collapse or New Politics? the Conflict in Zaire 1996-1997” (1999) 21:1 Strategic 
Review for Southern Africa. 
696 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch Condemns Civilian Killings by Congo Rebels”, (27 
August 1998), online: Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/news/1998/08/27/human-rights-watch-
condemns-civilian-killings-congo-rebels>; World Peace Foundation, “Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) | Mass 
Atrocity Endings”, (18 September 2015), online: Mass Atrocity Endings 
<https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/09/18/democratic-republic-of-congo-zaire/>. 
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While the Second Congo War officially ended in 2003,697 armed groups have continued to 
operate and clash frequently with the FARDC698 and with each other.699 Although violence has, 
for the most part, decreased since 2003 and many parts of the country have returned to relative 
peace and stability, the conflict, violence, and instability have never completely ended in the 
eastern part of the DRC, particularly in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri 
(formerly part of Orientale province).700 As in Sierra Leone’s civil war, many small armed 
groups, known as mai-mai,701 have formed under the pretense of protecting the local population 
in different areas in the East;702 however, they also commit IHL violations against civilians.703. 
Armed conflict in the DRC has been characterized by fluctuation and fragmentation in the nature 
and existence of non-state armed groups.704 Groups have alternated between existing as non-state 
 
697 See, e.g., Reyntjens, supra note 693 at 194–206; Stearns, supra note 693 at 181–306; Prunier, supra note 691 at 
181–284. 
698 See, e.g., Thom, supra note 695; Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen & Maria Eriksson Baaz, The national army and 
armed groups in the eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity (London, UK: Rift Valley Institute 
& Usalama Project, 2013); Reyntjens, supra note 693 at 45–57; Matthee, supra note 695; Adelman & Rao, supra 
note 695. Upon its renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate in the DRC in 2018, the Security Council 
noted: “the DRC has continued to suffer from recurring and evolving cycles of conflict and persistent violence by 
armed groups”: UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2409 (2018) (on extending the UN mission in 
DRC), 27 March 2018, S/RES/2409 (2018). 
699 For example, in Ituri province ethnic Lendu armed groups have fought ethnic Hema armed groups: see, e.g., 
Reyntjens, supra note 693 at 207–20. Another example has been clashes between armed groups for control of 
resource rich mining sites in Eastern Congo: see, e.g., UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo, 12 April 2001, S/2001/357; UN 
Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16 October 2002, S/2002/1146; UN Security Council, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 5 
March 2014, S/2014/15 at para 86; Human Rights Watch, supra note 143. 
700 See, e.g., Prunier, supra note 691 at 281–81. UN Secretary-General Reports to the UN Security Council on the 
UN’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC have continued to contain a special section devoted to security issues in the 
Eastern Provinces of the country: see, e.g., UN Security Council, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” Report of the Secretary-General, 4 January 2019, S/2019/6; UN Security 
Council, Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16 August 2004, S/2004/650 at paras 27-32, 34-46; UN Security Council, Report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, 12 May 2011, S/2011/298 at paras 12-28; UN Security Council, supra note 699 at paras 18-28. 
701 Mai-Mai is sometimes spelled Mayi-Mayi. 
702 See, e.g., Luca Jourdan, “Mayi-Mayi: Local Rebels in Kivu, DRC” (2011) 35:3–4 Africa Development 89 at 94–
95; Franck van Acker & Koen Vlassenroot, “The Mai-Mai and the function of militia violence in eastern Congo” 
(2001) 4 Politique Africaine 103; Koen Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices dans l’Est du Congo: Le 
Cas des Mayi-Mayi” (2001) Afrique des Grands Lacs Annuaire 115. 
703 See, e.g., Jason Stearns, Mai-Mai Yakutumba: Resistance and Racketeering in Fizi, South Kivu (London, UK: 
Rift Valley Institute, 2013); UN Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, 4 June 2018, S/2018/531 at para 22; Jourdan, supra note 702; van Acker & Vlassenroot, supra note 702. 
704 See, e.g., Joanne Richards, “Implementing DDR in Settings of Ongoing Conflict: The Organization and 
Fragmentation of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)” (2016) 5:1 Stability: International 
Journal of Security and Development 11. 
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armed groups and existing as, or integrated into, the national armed forces.705 Non-state armed 
groups have also frequently splintered in separate groups as a result of disputes among leaders 
and commanders.706 This has led to the proliferation of armed groups in Eastern Congo and, as of 
December 2017, around 120 armed groups of varying sizes and levels of organization were 
believed to be operating in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu.707 
5.3 IHL Violations of Civilians Protections 
As noted above, the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC were and, in the case of the DRC, 
continue to be characterized by widespread IHL violations against civilians.708 The following 
sections will discuss in more detail the specific IHL violations committed against civilians in 
practice during the Sierra Leone Civil War and the conflicts in the DRC. The substantive legal 
content of IHL protections for civilians was discussed in chapter 4. The reality of IHL violations 
in practice is that many violations often occur concurrently during a single operation.709 For 
 
705 For example, in 2009 Bosco Ntaganda, at the time the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the International 
Criminal Court, negotiated to integrate his Congrès national pour la defense du people (National Congress for the 
Defense of the People) into the FARDC and he himself received the rank of General in the FARDC: see, e.g., 
Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Chronology”, (21 August 2009), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/21/dr-congo-chronology>; UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 27 March 
2009, S/2009/160 at para 4; UN Security Council, Letter dated 21 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (2012) at para 66. 
706 For example, tension among leadership led to a split within the RCD in May 1999 and two groups emerged, the 
RCD and RCD-Goma. A further split within RCD-Goma would lead to the formation of RCD-ML in July-August 
1999. See, e.g., Prunier, supra note 691 at 221, 225, 229. 
707 “Armed Actors in North and South Kivu”, (December 2017), online: Kivu Security Tracker | Crisis Mapping in 
Eastern Congo 
<https://kivusecurity.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/reports/3/Armed%20Actor%20Area%20of%20Control%20Map
%20Eng%20Dec%202017.pdf>. 
708 See, e.g., Anneke Van Woudenberg & Ida Sawyer, You Will Be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009) at 52; Kirsten Johnson et al, “Association of Sexual Violence and Human 
Rights Violations with Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo” 
(2010) 304:5 Journal of American Medical Association 553 at 559; UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 2098 (2013) (on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2014), 28 March 2013, S/RES/2098 (2013); UN 
Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2053 (2012) (on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 30 June 2013), 27 June 2012, 
S/RES/2053(2012); Amelia Bookstein, Beyond the Headlines: An Agenda for Action to Protect Civilians in 
Neglected Conflicts (OXFAM, 2003) at 6, 20. 
709 For example, the Kamajors attack and capture of Koribondo, Sierra Leone on 15-16 February 1998, which 
included unlawful killings, terrorizing the civilian population, collective punishment, assault, destruction of 
property, and pillage: SCSL CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 674 at paras 420-30. The AFRC attack on Freetown, 
Sierra Leone beginning on 6 January 1999 included the unlawful killing of civilians, rape, outrages on personal 
dignity, violence to life, health and physical or mental suffering, the use of children under the age of 15 years, 
abductions and forced labour, pillage, and acts of terrorism: SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at paras 
951, 1068, 1170, 1243, 1277, 1389, 1429, 1610. 
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example, in the DRC, an attack on Bogoro carried out on 24 February 2003 included direct 
attacks on civilians, murder, rape and sexual slavery, the use of children under the age of 15 
years in hostilities, destruction of property and pillage.710 Therefore, for the purposes of framing 
the discussion of IHL violations in the Sierra Leone and DRC conflicts in the following sections, 
I have grouped the most common IHL violations committed against civilians into three 
categories: (1) theft of civilian and public goods; 2) forced recruitment of individuals for various 
tasks; and, (3) violations of bodily integrity and/or terrorization of civilians. 
 5.3.1 Theft of Civilian or Public Goods 
Pillage, the “unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict”,711 has been particularly 
prevalent in practice among armed groups in both Sierra Leone and the DRC.712 This IHL 
violation was used by armed groups both as personal sources of income as well as a means to 
finance the activities of the armed group.713 Members of armed groups were often unpaid and 
 
710 ICC Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 661 at paras 809-41, 915-24, 925-32, 985-1019, 1051-65. 
711 ICTY Delalic Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 591. 
712 With regards to Sierra Leone see, e.g., UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 4 March 1999, S/1999/237 at para 27; UN Security Council, Special 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999, 
S/1999/20 at para 19; David Keen, “Sierra Leone: War and its Functions” in Frances Stewart & Valpy Fitzgerald, 
eds, War and Development, Volume 2: Country Experiences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 155 at 182–
63; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4, para 90. With regards to the DRC, 
see, e.g., ICC Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 661 at paras 516, 519; UN Security Council, Midterm report of 
the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 19 July 2013, S/2013/433* at Annex 7; Human Rights 
Watch, “Congo: Rebel Fighting Imperils Beni Residents”, (12 June 2001), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/06/12/congo-rebel-fighting-imperils-beni-residents>; Human Rights Watch, 
“Eastern Congo Ravaged”, (15 May 2000), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/05/15/eastern-congo-ravaged>; Human Rights Watch, “What Kabila Is Hiding: 
Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo (October 1997)”, (October 1997), online: Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/congo/>; Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Massive Increase in 
Attacks on Civilians”, (2 July 2009), online: Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/02/dr-
congo-massive-increase-attacks-civilians>; Human Rights Watch, “Renewed Crisis in North Kivu”, (23 October 
2007), online: Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/10/23/renewed-crisis-north-kivu>; UN 
Security Council, supra note 699; UN Security Council, supra note 699; Human Rights Watch, supra note 143; UN 
Security Council, supra note 699 at para 86. 
713 See, e.g., UN Security Council, supra note 712 at Annex 7; Jake Sherman, “Profit vs. Peace: The Clandestine 
Diamond Economy” (2000) 53:2 Journal of International Affairs 699 at 699; UN Environment Programme, Sierra 
Leone Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding Assessment, Technical Report (Geneva: UNEP, 2010) at 15; David 
Pratt, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd 
Axworthy, PC, MP from David Pratt, MP, Nepean-Carleton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone (Ottawa, 1999); SCSL 
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at para 238; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to 
Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Vol 2 (Accra, Ghana: Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, 2004) at Ch 2, para 93. 
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expected to pillage in order to ‘pay’ themselves.714 In the DRC, Human Rights Watch identified 
pillage as not only a means of enriching the armed group or members of the group, but also as a 
means of punishing or deterring civilians from supporting enemy combatants.715 Pillage could be 
an extremely profitable means of supporting an armed group: for example, the Mouvement du 
mars 23 (M23; March 23 Movement) in the DRC is believed to have stolen as much as 
$3,000,000 US worth of goods during its occupation of Goma in November 2012.716  
 
After pillaging property, combatants often destroyed whatever was left behind.717 For example, 
in Sierra Leone there were many reports of houses being burned, sometimes with their 
inhabitants locked inside.718 In fact, this was something that the RUF did so frequently that it 
became known as “a signature of RUF attacks on villages.”719 Similar reports of civilians being 
burned alive in their homes have emerged from the DRC, as well.720 
 
In both Sierra Leone and the DRC, pillage was not limited to the theft of civilian possessions but, 
rather, also extended to the pillage of natural resources.721 In both countries, the pillage of natural 
 
714 SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at para 238; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
supra note 713 at Ch 2, para 93; Zoë Marriage, “Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier: demobilisation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo” (2007) 7:2 Conflict, Security & Development 281 at 287; Thom, supra note 695. 
715 Human Rights Watch, supra note 712. 
716 UN Security Council, supra note 712 at Annex 7. 
717 In Sierra Leone see, e.g. Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 713 at Ch 2, paras 86, 
93; SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at para 418; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (New York: UN, 2000) at para 38; Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2000 - 
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resources directly fuelled and funded the conflict.722 In Sierra Leone, parties to the conflict 
fought for control over diamonds and diamonds mines, in order to benefit financially from these 
resources.723 In the DRC, armed groups as well as units of the national armed forces have fought 
for control of, in particular, gold mines,724 but also diamond mines725 and mining sites for 
tungsten, tantalum, and tin.726 These are often referred to as conflict minerals.727 
 
In addition to theft of possessions and natural resources, two common forms of pillage employed 
by members of armed groups have been extortion and illegal taxation in territories under armed 
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group control.728 These groups often create checkpoints or roadblocks along roads under their 
control, where they will extort money, food, and other goods or charge illegal ‘customs duties’ to 
all people travelling the road.729 In 2011 in the DRC, the Forces démocratiques de liberation du 
Rwanda (FDLR; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) were reported as having 
specific units devoted to producing income for the group from, among other things, illegal 
taxation.730 Illegal taxation and extortion can be extremely profitable for armed groups: in the 
DRC in early 2013, members of the M23 were believed to be earning $180,000 US a month from 
these IHL violations.731 
5.3.2 Forced Recruitment of Individuals for Various Tasks 
Armed groups in Sierra Leone and the DRC have also used abduction and forced recruitment of 
both adults and children to serve as combatants,732 or for forced labour.733 Women and girls have 
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been targeted in particular for domestic and sexual enslavement.734 The use of child soldiers was 
extremely prevalent in both Sierra Leone and the DRC.735 Indeed, the armed conflict in “Sierra 
Leone … bec[a]me synonymous with child soldiering.”736 Abduction and forced recruitment of 
children was widespread among all four of the primary parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone 
(i.e., the AFRC, CDF, RUF, and SLA).737 These children were then forced to fight for these 
armed groups.738 It is possible that “as many as half of the RUF’s combatants were between eight 
and fourteen years old” and the vast majority “reported being forcibly abducted”.739 Abducted 
children in Sierra Leone were also required to do forced labour and subjected to “rape, sexual 
slavery and other forms of sexual abuse.”740 In the DRC, while armed groups have often pledged 
to discontinue the practice of recruiting children, these commitments have been frequently short-
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lived and unrealized.741 In both conflicts, children caught trying to escape were, at best, severely 
beaten, and at worst, killed immediately.742 In 2000, it was estimated that 15-30 percent of new 
recruits in the DRC were under 18 years of age, with a significant number of these children 
under the age of 12 years.743 
 
Armed groups in Sierra Leone and the DRC frequently used forced labour to support their 
activities during the conflict.744 For example, in both conflicts, armed groups forced (and, in the 
DRC continue to force) both children and adults to transport their supplies or to undertake 
manual labour in mining camps.745 In Sierra Leone, the RUF and CDF forced people to conduct 
agricultural work and turn the proceeds over to their leaders.746 In both Sierra Leone and the 
DRC, captives were often forced to perform domestic work for both senior and junior 
combatants, such as preparing food and cleaning.747 
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5.3.3 Violations of Bodily Integrity and/or Terrorization of Civilians748 
During the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the DRC, amputations,749 rape and other forms of sexual 
violence,750 torture,751 and murder752 were all used to violate the bodily integrity of and/or 
terrorize civilians. Amputation was particularly prominent during the Sierra Leone civil war,753 
where the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found the RUF to be responsible for nearly 40 
percent of the amputations they recorded, and the AFRC to be responsible for a further 27 
percent of recorded amputations.754 Amputation has not been a common feature of conflict in the 
DRC in the same manner as in Sierra Leone; however, mutilation through the use of machetes to 
attack civilians has been recorded.755 
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Rape and other forms of sexual violence were particularly widespread during the conflicts in 
both Sierra Leone and the DRC.756 In Sierra Leone, women and girls were subjected rape, sexual 
slavery, and what would come to be known through the jurisprudence of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone as forced marriage.757 As many as an “estimated 250,000 women and girls were 
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raped and forced into sexual slavery, or, experienced other crimes of sexual violence” during the 
Sierra Leone civil war.758 In the DRC, conflict-related rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
such as sexual mutilation, have also been particularly endemic, with a 2011 report stating that 48 
women in the DRC were raped every hour.759 In March 2019, the UN Secretary General reported 
that approximately 70 per cent of the documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence in the 
DRC in 2018 were perpetrated by members of armed groups.760  
 
Other IHL violations have also been used as a means of punishing or terrorizing civilians, in 
particular assault and murder.761 Beatings and murder were often used to control and punish 
civilians, and deter disobedience among civilians.762 Torture was another terror tactic,763 often 
carried out in public for maximum effect on communities.764 Assault was a common tool used by 
armed groups to punish civilians, as well as to coerce compliance from civilians.765 Killing 
civilians was also a means of controlling civilians by creating and enhancing the terror of 
civilians and to serve as an example to others of what could happen to them if they disobeyed 
combatants.766  
 
Soldiers and the Special Court for Sierra Leone” (2006) 15:3 Social & Legal Studies 315; Oosterveld, supra note 
756 at 64–68; Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, “Forced Marriage: A New Crime against Humanity” (2008) 8 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 53; Valerie Oosterveld, “Forced Marriage and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone: Legal Advances and Conceptual Difficulties” (2011) 2:1 Journal of International 
Humanitarian Law 127; Annie Bunting, “Forced Marriage in Conflict Situations: Researching and Prosecuting Old 
Harms and New Crimes” (2012) 1 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 165. 
758 UN Security Council, Conflict-related sexual violence Report of the Secretary-General, 13 January 2012, 
A/66/657*–S/2012/33 at para 72; Dougherty, supra note 679 at 427. 
759 Note this statistic includes all incidents of rape in the DRC, both conflict-related and not. Peterman, Palermo & 
Bredenkamp, supra note 750 at 1064–65. 
760 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, 29 March 2019, 
S/2019/280 at para 46. 
761 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 732; UN Security Council, supra note 102 at paras 50, 56; UN 
Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 24 October 2011, S/2011/656 at paras 46, 48; Human Rights Watch, supra note 
752; Human Rights Watch, supra note 712; Human Rights Watch, supra note 712; Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 712; Human Rights Watch, supra note 752; Human Rights Watch, supra note 712. 
762 Human Rights Watch, supra note 732; UN Security Council, supra note 102 at paras 50, 56; UN Security 
Council, supra note 761 at paras 46, 48; Human Rights Watch, supra note 712; Human Rights Watch, supra note 
712; Human Rights Watch, supra note 752. 
763 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4,para 67. 
764 Ibid at Ch 4, para 67. 
765 UN Security Council, supra note 102 at para 50; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 
102 at Ch 4, paras 62-63; Human Rights Watch, supra note 680; Van Woudenberg & Sawyer, supra note 708. 
766 MONUSCO & UNOHCHR, supra note 720 at 6, 12–14; Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Torture: A weapon of war against unarmed civilians”, (26 June 2001), online: Refworld 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b83b6e37.html>; Human Rights Watch, supra note 712; Human Rights Watch, 
supra note 680; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4, para 108. 
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5.2 Conclusion  
Although the discussion of IHL protections for civilians in chapter 4 suggested that extensive 
protections do exist for civilians, this chapter’s discussion of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the 
DRC has demonstrated that, in practice, civilians often suffer from the widespread perpetration 
of IHL violations. This chapter has demonstrated two key points. First, the prevalence of 
violations of IHL protections for civilians during these conflicts indicates that, in practice, the 
current status quo of IHL is not providing sufficient protection for civilians during armed 
conflict. Second, the identification and description of these violations does not provide insight 
into the psychology of the commission of these violations. The lack of understanding of the 
perpetration of IHL violations by members of armed groups has been discussed by IHL 
practitioners.767 These discussions have drawn primarily on practical experiences of physical 
engagement with armed groups. These works by IHL practitioners attempt to understand IHL 
violations for the purpose of improving strategies for engaging with armed groups. IHL 
practitioners appreciate how an understanding of IHL violations can help them to do their jobs – 
engaging with armed groups to promote compliance and provide IHL training – more effectively. 
Vincent Bernard, Editor-in-Chief of the ICRC’s International Review of the Red Cross, has 
stated that “[i]t is vital to comprehend why armed groups choose to respect or flout the law.”768 
Therefore, the idea that it is both possible and beneficial to have a deeper understanding of IHL 
violations already exists. However, the addition of an understanding of the psychology 
underlying IHL violations has rarely been examined.769 Psychology has entered into IHL 
literature aimed at using effective persuasion to secure armed group compliance with IHL.770 
 
767 See, e.g., Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Reactions to Norms Armed 
Groups and the Protection of Civilians, Policy Briefing No 1 (Geneva: Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014); Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra note 12; Bangerter, supra note 232. 
768 Vincent Bernard, “Editorial: Understanding Armed Groups and the Law” (2011) 93:882 International Review of 
the Red Cross 261 at 264. 
769 One study that did examine the psychology of combatants was the ICRC’s “Roots of Behaviour” study, which 
focused on using the psychological insights to improve ICRC engagement strategies. Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra 
note 12. 
770 See, e.g., Olivier Bangerter, “Comment - Persuading Armed Groups to Better Respect International Humanitarian 
Law” in Heike Krieger, ed, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African 
Great Lakes Region (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 112; Steven R Ratner, “Persuading to 
Comply: On the Development and Avoidance of Legal Argumentation” in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Mark A Pollack, eds, 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 568; Ulrich Schneckener & Claudia Hofmann, “The Power of Persuasion” 
in Heike Krieger, ed, Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great 
Lakes Region (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 79; Claudia Hofmann & Ulrich Schneckener, 
  
144 
This thesis argues that understanding the psychology behind IHL violations is vital, not only for 
engaging with armed groups, but also for identifying and devising ways to develop the 
substantive regulation of armed conflicts under IHL. Understanding combatant psychology 
allows IHL academics and practitioners alike to further develop IHL policy and practice to 
prevent violations.  
 
The next chapter examines whether legal theory can provide a deeper understanding of the 
perpetration of violence toward civilians by members of armed groups. While legal theories tend 
to leave questions of compliance and deviance to other academic disciplines, such as social 
psychology and criminology, there are three legal theories that address the psychology of 
individuals and their interaction with the law: Law and Economics theory, Behavioural Law and 
Economics theory, and the theory of Socialization and International Law. The chapter will assess 
the viability of using any of these theories to provide an adequate explanation of the psychology 
of combatant deviance from IHL protections for civilians.  
 
“Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-building: options and strategies” (2011) 93:883 International 
Review of the Red Cross 1 at 10–11. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6 The Limitations of Existing Legal Theory to Explain Combatant 
Behaviour 
 
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant 
violence during war. The previous chapters examined existing IHL protections for civilians 
during NIACs as they apply to armed groups in both theory and practice. Those chapters 
demonstrated that existing civilian protections are based largely on the same protections afforded 
to individuals in peace and that the widespread existence of violence toward civilians in practice 
provides little to no insight into the psychology of the perpetrators of that violence. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether legal theory can provide an explanation for 
combatant deviance from the IHL provisions designed to protect civilians during armed conflict. 
Legal theories typically focus on the function and formation of law,771 with legal theorists 
addressing questions such as “what is law”,772 “what should the law be”,773 “who gets to make 
law and for whose benefit”.774 In most international law-focused legal theories, the behaviour of 
 
771 For example, international legal positivism, which focuses on the source and authoritativeness of law and the 
legal system: see, e.g., Bruno Simma & Adreas Paulus, “The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in International Conflicts: A Positivist View” (1999) 93:2 American Journal of International Law 302. 
Marxist International Law and Third World Approaches to International Law, which focus on greater involvement 
of non-state actors in law-making: see, e.g., BS Chimni, “An outline of a Marxist course on public international law” 
in Susan Marks, ed, International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 53; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social 
Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Feminist 
International Law, which seeks to change the actors involved in law-making by increasing women’s representation 
and promoting legal reform to address gender inequalities inherent in existing law: see, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth & 
Christine Chinkin, The boundaries of international law: A feminist analysis (Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press, 2000). Interactional legal theory promotes inclusion of state and non-state actors in international 
law making and promotes the importance of factors such as generality, clarity, constancy and congruence in the 
content of law; however, without addressing factors contributing to legal compliance and deviance: see, e.g. Jutta 
Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
772 Craig Forcese, What is Law - Legal Theory in a Nutshell (Podcast) at 01m:43s. See also, e.g., HLA Hart, The 
Concept of Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 7–8; Joseph Raz, “Legal Principles and the 
Limits of Law” (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 823 at 842. 
773 Danny Priel, “The Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy” (2008) 27:6 Law and Philosophy 
643 at 646. 
774 Forcese, supra note 772 at 02m:14s. 
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states and not individuals is addressed. Further, the behaviour of states is generally only 
considered for the purpose of determining what the law is or should be. International legal 
positivism is focused on the formal sources of international law and considers state behaviour 
only so far as is necessary to identify “‘international law as it is’”.775 Most other international 
legal theories use international legal positivism “as their starting point to ascertain lex lata, even 
if their purpose is primarily to critique any such concept.”776 Other international legal theories 
tend to focus on the need to include actors other than states or other than American and European 
states.777 Consequently, Marxist International Legal theory and Third World Approaches to 
International Law argue that existing international law is imperialist and the voices of different 
classes and developing states need to be incorporated into both the formation of international law 
and the functioning of the international legal system.778 Feminist International Legal theory 
advocates for greater inclusion of women in international law-making and institutions.779 
Interactional legal theory promotes inclusion of both state and non-state actors in international 
law making and promotes the importance of factors such as generality, clarity, constancy and 
congruence in the content of law.780 However, while these theories address what the law should 
be, they do not seek to explain why individuals do or do not comply with the law. Where 
international legal theories do broach the topic of compliance, they generally target macro-level, 
that is, state, compliance with international law based on the process of international law 
formation.781 The issue of individual combatant deviance is, however, far removed from the 
 
775 Simma & Paulus, supra note 771 at 303. 
776 Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R Ratner, “The Method is the Message” (1999) 93:2 American Journal of 
International Law 410 at 415. 
777 See, e.g., Chimni, supra note 771 (Marxist International Legal Theory); China Miéville, “The commodity-form 
theory of international law” in Susan Marks, ed, International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 92 (Marxist International Legal Theory); James Thuo Gathii, 
“TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography” (2011) 3:1 
Trade, Law and Development 26 (Third World Approaches to International Law); Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, 
“Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law” (2011) 3:1 Trade, Law and 
Development 103  (Third World Approaches to International Law); Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 771 
(Feminist International Legal Theory); Karen Knop, “Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in 
International Law” (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 293 (Feminist International Legal 
Theory). 
778 See, e.g., Miéville, supra note 777; Chimni, supra note 771; Gathii, supra note 777; Eslava & Pahuja, supra note 
777. 
779 See, e.g., Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 771; Knop, supra note 777. 
780 See, e.g., Brunnée & Toope, supra note 771. 
781 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereingty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Harold Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey 
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state-driven process of international law formation. There is also, a body of theories in 
International Law and International Relations theory that address compliance drawing on 
mechanisms of either coercion and material inducement782 or persuasion.783 The focus of these 
theories tends to be on the behaviour and compliance of states; however, these schools of thought 
are incorporated into the three-mechanisms that form Socialization and International Law theory. 
Consequently, they will be addressed through the discussion of material inducement and 
persuasion under Socialization and International Law theory in section 6.3 of this chapter. 
 
In this chapter, I focus on three international legal theories that address the psychology of 
individuals in their interaction with law: Law and Economics theory, Behavioural Law and 
Economics theory, and Socialization and International Law theory. Law and Economics and 
Behavioural Law and Economics theories both develop an individual behavioural model to 
explain individual decision-making and interaction with the law. Socialization and International 
Law theory is primarily focused on addressing state compliance with international law; however, 
I have included it in this chapter because the theory draws heavily on individual psychology to 
understand how individuals interact with the law. This chapter examines the psychological 
explanations for compliance and deviance provided by each of these three theories (Law and 
 
International Law?” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599; Harold Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 
Nebraska Law Review 181. 
782 See, e.g., Robert O Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Stephen 
D Krasner, “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights” in Volker Rittberger, ed, Regime Theory and International 
Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 139; AM Weisburd, “Implications of International Relations 
Theory for the International Law of Human Rights” (1999) 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45; Jack L 
Goldsmith & Eric A Posner, “A Theory of Customary International Law” (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1113; Jack L Goldsmith & Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Eric A Posner & Alan O Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013); Emilie Hafner-Burton, David G Victor & Yanatan Lupu, “Political Science 
Research on International Law: The State of the Field” (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 47. 
783 See, e.g., Rodger A Payne, “Persuasion, Frames, and Norm Construction” (2001) 7:1 European Journal of 
International Relations 37; Kal Raustiala, “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law” (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 1; Thomas Risse, 
“Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics” (2000) 54:1 International Organization 1; Margaret E Keck 
& Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change” (1998) 52 International Organization 887; Alistair Ian Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as 
Social Environments” (2001) 45 International Studies Quarterly 487; Jeffrrey T Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and 
National Identity in Contemporary Europe” (1999) 43 International Studies Quarterly 83; Jeffrrey T Checkel, “Why 
Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change” (2001) 55 International Organization 553; Koh, supra 
note 779. 
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Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and International Law) in order 
to determine whether or not they can provide an adequate explanation of the psychology of 
combatant deviance from IHL protections for civilians. 
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of Law and Economics theory. It examines and critiques 
the three key components of individual psychology advanced by Law and Economics theory to 
explain how individuals interact with law: (1) individuals are rational, self-interested actors; (2) 
individual preferences are both quantifiable and universal; and, (3) individual decision-making is 
consistent in all contexts. The chapter next turns to a discussion of Behavioural Law and 
Economics theory, a derivative of Law and Economics theory, premised on addressing existing 
critiques of Law and Economics theory. It examines how Behavioural Law and Economics 
theorists have drawn on insights from psychology to develop a more nuanced understanding of 
how individuals interact with law based on concepts of bounded rationality and bounded self-
interest. This section of the chapter evaluates whether the psychological insights used by 
Behavioural Law and Economics theorists provide an adequate explanation of individual 
psychology that can be used to understand and explain combatant violence toward civilians. The 
final section of the chapter discuses Socialization and International Law theory. The chapter 
examines the three components of this theory that are said to influence behaviour: (1) material 
inducement; (2) persuasion; and, (3) acculturation. Each of these components is analysed to 
assess whether they provide the necessary framework to understand and explain psychological 
processes that lead to deviance.  
 
Ultimately, this chapter argues that none of the three legal theories discussed provide an 
explanation for combatant deviance from the IHL provisions designed to protect civilians during 
armed conflict. The failure of these theories to provide an adequate explanation of combatant 
deviance is linked in large part to the fact that these theories are designed to be broadly 
applicable to the legal system, whether national or international, in a typical context. The typical 
context is peacetime. Therefore, just as there is a gap between the legal protections afforded to 
individuals in peace and the protections required for the safety of civilians in war, there is a 
similar gap in existing legal theories that seek to explain the psychology of individual interaction 
with law. A broadly applicable behavioural model based largely on individual legal compliance 
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and deviance in peacetime is inadequate for the exceptional context of armed conflict. This thesis 
advocates for the use of psychological and behavioural insights specific to the context of armed 
conflict, rather than insights more generalizable to human behaviour in a multitude of contexts as 
is done in Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and 
International Law. This chapter is important because it demonstrates the absence of a legal 
theory that provides the necessary specificity about individual deviance in armed conflict. The 
inadequacy of existing behavioural models from Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and 
Economics, and Socialization and International Law, which will be established in this chapter, 
supports the approach to the examination of IHL employed in this thesis: a turn to theories of 
criminology and social psychology that have been used to explain individual deviance during 
armed conflicts.784 
6.1 Law and Economics Theory 
Law and Economics argues that principles of economics can be used to explain individual legal 
compliance and deviance.785 This is because, according to Law and Economics theory, 
individuals make decisions about whether to follow or break the law based on an economic 
evaluation of the personal costs and benefits of compliance.786 Consequently, if laws are made 
that increase the costs of negative behaviour and decrease the benefits, individuals should be 
more likely to comply with a law.787 Law and Economics theory relies on several key 
assumptions a both about the world and human nature: (1) all people are rational and self-
 
784 Although this chapter takes issue with the adequacy of legal theories to provide an understanding of the 
psychological dynamics of combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict, this should not be interpreted 
as a general criticism of the validity of the theories of Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, or 
Socialization and International Law. The validity of these three theories as general theories of law is not the subject 
of this chapter.   
785 See, e.g., Werner Z Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 2d ed (San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press Inc, 1988) at 262–82; Lewis A Kornhauser, “The New Economic Analysis of Law: Legal Rules as Incentives” 
in Nicholas Mercuro, ed, Law and Economics (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) 27; Richard A 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th ed (New York: Walter Kluwers Law & Business, 2014) at 253–58; Dan M 
Kahan, “Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime” (1998) 27:S2 Journal of Legal Studies 609. 
786 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 785 at 262–82; Kornhauser, supra note 785; Posner, supra note 785 at 253–58; 
Kahan, supra note 785. 
787 See, e.g., Samuel Kramer, “An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal 
Structure of Sanctions” (1990) 81:2 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 398 at 402–407; Talia Fisher, 
“Economic Analysis of Criminal Law” in Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hornle, eds, The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 28 at 40–41. 
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interested;788 (2) utility maximization is people’s ultimate goal;789 (3) all people assign the same 
value to specific preferences and that value is quantifiable;790 and, (4) context does not play a 
role in the construction of individual preferences.791 These assumptions have been heavily 
criticized by Behavioural Law and Economics scholars.792 For example, the work of Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman has demonstrated how individuals are not entirely rational in 
their decision-making.793 This section will examine these flawed assumptions of Law and 
Economics theory in order to demonstrate that it cannot provide a useful model for 
understanding combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict.  
 6.1.1 People are Rational and Self-Interested 
Law and Economics theory assumes that individuals are both rational and self-interested and are 
guided by these characteristics in everything that they do.794 While people’s ability to maximize 
their goals (preferences) will be limited by their access to resources and external restrictions 
placed on their ability to act, they will nonetheless evaluate available options based on a cost-
benefit analysis.795 On the basis of such an analysis, the rational choice is considered to be the 
 
788 See, e.g., Michael Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 9th ed (London, UK: Thomas Reuters, 2014) 
at 518, 522; Gregory Mitchell, “Alternative Behavioral Law and Economics” in Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman, 
eds, The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 167 at 
168; Posner & Sykes, supra note 782 at 12; DL McFadden, “Rationality for Economists” (1999) 19 Journal of 
Uncertainty 73. 
789 See, e.g., Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2007) at 10–15; 
Richard A Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory” (1979) 8:1 Journal of Legal Studies 103; 
Freeman, supra note 788 at 520. 
790 See, e.g., David D Friedman, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why it Matters (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000) at 20–21, 33, 39–40; Jeffrey L Dunoff & Joel P Trachtman, “Economic Analysis 
of International Law” (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 1 at 48; Richard A Posner, “Wealth 
Maximization Revisited” (1985) 2 2 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 85 at 86; Posner & 
Sykes, supra note 782 at 13. 
791 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 790 at 19. 
792 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein & Richard H Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics” 
(1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471; Christine Jolls, “Behavioral Law and Economics” in Alain Marciane, ed, 
Law and Economics: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 2009) 71; Russell B Korobkin & Thomas S Ulen, “Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics” (2000) 88 California Law 
Review 1051; Russell B Korobkin, “What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?” (2011) 
2011:5 University of Illinois Law Review 1653; Anne van Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics” 
(2014) 55:2 Harvard International Law Journal 421. 
793 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” in Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “The framing of decisions and the 
psychology of choice” (1981) 30:4481 Sciences 453; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk” (1979) 47 Econometrica 263. 
794 Freeman, supra note 788 at 522. 
795 Posner & Sykes, supra note 782 at 12. 
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option for which the benefits are outweighed by the costs. Further, because the individual is self-
interested, the costs and benefits will be based solely on the individual’s personal interests and 
preferences. As Freeman describes it, the value ascribed to a thing by an individual “is said to be 
‘measured’ by the maximum that person would be willing to pay for it, or the minimum for 
which the person would be willing to take to give it up.”796 The utility of assuming that people 
are rational and self-interested is that it allows Law and Economics scholars to make predictions 
about how individuals will behave in a given situation. It means that, based on the information 
available to an individual, we can assume that they will “make[s] consistent and logical 
choices”.797 Self-interest, along with Law and Economics’ assumption of utility maximization, 
allow Law and Economics theorists to make predictions about individuals’ goals and 
preferences.  
 
Issacharoff notes that assuming all people are rational and self-interested is a “highly reductionist 
view of human psyche”.798 The assumption in Law and Economics theory that individuals are 
rational and self-interested is problematic for three important reasons. First, people often make 
decisions that are irrational due to an array of flawed cognitive processes.799 For example, people 
often have flawed memories and relying on flawed memories can lead to irrational choices or 
which may limit their rationality.800 This is addressed in Behavioural Law and Economics theory 
discussed below. Second, Law and Economics theory makes assumptions about the availability 
of information to a decision-maker and about the stability of individual preferences.801 It assumes 
that people’s preferences are both fixed and stable.802 This assumption “is not so much 
 
796 Freeman, supra note 788 at 518. 
797 Mitchell, supra note 788 at 168. See also McFadden, supra note 788. 
798 Samuel Issacharoff, “Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?” (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1729 
at 1730. 
799 See, e.g., Herbert A Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice” (1955) 69 Quarterly Journal of Economics 
99; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 793. 
800 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477; Freeman, supra note 788 at 522; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 
792 at 1074. 
801 Freeman, supra note 788 at 522; Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: Chicago 
University Pres, 1976) at 14; Matthew D Adler, Rational Choice, Rational Agenda-Setting, and Constitutional Law: 
Does the Constitution Require Basic or Strengthened Public Rationality? (2013) at 113. 
802 Matthew Rabin, “Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics” (1993) 83 American Economic 
Review 1281 at 13–16; Yulia Foka-Kavalieraki & Aristides N Hatzis, “Rational After All: Toward an Improved 
Theory of Rationality in Economics” (2011) 12:1 Revue de Philosophie Economique 2 at 7. 
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empirically informed, but rather a methodological aid”,803 which adds to the flawed behavioural 
model produced by Law and Economics theory. People do not always have access to all of the 
information necessary to make the rational choice in a particular situation.804 Also, people’s 
preferences are not static but can change over time and be affected by many internal and external 
variables.805 Finally, the assumption that individuals will always make a choice based on their 
own self-interest ignores the fact that people are sometimes motivated by, or their decisions 
influenced by, other considerations such as “altruism, a concern for the community, [or] an 
interest in the environment.”806 Not only are these flawed assumptions relevant in ordinary, 
everyday types of decisions (e.g., to go to work or to call in sick; to give someone your seat on 
the bus or to remain seated), but they are often magnified in situations of armed conflict when, 
arguably, the rational, self-interested choice would be to remain home and let someone else risk 
their life on the battlefield. Once a combatant, individuals may often lack complete information 
about their situation and/or possible outcomes of their choices.807 They may jeopardize their own 
safety, or even life, to help a fallen comrade. They may choose to treat unarmed civilians or 
detainees violently when those civilians pose no threat to themselves or their fellow combatants. 
Other times, an order from a commanding officer may seem to present combatants with no 
option for choice at all,808 while some combatants (albeit a minority) may choose to disobey a 
command and risk punishment. Even if the rational, self-interested, informed actor with stable 
preferences was an accurate model in the peacetime context (which Behavioural Law and 
Economics demonstrates is not the case),809 it is difficult to see how the rational actor model 
could ever be a reliable framework for understanding individual decision-making in armed 
conflict. 
 
803 Markus Englerth, “Behavioral Law and Economics” in Emanuel V Towfigh & Niels Petersen, eds, Economic 
Methods for Lawyers (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015) 177 at 190. 
804 See, e.g., Joshua S Gans, “On the Impossibility of Rational Choice under Incomplete Information” (1996) 29:2 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 287. 
805 Amos Tversky & Richard H Thaler, “Preference Reversals” in Richard H Thaler, ed, The Winner’s Curse: 
Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 79 at 91; Jolls, Sunstein 
& Thaler, supra note 792 at 1488, 1535–36. 
806 Freeman, supra note 788 at 522. 
807 Karl von Clausewitz, Principles of War (London, UK: Stephen Austin & Sons Ltd, 1943) at 51. 
808 This was the argument advanced by the defendant in The Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, 
5 March 1998, IT-96-22-Tbis. 
809 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 799; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477; Tversky & Kahneman, supra 
note 793. 
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 6.1.2 Utility Maximization and the Quantification and Universality of Preferences 
Another assumption of Law and Economics theory is that preferences can always be quantified. 
Law and Economics theory states that individuals make decisions based on an end goal of utility 
maximization.810 Utility maximization “assumes that all choices are made to maximize the 
chooser’s utility, happiness, or pleasure” and “what maximizes a chooser’s utility, happiness, or 
pleasure is achieving his or her goals.”811 Some economists, such as Posner, use wealth 
maximization as an end goal as opposed to utility maximization and argue that wealth provides a 
greater guide for decision-making than ‘utility’ since “utility whether as welfare or happiness is 
both difficult to discover and to measure”.812 The basis for this is that “[m]oney is easier to 
measure than utility.”813 Regardless of whether wealth maximization or utility maximization is 
used as an end goal, both require some means evaluating and predicting the extent to which 
individuals value (either monetarily or based on utility) the different courses of action between 
which they are choosing. Law and Economics theory nonetheless “presupposes the ability to 
measure and compare the ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ of various types of transactions”.814 Reliance on 
utility maximization in lieu of wealth maximization helps to overcome the problem of 
incommensurability, where a choice must be made between values which are not all easily 
quantified, such as a choice between money and respect.815 Law and Economics theory does not 
provide guidance on how to measure values that are not readily quantifiable, such as national 
pride or friendship.816  
 
Law and Economics theory considers a law to be efficient and “desirable even though it 
produces losers as well as winners, as long as winners gain more than the losers lose.”817 In 
addition to assuming the ability to quantify values or measure usefulness, as already mentioned, 
this assumes an ability to universalize this measurement. To assume that a law can be used to 
 
810 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 789 at 10–15. 
811 Jonathan E Leightner, “Utility Maximization, Morality, and Religion” (2005) 39:2 Journal of Economic Issues 
375 at 375. 
812 Posner, supra note 789. 
813 Freeman, supra note 788 at 520. 
814 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 790 at 48. 
815 This is referred to as the incommensurability thesis: see, e.g., Jane B Baron & Jeffrey L Dunoff, “Against Market 
Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory” (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 431; Cass R 
Sunstein, “Incommensurability and Valuation in Law” (1993) 92 Michigan Law Review 779 at 796–97. 
816 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 815 at 783, 797–98, 805, 812–13. 
817 Posner & Sykes, supra note 782 at 13. 
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direct the behaviour of individuals within a society requires an assumption that at least a 
significant number of individuals will react similarly to the same legal incentives and 
disincentives.818 However, such an assumption requires that individuals quantify the values and 
goals affected, or intended to be affected, by the law in the same manner.819 This fails to account 
for evidence that there are individual variations in preferences within a single society. It assumes 
comparable, if not equal, valuation by both rich and poor, young and old, male and female or 
even by two random people that cannot be classified into binary dichotomies such as these. 
 
The assumption that all preferences are identifiable and quantifiable, and that such quantification 
is universal, is problematic in two important ways. First, not all values can be monetized or 
quantified.820 Second, even if a particular value can or could be quantified, it cannot be assumed 
that this quantification is universal or generalizable within a group or a society.821  
 
The assumption that all values are quantifiable is simply inaccurate. Law and Economics 
theorists’ attempt to simplify the complexity of quantifying values has led to a tendency to 
evaluate choices based on the monetization of preferences.822 However, not all preferences can 
be easily monetized or monetized at all. For example, while a price may be assigned to the cost 
of tuition for a four-year bachelor’s degree, a price for the knowledge gained from such an 
education cannot easily be monetized. This is because, while most, if not all, societies provide a 
framework or metric for objectively assessing the value of some goods, such as a car or a 
house,823 other goods – such as abstract goods like friendship or the eradication of discrimination 
- have no such standardized framework or metric for valuation.824 Some decisions may involve a 
single metric for valuation, such as money, distance or weight, while some “[k]inds of valuation 
 
818 Dan Danielsen, “Letting Go of ‘The Normal’ in Pursuit of an Ever- Elusive Real” in Anne Orford & Florian 
Hoffmann, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 
452 at 459. 
819 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 788 at 519; Danielsen, supra note 818 at 459. 
820 Sunstein, supra note 815 at 796–97. 
821 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 788 at 519. 
822 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 790 at 86; Friedman, supra note 790 at 20, 33, 39–40; Freeman, supra note 788 at 
520. 
823 For example, in Canada, there are provincial authorities, such as Ontario’s Municipal Property Assessment 
Corporation (MPAC), BC Assessment (BCA), that assess the value of homes and properties for the purpose of 
calculating property taxes. 
824 Sunstein, supra note 815 at 796–97. 
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- love, respect, wonder and worship - embody no metric at all.”825 When dealing with values, 
preferences, and goals for which there is no metric or which cannot be monetized, a cost-benefit 
analysis is not possible and cannot accurately depict human decision-making.826 Even where 
Law and Economics theory may adequately explain and describe market behaviours, it has 
difficulty “accurately explain[ing] and predict[ing] non-market behavior.”827 Even where there is 
an objective framework to assess the value of a particular good, this does not account for 
individual variation, as will be discussed below. Further, goods and values may be valued either 
instrumentally or intrinsically and the value assigned can often vary based on which form of 
valuation is applied.828 It may be that a single actor may assign two (or more) values to a single 
act. For example, a military operation may be assigned a monetary value based on the cost of 
soldiers’ salaries, of weapons used, fuel for transport, and so on, but the same operation may also 
possess an intangible value that cannot be monetized, such the value of a military victory or 
defeat.  
 
Finally, under Law and Economics theory, a law-maker must assume that the valuation of 
specific preferences can be generalized across individuals in society because a single law or body 
of laws is intended to produce a specific outcome from most, if not all, of these individuals. Law 
and Economics effectively “assumes that the worth of £1 is the same to everyone”.829 A person 
who is poor may value a dollar much more than a person who is rich. A person who is starving 
may value acquiring food, even by theft, over a personal desire to be a law-abiding citizen. An 
assumption that there will be no variation among individuals in their cost-benefit analysis of a 
situation and that all people value all things equally is an untenable assumption. This is because 
there are many different kinds or different modes of valuation: “[people] care about things and 
[other] people in different ways, … such as love, respect, and admiration.”830 Not only do people 
generally care about things in different ways, they also often care about things differently from 
one another and this can result in valuation differences between individuals. While the former is 
 
825 Ibid. 
826 See, e.g., Margaret J Radin, “Market-Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1849 at 1905–1906. 
827 Thomas S Ulen, “Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics” (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1747 at 
1759. 
828 Sunstein, supra note 815 at 782–83. 
829 Freeman, supra note 788 at 519. 
830 Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) at 6. 
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often affected by context, which will be discussed more below, the latter may be influenced by 
any number of factors. For example, a person who is spendthrift may value a dollar more than a 
person is not particularly frugal, even if there is no disparity between their personal wealth. My 
brother who dislikes Brussel sprouts likely values them less than I who love them. This is not to 
say that there are never instances where certain values may be generalized to a particular society 
or group of persons. Societies often have shared values such as “liv[ing] in … harmony with 
nature” or cultural or racial purity.831 The argument here is that, while there will be times when 
valuation of preferences may be generalizable, there will also be times when it is not and an 
assumption to the contrary inhibits an accurate understanding of human behaviour. 
 6.1.3 Context 
Finally, the omission of consideration of context within Law and Economics theory suggests a 
flawed assumption that context is not relevant to individual decision-making, choices, or 
preferences. The assumption is that social situations reveal human preferences and values, but 
that social situations do not influence their construction.832 However, context is highly 
relevant:833 “People do not value goods acontextually.”834 The choices I make while grocery 
shopping are very different when my budget is small than when it is large. If my choices are 
relied on to reveal my preferences, as is the practice according Law and Economics theory, 
failure to consider the context, or situational factors, in which I am operating can lead to 
erroneous conclusions about my preferences. Similarly, it is likely that assuming an individual’s 
preferences during war are consistent with their preferences during peacetime is also likely to 
lead to erroneous behavioural predictions of behaviour during armed conflict.  
 
As a result of its flawed assumptions about human psychology and how individuals interact with 
law, Law and Economics theory cannot provide an adequate understanding of combatant 
behaviour during armed conflict. Even without these assumptions, Law and Economics theory - 
in an effort to create a broadly generalizable theory - focuses on individual decision-making in 
 
831 Ibid. 
832 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 788 at 19 (on revealed preferences). Behavioural Law and Economics directly 
contradicts this assumption by asserting that social situations construct human preferences and values: Cass R 
Sunstein, “Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report” (1999) 1 American Law and Economics Review 
115 at 117. 
833 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1102–26. 
834 Sunstein, supra note 815 at 784. 
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typical, day-to-day, peacetime contexts, which cannot satisfactorily provide for the manner in 
which the exceptional context of armed conflict affects individual behaviour. In an effort to 
address the flawed assumptions of Law and Economics theory, scholars have developed the 
derivative theory of Behavioural Law and Economics. Behavioural Law and Economics has 
attempted to use the work of psychologists to develop a more nuanced, and more accurate, 
understanding of human behaviour. The following section will examine Behavioural Law and 
Economics and assess whether it can provide an adequate model for understanding and 
explaining combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict. 
6.2 Behavioural Law and Economics 
Behavioural Law and Economics scholars attempt "to model and predict behavior relevant to law 
with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions about human 
behavior” than Law and Economics theorists.835 The field emerged from scholars’ arguments 
that, while people often “violated[d] the predictions of rational choice theory”, their “reliance on 
cognitive heuristics and on-the-spot preference construction [still led] to predictable biases in 
judgment and choice”.836 Behavioural Law and Economics’ model for understanding individual 
decision-making and interaction with law directly challenges Law and Economics’ assumptions 
of pure rationality and pure self-interest while giving consideration to the influence of context on 
individual preferences and values. The following sections will examine the manner in which 
Behavioural Law and Economics challenges these assumptions. 
 6.2.1 Bounded Rationality 
Behavioural Law and Economics has qualified Law and Economics’ depiction of humans as 
rational beings. Instead, these theorists consider humans to possess “bounded rationality”.837 
Jolls has categorized bounded rationality as either “judgment errors” or “departures from 
expected utility theory.”838 Judgment errors are the result of inherent limitations on the human 
ability to think, learn, understand, and process information.839 The work of many cognitive 
psychologists has found “that people are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting 
 
835 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1476. 
836 Mitchell, supra note 788 at 169. 
837 See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477. 
838 Jolls, supra note 792 at 76. 
839 Simon, supra note 799. See also, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, “Is the Mind Irrationally or Ecologically Rational?” in 
Francesco Parisi & Vernon L Smith, eds, The Law and Economics of Behavior (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2005) 37 at 38–39; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477. 
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their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect 
evaluation of past experiences.”840 Furthermore, “irrational ideas or prejudices will often persist 
over time.”841 These limitations often lead to departures from the Law and Economics 
assumption of unbounded rationality.842 Behavioural Law and Economics theorists do not argue 
that people are always irrational but, rather, that the idea of unbounded rationality is an 
excessively and unnecessarily limited understanding of human behaviour.843 The work of 
Tversky and Kahneman has shown that these departures are often the result of the methods of 
processes people use to form judgments and make decisions.844 People often use mental shortcuts 
when forming a judgment, thereby differentiating actual judgments from unbiased forecasts.845 
For example, Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate that, in situations of uncertainty, people will 
often estimate the frequency of an event based on how easily they remember other instances of 
this event, which can result in false conclusions.846 Similarly, how a problem is framed often 
“leads the individual to focus on certain characteristics of a problem (whilst neglecting others) 
and points towards certain decisions (and not to others).”847 The use of these shortcuts can also 
contribute to how a problem is framed. How a problem is framed often “leads the individual to 
focus on certain characteristics of a problem (whilst neglecting others) and points towards certain 
decisions (and not to others).”848 
 
Tversky and Kahneman’s work found that there is a certain predictability to people’s judgment 
errors.849 While the use of a shortcut may be “rational[] in the sense of economizing on thinking 
time” it may nonetheless “lead to errors in particular circumstances” meaning that the person 
employing the shortcut still “make[]s] forecasts that are different from those that emerge from 
the standard [law and economics] rational choice model.”850 However, although there may be a 
 
840 Freeman, supra note 788 at 524 discussing; Daniel Kahneman, “New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption” 
(1997) 3:2 Legal Theory 105. 
841 Freeman, supra note 788 at 524. 
842 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477. 
843 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1074. 
844 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 793. 
845 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477. 
846 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 793 at 11. 
847 van Aaken, supra note 792 at 428. 
848 Ibid. 
849 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 793 at 11; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1477. 
850 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1478. See also, e.g., John Conlisk, “Why Bounded Rationality” 
(1996) 34 Journal of Economic Literature 671 at 682–83. 
  
159 
certain predictability to people’s use of heuristics, there is also variability in how these heuristics 
affect, or the extent to which they affect, people. The manner in which a choice is framed may be 
used to predict how some people will respond but some people will also be unaffected, or less 
affected, by the frame such that their decision will differ from those affected by the frame.851 
Korobkin has argued that this heterogeneity requires greater consideration to understand its 
consequences for the scope of bounded rationality.852  
 
Whereas past choices are assumed under Law and Economics theory to have either a negative 
influence on future choices or no influence at all,853 Behavioural Law and Economics theorists 
have demonstrated that people have habits and will “often repeat behaviors (or repeatedly choose 
the same good or service) … as a way of reducing the costs of decision making.”854 People have 
a bias for the status quo.855 For example, they tend to ascribe greater value to things they already 
possess than those they do not (known as the endowment effect).856 This more nuanced 
conception of the individual provided by Behavioural Law and Economics is a necessary step 
forward from traditional Law and Economics’ flawed conception of the individual; however, as 
will be discussed in Section 6.2.4, Behavioural Law and Economics unfortunately tends to limit 
the extent to which it draws insights from psychology. 
 
The second category of bounded rationality - departures from expected utility theory - addresses 
Law and Economics’ assumption of wealth maximization as everyone’s end goal. Some 
Behavioural Law and Economics scholars speak of utility maximization rather than wealth 
maximization,857 while others continue to frame their theory around wealth maximization.858 
Although there may be times when individuals seek to maximize utility, there are also many 
times when they exhibit “satisficing behaviour” whereby they “aim to make a satisfactory 
 
851 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 792 at 1669; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values and Frames” 
(1984) 39 American Psychologist 341 at 343. 
852 Korobkin, supra note 792 at 1674. 
853 See, e.g., Gary Becker, “Habits, Addictions, and Traditions” (1992) 45 Kyklos 327 at 327. 
854 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1114. 
855 See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making” (1988) 1 Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty 7. 
856 See, e.g., Richard H Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice” (1980) 1 Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 39 at 44. 
857 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792. 
858 See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792. 
  
160 
choice-one that meets a specified aspiration level rather than one that maximizes their utility.”859 
Failure to maximize utility is also often the result of the use of heuristics which contribute to 
judgment errors.860 As it is Law and Economics’ assumption of unbounded rationality that 
“permits the application of maximizing methods”, limitations on an individual’s rationality 
similarly limit “the application of maximizing methods”.861 For example, the complexity of a 
situation may render it impossible for an individual to cognitively assess which outcome will 
maximize utility or an individual may chose “to limit her search for information or consideration 
of the decision short of reaching a utility-maximizing decision.”862 People often use a 
combination of different decision-making strategies rather than employ a single strategy.863 
 
In the criminal law context, Behavioural Law and Economics does provide some useful insights 
for IHL in its discussion of unbounded rationality. Behavioural Law and Economics suggests 
that, in the calculation of costs and benefits of committing a criminal act, people “may make 
systematic (as opposed to random) errors in computing these costs and benefits” as a result of 
bounded rationality.864 As discussed, people make errors as to the frequency and probability of 
events, such as the possibility of being caught committing a crime. This supports “making law 
enforcement highly visible, holding constant the actual probability that offenders will be 
caught”.865 Similarly, Behavioural Law and Economics identifies limits to people’s individual 
self-control or will-power. In the criminal context, this means that emphasis among offenders 
tends to be on the immediate benefits accruing from the criminal act rather than future (potential) 
costs.866 The need for consistent enforcement of rules, perhaps at lower levels of severity in 
 
859 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1076. The concept of “satisficing behaviour” was first developed by Herbert 
A Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment” (1956) 63:2 Psychological Review 129 at 129, 
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863 See, e.g., John W Payne, James R Bettman & Eric J Johnson, The Adaptive Decision Maker (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 28–29. 
864 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1538. Even some more traditional law and economics scholars 
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Theory of Crime (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990) at 85–120; James Q Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, 
“Does Crime Pay?” (1992) 9:3 Justice Quarterly 359 at 372–74. 
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terms of punishment or perceived seriousness of the offence, can be useful in the context of IHL, 
the enforcement of which under international criminal law internationally has tended to focus 
only the most grave or serious violations of IHL. Behavioural Law and Economics analysis in 
the criminal context also suggests that enforcement of IHL and sanctions for violations that are 
more proximate to the time of the violation may have greater deterrent value as they will be 
factored into short-term evaluations rather than downplayed as a distant, future potential cost. 
This idea will be revisited in chapter 8. 
6.2.2 Bounded Self-Interest 
Behavioural Law and Economics has qualified Law and Economics theory’s assumption that 
people always strive to maximize their self-interest. Conformity with social norms, defined by 
Sunstein as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and 
what ought not to be done”,867 may sometimes by the rational, self-interested choice; however, it 
is often the case that compliance with a social norm will result in behaviour that is inconsistent 
with self-interest. For example, a man may take his hat off in a church even if his preference is to 
always wear a hat or a person will leave a tip in a restaurant in to which they will never return 
based on social norms that say men should not wear hats in churches and people should tip for 
good service.868 The power of social norms can be attributed to either a “desire for social 
approval”869 or the “internalization [of norms]”870 or both.871 Thus, “[t]he primary deterrent 
effect many laws have on undesirable behavior might not be the direct increase in the price of the 
behavior … but the encouragement of a social norm against the activity.”872  
 
 
867 Cass R Sunstein, “Social Norms and Social Roles” (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 903 at 914. 
868 Robert D Cooter, “Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the 
New Law Merchant” (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643 at 1656; Robert D Cooter, 
“Normative Failure Theory of Law” (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 947 at 854; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 
792 at 1492–93. 
869 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1131. See also, e.g., Richard H McAdams, “The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms” (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 338 at 355–56. 
870 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1131. See also, e.g., Robert D Cooter, “Expressive Law and Economics” 
(1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 585 at 585–86; Cooter, supra note 868 at 1667; Robert C Ellickson, “Law and 
Economics Discovers Social Norms” (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 537 at 539–40. 
871 See, e.g. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1131; Cass R Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law” 
(1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021 at 2031. 
872 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1131–32. 
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Behavioural Law and Economics theorists have focused in particular on the social norm of 
fairness,873 or reciprocity.874 The unbounded self-interest of the actor in Law and Economics 
theory precludes the potential for people to act based on “unenforced notions of fairness”.875 
However, ‘fairness’ is a vague term.876 For Behavioural Law and Economics scholars, “fairness” 
is understood to refer to the idea that “people will judge outcomes as unfair if they depart 
substantially from the terms of a ‘reference transaction’ – a transaction that defines the 
benchmark for the parties’ interactions”.877 Yet, ‘reference transactions’ “[are] not always 
unique” and the use of different reference transactions by people can lead to disagreements about 
what is fair in a particular situation.878 When an individual perceives someone’s actions or 
something to be unfair, there is equal potential for that person to be motivated to retaliate.879 The 
influence of social norms and variability of individual perception is one way in which 
Behavioural Law and Economics incorporates consideration of the effect of context into its 
model of human behaviour. 
 6.2.3 Context 
Behavioural Law and Economics has given greater consideration to the role of context with 
regards to individual behaviour through the idea of “context-dependent preferences”.880 The 
existence of context-dependent preferences directly challenges Law and Economics theory’s 
assumption that an individual’s preferences are stable and exist outside of situational factors 
(discussed above). Instead, Behavioural Law and Economics considers social situations to play a 
role in constructing human values and preferences: “preferences can be a product of procedure, 
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description, and context at the time of choice.”881 Behavioural Law and Economics theory 
demonstrates that “the ‘frame’ or the way options are presented will influence choices.”882 For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman’s framing effect shows that, when outcomes are uncertain, 
people are more likely to be risk averse when options are presented as gains and more risk-
seeking when options are presented as losses.883 Thus, Behavioural Law and Economics has been 
able to identify contexts in which people will tend to shape their preferences in the similar ways 
and based on the same predictable heuristics. 
 6.2.4 Limitations of Behavioural Law and Economics  
Behavioural Law and Economics’ behavioural model represents a useful step forward from Law 
and Economics’ flawed assumptions of unbounded rationality and self-interest as well as the 
failure to consider the role of context on behaviour. However, Behavioural Law and Economics’ 
behavioural model remains limited in two key ways that render it an inadequate lens through 
which to assess combatant behaviour in armed conflict. First, Behavioural Law and Economics 
has, as yet, drawn only on a very limited sphere of insights from psychology to create its more 
nuanced behavioural model. The tendency has been to draw only on "phenomena that have 
reasonably precise implications for legal issues.”884 Hanson and Yosifon have criticized this, 
stating that Behavioural Law and Economics scholars “pick and choose among psychological 
findings, and select only those that seem directly applicable to a pre-existing policy debate 
within the law and economics paradigm.”885 Behavioural Law and Economics scholars, such as 
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, have strived to create “an approach spare enough to generate 
predictions across a range of contexts, but not so spare that its predictions about behavior are 
often incorrect” over a deeper and more robust behavioural model.886 The focus has been on 
behavior patterns that generate distinct predictions, setting aside those that “fail to point in 
 
881 Sunstein, supra note 832 at 117. See also, e.g., Paul Slovic, “The Construction of Preference” (1995) 50 
American Psychologist 364; Amos Tversky, “Rational Theory and Constructive Choice” in Kenneth Arrow et al, 
eds, The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour (London, UK: MacMillan, 1996) 185. 
882 Sheffrin, supra note 880. 
883 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 793; Daniel Kahneman, “Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed 
Feelings” (1992) 51:2 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 296. 
884 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1481. 
885 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, “The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal” 
(2003) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 1 at 168. 
886 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 792 at 1480. 
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systematic directions”.887 This approach limits the degree to which the Behavioural Law and 
Economics behavioural model can reflect the spectrum of human behavioural complexities. 
 
The second key limitation of the current Behavioural Law and Economics behavioural model is 
the extent or manner in which considerations of context have been incorporated into the model. 
Behavioural Law and Economics is correct to note that context often, if not always, plays an 
important role in constructing individual preferences and values which, in turn, affects their 
decision-making and choices. However, context is incorporated into Behavioural Law and 
Economics in a very broad and generalizable manner. Behavioural Law and Economics has 
focused on context in terms such as the way a choice is framed,888 the influence of the status 
quo,889 the influence of existing social norms,890 and the “temporal distance of the rule's 
effects.”891 Behavioural Law and Economics’ insights have been applied to a variety of domestic 
legal contexts such as tort,892 contracts,893 and corporations.894 However, those are relatively 
stable domestic contexts during peace. Behavioural Law and Economics contemplates law-
making during and for peacetime and therefore insights from psychology that may provide 
insights unique or particularly relevant for a behavioral model of combatants in an armed conflict 
context. This is not to say that the judgment heuristics used to develop the concepts of bounded 
rationality and bounded self-interest are irrelevant in a behavioural model for armed conflict. 
However, there may be - and the following chapter demonstrates that there are - psychological 
theories supported by empirical studies that can be employed to develop a more armed conflict-
specific behavioural model. 
 
 
887 Ibid at 1481. 
888 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch & Richard H Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias” (1991) 5:1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 193; Kahneman, supra note 883; 
Anton Kühberger, “The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-Analysis” (1998) 75 Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 23. 
889 See, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 888; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 855; Russell B 
Korobkin, “The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules” (1998) 83 Cornell Law Review 608. 
890 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1130–31; McAdams, supra note 869 at 355–56; Cooter, supra 
note 870 at 585–86; Cooter, supra note 868 at 1667; Ellickson, supra note 870 at 539–40. 
891 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1069. 
892 See, e.g., Michael G Faure, “Calabresi and Behavioural Law and Economics” (2008) 1:4 Erasmus Law Review 
75. 
893 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 889. 
894 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, “Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as 
Regulatory Tool” (2001) 35 UC Davis Law Review 581. 
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There are, however, some Behavioural Law and Economics scholars, such as Korobkin and 
Ulen, who have advocated that, rather than “a single unified theory designed to explain or predict 
the full realm of human decision-making behavior”, the focus of Behavioural Law and 
Economics should be on “a pragmatic collection of situation-specific insights that can assist 
policymakers dealing with relevant problems.”895 Korobkin and Ulen consider a “collection of 
situation-specific minitheories [of behaviour]” that can be used in the “analysis of discrete legal 
problems” is far more preferable than a theory which has been drastically simplified to provide 
for universal application.896 This approach of using situation-specific theories is used in this 
thesis. Any model of human behaviour generalized or simplified to the point that it may be 
applied to all contexts is likely to be dominated by understandings of human behaviour based on 
day-to-day lives during peacetime, rather than armed conflict. The “average behavior of 
actors”897 in such contexts will often stand in stark contrast to how people behave within the 
extraordinary and exceptional context of armed conflict. Ultimately, the greatest utility of 
Behavioural Law and Economics for this thesis is the approach of turning to other disciplines 
such as psychology to help understand the how individuals interact with law. The final theory 
discussed in the following section, Socialization and International Law, similarly draws on 
another discipline, social psychology, to provide insight into individual behaviour and decision-
making. 
6.3 Socialization and International Law 
The third theory of interest in the search to find a model to explain combatant violence toward 
civilians is Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ Socialization and International Law.898 Goodman 
and Jinks’ theory examines mechanisms for influencing state behaviour, specifically state 
compliance with international human rights law.899 The primary focus of Goodman and Jinks’ 
 
895 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 792 at 1075. 
896 Ibid at 1072. 
897 Anne van Aaken, “Rationalist and Behavioral Approaches to International Law” in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Mark A 
Pollack, eds, International Legal Theory: Foundations and Frontiers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2019) at 6. 
898 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “International 
Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges” (2005) 54:4 Duke Law Journal 
983; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law” (2008) 
19:4 European Journal of International Law 725. 
899 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 4, 6. 
  
166 
theory is on the interaction between “rights-regarding actors—including states, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations—and rights-disregarding actors.”900 Actors in 
these interactions states are either influencers or the target of influence and which of these two 
roles a state fulfills can vary depending on the behaviour at issue.901 For example, the United 
States can be considered an influencer in the context of human rights compliance in the Syrian 
civil war and a target of influence with respect to “the treatment of detainees in the ‘global war 
on terror’.”902 
 
Socialization and International Law turns to the “social and behavioral sciences” because those 
disciplines “have developed an increasingly nuanced conception of the human actor”.903 This 
conception of human behaviour developed in the social and behavioral sciences provides an 
understanding that “qualifies both the oversimplified model of actors as wealth maximizers and 
the idealized conception of actors as rational, deliberative agents”.904 Therefore, Goodman and 
Jinks incorporate insights from sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc. to provide a more 
accurate model of human behaviour than that used in the Law and Economics theories discussed 
above.905 
 
They identify two prominent mechanisms for influencing state behaviour in existing academic 
literature: material inducement906 and persuasion.907 According to material inducement and 
persuasion, the “international regime alters human rights practices … either by materially 
inducing states (and individuals) or by persuading states (and individuals) of the validity and 
legitimacy of human rights law.”908 Like the theorists of Behavioural Law and Economics, 
 
900 Ibid at 5. 
901 Ibid at 5–6 [emphasis in original]. 
902 Ibid at 6. 
903 Ibid at 10. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Ibid. 
906 See, e.g., Daniel W Drezner, “Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions” in Daniel 
W Drezner, ed, Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003) 1 at 12–13; Johnston, supra note 783 at 489–90; Lisa L Martin, 
“Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions” (1996) 45 World Politics 406 at 413; 
Leonard J Schoppa, “The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining” (1999) 53 International 
Organizations 307 at 310. 
907 See, e.g., Rodger A Payne, “Persuasion, Frames, and Norm Construction” (2001) 7 European Journal of 
International Relations 37; Raustiala, supra note 783; Risse, supra note 783; Johnston, supra note 783 at 495. 
908 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 4. 
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Goodman and Jinks advocate for “more sociologically plausible models of law’s influence”.909 
Consequently, to the mechanisms of material inducement and persuasion, Goodman and Jinks 
introduce the mechanism of acculturation, drawn from the fields of sociology and psychology, to 
explain how international actors (international organizations and institutions as well as other 
states) can induce or influence states to comply with international human rights norms.910 
 6.3.1 Material Inducement 
The first mechanism discussed by Goodman and Jinks is material inducement, which is a 
“process whereby target actors are influenced to change their behavior by the imposition of 
material costs or the conferral of material benefits.”911 International institutions can employ 
material inducement to influence state behaviour through the manipulation of “material rewards 
and punishments”.912 Consequently, material inducement is largely premised on the model of 
individual cost-benefit based decision-making developed in Law and Economics.913 Although 
Goodman and Jinks refer to this mechanism as “material inducement” they discuss not only the 
use of economic incentives and disincentives, but also the use of military power.914 
 
Material inducement is already present in the context of IHL violations by armed groups. 
Material incentives exist in the incentives provided to leaders of armed groups in order to 
influence them into signing peace treaties. For example, in the DRC, rebel leaders are often 
rewarded with high level positions in government or the national armed forces.915 This has 
included high level military positions for rebel leaders - such as Bosco Ntaganda, subject to 
arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity  - at the time they received their prestigious military appointments.916 Rather than 
 
909 Ibid at 5. 
910 Ibid at 4–6. 
911 Ibid at 22. 
912 Ibid at 23. 
913 Ibid at 23–24. In earlier works, Goodman and Jinks use the term ‘coercion’ in lieu of ‘material inducement’: see, 
e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898. 
914 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 125. 
915 For example, the agreement to end the Second Congo War provided the leaders of the three most powerful armed 
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during the conflict, with political positions as Vice-Presidents of the DRC. See, e.g., Prunier, supra note 691 at 277; 
Reyntjens, supra note 693 at 260–61; Laura Davis & Priscilla Haynor, Difficult Peace, Limited Justice: Ten Years of 
Peacemaking in the DRC (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009) at 12–13. 
916 Jason Stearns, From CDNP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo (London & Nairobi: 
Rift Value Institute: Usalama Project, 2012) at 34–35; Leslie Massicotte, “Violence of the Name: How Naming the 
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incentivize IHL compliance, this style of incentivized peace negotiation has given combatants in 
the DRC the impression that joining an armed group is their best chance for gaining power and 
social mobility.917  
 
A different form of material inducement used to influence the behaviour of combatants exists in 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs aimed at creating incentives for 
combatants to leave armed groups, relinquish their weapons, and reintegrate into society. These 
programs usually have a monetary component as well as a re-training component to provide the 
former combatant with skills and means to reintegrate into society.918 It is possible for 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to be successful. For example, the 
program in Sierra Leone at the end of the civil war is considered to have succeeded beyond the 
expectations of international actors at the time919 even though it faced obstacles such as limited 
resources.920 Other programs have seen “limited success”, such as the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration program in the DRC.921 Where programs are unsuccessful 
there is a risk that, rather than incentivize laying down one’s arms, it may not only disincentivize 
relinquishing arms, but also lead to previously demobilized ex-combatants taking up arms once 
again.922 
 
It is very difficult to explain violent acts toward civilians, though it may help to explain acts of 
pillage, by members of armed groups as the product of material inducement. This is because 
frequently members of armed groups receive little to no pay for their services as fighters.923 In 
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spite of combatant poverty, however, the academic literature provides mixed views as to whether 
economic incentives play a role in individuals joining armed groups. Although there are scholars 
who advance a “greed” theory to explain that members of armed groups are economically 
motivated to join armed groups,924 empirical studies in Liberia and Colombia suggest 
otherwise.925 In one study, only four per cent of combatants interviewed identified money as the 
reason they joined an armed group.926 Consequently, it is difficult to say whether material 
inducement plays a role in affecting combatant behaviour and even more difficult to see how this 
mechanism could adequately explain combatant violence toward civilians during armed conflict. 
 6.3.2 Persuasion 
The second mechanism for influencing state behaviour discussed by Goodman and Jinks is 
persuasion. This mechanism of persuasion explains how through “argument and deliberation” 
states may come to “‘internalize’ new norms and rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their 
interests and identities accordingly.”927 International actors employing persuasion to alter the 
behaviour of states will center their approach around the “content of a norm” that they want the 
target of influence to adopt and internalize.928 Successful use of the mechanism of persuasion 
leads the target of influence not only to adapt their behaviour to correspond to the norm in 
question, but also to completely internalize the norm into their value system.929 
 
Goodman and Jinks discuss two microprocesses of persuasion: framing and cuing.930 The 
process of framing explains that arguments are likely to have more “persuasive appeal” if 
influencers structure their argument to “resonate” with norms already accepted by the target of 
influence.931 Persuasion may also be successful where the microprocess of “cuing” is used. 
Influencers can cue the target of influence through the “introduction of new information” which 
 
924 Jeremy Weinstein, “Resource and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment” (2005) 49:4 Journal of 
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can lead the target of influence to “engage in a high intensity process of cognition, reflection, and 
argument” that can ultimately lead to “changes in opinion”.932 
 
Persuasion is the primary mechanism employed by international organizations, such as the 
ICRC, that engage with armed groups to promote compliance with IHL norms.933 The use of 
persuasion to influence armed group behaviour is also widely discussed in academic literature.934 
Persuasion can be an effective tool to induce members of armed groups to comply with IHL 
norms for the protection of civilians during armed conflict. For example, the non-governmental 
organization Geneva Call, which engages armed groups on specific thematic issues, such as 
landmines or child protection, has had significant success through dialogue and persuasion.935 
Geneva Call has succeeded in getting 50 armed groups to commit to ban the use of anti-
personnel landmines by their combatants.936 Most of these 50 armed groups having participated 
in, “carried out[,] or cooperated in humanitarian mine action” and often the destruction of 
stockpiled landmines since they made this commitment with Geneva Call.937 Geneva Call has 
also successfully engaged 26 armed groups which have committed to “protecting children in 
armed conflict, and have taken measures to enforce their obligations.”938 Persuasion can 
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international humanitarian law - ICRC”, (3 March 2009), online: ICRC 
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therefore be used to put an end to combatant deviance from IHL norms much in the same manner 
as persuasion can be used to induce state compliance with human rights norms. However, it 
provides limited insight into the psychology of how law-abiding citizens in peacetime become 
law-breaking combatants during armed conflict. Although it is possible that combatants could be 
persuaded to internalize norms advocating violence toward civilians, Goodman and Jinks’ work 
on Socialization and International Law merely provides the mechanism of behavioural change 
rather than providing a detailed understanding of the psychological shift from compliance to 
deviance. 
 6.3.3 Acculturation 
Acculturation, the third mechanism discussed by Goodman and Jinks, represents the central 
component of Socialization and International Law theory. Goodman and Jinks seek to 
demonstrate how “legal institutions at times influence actors through acculturation”.939 
Acculturation is the “the process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the 
surrounding culture”.940 As opposed to focussing on the content of a norm, as is the case with the 
mechanism of persuasion, “acculturation emphasizes the relationship of the actor to a reference 
group or wider cultural environment.”941 The focus on relationship as opposed to content means 
that, unlike persuasion, where the target of influence internalizes a norm, acculturation could 
lead to either complete or incomplete internalization of a norm even while altering an actor’s 
behaviour.942  
 
The process of acculturation includes both internal “[c]ognitive pressures” and external “social 
pressures” that influence the state’s choices.943 Cognitive pressures exist when “individuals -
experience discomfort-including anxiety, regret, and guilt-whenever they confront cognitions 
about some aspect of their behavior inconsistent with their self-concept (including any social 
roles central to their identity)” which is referred to as cognitive dissonance by social 
psychologists.944 Actors will try to address this discomfort by “either changing their behavior or 
 
939 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 22. 
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941 Ibid at 26 [emphasis omitted]. 
942 Ibid at 28–31. 
943 Ibid at 22. 
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finding ways to justify their past behavior.”945 Social pressures emerge through the actor’s desire 
to conform to a group and to “minimize social costs”.946 Social pressure can be manipulated by 
influencers through the “imposition of social-psychological costs through shaming or shunning” 
or through the “conferral of social-psychological benefits through displays of public 
approval.”947  
 
The “identification” of an actor with a “reference group” plays an integral role in the 
acculturation process.948 The “varying degrees of identification with a reference group” will 
affect the extent to which the target of influence feels “cognitive and social pressures to 
conform.”949 Additionally, the question of whether or not an actor will respond positively to 
social pressure from external influencers can be affected by the “the strength, immediacy, and 
size of the group.”950  
 
Goodman and Jinks focus their discussion of acculturation on two microprocesses of the 
mechanism: status maximization and mimicry.951 The microprocess of status maximization exists 
where actors are “compelled by reputation- and status-based concerns”, rather than “[material] 
cost-benefit calculations” to adapt their behaviour.952 Actors seek to gain or maintain the 
“approval of, or status in, [a] reference group”,953 while also “minimiz[ing] social 
disapproval.”954  Mimicry is linked to efforts for status maximization as actors are more likely to 
“‘mimic’ the behavior of other highly legitimated actors”.955 Where states “value their position in 
the group “they are more inclined to “‘identify’ with, or mimic, the group”.956 These 
microprocesses of acculturation, like acculturation more generally, turn on pressures to conform, 
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which drive an actor “to behave and think in ways consistent with the highly legitimated 
purposes and attributes of that role” they have assumed.957 
 
The manner in which acculturation captures internal and external pressures on an individual to 
adopt certain behaviours makes acculturation the most useful of the three mechanisms examined 
by Goodman and Jinks to help understand the psychology of combatant violence toward 
civilians. The recognition in Socialization and International Law theory that multiple 
mechanisms – material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation – can affect an actor’s 
behaviour is similarly useful as it provides a more nuanced approach to understanding 
behavioural change than that provided by Behavioural Law and Economics theorists. However, 
Socialization and International Law theory remains an inadequate theory for understanding 
combatant violence toward civilians and, more importantly, the process by which law-abiding 
individuals transform into law-breaking combatants for one important reason specific to the 
discussion of acculturation.  
 
The reason Socialization and International Law theory’s acculturation mechanism is inadequate 
for understanding the transition from law-abiding citizen to law-breaking combatant who 
commits violent acts is the extent to which the theory draws on socio-psychological theories and 
mechanisms to explain behavioural change. Goodman and Jinks themselves implicitly and 
explicitly acknowledge this limitation. Acculturation is but one of “various social processes” that 
contribute to “socialization processes”.958 The microprocesses of acculturation discussed by 
Goodman and Jinks – mimicry and status maximization – are but two of an unknown (based on 
Goodman and Jinks’ discussion) number of processes.959 Goodman and Jinks also acknowledge 
that the fact “individual behavior and cognition reflect substantial social influence” is but “[o]ne 
of the central insights of social psychology”.960 Further, Goodman and Jinks have acknowledged 
the need for more “refinement” of the ideas they have introduced, including the need for “more 
 
957 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 27. 
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highly specified causal pathways that involve micro-level, mechanism-based accounts”.961 
Therefore, in reading Goodman and Jinks’ work on Socialization and International Law, one can 
see both the utility of turning to theories of social-psychology, but one is also left to wonder what 
more social-psychology can offer to help understand human behaviour, including in the specific 
context of armed conflict. Goodman and Jinks’ Socialization and International Law theory, 
therefore, points to the disciplines, particularly social psychology, that are likely to have at least 
some of the answers necessary to understand combatant violence toward civilians and how law-
abiding individuals transition into law-breaking combatants. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Most existing legal theories do not develop a behavioural model for understanding legal 
deviance. This chapter has examined three existing legal theories that do develop behavioural 
models and provide behavioural insights to explain legal compliance or deviance: Law and 
Economics theory, Behavioural Law and Economics theory, and Socialization and International 
Law. This chapter demonstrated how each of these three theories fail to provide an adequate 
model for understanding the perpetration of violence toward civilians and the transition from 
law-abiding individual to law-breaking combatant that perpetrators often undergo. First, the 
behavioural model developed by Law and Economics theory is based on fundamentally flawed 
assumptions about human rationality, self-interest, the ability to measure preferences, and goals. 
Behavioural Law Economics theorists have turned to psychology to develop a behavioural model 
that addresses the fundamental flaws in Law and Economics theory to demonstrate that there are 
limits to the extent individuals are rational and self-interested. However, although Behavioural 
Law and Economics theory does not suffer from the severe flaws of Law and Economics theory, 
the Behavioural Law and Economics behavioural model nonetheless remains a model that is 
intended to be generally applicable across a wide array of peacetime contexts. Consequently, 
Behavioural Law and Economics fails to provide a behavioural model that can adequately 
explain the transition of individuals from law-abiding in peace to law-breaking in conflict.  
 
 
961 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “Social Mechanisms to Promote International Human Rights: Complementary or 
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Socialization and International Law draws more deeply on understandings of human behaviour 
derived from behavioural sciences, in particular social psychology, than Behavioural Law and 
Economics theory, which has limited its reliance on psychology to what is necessary to correct 
the flawed assumptions of Law and Economics. The most useful component of Socialization and 
International Law theory for beginning to understand the perpetration of violence toward 
civilians is the socio-psychological state of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance explains 
how individuals faced with contradictory values, beliefs, or ideas, such as possible contradictions 
between the mildness of peace and the violence of war, suffer cognitive dissonance that they will 
try to address by “either changing their behavior or finding ways to justify their past 
behavior.”962 However, Socialization and International Law’s use of acculturation to explain how 
internal and social pressures to conform can lead to behavioural change provides a limited and 
incomplete model for understanding how law-abiding citizens come to be law-breaking 
combatants who perpetrate acts of violence toward civilians. Acculturation and the two 
microprocesses of mimicry and status maximization provide only one small component of a 
more elaborate and detailed body of socio-psychological theory explaining individual behaviour.  
 
Despite this weakness, Goodman and Jinks’ Socialization and International Law theory provides 
an excellent introduction into the potential of employing social psychology theories to 
understand legal compliance or deviance. Goodman and Jinks’ work further serves to 
demonstrate the value to law and legal scholars both theoretically and in practice of borrowing 
from other disciplines to improve understandings of human behaviour in the interactions of 
people with legal rules and norms. This chapter has therefore demonstrated both the lack of an 
existing legal theory capable of explaining the perpetration of violence toward civilians by 
members of armed groups as well as the opportunity other academic disciplines supply to 
develop an adequate understanding of combatant behaviour. 
 
The next chapter seizes the opportunity to learn from academic disciplines like social 
psychology. The chapter will discuss four theories of social psychology and criminology that 
have been repeatedly relied on to explain how ordinary people come to commit violent acts 
during conflict such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The four theories 
 
962 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 641; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 898 at 27. 
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discussed have been developed to understand and explain the specific perpetration of violence 
toward civilians within the exceptional and unique context of conflict. The chapter will provide a 
nuanced understanding of human behaviour that, in addition to the social pressures to conform 
used by Goodman and Jinks, captures more specific processes to explain behavioural change and 
the transition from law-abiding citizen in peacetime to law-breaking individual in conflict.
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Chapter 7 
 
7 How Ordinary People Come to Commit Extraordinary Acts of Violence 
 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that IHL contains many rules for the protection of 
civilians during NIACs that apply to the conduct of members of armed groups; however, in 
practice, widespread IHL violations are often committed by members of armed groups against 
civilians. The preceding chapter argued that there is no adequate legal theory to explain or 
account for the reasons underlying these IHL violations. Therefore, this chapter turns to theories 
of social psychology and criminology to help understand the perpetration of violent acts toward 
civilians and how law-abiding civilians during peacetime come to be law-breaking combatants 
during armed conflict. 
 
This chapter examines four theories that explain how ordinary people come to commit acts of 
violence against civilians during conflict: criminology’s theory of techniques of neutralization 
and social psychology’s theories of moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to 
authority. First, the chapter discusses the reason for selecting these four theories to help 
understand combatant behaviour. Second, the chapter will discuss the concept of ‘ordinary 
people’ as perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Then the chapter 
examines each of the four theories in turn, beginning with techniques of neutralization and 
followed by moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority. This chapter 
develops a nuanced understanding of how law-abiding citizens in peacetime come to be law-
breaking combatants who commit violent acts toward civilians during conflict. This chapter 
identifies two key themes: (1) the use of dehumanization by perpetrators to facilitate the 
commission of violence toward civilians,963 and (2) the displacement of a sense of responsibility 
 
963 Sociologists, such as Sherene Razack, have explored the danger of “[race thinking,] a structure of thought that 
divides up the world between the deserving and the undeserving”: Sherene Razack, “‘Your Client has a Profile:’ 
Race and National Security in Canada after 9/11” (2007) 40 Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 3 at 7 See also, 
e.g., ; Sherene Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2008); Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: the Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and 
the New Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); George L Mosse, A History of European Racism 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Sociologists have also explored the effects of language, 
specifically racist language, that is often the product of race thinking. Van Dijk has noted the tendency to focus on 
violence that is a product of racism and overlook or ignore the implicit, everyday conveyance of racism: Teun A van 
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for one’s actions used by perpetrators to facilitate the commission of violence toward civilians. 
These two themes are important because they indicate that combatant behaviour that 
dehumanizes civilians and/or allows combatants to displace their sense of responsibility for their 
actions can contribute to violence toward civilians. Therefore, this chapter explains the theories, 
which are then employed in chapter 8 to identify specific combatant behaviours in need of IHL 
regulation in order to advance the humanitarian goal of civilian protection in IHL. Ultimately, 
using the theories outlined in this chapter, this thesis argues that dehumanizing behaviours and 
behaviours that displace responsibility must be inhibited - through the use of law - before they 
result in violence directed toward civilians. 
7.1 Social Psychology and Criminology 
In order to understand combatant violence toward civilians, this thesis has, like Goodman and 
Jinks’ theory of Socialization and International Law discussed in the preceding chapter, turned to 
other academic disciplines that can provide a nuanced understanding of human behaviour during 
armed conflict: social psychology and criminology. Social psychology is “the systematic study 
of the nature and causes of human social behavior.”964 This includes the study of “individuals’ 
activities in the presence of others and in particular situations, the processes of social interaction 
between two or more persons, and the relationships among individuals and the groups to which 
they belong.”965 The behaviour examined is not merely actions, but also emotions and 
 
Dijk, “Discourse and Racism” in David Theo Goldberg & John Solomos, eds, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic 
Studies (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002) 145 at 153 See also, e.g., John F Dovidio, “On the Nature of 
Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave” (2001) 57:4 Journal of Social Issues 829. The effects of everyday racism 
(i.e., racism in peacetime among non-military citizens) have been widely examined: see, e.g., Kaine Grigg & Lenore 
Manderson, “‘Just a Joke’: Young Australian understandings of racism” (2015) 47 International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations 195; Nazar Akrami, Bo Ekehammar & Tadesse Araya, “Classical and modern racial 
prejudice: A study of attitudes toward immigrants in Sweden” (2000) 30:4 European Journal of Social Psychology 
521; John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, 2d ed (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); Philomena Essed, 
Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications Ltd, 1991); 
Additionally, racist statements, even where made casually and conversationally, are “pernicious”: Bernard Guerin, 
“Combating Prejudice and Racism: New Interventions from a Functional Analysis of Racist Language” (2003) 13 
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 29 at 29; This includes racist humor employed casually and 
without any intent to promote racist ideology, actions, or hatred: see, e.g., Michael Billig, “Humour and hatred: the 
racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan” (2001) 12 Discourse and Society 267; Brendon Barnes, Ingrid Palmary & Kevin 
Durrheim, “The denial of racism: The role of humor, personal experience, and self-censorship” (2001) 20:3 Journal 
of Language and Social Psychology 321; Christie Davies, “Language, identity and ethnic jokes about stupidit” 
(1987) 65 International Journal of the Sociology of Language 39. 
964 John D DeLamater, Daniel J Myers & Jessica L Collett, Social Psychology, 8th ed (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 2015) at 3. 
965 Ibid. 
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thoughts.966 Criminology is the “study of the nature, extent, cause, and control of lawbreaking 
behavior.”967 One of its central components is the “analysis of crime causation.”968 While not 
limited to the study of psychological mechanisms which affect people’s behaviour, both social 
psychology and criminology include theories which focus on this particular aspect of behaviour. 
There is overlap between social psychology and criminology and, in the case of two of the 
theories discussed in this chapter - techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement – 
strong direct parallels between theories.  
 
Both social psychology and criminology are expansive fields with many theories of human 
behaviour. Consequently, it was essential to narrow the focus of this study to theories which 
attempt to explain, either in their original form or through the subsequent application by other 
scholars, the concept of how ordinary people come to commit acts of violence against civilians 
during conflict, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.969 This thesis 
focuses on the individual level of analysis, that is, on theories which explain the psychological 
mechanisms or cognitive processes within an individual that produce or allow for destructive 
behaviour (as opposed to those mechanism within a state, a society, or an organization that lead 
to such behaviour). However, there is consideration of situational influences on the individual, 
such as the social pressures discussed in Goodman and Jinks’ theory of Socialization and 
International Law. This focus on the individual is not intended to suggest or imply that factors 
beyond the individual are irrelevant to the commission of international crimes. On the contrary, 
 
966 Ibid. 
967 Mark M Lanier & Stuart Henry, Essential Criminology, 3d ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010) at 16. 
968 Ibid. 
969 In addition to the four dominant theories identified and discussed in this chapter, the following works were 
considered: Cohen, supra note 32; Baumeister, supra note 32; Marina Aksenova, “Introduction: Breaking the Cycle 
of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal Approaches to International Criminal Law” in Marina 
Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological 
and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019); Grossman, supra note 32; Maier-
Katkin, Mears & Bernard, supra note 32; Rothe & Mullins, supra note 32; Dawn L Rothe, State criminality: The 
crime of all crimes (Lanham, MD: Lexinton, 2009); Frank Neubacher, “How Can it Happen that Horrendous State 
Crimes are Perpetrated?: An Overview of Criminological Theories” (2006) 4:4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 787; Smeulers & Haveman, supra note 32; Smeulers, supra note 32; Smeulers, supra note 84; Mika Haritos-
Fatouros, “The Official Torturer:  A Learning Model for Obedience to the Authority of Violence” (1988) 18 Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology 1107; Harrendorf, supra note 84; Waller, supra note 22; Staub, supra note 90; Staub, 
supra note 32; Staub, supra note 32; Ervin Staub, The Roots of Goodness and Resistance Evil Inclusive Caring, 
Moral Courage, Altruism Born of Suffering, Active Bystandership, and Heroism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015); Zimbardo, supra note 23. 
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these factors are often, if not always, highly influential.970 However, these factors are normally 
beyond the scope of IHL. IHL governs how wars are conducted, including the means and 
methods,971 and sometimes circumstances under which attacks may legally occur.972 IHL 
establishes rules to govern the selection of legitimate targets.973 IHL defines who is a civilian and 
who is a combatant.974 IHL is, for the most part, temporally limited to the space between the 
commencement of hostilities and their end.975 The reason for the hostilities - that is, why the 
parties have decided to go to war - is irrelevant under IHL.976 IHL largely limits itself to 
consideration of conduct of parties to an armed conflict during an armed conflict. It addresses a 
state’s armed forces and provides for state responsibility for violations of IHL; however, it does 
not seek to regulate cultural,977 societal, or political aspects of the state beyond the scope of 
armed conflict. Therefore, issues of ideology, economic hardship, cultural norms, government 
 
970 See, e.g., Waller, supra note 22; Rothe & Mullins, supra note 32; Staub, supra note 32; Staub, supra note 90; 
Staub, supra note 969; Staub, supra note 32. 
971 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Historical Development and Legal Basis” in Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook 
of International Humanitarian Law, 3d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 101–102; Moir, supra note 46 
at 117–18, 145; Robert Kolb & Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts 
(Portland, OR: Hart, 2008) at 15, 17–18; ICRC, International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2002) at 4. 
972 For example, certain weapons may only be illegal under certain circumstances. For example, the use of cluster 
munitions, which are not universally banned, in situations of urban warfare: see, e.g., Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of 
Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons under International Humanitarian Law” (2000) 22:1 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 85 at 104–119. 
973 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at Article 52(2); CCW Protocol II, supra note 516 at Article 2(6); Henckaerts 
& Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 8; Sassoli, supra note 9. 
974 Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at Article 43(2); 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 465 at Article 3; 
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 3 & 5; The Prosecutor v Thiomir Blaskic, Trial Judgment, IT-
95-14-T, 3 March 2000 at para 180. 
975 A few exceptions or possible exceptions exist such as provisions providing for the dissemination of treaty texts 
(i.e., GC I-IV Articles ; AP I Article 83; AP II Article 19) which is more likely to occur during times of peace than 
of war, the promotion of amnesty for those who participate in the conflict (ie., AP II Article 6(5)) that is largely a 
post-conflict matter, and the legal review of new weapons, methods and means of warfare (i.e., AP I Article 36) 
which is generally conducted during times of peace. 
976 The question of when a state can go to war or use force legally against another state is governed by a different 
body of international law known as jus ad bellum. 
977 “[Law] is not the only norm-shaping force in society” (Sampsell-Jones at 135). The culture (e.g., beliefs, 
behaviours, values) of a particular society also plays an important role in influencing norms and behaviour: See, e.g., 
Ted Sampsell-Jones, “Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive Criminal Law” (2003) 27 Seattle 
University Law Review 133; While law can help constrain and shape behaviour, culture can also influence the 
extent to which certain individuals conform or comply with certain laws. See, e.g., discussion of female 
circumcision, culture, and law by L Amede Obiora, “Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and 
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision” (1996) 47 Case Western Law Review 122 at 
lehmanlef; Janice Nadler, “Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social Groups” (2017) 42:1 Law & Social Inquiry 
60 at 67–68; Richard W Brislin, Understanding Culture’s Influence on Behavior, 2d ed (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt 
College Publishers, 2000); On the dynamic interplay between psychology and culture see, e.g., Darrin R Lehman & 
Chi-yue Chiu, “Psychology and Culture” (2004) 55 Annual Review of Psychology 689 at 703–704; Edmund W 
Gordon, “Cultural Identity and Behavioral Change” (1997) 47:2 Case Western Law Review 389. 
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policy, etc., which have been identified by some scholars as important components of the 
commission of international crimes, cannot be regulated through the application of IHL.978 
Similarly, actors who are not part of an armed group, such as civilian state officials, are also 
outside the scope of IHL. Furthermore, there are certain assumptions that must be accepted 
within the context of IHL, namely that wars will occur and armed groups will exist. Thus, the 
temporal scope that is the focus of this thesis is the period between the commencement of an 
armed conflict and the conclusion of that conflict. 
 
Many of the theories of the perpetration of international crimes or violence to civilians focus on 
state-based crimes.979 Due to the individual level focus of this thesis, these state-focused theories 
have been eliminated from consideration in this study. Where theories that predominantly focus 
on an organization or group have been included, it is because these theories include aspects 
applicable at the individual level of analysis, such as situational social pressures, or because they 
have analogous applications to non-state military organizations. An analysis of the social 
psychological and criminological literature reveals four theories that are the most frequently 
relied upon to examine individual psychological processes that contribute to or facilitate the 
commission of violence against civilians and international crimes: techniques of neutralization, 
moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority. 
 
Each of the four theories discussed in this chapter has been employed to explain the commission 
of international crimes. In some cases, the theory has been used to explain genocide, other times 
to explain crimes against humanity, and other times war crimes.980 This thesis considers that it is 
both reasonable and logical to consider theories applied to the context of genocide or 
commission of crimes against humanity (which do not fall under IHL, as they may also take 
place during peacetime) to be transferable to the commission of war crimes (which are governed 
 
978 See, e.g., Waller, supra note 22; Rothe & Mullins, supra note 32; Rothe, supra note 969; Staub, supra note 32; 
Staub, supra note 90; Staub, supra note 32; Staub, supra note 969; Neubacher, supra note 969. 
979 See, e.g., Neubacher, supra note 969; Rothe, supra note 969. 
980 For example, Alvarez applies techniques of neutralization to violence toward civilians which could be construed 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in World War II during the Holocaust, Bryant et al. similarly 
apply techniques of neutralization to the Rwandan genocide (acts which were also crimes against humanity and war 
crimes). Kelman and Hamilton discuss obedience to authority with regards to the My Lai massacre which included 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Similarly, Zimbardo’s discussion of deindividuation and moral 
disengagement in the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison could be considered war crimes. See Alvarez, supra 
note 23; Bryant et al, supra note 23; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23; Zimbardo, supra note 23. 
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by IHL). This is because, while each of these types of crime fall under different categories within 
international criminal law, the specific acts and the fact that violence is directed towards civilians 
is common to all three categories of international crimes. For example, the murder of a civilian 
could amount to a war crime, a crime against humanity, or an act of genocide during war, or a 
crime against humanity or act of genocide during peace. It is possible - and has occurred in 
practice - that the same act is charged as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and genocide 
under international criminal law.981 There is little difference between most crimes against 
humanity committed during an armed conflict and war crimes as neither inherently include or 
require discriminatory intent. What renders crimes against humanity unique from war crimes is 
that they can occur during peacetime. If crimes against humanity could only be committed 
during armed conflict “[they] would have been largely redundant, since most or all of the 
conduct involved would already have been covered as war crimes.”982 However, the crime of 
genocide, whereby perpetrators seek to “destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group”983 inherently involves extensive dehumanization of victims,984 as does the 
crime against humanity of persecution, which requires the perpetrator to target victims based on 
“political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender …, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law”.985 It must be acknowledged 
that the fact that dehumanization is inherent to these crimes may affect the extent to which 
theories that have previously only been used to address genocide or persecution as a crime 
against humanity can accurately explain IHL violations sufficiently. The following section turns 
to a discussion of the four theories used in this thesis: techniques of neutralization, moral 
disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority. 
 
981 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Théoneste Bagasora for genocide, the 
crimes against humanity of extermination and murder, and the war crime of murder and violence to life all for the 
murder of Augustin Maharangari and other killings between 7-9 April 1994 at the Kigali area roadblocks: ICTR 
Bagosora Trial Judgment, supra note 580 at paras 2158, 2186, 2194, 2245. 
982 Darryl Robinson, “The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy S Lee, ed, The International Criminal 
Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 
2001) 57 at 63. 
983 Rome Statute, supra note 52 at Article 6. 
984 See, e.g., Gregory H Stanton, “Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?” (2004) 6:2 Journal of 
Genocide Research 211 at 214; Gregory H Stanton, “The 10 Stages of Genocide”, (2013), online: Genocide Watch 
<http://genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html>; Carola Lingaas, “The Concept of Race in 
International Criminal Law”, (12 February 2018), online: Völkerrechtsblog <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-
concept-of-race-in-international-criminal-law/>. 
985 Rome Statute, supra note 52 at Article 7(1)(8). 
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7.2 Ordinary People, Monstrous Acts 
It is widely accepted among social psychologists, psychiatrists, psychopathologists, and 
criminologists that “the perpetrators [of international crimes] are ordinary people rather than 
psychopaths, sadists, or mentally deranged people.”986 Although “the insistence that perpetrators 
of mass evil are different from the rest of us still thrives, both in popular opinion and in legal 
ones”,987 nearly all case studies and general studies on perpetrators of international crimes have 
found that “perpetrators are indeed ordinary people who are not mentally deranged or otherwise 
disturbed.”988 Waller has remarked that  
not only does the claim of widespread psychopathology among 
perpetrators contradict the available evidence, but it also 
contradicts all diagnostic and statistical logic.989 
The number of acts perpetrated in these violent contexts “greatly exceeds the crime rates under 
ordinary circumstances.”990 The number of perpetrators of violence toward civilians during 
NIACs far exceeds societal prevalence rates of sadism and psychopathy991 - personality disorders 
that, during peace, are sometimes used to explain how individuals come to commit acts of 
extreme violence against individuals. Consequently, the perpetration of these violent acts cannot 
be dismissed as merely the result of individual defects unique to the perpetrators. The 
perpetrators of these crimes are indeed law-abiding citizens who, in the context of conflict, 
become law-breaking combatants, a process which Smeulers refers to as the “phenomenon of the 
‘law-abiding criminal’”.992 Having demonstrated that the cause of these violent acts cannot be 
attributed to psychological deficiencies in the perpetrators, there is a need to explore other causal 
explanations. The following section will address each of the four dominant theories found in 
 
986 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234. 
987 Saira Mohamed, “Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass Atrocity” (2015) 115 Columbia Law 
Review 1157 at 1169; See, e.g., Martha C Nussbaum, Hiding from humanity : disgust, shame, and the law 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 166–67 (on appeal of idea that these perpetrators are monsters); 
Houge, supra note 83 at 189, 191 (discussing the common depiction of perpetrators tried by the ICTY as either 
opportunists or sadists). 
988 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234. 
989 Waller, supra note 22 at 69. 
990 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234. 
991 The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders records the 12-month prevalence 
rates of antisocial personality disorder, which includes psychopathy and sociopathy, at between 0.2% and 3.3%: 
American Psychiatric Association, supra note 20; Torgersen, Kringlen & Cramer, supra note 20 A 2001 study based 
on 2053 adults in Oslo, Norway found prevalence rates of sadism at 0.2% and antisocial personality disorder at 
0.7%: . 
992 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234. 
  
184 
social psychology and criminology literature: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, 
deindividuation, and obedience to authority.   
7.3 The Dominant Theories of Ordinary Evil 
This section discusses the four dominant theories in social psychology and criminology literature 
to explain how ordinary civilians come to commit acts of violence toward civilians during 
conflict. These four theories are: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, 
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. Each of these theories contains specific patterns of 
behaviour that can contribute to the perpetration of violence towards civilians and which have 
been identified in perpetrator testimonies from historic instances of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes. These psychological processes all address how individuals overcome 
societal and/or moral objections to harming innocent people. Techniques of neutralization and 
moral disengagement are particularly interesting because, while they originate from different 
fields of study, there is significant similarity in the behaviours they identify as facilitating crime. 
Each of these theories will be discussed in turn to identify the common themes of 
dehumanization993 and displacement of responsibility that will be used in chapter 8 to identify 
combatant behaviours that would benefit from new IHL regulation in order to better for the 
protection of civilians. 
 7.3.1 Techniques of Neutralization 
The theory of “techniques of neutralization” was introduced by Gresham Sykes and David Matza 
in 1957.994 They sought to explain how delinquents, having been socialized into the norms and 
values of society, overcome this socialization to participate in deviant behaviour. Juvenile 
offenders, for the most part, exhibit conforming and law-abiding behaviours, which is suggestive 
 
993 Dehumanization is not merely a common theme amongst the dominant theories employed in this thesis, it appears 
throughout the literature that seeks to explain how ordinary people commit violent acts against civilians. See, e.g., 
Smeulers, supra note 32; Zimbardo, supra note 23; Philip Zimbardo, “A situationist perspective on the psychology 
of evil: Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators” in AG Miller, ed, The social psychology 
of good and evil (New York: The Guilford Press, 2004) 21; Johanna Ray Vollhardt & Maggie Campbell-Obaid, 
“The Social Psychology of Genocide and Mass Atrocities” in AG Miller, ed, The Social Psychology of Good and 
Evil, 2d ed (New York: Guildford Press, 2016) 159; Nick Haslam & Steve Loughnan, “How Dehumanization 
Promotes Harms” in AG Miller, ed, The Social Psychology of Good and Evil, 2d ed (New York: Guildford Press, 
2016) 140; Waller, supra note 22; Staub, supra note 32; Grossman, supra note 32; Christopher W Mullins & Dawn 
L Rothe, Blood, Power, and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-Colonial Africa (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, 2008); Maier-Katkin, Mears & Bernard, supra note 32. 
994 Gresham M Sykes & David Matza, “Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency” (1957) 22:6 
American Sociological Review 664. 
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of an acceptance of the conventional beliefs and values of the larger society. As Sykes and Matza 
note,  
… the juvenile delinquent would appear to be at least partially 
committed to the dominant social order in that he frequently 
exhibits guilt or shame when he violates its proscriptions, accords 
approval to certain conforming figures, and distinguishes between 
appropriate and inappropriate targets for his deviance.995 
 
The question is, then, how to explain deviant acts committed by delinquents in face of their at 
least partial commitment to the dominant social order. Sykes and Matza explain that this is 
accomplished through “justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not 
by the legal system or society at large.”996 Rationalizations are commonly used after a deviant 
act has been committed in order to lessen feelings of self-blame and shield the individual from 
the blame of others. However, the justifications Sykes and Matza identify are neutralizations 
which precede the deviant act thereby serving to “neutralize[], turn[] back, or deflect[] in 
advance”997 both internal disapproval and external disapproval from others in society. This 
internal and external disapproval, feelings of self-blame, etc., represent the cognitive dissonance 
that underlies acculturation in Goodman and Jinks’ theory of Socialization and International Law 
discussed in the preceding chapter. The neutralizing justification blocks the social controls, 
which would otherwise function to prevent the exercise of deviant impulses, so that the 
delinquent is free to proceed with deviant acts “without serious damage to [their] self image.”998 
The delinquent, therefore, has not adopted deviant values, rather they have merely qualified 
existing societal values through the use of techniques of neutralization. It is the techniques of 
neutralization that provide the specific process employed to address cognitive dissonance. They 
have redefined these values in a way that suppresses their moral force in certain situations. 
Consequently, through the use of these techniques of neutralization, “the delinquent represents 
not a radical opposition to law-abiding society but something more like an apologetic failure, 
often more sinned against than sinning in [their] own eyes.”999 
 
 
995 Ibid at 666. 
996 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
997 Ibid at 667. 
998 Ibid. 
999 Ibid. 
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As noted, juvenile delinquents often exhibit guilt and shame when facing censure for deviant 
acts. Consequently, techniques of neutralization “may not … fully shield the individual from the 
force of [their] own internalized values and the reactions of conforming others”.1000 Nonetheless, 
they are sufficient to facilitate the commission of the delinquent act in the first place. Further, 
while Sykes and Matza’s introduction of the theory of techniques of neutralization originated in 
the study of juvenile delinquents, the theory has since been applied more widely, including to 
adult crimes.1001  
 
Subsequent work on techniques of neutralization has called into question the temporal aspect of 
Sykes and Matza’s depiction of the theory. Whereas Sykes and Matza emphasized that these 
techniques were employed before the criminal activity, strong arguments have been put forward 
that techniques of neutralization have significant utility after the commission of deviant acts, 
though they remain useful prior to these acts as well. Travis Hirschi has argued that some early 
acts of delinquency will occur prior to the formation of any technique of neutralization.1002 
Instead, it is after these initial acts that the techniques will be formed as a result of these early 
acts and serve to facilitate subsequent delinquent acts.1003 Stanley Cohen emphasizes that 
neutralizations play important roles both before and after criminal acts. He states that 
neutralizations “function[] after the act to protect the individual from both self-blame and blame 
by others, and before the act to weaken social control . . . and make delinquency possible”.1004 
This dual temporal utility is strongly supported by Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes’ thorough 
analysis of techniques of neutralization in 2005.1005 They conclude that “neutralization theory, 
then, is best understood as an explanation of persistence or desistance rather than of onset of 
offending.”1006 The use of techniques of neutralization prior to any deviant activity is, however, 
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property theft); Carl Klockars, The Professional Fence (New York: The Free Press, 1974) (on buying and selling 
stolen goods). 
1002 Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969) at 208. 
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1004 Cohen, supra note 32 at 60. 
1005 Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, “What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?” 
(2005) 32 Crime and Justice 221. 
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difficult to empirically assess. As a result, studies examining the use of these techniques rely on 
data collected after deviant acts have been committed. For this reason, it is likely that the 
conclusions of Hirschi, Cohen, Maruna and Copes are a more accurate depiction of the theory’s 
temporal aspect than Sykes and Matza’s earlier assertions. 
 
Five types of techniques of neutralization were identified in the work of Sykes and Matza: (1) 
denial of responsibility; (2) denial of injury; (3) denial of the victim; (4) condemnation of the 
condemners; and, (5) appeal to higher loyalties. These five techniques remain at the heart of the 
theory; however, subsequent scholars have identified five further techniques of neutralization. In 
1974, Carl Klockars established the technique of the metaphor of the ledger.1007 The 1981 work 
of W. William Minor describes the technique of defense of necessity.1008 Alexander Alvarez, in 
his 1997 analysis of the theory, identified the technique of denial of humanity.1009 Finally, in 
their 2017 article, Emily Bryant, Emily Brooke Schimke, Hollie Nyseth Brehm, and Christopher 
Ugge describe two new techniques of neutralization: victimization and appeals to good 
character.1010 These ten techniques of neutralization are now described in turn. 
  7.3.1.i Denial of Responsibility  
The controlling and constraining power of a sense of responsibility can be undone or limited 
where a delinquent employs the technique of denial of responsibility. The weight of 
responsibility has an important social function: it acts as an inhibiting or constraining influence 
on the actions of individuals. In using this technique of neutralization, the delinquent absolves 
responsibility for acts that they deem either accidental or the products of forces beyond their 
control. It is in “learning to view [themselves] as more acted upon than acting, [that] the 
delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant normative system without the 
necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves.”1011 The denial of responsibility technique 
captures the theme of responsibility across the dominant theories addressed in this chapter. 
Consequently, this idea of a psychological mechanism that allows individuals to divest 
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themselves of a sense of responsibility for their actions will play an important role in the review 
of IHL protections for civilians in chapter 8. 
  7.3.1.ii Denial of Injury 
The denial of injury technique is used by individuals to seek to minimize or negate the harm 
caused by a deviant act in order to eliminate the censure, both internal and external, associated 
with causing harm. This technique of neutralization occurs when individuals characterize acts 
such as vandalism as “mischief” and stolen cars as being “borrowed”.1012 Individuals also justify 
damaging people’s property or shoplifting from stores by claiming that insurance or wealth 
excuse the actions.1013 What is important is that the deviant believes that, “since no obvious harm 
has been done to anyone or anything, the behavior is acceptable.”1014 
  7.3.1.iii Denial of Victim 
In the operation of the denial of the victim technique, delinquents may “accept[] the 
responsibility for [their] deviant actions and [be] willing to admit that [their] deviant actions 
involve an injury or hurt”.1015 However, individuals using this technique of neutralization render 
the victims themselves responsible for their own victimization.1016 The perpetrators justify their 
injurious acts as “rightful retaliation or punishment.”1017 The use of the denial of the victim 
technique can be facilitated by circumstances surrounding the deviant act, such as where “the 
victim is physically absent, unknown, or a vague abstraction.”1018 Ultimately, whatever the 
context, the consequence of employing the denial of the victim technique is that the delinquents 
recast themselves as justified in their actions and the victims are recast as deserving of the harms 
they have suffered.  
  7.3.1.iv Condemnation of the Condemners  
Individuals resorting to the condemnation of the condemners technique shift the focus from the 
victim(s), as well as themselves, onto those members of society who would judge the actions of 
the delinquent. The perpetrators claim that the condemners are the problem, not themselves, for 
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the condemners “are hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or impelled by personal spite.”1019 The 
delinquents may assert that the condemners are corrupt or unfair, in order to deflect focus from 
their own actions. In doing so, “[t]he delinquent, in effect, has changed the subject of the 
conversation in the dialogue between [their] own deviant impulses and the reactions of others; 
and by attacking others, the wrongfulness of [their] own behavior is more easily repressed or lost 
to view.”1020 
  7.3.1.v Appeal to Higher Loyalties 
In the appeal to higher loyalties technique, delinquents deny that they are motivated by self-
interest; rather they claim that they are simply “sacrificing the demands of the larger society for 
the demands of the smaller social groups to which the delinquent belongs such as the sibling 
pair, the gang, or the friendship clique.”1021 The delinquent does not reject the conventional 
values of dominant society, but instead prioritizes norms seen as “more pressing or involving a 
higher loyalty”.1022 
  7.3.1.vi Metaphor of the Ledger 
The metaphor of the ledger technique harkens to the use of a ledger in business, in which income 
is tracked in a credit column and expenditures are tracked in a debit column.1023 In the optimal 
business scenario, credits will exceed debits and the business will make money. Employed as a 
technique of neutralization, the credits are good deeds - “acts of charity and benevolence” - while 
delinquent acts constitute debits. Individuals employing this technique will justify criminal acts 
through the reasoning that they have done more good things than bad things in life.1024 In the 
balance of things, they are a good person, not a criminal. The application of this technique of 
neutralization “allows [a person] to loosen the restraints of [their] moral order” and emerge with 
“a positive, moral, decent self-image.”1025 
  7.3.1.vii Defense of Necessity 
The defense of necessity technique of neutralization involves the perpetrator focusing on the 
necessity of committing the delinquent act. This focus absolves the delinquent of any sense of 
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guilt.1026 The concentration on necessity allows the perpetrator to challenge “[the act’s] 
characterization as deviant.”1027 This technique may manifest itself in assertions by the 
perpetrator that that deviant act is “standard practice” in the context, or that the act is the “only 
way” to achieve the desired end.1028 While there may be similarities between the types of 
rationalizations advanced under the defense of necessity technique and the technique of denial of 
responsibility, the two techniques are “conceptually distinct” from each other.1029 
  7.3.1.viii Denial of Humanity 
Under the denial of humanity technique, the perpetrator seeks to dehumanize the victim of the 
deviant act. This serves to “distance[] participants … from their intended victims.1030 Victims 
may be described as animals, demons, or objects.1031 The act of depriving victims of their 
humanity means that “killing them no longer violates the religious and philosophical traditions 
whereby human life is pronounced sacred and special.”1032 When there is no shared humanity 
between perpetrator and victim, the bonds of society’s norms of morality are broken.1033 The 
portrayal of victims as inferior beings or objects serves to create the “psychological distance” 
common to all techniques of neutralization.1034 Alvarez notes that this technique of neutralization 
was an essential component for participation in the Holocaust; however, it is unclear as to 
whether he considers the denial of humanity technique as essential to the employment of 
techniques of neutralization in order to participate in all acts of violence.1035  
 
This technique of neutralization represents the second theme across the dominant theories 
discussed in this chapter, the theme of dehumanization. In chapter 8, dehumanization will be 
examined in the Sierra Leone and DRC case studies with a view to developing new IHL rules to 
inhibit combatants’ use of this technique to facilitate violence toward civilians.  
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  7.3.1.ix Victimization 
The technique of victimization differs from the denial of victim technique. Under the 
victimization technique, rather than focus on denying that the victim is a victim, the perpetrators 
focus on portraying themselves as victims.1036 There may also be a similarity with the technique 
of condemning the condemners in that the individual “shifts blame from themselves”; however, 
the technique of victimization “do[es] not include the necessary component of accusing 
condemners.”1037 A person employing the technique of victimization will speak of their own 
suffering or persecution. They will emphasize their own losses whether that be the loss of family, 
friends, or property. They will speak of their own victimization or “that of their ethnic group” or 
a minority group to which they belong.1038 This technique allows actors to take refuge in the 
status of victimhood in order to avoid feelings of guilt for their own actions.  
  7.3.1.x Appeals to Good Character 
In the appeals to good character technique of neutralization, actors “assert their good deeds or 
admirable character attributes that they contend render them incapable of committing … 
crimes.”1039 These good acts may include the protection of others from violence, attempts to 
“stop violence, and calling for peace.”1040 In addition to such claims, people will “highlight other 
positive character traits” by “denying any personal … animus” against victims or “by expressing 
remorse for the violence.”1041 While there are similarities between the technique of appeals to 
good character and the metaphor of the ledger technique, actors employing the technique of 
appeals to good character refrain from “admitting guilt when cataloging their virtuous acts” and 
emphasize not only good deeds but also good character.1042 
  7.3.1.xi Application of Techniques of Neutralization to International Crimes 
The preceding subsections have discussed each of the ten techniques of neutralization. The 
theory of techniques of neutralization was originally conceived and applied to domestic crimes 
during peacetime; however, techniques of neutralization have subsequently been applied to 
explain the commission of international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
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war crimes.1043 This section will discuss the manner in which techniques of neutralization has 
been applied to explain acts of violence against civilians during conflict, in particular during the 
Holocaust and during the Rwandan genocide. 
 
Of particular interest to this thesis is the application of techniques of neutralization to the context 
of genocide, both by Alexander Alvarez and Bryant et al.1044 As noted above in section 7.1, 
while genocide is a different crime than war crimes or crimes against humanity, specific 
underlying acts of genocide, such as the murder of civilians, are common to both crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The focus of Alvarez and Bryant et al. is on how the violence of the 
acts committed are facilitated by techniques of neutralization, rather than genocide per se. They 
do not seek to explain genocide generally. Rather, their works examine individual perpetrators of 
acts within the context of genocide. 
 
Bryant et al. identify techniques of neutralization in the testimonies of defendants before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Alvarez employs the theory to explain how 
ordinary men and women came to participate, to varying degrees, in the Holocaust. Bryant et al. 
focus on the frequency with which the various techniques are applied, noting “limited use of the 
appeals to higher loyalty, denial of injury, and denial of the victim techniques”, but “frequent 
reliance” on the techniques of denial of responsibility, condemnation of the condemners, 
victimization, and appeals to good character. While interesting, consideration must be given to 
whether and to what degree the techniques noted by Bryant et al. were actually employed by the 
defendants to neutralize their behaviours before and during the commission of the acts. The 
findings of Bryant et al. rely on testimonies given at trial and Bryant et al. acknowledge that the 
status of the speakers as a defendants in criminal trials likely affected the types of techniques of 
neutralization revealed in the testimonies considered in the study.1045 As Bryant et al. note, 
“denying the genocidal violence or the humanity of Tutsis would be deleterious to both [the 
defendants’] cases and their public image”.1046 Consequently, the failure to find the techniques of 
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denial of injury and denial of humanity in these testimonies does not inherently mean that these 
techniques were not employed by perpetrators. While defendant testimonies did not provide 
evidence of the use of the denial of humanity technique, other sources have recorded the 
widespread use of dehumanizing language during the Rwandan genocide by génocidaires, most 
notably the use of the word ‘inyenzi’ (cockroach) to refer to Tutsis.1047 Since the denial of 
humanity technique will often be absent from perpetrator accounts of conflict, one must look 
beyond perpetrator accounts to other sources to determine whether this technique may have been 
employed in a specific context.  
 
Alvarez relies on evidence gathered during the Holocaust and statements made by perpetrators 
after the Holocaust to identify the application of Sykes and Matza’s original five techniques of 
neutralization.1048 The denial of responsibility technique can be identified in the statements of 
many perpetrators, such as SS Lieutenant-Colonel Adolf Eichmann and Treblinka concentration 
camp Commandant Franz Stangl, both of whom claimed that their participation in acts of 
genocide was “innocent of wrongdoing because they were only following orders”.1049 The denial 
of responsibility technique was employed by both to reassure themselves “that they remained 
decent people forced to do a dirty job.”1050 In order to employ the denial of injury technique, 
participants in the genocide employed euphemistic language to disguise the negative reality of 
their actions. Rather than speak of genocide, they spoke of a “final solution” and instead of 
speaking of killing, they used the terms “special treatment,” “treated appropriately,” or 
“cleansing.”1051 The use of scientific and technical euphemisms allowed participants to 
psychologically distance themselves from the true nature of their actions.1052  
 
The denial of victim technique is evident in the way Jews were constructed as the enemy of 
Germany and the German people; they were “scapegoats for the defeat Germany suffered in 
World War I, the country’s subsequent economic collapse, and many other real or imagined 
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social woes.”1053 This allowed participants in the genocide to perceive of themselves as the true 
victims, rather than the Jews. Consequently, they “could operate from a position of moral 
superiority and define their actions as just, moral, and necessary.”1054 Participants’ resort to the 
appeal to higher loyalties technique was facilitated by the same propaganda which portrayed the 
Jews as the cause of Germany’s woes. In depicting the Jews as the enemy, it was possible for 
participants to appeal to their own sense of patriotism and their need to protect “their people and 
their country.”1055 Finally, Alvarez cites the extensive use by Nazis of “virulent anti-Semitic 
propaganda” that “focused on depicting Jewish people as subhuman” as evidence of the 
technique of denial of humanity.1056 Ultimately, Alvarez successfully demonstrates how 
techniques of neutralization were employed by participants in the Holocaust “to overcome 
normative hurdles”.1057 
 
The theory of techniques of neutralization developed by Sykes and Matza, and later elaborated 
upon by Klockars, Minor, Alvarez, and Bryant et al., provides a framework for understanding 
how ordinarily law-abiding individuals overcome society’s conventional normative constraints in 
order to commit deviant acts. It is not that such individuals have abandoned the conventional 
beliefs and values of larger society; rather, they have employed one or some of the ten 
techniques of neutralization identified by these theorists in order to defeat, or minimize, the 
power of social controls which would normally inhibit deviance. These techniques explain how 
offenders recast their deviance in a positive light free from internal or external censure in order 
to preserve their self-image. Social scientists have widely applied techniques of neutralization to 
traditional forms of criminality, but Alvarez and Bryant et al. demonstrate that this theory can 
also be usefully and successfully applied to international crimes such as acts of genocide.1058 The 
techniques of denial of responsibility and denial of humanity are particularly important for the 
remainder of this chapter and the thesis as a whole. The importance of these two techniques 
comes from the fact that they capture the two themes of dehumanization and displacement of 
responsibility for one’s actions identified across the theories discussed in this chapter. Further, 
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the themes of dehumanization and displacement of responsibility for one’s actions form the basis 
for analyzing combatant behaviour and identifying the need for new rules of IHL to protect 
civilians in chapter 8. 
7.3.2 Moral Disengagement 
The theory of “moral disengagement” was developed by social psychologist Albert Bandura and 
has its origins in Bandura’s 1986 Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive 
Theory.1059 It was subsequently developed by Bandura in works devoted to the study of moral 
behaviour.1060 There are numerous parallels between the mechanisms of moral disengagement 
developed by Bandura in social psychology and the criminological theory of techniques of 
neutralization. Bandura himself applied his theory to describe how people commit harmful acts, 
or what Bandura referred to as “the perpetration of inhumanities”, in contravention of their moral 
standards while “retain[ing] their sense of moral integrity.”1061 Moral standards are learned 
through a combination of teaching and observation.1062 They are then used to regulate one’s 
actions, guiding the commission of acts which meet these standards and deterring those which 
violate them. Humans seek to engage in activities which provide them with “satisfaction and a 
sense of self-worth” while abstaining from doing things that “will bring self-censure.”1063 The 
“exercise of moral agency” is both inhibitive – preventing inhumane action – and proactive – 
providing the capability to act humanely.1064 Consequently, individuals have the capacity to 
choose to refrain from inhumane behavior by exercising self-influence.1065 Therefore, the 
perpetration of violence against civilians is not inevitable. This suggests that if some, or all, of 
these mechanisms of moral disengagement could be prevented, deterred or inhibited, it could 
result in fewer IHL violations of protections for civilians.  
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Bandura identifies social and psychological processes by which this ability to regulate one’s own 
behaviour, through the exercise of internal control, “can be disengaged from inhumane conduct” 
thus facilitating the exercise of harmful behaviour without the consequence of self-censure.1066 
Disengagement of self-censure can occur by 
reconstructing conduct as serving moral purposes, by obscuring 
personal agency in detrimental activities, by disregarding or 
misrepresenting the injurious consequences of one’s actions, or by 
blaming and dehumanizing the victims.1067 
 
Disengagement of self-censure can be accomplished through one or more of the eight 
psychosocial mechanisms for moral disengagement: (1) moral, social, and economic 
justification; (2) euphemistic language or labeling; (3) advantageous comparison; (4) 
displacement of responsibility; (5) diffusion of responsibility; (6) disregard, distortion and denial 
of harmful effects; (7) dehumanization; and, (8) attribution of blame.1068 Three of these 
mechanisms of moral disengagement - displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, 
and dehumanization – expressly capture the themes of dehumanization and responsibility, which 
are addressed by all of the dominant theories discussed in this chapter. However, the remaining 
five mechanisms of moral disengagement also contribute to dehumanization, particularly the use 
of euphemistic language, and the abdication of accountability for one’s acts. 
 
The effect of the application or employment of mechanisms of moral disengagement by 
individuals is not instantaneous; it “will not instantly transform considerate persons into cruel 
ones.”1069 Self-censure is gradually disengaged. People begin by “perform[ing] milder aggressive 
acts they can tolerate with some discomfort” and then, when “their self-reproof has been 
diminished…, the level of ruthlessness increases, until eventually acts originally regarded as 
abhorrent can be performed with little personal anguish or self-censure.”1070 It must be noted, 
however, that the identification and operation of these processes of moral disengagement in the 
behaviour of those who participate in inhumane acts in no way excuses the commission of such 
acts. As Bandura clearly states, “[t]here is a marked difference between scientific explanations of 
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how moral self-sanctions are disengaged from inhumane conduct and evaluative judgments of 
that conduct.”1071 When considering violence against civilians during armed conflict, while IHL 
provides the evaluative judgments of what conduct is legal and illegal, moral disengagement and 
the other theories discussed in this chapter provide the scientific explanations for how 
combatants come to commit acts of violence. These scientific explanations are a tool that can be 
employed “to prevent and counteract the suspension of morality in the perpetration of 
inhumanities.”1072  
 
The technique of moral disengagement, like techniques of neutralization, explains specific 
thought processes individuals use to overcome cognitive dissonance in the commission of 
crimes. These mechanisms provide the specific content that Goodman and Jinks’ discussion of 
cognitive dissonance in the context of acculturation lacked.1073 Further, as shown by Alvarez’s 
application of techniques of neutralization to the Holocaust and Bryant et al.’s application to the 
Rwandan genocide, evidence of these techniques can often be found in the testimonies of 
perpetrators. The next sections briefly examine each of Bandura’s mechanisms of moral 
disengagement in turn. 
  7.3.2.i Moral, Social, and Economic Justification 
The first psychosocial mechanism for moral disengagement is moral, social, and economic1074 
justification. Individuals use this mechanism to reconstrue their behaviour as morally acceptable. 
The act in question “is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving 
socially worthy or moral purposes.”1075 These justifications serve to imbue the deleterious 
behaviour with a meritorious purpose: “[r]ighteous and worthy ends are used to justify harmful 
means.”1076 
 
Military conduct represents a clear example of the psychosocial process of moral and social 
justification. The transformation of ordinary individuals into soldiers “is achieved not by altering 
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their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards,” but by “redefining the 
morality of killing so that it can be done free from self-censure.”1077 Moral and social 
justifications operate to construe armed combat as a fight against oppression, to preserve a way 
of life, or to save humanity: “killing becomes an act of heroism.”1078 Upon discharge, the soldier 
reverts to a civilian and “moral standards are reengaged” to once more deter deleterious 
behavior.1079  
 
A further example of social and moral justification can be identified in some civil rights 
movements. Members of the movement identify the eradication of human rights violations as the 
righteous end that justifies sometimes militant means. In such contexts, members “appeal[] to 
what they regard as a higher level of morality derived from communal concerns.”1080 While not 
acknowledged by Bandura, there is a parallel here to the appeal to higher loyalties technique of 
neutralization identified by Sykes and Matza.  
  7.3.2.ii Euphemistic Language and Labelling  
The use of euphemistic language or labeling by individuals is another psychosocial mechanism 
that operates to disengage moral reasoning from moral conduct. This mechanism recognizes the 
important role and effect language plays in how actions are perceived. The language used by 
individuals to describe an activity can have a significant effect on the “personal and social 
acceptability of [the activity]”.1081 Euphemistic language and labeling can be, and is, employed 
by individuals to mask the true nature of destructive behaviour and acts, such that they are 
rendered “benign and people who engage in [them] are relieved of a sense of personal 
agency.”1082 The work of Richard Gambino identifies three types of euphemisms: (1) “sanitizing 
and convoluted language”; (2) “the agentless passive form”; and, (3) “the borrowing of 
specialized jargon from a respectable enterprise.”1083 Bandura returns to the context of the armed 
forces to provide examples of these forms of euphemistic language. The sanitizing language of 
“waste” and the acronym “KIA” (“killed in action”) are used to mask the soldier’s act of killing a 
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person and neutralize the act’s repugnancy.1084 The agentless passive form is employed to 
“creat[e] the appearance that harmful acts are the work of nameless forces rather than of 
individuals.”1085 For example, the borrowed jargon of “clean, surgical strikes” describes bombing 
attacks in a manner that evokes the image of healing and medicine.1086 The use of euphemistic 
language thereby distances the act from the reality of its harmful nature and distances the actors 
from responsibility for their acts. Again, there is a parallel between Bandura’s euphemistic 
language mechanism of moral disengagement and Sykes and Matza’s denial of injury technique 
of neutralization. Alvarez identifies the use of euphemisms such as “Final Solution” for genocide 
and “special treatment” for killing that neutralize the horrific nature of the acts themselves.1087 
Euphemistic language and labelling can also be linked to the mechanisms of dehumanization 
used in the Rwandan genocide, when génocidaires were instructed to “go to work [because] there 
was a lot of dirt that needed to be cleaned up.”1088 The euphemism ‘to clean up’ was used to 
instruct people to kill, and Tutsis were dehumanized by being referred to as “dirt”. 
  7.3.3.iii Advantageous Comparison 
The mechanism of advantageous comparison operates by comparing an act to another act that is 
considered even more morally reprehensible, thereby casting the first act in a more favourable 
light. The starker the contrast between the two activities, “the more likely it is that one’s own 
destructive conduct will appear benevolent and righteous.”1089 For example, the United States 
Cold War policy of containment - stopping the threat of “communist enslavement” - was 
employed to detract from the horrors committed by American armed forces during the Vietnam 
War.1090 Actors may also use historical comparisons to justify their destructive acts. For instance, 
the oppressive acts of a current regime may be contrasted with the crimes of a previous 
regime.1091 Advantageous comparison, along with moral and social justifications and 
euphemistic language, represent, according to Bandura, “the most powerful set of psychological 
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1088 The Prosecutor v Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Trial Judgment, ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999 
at para 385. 
1089 Bandura, supra note 23 at 56. 
1090 Bandura, supra note 23 at 196. 
1091 Ibid. 
  
200 
mechanisms for promoting detrimental activities.”1092 The use of these mechanisms to “invest[] 
injurious means with high social or moral purpose not only eliminates self-deterrents but also 
engages self-approval in the service of harmful exploits.”1093  
  7.3.2.iv Displacement of Responsibility and Diffusion of Responsibility 
As already noted, one of the strong themes running through the theories discussed in this chapter 
is the idea of responsibility and the process by which individuals divest themselves of a sense of 
responsibility in order to perpetrate, or deal with having perpetrated, a crime. The following two 
mechanisms of moral disengagement – displacement of responsibility and diffusion of 
responsibility – serve to “obscure[] or distort[]” the link between the actor, their actions, and the 
consequences of those actions.1094 The mechanism of displacement of responsibility is identified 
in the works of Herbert Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, and Stanley Milgram, discussed below. 
They demonstrated that, when an authority figure accepts responsibility for the consequences of 
a subordinate’s actions, the subordinate is willing to commit acts they would otherwise consider 
inhumane.1095 The subordinate sees their act as flowing from the orders of the authority figure 
and, therefore, the act and its consequences are not a product of the subordinate’s actions. The 
subordinate has exempted themselves from any sense of culpability. The application of the 
displacement of responsibility mechanism is apparent in the testimonies of many Nazi 
commandants after the Holocaust. For example, the Commandant of Treblinka concentration 
camp, Franz Stangl, stated that “[t]he motive to murder did not originate with him. He 'only' 
carried out the order he had received in the best possible way.1096 Yitzhak Arad observes that, 
“[l]ooking at the situation in this way relieved his conscience and enabled him to oversee the 
death factory in which hundreds of thousands of people were murdered.”1097 A defence of 
superior orders was refuted at the Nuremberg Trials.1098 Nonetheless, the employment of the 
displacement of responsibility mechanism can be observed in subsequent instances of mass 
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atrocities perpetrated by armed forces, such as the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.1099 A clear 
parallel exists between the mechanism of displacement of responsibility and the technique of 
neutralization, denial of responsibility.  
 
A sense of culpability is weakened when responsibility for destructive acts is diffused amongst 
numerous individuals.1100 Self-sanctions lose their power as the direct link between action and 
consequence is obscured. This mechanism, known as diffusion of responsibility, can take three 
forms: (1) group decision-making; (2) division of labour; and, (3) collective action.1101 Group 
decision-making serves to obscure individual responsibility since the decision, act, and its 
consequences can be attributed to the group and not one particular person: “[w]hen everyone is 
responsible, no one really feels responsible.”1102 By dividing an action into its constituent parts 
and assigning each part to a different individual, individual responsibility for the ultimate 
product of the combined parts is dispersed and diminished. For example, the functions of death 
row executions in the United States are divided amongst numerous officers: each straps down 
only one part of the body, one inserts syringes, another attaches the heart monitor, and so on.1103 
Finally, collective action also allows individuals to easily “attribute [harm] largely to the 
behavior of others.”1104 One example is a firing squad where all shooters must fire 
simultaneously and only one gun contains live ammunition. Further, collective action can serve 
to create a “sense of anonymity” among group members.1105 The work of Bandura, Underwood, 
and Fromson and Zimbardo demonstrates that “[p]eople behave more cruelly under group 
responsibility than when they hold themselves personally accountable for their actions.”1106 
Much like the closely related displacement of responsibility, the mechanism of diffusion of 
responsibility parallels the technique of neutralization, denial of responsibility. 
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  7.3.2.v Disregard, Distortion and Denial of Harmful Effects 
The mechanism of disregard, distortion and denial of harmful effects allows individuals to 
disengage moral control by minimizing, discrediting, misrepresenting, or denying the 
consequences of their actions. When people are insulated from the consequences of their actions 
and the suffering of their victims, it is easier for them to complete their tasks.1107 Hierarchical 
chains of command can serve to distance decision-making superiors from the consequences of 
their orders executed by lower level functionaries.1108 However, even the commands of authority 
figures are less likely to be obeyed when a person can “see and hear the suffering they cause”.1109 
There is a parallel here between the moral disengagement mechanism of disregard, distortion and 
denial of harmful effects and Sykes and Matza’s technique of neutralization denial of injury. 
Both serve to distance the actor from the reality of the harms suffered as a result of their actions. 
  7.3.2.vi Dehumanization 
The mechanism of dehumanization allows people to divest victims of the qualities which make 
them human, resulting in the minimization or prevention of feelings of empathy and compassion 
in the perpetrator.1110 There is a shared sense of common humanity when one sees others as 
sentient beings like themselves, which renders it “difficult to inflict suffering on humanized 
persons without experiencing distress and self-condemnation.”1111 Yet, when these same persons 
are portrayed in subhuman terms, “it is easy to [inflict suffering] without guilt”.1112 
Dehumanization of victims can be achieved by depicting them as “mindless ‘savages,’ 
‘degenerates’ and other despicable wretches.”1113 Perpetrators may use degrading labels and 
ethnic slurs, for example American servicemen using the term “gook” during the Vietnam War 
to describe the Vietnamese people or the terms “hajis” and “towel heads” to describe Iraqis 
during the second Gulf War (2003-2011).1114 In an effort to further dehumanize victims, 
perpetrators may resort to “attributing demonic or bestial qualities to [victims].”1115 This was 
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done, for example, by the Nazis who referred to the Jewish people as “parasitic vermin” and by 
Rwandan génocidaires who called their Tutsi victims “inyenzi” (cockroaches).  
 
Laboratory studies have demonstrated that “when otherwise considerate people are given 
punitive power, they treat dehumanized individuals more harshly than those who are 
personalized or invested with human qualities.”1116 The mechanisms of dehumanization and 
diffused responsibility, when combined, significantly increase the degree of punitiveness 
demonstrated by perpetrators, whereas when responsibility is personalized and victims 
humanized, there is a strong and positive effect on the exercise of self-restraint.1117 This means 
that the combination of dehumanization and responsibility have the potential to be even more 
problematic than either in isolation. Depersonalization allows actors to treat others with 
“emotional detachment and little regard for them as persons.”1118 Depersonalization can be 
facilitated through common phenomenon such as “[b]ureaucratization, automation, urbanisation, 
and high mobility” that “lead people to relate to each other in anonymous, impersonal ways.”1119 
The common conditions of war, where the enemy and its civilian population are strangers to 
opposing armed forces, also facilitate depersonalization since “[s]trangers can be more easily 
depersonalized than can acquaintances.”1120 The devaluation and detachment produced by 
depersonalization render it a conducive stepping stone on the way to activating the disengaging 
power of dehumanization. The moral disengagement mechanism of dehumanization directly 
mirrors the technique of neutralization, denial of humanity, articulated by Alvarez. This 
mechanism reinforces the importance of the theme of dehumanization identified across the 
theories discussed in this chapter in the context of explaining combatant violence toward 
civilians. 
  7.3.2.vii Attribution of Blame   
Attribution of blame is the final mechanism of moral disengagement in which perpetrators casts 
themselves as victims provoked into violence by the target of their violence.1121 Perpetrators 
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selectively portray the circumstances as being instigated by their victims, and thus characterize 
their own harmful acts as merely defensive. Furthermore, such a portrayal of events and 
circumstances means that “[v]ictims then get blamed for bringing suffering upon 
themselves.”1122 The attribution of blame to others or on circumstances means that “not only are 
one’s own injurious actions excusable, but one can feel self-righteous in the process.”1123 
Attribution of blame was used extensively by Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party in their persecution 
of Jewish people during the Holocaust. They conveyed the message that “[t]he Jews are guilty of 
everything”, including the economic crisis in Germany and Germany’s defeat in the First World 
War.1124 Another example is the manner in which Osama bin Laden “characterized his terrorist 
activities as ‘defensive jihad,’ compelled by ‘debauched infidels’ bent on enslaving the Muslim 
world.”1125 Tactics such as these facilitated people’s participation in the commission of atrocities 
in the forms of genocide and terrorist attacks by deactivating self-censoring capacities through 
moral disengagement. Attribution of blame parallels the denial of victim technique of 
neutralization articulated by Sykes and Matza. Both operate to render victims responsible for 
their own victimization. 
 
Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement demonstrates mechanisms by which people are 
able to deactivate moral control to permit the commission or participation in atrocities. People 
have the capacity to selectively activate their internal control through the operation of self-
regulation, self-censure, and self-sanctions. It is the failure to activate these processes of personal 
control that permits destructive and harmful behaviour. The moral standards of the individual 
have not been altered by the mechanism of moral disengagement nor have their personality 
structures or aggressive drives been changed. It is simply that self-restraint is no longer activated 
by the behaviour or act in question. The ability to activate and deactivate moral control 
selectively means that both acts of kindness and extreme cruelty can be observed in the same 
individual. Bandura actively makes the link between armed forces and the use of mechanisms of 
moral disengagement, as demonstrated by Nazis during the Holocaust and American armed 
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forces during the Vietnam War.1126 While not acknowledged by Bandura, there are significant 
parallels between mechanisms of moral disengagement and the techniques of neutralization 
identified by Sykes and Matza, and subsequently further developed by Klockars, Minor, and 
Alvarez. Bandura has, however, provides greater detail on the specific psychological function of 
the mechanisms of moral disengagement than there is on the function of the techniques of 
neutralization. In particular, in addition to the mechanism of dehumanization, Bandura includes a 
separate mechanism addressing the use of euphemistic language. The historical examples 
provided above demonstrate that dehumanizing and euphemistic language are often used 
together by combatants. Further, Bandura identifies two separate mechanisms expressly 
addressing responsibility and how individuals can both displace or diffuse responsibility for their 
actions. Moreover, Bandura makes explicit the link between armed forces, as well as 
international crimes, and moral disengagement that was absent from the earliest articulations of 
techniques of neutralization. 
 7.3.3 Deindividuation  
The theories of techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement focus largely on wholly 
internal processes – processes internal to the individual perpetrators – although diffusion and 
displacement of responsibility are often linked to the existence of a group or authority figure. 
However, the theory of deindividuation focuses primarily on the psychological effect 
membership within a group has on an individual. Deindividuation has its earliest roots in 
Gustave Le Bon’s 1895 book on crowd psychology.1127 It was not until a 1952 article by social 
psychologists Leon Festinger, Albert Pepitone, and Theodore Newcomb that the term 
“deindividuation” was applied in the manner in which I will refer to it here: describing the 
behaviour exhibited by individuals when “submerged in a group.”1128 Individuals are 
“submerged in the group” when they are no longer seen as, nor feel as, though they “stand out as 
individuals” - that is, when focus is placed on the group and not the individuals that make up the 
group.1129 Under such conditions of deindividuation, Festinger et al. explained, 
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there is likely to occur for the [group] member a reduction of inner 
restraints against doing various things. In other words, many of the 
behaviors which the individual wants to perform but which are 
otherwise impossible to do because of the existence, within 
[themselves], of restraints, become possible under conditions of de-
individuation in a group.1130 
 
Consequently, deindividuation can lead to behaviour normally frowned upon by society (i.e., 
anti-normative behaviour) because it weakens an individual’s internal restraints. This includes 
both negative behaviour, such as acts of violence, as well as positive behaviour, such as public 
displays of extreme joy or sadness.1131 The influence of the group on the individual in 
deindividuation theory has direct parallels to the influence of the groups discussed in the context 
of acculturation by Goodman and Jinks. However, deindividuation theory provides a more 
nuanced account of the function of social pressures on the individual than that provided in 
Goodman and Jinks’ Socialization and International Law theory.  
 
The theory of deindividuation was revisited in 1965 by Jerome E. Singer, Claudia A. Brush, and 
Shirley C. Lublin.1132 They elaborated on the work of Festinger et al. and focused on the internal 
characteristics of deindividuation. Deindividuation was defined by Singer at al. as a “subjective 
state in which people lose their self-consciousness.”1133 A reduced sense of individuality and loss 
of self-consciousness are essential components of deindividuation. It is now understood that this 
can be more accurately described as a state of “reduced self-awareness” which “induce[s] a state 
of psychological disinhibition”.1134 It operates on both public and private self-awareness.1135 
Public self-awareness has an external focus that “involves attention to oneself as a social object” 
and includes “[c]oncerns about one’s appearance and the impression made in social 
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situations”.1136 When public self-awareness is reduced, “people may be aware of what they are 
doing but have a reduced expectation of suffering any negative consequences.”1137 By contrast, 
private self-awareness has an internal focus on things such as personal “perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings.”1138 Prentice-Dunn and Rogers have argued that it is the reduction of private self-
awareness in particular that activates the process of deindividuation.1139 This is because the 
submergence of one’s identity in a group “decrease[s one’s] ability to self-monitor their 
behaviour” and, consequently, “their capacity for self-regulation is fundamentally impaired.”1140 
 
Psychologist Ed Diener has identified three fundamental premises of deindividuation. First, the 
prevention of self-awareness as an individual is submerged in a group and that group becomes an 
operating unit unto itself and the focus of all attention.1141 Second, the individual no longer pays 
attention to their own behaviour and no longer sees themselves as an entity distinct from the 
group.1142 Third, deindividuation triggers a “lack of self-regulation”.1143 Additionally, self-
regulation is absent in states of deindividuation because “[individuals] have relinquished 
decision-making to the group.”1144 The external or outward focus of such individuals inhibits 
their ability to access their internal standards of behaviour from long-term memory.1145 
Deindividuation, as demonstrated by Diener’s three premises, is therefore the result of an 
interplay of “situational, internal and behavioral factors.”1146 
 
Transgressive behaviour as a result of deindividuation is not reliant on the presence of deviant 
norms within the group. While the presence of such norms in the group can lead to transgressive 
behaviour, their absence does not inherently produce behaviour obedient to societal norms. This 
is because “lowered self-awareness leads to lowered adherence to societal norms even in the 
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absence of deviant group standards.”1147 There are several forces that have been identified by 
scholars as contributing to the creation of a deindividuated state: (1) pressure to conform; (2) a 
sense of anonymity; (3) and, a sense of responsibility.  
  7.3.3.i Pressure to Conform 
Conformity is defined as “the tendency to behave in accordance with group norms or unspoken 
rules about what one should or should not do.”1148 Individuals join and conform to groups to 
fulfill their information needs.1149 Group members are a source of other “ideas, views, 
perspectives, and knowledge that helps us to better navigate our world”.1150 Second, a desire to 
belong to a group and be accepted by others fuels an individual’s normative needs: “other people 
are more likely to accept us when we agree with them than when we disagree, so we yield to 
their view of the world”.1151 As group conformity increases and group members become 
progressively similar in behaviour, the ability to differentiate between members of the group 
becomes difficult, thereby leading to the inhibition of individual self-awareness.1152 The pressure 
to conform was the primary source of social pressures discussed by Goodman and Jinks in their 
work on Socialization and International Law theory.  
  7.3.3.ii Sense of Anonymity  
A sense of anonymity may contribute powerfully to a state of antisocial deindividuation.1153 
Zimbardo argues that “anything that makes a person feel anonymous, as if no one knows who he 
or she is, creates the potential for that person to act in evil ways – if the situation gives 
permission for violence.”1154 Submergence in a group can create this sense of anonymity, but 
groups may enhance anonymity and thus reduce a sense of personal accountability, through the 
use of “uniforms, costumes, and masks, all disguises of one’s usual appearance”.1155 Many 
studies support the finding that anonymity and deindividuation increase the likelihood of 
antisocial behaviour. For example, Zimbardo demonstrated in a 1970 study that deindividuated 
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and anonymous women were more inclined to inflict pain on victims than individuated 
women.1156 Diener, however, stresses that anonymity and deindividuation are not 
interchangeable terms because “an anonymous person (e.g., a bank robber in a ski mask) may be 
highly individuated and self-conscious, and a deindividuated crowd member may not be 
anonymous to a particular onlooker such as a policeman.”1157 For example, some studies have 
suggested that anonymity in a group setting can actually lead to more reserved or controlled 
behaviour.1158 In considering both studies that support a finding that anonymity increases 
disinhibited behaviour and those which suggest it decreases such behaviour, Diener concludes 
that “[a]nonymity will tend to disinhibit behavior if threats of punishment are a major source of 
inhibition”; “[t]he symbolic function of anonymity-inducing costumes will create a pressure on 
the individual to conform to the implicit message conveyed by the outfit”; and, that “[w]hen 
people are anonymous by virtue of appearing outwardly similar, besides the anonymity effect per 
se there will be group compliance pressures and a feeling of unity created by similar 
appearance.”1159 By contrast, anonymity may serve to increase or decrease inhibition depending 
on whether the “form of anonymity serves to heighten or lessen the individual’s self- 
awareness.1160 Anonymity from other members of the group, such as an individual in a group of 
strangers participating in a protest, will reduce the pressure on individuals to conform to the 
group and thus is likely to decrease the level of disinhibited behaviour.1161 Anonymity from 
people who are not members of the group, such as a group of individuals in disguise holding a 
public protest, however, may facilitate an individual’s dispersal or diffusion of responsibility 
from themselves onto other members of the group. 
  7.3.3.iii Sense of Responsibility  
Deindividuation can affect an individual’s sense of responsibility for actions committed as a 
member of the group. The pressures to conform with a group and a sense of anonymity within 
that group contribute to a deindividuated individual’s ability to displace or diffuse responsibility 
onto the group and/or other members of the group. Zimbardo notes that the sense of 
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responsibility “may be made insignificant by situations in which [responsibility] is shared by 
others, by conditions which obscure the relationship between an action and its effects, or by a 
leader’s willingness to assume all of it.”1162 Denial of responsibility as well as diffusion and 
displacement of responsibility indicate that an individual may shift responsibility for their actions 
onto a leader regardless of whether that leader is willing or not to assume responsibility for the 
actions of the group, as suggested in the preceding quote from Zimbardo. Zimbardo’s article in 
which these comments on responsibility were made predates Bandura’s articulation of the moral 
disengagement mechanisms of diffusion and displacement of responsibility. There are definite 
parallels between Zimbardo’s discussion of responsibility and Bandura’s discussion of 
displacement and diffusion of responsibility as well as between Zimbardo’s work and the earlier 
techniques of neutralization work done by Sykes and Matza. Zimbardo’s later work directly 
draws on Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement to explain torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment of civilian detainees by of members of the United States Armed Forces in 
Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq, in 2003.1163 
  7.3.3.iv Criticism of Deindividuation  
Reicher, Spears, and Postmes have been extremely critical of deindividuation theory.1164 Postmes 
and Spears conducted a meta-analysis of deindividuation literature and studies. According to 
their findings, “group immersion, group size, anonymity, lack of self-awareness” - characteristic 
factors of deindividuation - were “not associated with an increase in anti-normative 
behaviour.”1165 Instead, they argue, the literature and studies suggest that these factors actually 
“are associated with an increase in normative behaviour.”1166 In their view, in reality, any anti-
normative behaviour found in the studies was evidence of greater conformity with group 
norms.1167 Based on these findings and the results of their own studies, they advanced a new 
theory of social identity deindividuation effects (SIDE). This theory argues that anonymity and 
submergence in a group “can give rise to, not a loss of identity, but, rather, a change of identity, 
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with a particular emphasis on the group identities that may become salient in such situations.”1168 
An individual transitions from “a personal to a social identity”.1169 Despite this strong criticism 
of deindividuation, textbooks tend to not even reference the work of Postmes, Spears, and 
Reicher; rather they define and describe deindividuation in line with the works of Diener, 
Zimbardo, and Prentice-Dunn and Rogers.1170 
 
The theory of deindividuation demonstrates a process by which membership in a group can 
facilitate individual participation in anti-normative behaviour. This behaviour may be positive or 
transgressive in nature. Through the process of deindividuation, individuals lose the ability to see 
themselves as individuals and, instead, focus is increasingly placed on the group as a whole. The 
effect is to inhibit individual self-awareness and thus the ability of individuals to self-regulate 
their own behaviour according to personal standards and societal norms. Similar to techniques of 
neutralization and moral disengagement, deindividuation operates on the individual. However, 
deindividuation differs from these two theories in that it is a process that requires the presence of 
a group in which the individual is submerged. The process does not operate if no group exists. 
Factors which contribute to the process of deindividuation - pressure to conform, a sense of 
responsibility, and a sense of anonymity –exist in many group contexts and have been expressly 
linked to the military context in the works of Zimbardo.1171 Militaries and armed groups must be 
cohesive units in order to carry out operations effectively and efficiently. Additionally, a uniform 
has long been a requirement for parties to an international armed conflict.1172 Ideally, uniforms 
should also be worn be parties to NIAC to facilitate combatants’ task of distinguishing between 
non-targetable civilians and legally targetable combatants even though a uniform is not a 
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1171 Zimbardo, supra note 1134; Zimbardo, supra note 993; Zimbardo, supra note 23. 
1172 See, e.g., 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 465 at Article 1(2); Geneva Convention III, supra note 5 at 
Article 4(A)(2)(b). 
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requirement for an armed group to be considered a party to a NIAC.1173 The possibility for 
deindividuation would therefore seem to be inherent within armed forces and armed groups. 
7.3.4 Obedience to Authority 
Whereas deindividuation focuses on the effect of being submerged in a group, obedience to 
authority in the work of Stanley Milgram, Kelman and Hamilton focus on the effect of authority 
figures on an individual. The effect of authority on obedience, even in situations where an 
individual is harming another human being, originates in Milgram’s laboratory experiments in 
the 1960s. His work has been widely cited and is relied upon by many of the scholars.1174 His 
experiments demonstrated that ordinary people will obediently inflict pain on an innocent human 
being when ordered to do so by an authority figure.1175 The results of Milgram’s obedience to 
authority experiments play a significant role in the related theory of crimes of obedience from 
social psychologists Kelman and Hamilton.1176 While Milgram drew parallels between his 
findings and the participation of so many German citizens in the Holocaust, Kelman and 
Hamilton examine their theory in the context of the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. 
Together, the work of Milgram, as well as that of Kelman and Hamilton, has been used in a great 
number of theories which endeavour to explain how ordinary people commit international 
crimes.1177 
  7.3.4.i Milgram’s Obedience Experiments 
In Milgram’s original, and most widely cited, laboratory experiment, two volunteers were placed 
in separate rooms. One volunteer, the “teacher,” was in a room with the authority figure (the 
 
1173 See, e.g., Toni Pfanner, “Military uniforms and the law of war” (2004) 86:853 International Review of the Red 
Cross 93 at 122; M Cherif Bassiouni, “The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict 
by Non-State Actors” (2008) 98:3 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 711 at 741–42; Kleffner, supra note 71 
at 320–21. 
1174 For example, Bandura, supra note 23 at 58–60, 64–65, 91, 134; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 197, 234, 260, 267–
76, 278–79, 281; Baumeister, supra note 32 at 190–91, 211, 256, 266–67, 285, 322; Kelman & Hamilton, supra 
note 23 at 148–66, 174, 207, 233, 266–67, 309–10; Cohen, supra note 32 at 89, 144, 311–12; Waller, supra note 22 
at 107–15, 258; Smeulers, supra note 84 at 9–10; Harrendorf, supra note 1043 at 237–41; Alvarez, supra note 23 at 
142, 146. 
1175 Milgram, supra note 23 at 6. 
1176 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23. 
1177 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 32 at 89–91; Maier-Katkin, Mears & Bernard, supra note 32 at 239; Grossman, 
supra note 32 at 187, 191; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 266–75; Zimbardo, supra note 993 at 26–29; Wortley, supra 
note 1134 at 192; Vollhardt & Campbell-Obaid, supra note 993 at 164, 166; Staub, supra note 32 at 29; Smeulers, 
supra note 32; Alette Smeulers, “Preventing International Crimes” in Willem de Lint, Marinella Marmo & Nerida 
Chazal, eds, Criminal Justice in International Society (London, UK: Routledge, 2014) 267 at 236, 238; Hugo Slim, 
“Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War” (2003) 79:3 International Affairs 481 at 21, 280–
81. 
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experimenter) and the other, the “learner,” was hooked up to an electrode in another room. The 
experimenter instructed the teacher to administer electric shocks each time the learner answered 
a question incorrectly, beginning at 15-volts and increasing in 15-volt increments, upon each 
wrong answer, up to a maximum of 450-volts.1178 While physically separated from the learner, 
the teacher could hear the learner. The recipient of the shocks, unbeknownst to the teacher, was 
an actor and did not actually receive any shock. At 75-volts, the learner began expressing 
increasing discomfort and subsequently displayed increasing levels of distress, including asking 
to be released from the study and emitting an “agonized scream.”1179 At 330-volts, the learner 
would go silent and unresponsive.1180 If the volunteer administering shocks sought guidance 
from the experimenter or hesitated to administer a shock, they were instructed to continue by the 
experimenter.1181 They were told that the absence of a response should be considered as an 
incorrect response and a shock should be administered.1182 The majority of teachers continued to 
administer shocks up to the maximum level (450-volts), despite evidence that the learner had 
been in extreme pain and was now, perhaps, unconscious.1183 Milgram concluded that “ordinary 
people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become 
agents in a terrible destructive process.”1184 
 
From his studies, Milgram identified certain “adjustments in the [teacher’s] thinking … that 
undermine [their] resolve to break with the authority.”1185 First, individuals can become so 
focused on the “narrow consequences of the task that [they] lose[] sight of its broader 
consequences.”1186 Second, the teacher absolves themselves of responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions and places the responsibility on “the experimenter, a legitimate 
authority.”1187 The teacher’s moral priorities shift, from the morality of inflicting pain or harming 
an individual, to “a consideration of how well [they are] living up to the expectations that the 
 
1178 Milgram, supra note 23 at 3. 
1179 Ibid at 4. 
1180 Ibid at 23. 
1181 Ibid at 4. 
1182 Ibid at 23. 
1183 Ibid at 33. 
1184 Ibid at 6. 
1185 Ibid at 7. 
1186 Ibid. 
1187 Ibid at 8. 
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authority has of him.”1188 Finally, many of the teachers saw their acts as part of a larger “noble 
cause … the pursuit of scientific truth.”1189 
 
Milgram’s work on obedience to authority demonstrates that individuals are capable of 
committing extreme acts of violence when instructed to do so by an authority figure. As noted 
above, one of the key processes that contributes to this ability to commit acts of violence is the 
fact that the individual transfers responsibility for the consequences of his or her actions onto the 
authority figure. Responsibility is again the continuing theme in all of the theories discussed in 
this chapter. 
 7.3.4.ii Crimes of Obedience 
Milgram’s findings play an important role in Kelman and Hamilton’s theory of crimes of 
obedience. In addition to supporting Milgram’s theory of destructive obedience, they pick up on 
the themes of responsibility and dehumanization seen in the theories of techniques of 
neutralization, moral disengagement, and deindividuation. Their theory aims to answer how 
“moral inhibitions against violence become weakened.”1190 Again, this is very similar to the 
earlier theories presented in this chapter. All of these theories articulate explanations for 
individual participation in violent acts as a result of the deactivation or diminution of one’s 
ability to regulate their behaviour according to social norms. Kelman and Hamilton define a 
crime of obedience as “an illegal or immoral act committed in response to orders or directives 
from authority.”1191 This authority, in the context of a crime of obedience, is “unrestrained” and 
“wrongful[ly] exercise[d]”.1192 Kelman and Hamilton’s theory describes the social processes 
under which individuals may participate in sanctioned massacres, such as the Holocaust and the 
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization.1193 
These processes have been incorporated into criminologist Alette Smeulers’ work on the 
perpetration of human rights violations.1194 These three processes also, in many ways, repackage 
 
1188 Ibid. 
1189 Ibid at 9. 
1190 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 16. 
1191 Ibid at 307. 
1192 Ibid. 
1193 Ibid at 16; Herbert C Kelman, “Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of 
Victims and Victimizers” (1973) 29:4 Social Issues 25 at 25. 
1194 Smeulers, supra note 32. 
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the elements of responsibility and dehumanization seen in techniques of neutralization, moral 
disengagement, and deindividuation. Each of these processes will be discussed in turn.  
  7.3.4.iii Authorization 
The first social process identified by Kelman and Hamilton, authorization, is an inherent 
component of sanctioned massacres.1195 In identifying this, Kelman and Hamilton rely most 
heavily on the work of Milgram. A person is more likely “to commit or condone” violence when 
it is either directly or indirectly authorized by a legitimate authority, whether in the form of 
orders, encouragement, approval, or a generally permissive environment.1196 Authorization 
eliminates the need to exercise individual judgment or make choices for oneself, effectively 
inhibiting the application of personal moral standards.1197 A sense of obligation to obey orders 
will generally supplant personal standards even when those standards are inconsistent with the 
orders being given.1198 Individuals may, however, be willing to disobey orders which they 
consider illegitimate, although there will be individual variance in the extent to which an 
individual will be willing to challenge authority.1199 Usually, people will “obey without 
question”.1200 Kelman and Hamilton note that, “[unquestioning] obedience is specifically 
fostered in the course of military training and reinforced by the structure of the military authority 
situation.”1201 When a person is authorized, whether explicitly or implicitly, to commit an act, 
often they will “not see themselves as personally responsible for the consequences of their 
act[].”1202Authorization, according to Kelman and Hamilton, includes the processes of diffusion 
of responsibility and deindividuation.1203 Authorization, in the theory of crimes of obedience, 
allows people to detach from personal accountability in a similar manner to Sykes and Matza’s 
denial of responsibility, Bandura’s displacement of responsibility, or the attribution of 
responsibility to the group in deindividuation.   
 
1195 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 16. 
1196 Ibid. 
1197 Ibid. 
1198 Ibid. 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 Ibid. 
1201 Ibid at 17. 
1202 Ibid at 16. 
1203 Ibid at 334. 
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  7.3.4.iv Routinization 
Kelman and Hamilton’s second process of routinization focuses on the organization and 
repetitiveness of acts of violence. While authorization provides the means of initial participation 
in an action, continued participation is influenced by the regularization of the activity.1204 The 
transformation of the activity “into routine, mechanical, highly programmed operations” serves 
to significantly diminish “the likelihood of moral resistance”.1205 Similar to the process of 
authorization, individual decisions become unnecessary when the action is routinized, and, as a 
consequence, the “occasions in which moral questions may arise” are limited.1206 Routinization 
requires people “to focus[] on the details of the job rather than on it meaning”, though this is 
more easily accomplished by individuals who have some physical distance between themselves, 
their actions, and their victims.1207 Within an organization, each person will often only be 
responsible for one discrete component of the overall action. As a consequence, responsibility 
for the overall action is diffused among the various actors as in Sykes and Matza’s denial of 
responsibility and Bandura’s diffusion of responsibility.1208 The routinization of activity in the 
context of sanctioned massacres “reinforce[s] […] the view that what is going on must be 
perfectly normal, correct, and legitimate.”1209 
  7.3.4.v Dehumanization 
While authorization and routinization operate to “override standard moral considerations” and 
“reduce the likelihood that such considerations will arise”, Kelman and Hamilton feel that 
authorization and routinization are generally not sufficient in themselves to induce individual 
participation in sanctioned massacres.1210 The process of dehumanization will usually need to be 
employed in addition to authorization and routinization in order to commit atrocities. Here, 
Kelman and Hamilton differ slightly from Bandura’s moral disengagement mechanism of 
dehumanization and, possibly, Alvarez’s denial of humanity technique of neutralization. In 
addition to dehumanization, Kelman and Hamilton note that the “neutralization of the victim” 
 
1204 Ibid at 17. 
1205 Ibid at 18. 
1206 Ibid. 
1207 Ibid. 
1208 Ibid. 
1209 Ibid. 
1210 Ibid at 19. 
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can help to justify violence.1211 Kelman and Hamilton find that dehumanization will “generally” 
have to be employed whereas in moral disengagement is merely a possible and not essential 
element of facilitating participation in acts of violence. The technique of neutralization, denial of 
humanity, on the other hand, was deemed an essential component of participation in the 
Holocaust by Alvarez, though it was unclear whether he believed it to be an essential component 
to the use of techniques of neutralization to facilitate participation in all forms of violence. 
Kelman and Hamilton do define dehumanization in the same way as in these other theories. They 
describe it as the process by which victims are “stripped of their human status”.1212 They note 
that “[d]ehumanization of the enemy is a common phenomenon in any war situation” and that “a 
more extreme degree of dehumanization” is needed for sanctioned massacres because “the 
killing is not in direct response to the target’s threats or provocation.”1213 The process of 
dehumanization is self-reinforcing because, in “observing [the] victimization” of victims, 
participants “are reinforced in their perception of the victims as less than human.”1214 Thus, 
dehumanization can contribute to initial acts of violence as well as ongoing perpetuation of 
violence. 
 
Authority can play a powerful role in the perpetration of international crimes. The works of 
Milgram, Kelman and Hamilton demonstrate that human beings, despite their own misgivings, 
will usually obey an order to inflict pain on an innocent person.1215 People are reticent to disobey 
an order when they are unsure whether the order is or is not a legitimate order.1216 In the face of 
an illegitimate order, some people may be willing to challenge authority, but, more frequently, 
people will blindly obey.1217 Authorization from a legitimate authority allows individuals to 
place accountability for the consequences of their actions on the authority figure who gave the 
order. While the physical proximity of killing on the battlefield may provide encouragement to 
challenge an illegitimate order to kill a civilian, a soldier’s fear of the significant punishment 
attached to disobeying orders may counter the effects of physical proximity.1218 The additional 
 
1211 Ibid at 336. 
1212 Ibid at 19. 
1213 Ibid. 
1214 Ibid. 
1215 Milgram, supra note 23 at 6; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 16. 
1216 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 94, 138. 
1217 Ibid at 16. 
1218 Milgram, supra note 23 at Ch 4; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 163. 
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factors of routinization and dehumanization operate in military contexts where international 
crimes have been committed under explicit or implicit authorization from a superior officer. The 
repetitive routinization of violence contributes to the diffusion of responsibility.1219 Finally, 
dehumanization will usually be necessary in addition to authorization and routinization for an 
individual to participate in a massacre. Obedience to authority and crimes of obedience represent 
not only a powerful factor contributing to international crimes, but also reinforces the concepts 
of diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization found in the techniques of neutralization and 
moral disengagement. 
7.4 Conclusion 
A study of social psychology and criminology literature on how ordinary people come to commit 
acts of violence against civilians reveals the prominence of the use of the theories of techniques 
of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority in this body 
of literature. The theories all seek to explain how individuals reconcile the commission of violent 
acts that conflict with social, moral and legal norms while preserving their positive sense of self. 
Two specific themes dominate within these four theories: dehumanization and responsibility. 
Within techniques of neutralization, 10 forms of neutralizing criminal behaviour and avoiding 
self-censure are identified. Denial of responsibility and denial of humanity speak directly to the 
themes of dehumanization and responsibility. There are eight mechanisms of moral 
disengagement, which similarly explain how people to disengage moral self-sanctions and 
overcome moral standards in order to participate in international crimes. Diffusion or 
displacement of responsibility along with dehumanization and the use of euphemistic language 
and labelling focus on the themes of responsibility and dehumanization. The submergence of an 
individual in a group can result in deindividuation, wherein one’s ability to self-monitor their 
behaviour is inhibited. Factors such as conformity to the group and anonymity within the group 
can lead to diffusion of responsibility. Obedience to authority demonstrates that individuals will 
often obey orders to harm another human being, even if it contradicts their own morals. An 
instruction or order from an authority figure allows an individual to displace responsibility for 
acts of violence onto the person who issued the instruction or order. 
 
 
1219 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 18. 
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This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians during war from 
combatant violence. Social psychology and criminology theories help to fill this gap because 
they explain how combatant deviance is adversely affected by psychological processes that 
reframe combatants’ conceptions of right and wrong and, in doing so, fundamentally alter the 
way in which combatants view the IHL rules intended to protect civilians. This chapter has 
identified four theories from the disciplines of social psychology and criminology that address 
the psychology of violence toward civilians during conflict. All of these four theories present 
psychological processes which can prevent people from feeling responsible or accountable for 
the consequences of their actions. Further, across the four theories discussed in this chapter, 
dehumanization is shown to be another powerful contributing factor to violence against civilians. 
These processes allow an individual to reframe their understanding of right and wrong.   
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, “[t]here is a marked difference between scientific explanations of 
how moral self-sanctions are disengaged from inhumane conduct and evaluative judgments of 
that conduct.”1220 During armed conflict, IHL provides the evaluative judgments of what conduct 
is legal and what conduct is illegal. This chapter has provided the scientific explanations for how 
law-abiding citizens can become law-breaking combatants who commit acts of violence toward 
civilians. These scientific explanations are a tool that can be employed to “prevent and 
counteract the suspension of morality in the perpetration of inhumanities.”1221 The perpetration 
of violence against civilians is not inevitable.1222 Consequently, if some, or all, of these 
mechanisms of moral disengagement could be prevented, deterred or inhibited, it could result in 
fewer IHL violations of protections for civilians. 
 
The earlier chapters in the thesis demonstrated that existing IHL protections for civilians during 
conflict are largely the same as protections afforded to individuals in peacetime. The next 
chapter uses the scientific explanations for combatant violence toward civilians identified in the 
current chapter, namely the processes of dehumanization and the displacement of responsibility, 
 
1220 Bandura, supra note 23 at 48. 
1221 Ibid. 
1222 See, e.g., Bandura, supra note 23 at 194. 
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to examine combatant behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC. The next chapter will argue that 
there are common behaviours used by combatants to dehumanize civilians and to abdicate their 
sense of responsibility for their actions that are currently unregulated by IHL. In order to 
adequately protect civilians, new rules are needed to regulate these behaviours during armed 
conflict. 
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Chapter 8 
 
8 The Use of Social Psychology and Criminology to Identify and Address 
Gaps in International Humanitarian Law 
 
This thesis advances the claim that there is a gap between the regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant 
violence during war. Social psychology and criminology theories can help to develop the 
necessary conflict-specific behavioural regulations because they explain how combatant 
deviance is adversely affected by psychological processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions 
of right and wrong and, in so doing, fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the 
IHL rules intended to protect civilians. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis provided the theoretical 
foundations and practical realities of civilian protections under IHL. States made evaluative 
judgments about what conduct needed to be prohibited for the protection of civilians during 
armed conflicts and codified these judgments in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two 
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Civilian protections during armed conflict 
are premised on the protections afforded to individuals in peacetime, despite the dramatically 
different contexts of peace and war. In practice, NIACs, such as those in Sierra Leone and the 
DRC, often see law-abiding citizens become law-breaking combatants who commit acts of 
violence against civilians. These acts are unquestionably illegal under IHL; however, the fact 
that these IHL violations occur provides little insight into why they are occurring: why have law-
abiding citizens become law-breaking combatants? 
 
In order to identify an explanation for this shift from legal compliance to legal deviance, this 
thesis examined three legal theories which seek to explain human behaviour and legal 
compliance or deviance. Chapter 6 demonstrated that existing explanations of individual 
behaviour in Law and Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and 
International Law theories, fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced understanding of human 
behaviour to explain the transition from law-abiding citizen to law-breaking combatant who 
perpetrates acts of violence against civilians.  
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Without an adequate explanation of combatant perpetration of violence toward civilians in legal 
theory, Chapter 7 looked outside of the discipline of law for an explanation. Chapter 7 
demonstrated that a deeper and more focused turn to social psychology, than that employed in 
Socialization and International Law theory, as well as to criminology, can provide conflict 
specific explanations of combatant violations of IHL protections for civilians. An examination of 
the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and 
obedience to authority demonstrated that behaviours that allow combatants to dehumanize 
civilians or to abdicate responsibility for their own actions place civilians at a heightened risk for 
suffering violence at the hands of combatants. These scientific explanations for combatant 
violations of IHL protections for civilians allow for an assessment of whether there are 
behaviours related to dehumanization and the displacement of responsibility that warrant 
regulation in order to advance the humanitarian goals of IHL for the protection of civilians. 
 
Through the use of research and field data gathered in Sierra Leone and the DRC, this chapter 
identifies two common behaviours among members of armed groups that contribute to violence 
toward civilians in violation of IHL during NIACs. First, the use of dehumanizing or degrading 
language toward civilians by combatants was common in both the Sierra Leone civil war and the 
conflicts in the DRC. Second, the widespread use of nicknames by combatants in Sierra Leone 
and the DRC that contributes to producing a sense of anonymity in the combatant, which permits 
the combatant displace their sense of responsibility for their actions. 
 
This chapter will prove three key ideas proffered in this thesis. First, this chapter demonstrates 
that existing IHL protections for civilians do not adequately regulate the use of demeaning, 
degrading, and dehumanizing language directed at civilians and the use of anonymizing 
nicknames by combatants. Second, this chapter argues that, in order to advance the humanitarian 
goals of IHL discussed in chapter 4, new regulations should be introduced to inhibit the ability of 
combatants to employ these behaviours as a means of facilitating the commission of IHL 
violations against civilians. Third, this chapter demonstrates how scientific explanations of 
combatant perpetration of violence offered by techniques of neutralization, moral 
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disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority can be used to develop substantive 
regulations to address these problematic behaviours. 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts: (1) the underlying theory on the role of law; (2) the use 
of dehumanization by combatants; and, (3) and the displacement of responsibility by combatants. 
Section 8.1 of this chapter demonstrates that law is a common tool employed to regulate risky 
behaviour and that it has the capacity to contribute to positive changes in those behaviours. The 
chapter then turns to an examination of the two themes identified in the dominant theories of 
social psychology and criminology in chapter 7: dehumanization and displacement of 
responsibility.  
 
Section 8.2 of the chapter focusses on the theme of dehumanization and is divided into 12 
subsections. This discussion begins with a brief review of dehumanization and the manner in 
which it explains combatant violence toward civilians. The use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language to speak to, or refer to, civilians is a manifestation of the mechanism of 
dehumanization used by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC. The chapter examines 
whether existing protections for civilians currently address the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language by combatants. It argues that, although it may appear possible for 
existing IHL protections to capture these types of language, currently IHL does not clearly 
protect against the use of such language nor is there evidence that existing IHL has ever been 
interpreted in a manner that would capture demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language. 
The focus of the chapter next shifts to an examination of international human rights law to 
determine whether the prohibition on hate speech, as an exception to protection of free speech 
and expression rights, would adequately capture demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language used by combatants when speaking to or referring to civilians. It contends that hate 
speech, while able to capture some instances in which demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language is used, does not capture the full scope of the problematic use of these forms of 
language. The final subsection of section 8.2 recommends a new substantive regulation to 
prevent and inhibit the deleterious effects of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
that can contribute to violations of IHL protections for civilians.  
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Section 8.3 of this chapter focuses on deindividuation, depersonalization, and displacement of 
combatant responsibility for violence towards civilians and is divided into six subsections. This 
section examines the risky behaviour of combatant use of anonymizing nicknames. The first 
subsection examines how the use of nicknames is a manifestation of deindividuation, 
depersonalization, and displacement of responsibility and the consequent effect the use of 
nicknames can have on combatant psychology. The second subsection considers whether 
nicknames are currently regulated under IHL or international human rights law, concluding that 
neither area of law currently regulates the use of nicknames by combatants. The final subsection 
makes recommendations for the regulation under IHL of nickname use by combatants.  
 
This chapter concludes by demonstrating how scientific explanations, provided by theories of 
social psychology and criminology, for combatant violence toward civilians can positively 
contribute to the humanitarian goals of IHL. 
8.1 The Power of Law to Change Risky or Dangerous Behaviour 
This chapter argues that IHL regulation is needed to prevent or inhibit two behaviours which 
jeopardize civilian safety by increasing combatant violence toward civilians. This section 
explains why law is the appropriate tool to address the threat to civilians posed by combatant use 
of demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing language and combatant use of nicknames. This 
section demonstrates that law has the power to affect behavioural change by shaping how 
societies view particular actions.1223 This section further demonstrates that legal regulation is a 
common means employed in both domestic and international law to regulate risky or dangerous 
behaviours. 
 
1223 The culture (e.g., beliefs, behaviours, values) of a particular society also plays an important role in influencing 
norms and behaviour: See, e.g., Sampsell-Jones, supra note 977; Nadler, supra note 977 at 67–68; Brislin, supra 
note 977; While law can help constrain and shape behaviour, culture can also influence the extent to which certain 
individuals conform or comply with certain laws. See, e.g., discussion of female circumcision, culture, and law by 
Obiora, supra note 977; On the dynamic interplay between psychology and culture see, e.g., Lehman & Chiu, supra 
note 977 at 703–704; Gordon, supra note 977. 
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Laws and regulations express messages about the conduct they govern.1224 Law functions as a 
tool to coerce and/or deter certain behaviours, but this is not its sole function.1225 A law can also 
be used to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning of action through a legal 
expression or statement about appropriate behaviour.”1226 This is often a common aim or feature 
of regulatory law1227 and, more specifically, the regulation of dangerous or risky behaviour.1228 
Laws can impact not only people’s choices but the reputational effects of legal compliance and 
deviance.1229 The theories of techniques of neutralization and moral disengagement in chapter 7 
explained how people desire to maintain a positive self-image and often change their thinking 
and/or behaviour to align with a conception of positive identity.1230 Law can contribute to this 
process by shaping what an individual sees as a positive behaviour by indicating social approval 
of certain behaviours and social disapproval of other behaviours.1231 Law can also shape people’s 
“expectations about how others will behave” and how others will react to their own 
behaviour.1232 In changing their behaviour to align with the social message conveyed by a law, 
people contribute to changing social norms.1233 Behavioural change and/or reconstruction of 
social norms through regulation of dangerous or risky behaviour can be further aided through 
accompanying information and education about the risks of the behaviour or activity being 
regulated.1234 
 
 
1224 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 871; Alex Geisinger, “Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement Effects 
of Expressive Regulation” (2016) 58 William & Mary Law Review Online 1; Alex Geisinger, “A Belief Change 
Theory of Expressive Law” (2002) 88 Iowa Law Review 35; Maggie Wittlin, “Buckling under Pressure: An 
Empirical Test of the Expressive Effects of Law” (2011) 28 Yale Journal on Regulation 419; Lawrence Lessig, 
“Social Meaning and Social Norms” (1996) 144:5 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2181; Kenworthey Bilz 
& Janice Nadler, “Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change” in Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman, eds, The 
Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 241; Nadler, 
supra note 977. 
1225 See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 977 at 62–63; Wittlin, supra note 1224 at 419. 
1226 Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2031. ; See also Lessig, supra note 1224 at 2185. 
1227 Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2031. 
1228 See, e.g., ibid at 2032; Nadler, supra note 977 at 66–67. 
1229 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, “Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization” 
(2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 1 at 7–8; Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2031–32. 
1230 See chapter 7 at sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. 
1231 See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 977 at 63; Cooter, supra note 1229 at 7–8; Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2034–35. 
1232 Nadler, supra note 977 at 63. 
1233 See, e.g, Wittlin, supra note 1224 at 425; Cooter, supra note 870 at 586. 
1234 See, e.g, Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2034–35; Nadler, supra note 977 at 64. 
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States also attempt to address risks through international law. For example, the risks of nuclear 
weapons possession1235 or of the disposal of hazardous wastes1236 are both regulated through 
international treaties. IHL seeks to regulate the risks that war poses to civilians through rules 
governing the methods and means of warfare, including rules addressing combatant 
behaviour.1237 For example, the principles of proportionality and precaution require military 
actors to take account of risks to civilians during conflict and take actions to minimize in as 
much as possible those risks.1238 The regulation of risk is both a common function of law and an 
inherent characteristic of IHL. 
 
Where clear laws exist to govern specific behaviours, ongoing violations may be the result of 
multiple causes. As discussed in chapter 1,1239 IHL violations stem in part from compliance and 
enforcement issues. However, as argued in this thesis and demonstrated by the theories discussed 
in chapter 7, there are psychological factors that can contribute to IHL violations, some of which 
are either not currently regulated at all, or not sufficiently or clearly regulated, under existing 
IHL. This chapter posits that clear regulation of risky or dangerous behaviours, ideally 
accompanied by education about the risks associated with the behaviour, is particularly 
important where behaviours are considered innocuous or where the behaviours are socially 
accepted or socially tolerated. This chapter argues that the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language towards civilians by combatants is, at the very least, socially tolerated 
and the use of nicknames by combatants is generally considered to be innocuous.  
 
 
1235 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. 
1236 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal [Basel 
Convention]. 
1237 For example, IHL prohibits the use of certain weapons (e.g., anti-personnel landmines), tactics (e.g., siege 
warfare, starvation), and acts (e.g., murder, rape, torture). See Landmine Treaty, supra note 8; Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 53 prohibition on starvation as method of warfare]; Additional Protocol II, 
supra note 5 at Article 14 (prohibition on starvation as method of warfare] as well as Article 4(2]; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3. 
1238 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rules 14, 15, 22; Additional Protocol I, supra note 5 at Articles 
55(1)(b), 57, 58(c); Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 13(1). See also, e.g., Quéguiner, supra note 479; 
Ken Watkin, “Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal Rules” (2005) 8 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 3. 
1239 See chapter 1 at section 1.2. 
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Socially tolerated practices can include behaviours that are illegal. For example, in North 
America, speed limits or drunk driving limits are often violated and may go unpunished,1240 but 
this does not mean that speeding or drunk driving is legal. However, societal awareness of the 
risks sought to be minimized through the regulation of speeding and drunk driving (e.g., car 
accidents, death or injury to motorists or pedestrians) are widely known, if not even intuitive. 
However, there are times when criminal or regulatory measures are introduced to govern risky 
behaviour that has previously been legal and widely practiced. Drunk driving laws have not 
always been as restrictive as they are currently,1241 and drunk driving was once more socially 
acceptable.1242 
 
Another example of the power of law to effect social change can be seen in the introduction of 
seatbelt laws. Prior to 1963-1964, seatbelts were not a standard feature in automobiles1243 and a 
legal requirement to wear a seatbelt was introduced in different countries in the 1970s.1244 
Indeed, many individuals in western societies vociferously opposed being required to wear a 
 
1240 See, e.g., Scott M Stringer, “A Tale of Two Tickets: How Disparate Standards of Traffic Enforcement 
Compromise Safety on City Streets”, (20 March 2018), online: Office of the New York City Comptroller Scott M 
Stringer <https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/a-tale-of-two-tickets-how-disparate-standards-of-traffic-enforcement-
compromise-safety-on-city-streets/>; Sean Carson, “23,000 foreign drivers escape UK speeding fines since January 
2013”, (9 October 2014), online: Motoring Research <https://www.motoringresearch.com/car-news/23000-foreign-
drivers-escape-speeding-fines-since-jan-2013/>; Walter Roberts & Mark T Fillmore, “Curbing the DUI offender’s 
self-efficacy to drink and drive: A laboratory study” (2017) 172 Drug Alcohol Depend 73; Michael Laurence, The 
Development of California Drunk Driving Legislation (California Department of Justice, 1988). 
1241 See, e.g., Laurence, supra note 1240. 
1242 See, e.g., James C Fell & Robert B Voas, “Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD): The First 25 Years” 
(2006) 7 Traffic Injury Prevention 195; Government of Canada, “Impaired driving in Canada, 2015”, (20 July 
2016), online: Statistics Canada <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2016001/article/14679-eng.htm>. 
1243 See, e.g., Wittlin, supra note 1224 at 429–30; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Primary Enforcement 
of Seat Belt Laws | Motor Vehicle Safety | CDC Injury Center”, (7 February 2019), online: Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention <https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/factsheet/seatbelt.html>; Sean 
O’Grady, “The man who saved a million lives: Nils Bohlin - inventor of the seatbelt | The Independent”, (19 August 
2009), online: The Independent UK <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/motoring/features/the-man-who-
saved-a-million-lives-nils-bohlin-inventor-of-the-seatbelt-1773844.html>. 
1244 For example, Victoria, Australia in 1970, Ontario, Canada in 1976, Hungary in 1976, and the Netherlands in 
1975. See FT McDermott & DE Hough, “Reduction in road fatalities and injuries after legislation for compulsory 
wearing of seat belts: experience in Victoria and the rest of Australia” (1979) 66:7 British Journal of Surgery 518; 
Ontario Ministry of Transportation, “Seatbelts Saving Lives In Ontario For 35 Years”, (29 December 2010), online: 
news.ontario.ca <https://news.ontario.ca/mto/en/2010/12/seatbelts-saving-lives-in-ontario-for-35-years.html>; 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Driver Safety-Belt Use -- Budapest, Hungary, 1993”, (10 December 
1993), online: <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00022331.htm>; SWOV Institute for Road Safety 
Research, SWOV Fact sheet Seat belts, airbags and child protection devices (SWOV Institute for Road Safety 
Research, 2012). 
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seatbelt on the grounds that such laws interfered with “individual freedom” and civil liberties.1245 
Four decades after the first mandatory seatbelt laws, societal perceptions of seat belts and their 
required use has dramatically changed, due in large part  - or entirely - to the legal regulation of 
their use. Whereas the use of seatbelts prior to legal regulation was quite rare, their use has 
dramatically increased since the advent of seatbelt laws. In the province of Victoria, Australia, 
only 15 per cent of people wore seatbelts the year prior to the introduction of mandatory seatbelt 
laws in 1970; that number rose to 65 per cent in 1973 and 90 per cent by 1977.1246 In Canada, 
mandatory seat belt laws have had similar success. In the province of Ontario, only 17.2 per cent 
of people wore seat belts prior to the introduction of mandatory seat belt laws in 1976; by 2011 
that number had risen to 92.8 per cent.1247 According to Wittlin, seatbelt laws in and of 
themselves positively affected the use of seatbelts distinct from the added effects of enforcement 
of seatbelt laws in the states she studied.1248 
 
Legal regulation of risky behaviours is a common practice, both generally and in IHL 
specifically, and has been demonstrated to have the capacity to effect positive change in the 
prevalence of the risky behaviours being regulated. This suggests that, at a minimum, where a 
risky behaviour is identified in armed conflict, it is worth considering whether it may be possible 
to legally regulate the risky behaviour in question for the protection of civilians. As noted in 
chapter 1,1249 there is an internal tension in the proposition that new laws are the solution to 
combatant non-compliance with existing IHL protections for civilians. However, once employed 
the psychological processes focused on in this chapter – dehumanization and deindividuation – 
serve to alter combatant psyches and reframe how they view civilians and the current laws 
intended to protect civilians. The laws recommended in this chapter represent an upstream 
intervention that prevents the use of these psychological process and, in doing so, disrupts the 
progression from ordinary individual to law-breaking combatant. 
 
1245 See, e.g., Kenneth E Warner, “Bags, Buckles, and Belts: The Debate over Mandatory Passive Restraints in 
Automobiles” (1983) 8:1 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 44; Howard Leichter, “Lives, Liberty, and Seat 
Belts in Britain: Lessons for the United States” (1986) 16:2 International Journal of Health Services 213; Linda 
Geller Dubinsky, “The Minnesota Mandatory Seat Belt Law: No Right to be Reckless” (1987) 10:1 Hamline Law 
Review 229. 
1246 McDermott & Hough, supra note 1244. 
1247 Ontario Ministry of Transportation, supra note 1244. 
1248 Wittlin, supra note 1224. 
1249 See pages 18-19 in Chapter 1. 
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The next section will examine the first risky behaviour focused on in this chapter: the use of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians. It will also consider whether 
this risky behaviour is currently regulated under IHL and will assess the potential of creating 
explicit regulation to combat the ability of such problematic language to contribute to violations 
of IHL protections for civilians during armed conflict. 
8.2 Dehumanization 
This section examines the failure of IHL to clearly address the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language to refer to, or address, civilians. It draws together the theories of social 
psychology and criminology discussed in chapter 7, providing a brief review of the effects and 
risks of dehumanizing civilians, using evidence of dehumanization collected through research 
and field interviews in Sierra Leone and the DRC. It considers whether demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language could be sufficiently captured by existing IHL rules on non-
discrimination, humane treatment, and the prohibitions of violence to mental health, torture or 
cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment. It then discusses whether existing international human rights law addressing the 
regulation of hate speech as a permissible restriction on free speech and freedom of expression 
could adequately address the concerns raised by the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language in the theories of techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, 
deindividuation, and obedience to authority. Finally, it proposes a new IHL regulation that 
prohibits the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language to refer to or address 
civilians. 
 8.2.1 The Effect of Demeaning, Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language in Armed Conflict 
Dehumanization and/or the use of euphemistic language plays a significant role in violence 
directed toward civilians during armed conflict.1250 While the use of dehumanizing language 
toward civilians does not guarantee that an individual will perpetrate crimes against them, 
 
1250 Sociology literature has also examined the relationship between dehumanization and language in the context of 
racism in peacetime: see, e.g., Razack, supra note 963; Akrami, Ekehammar & Araya, supra note 963; Razack, 
supra note 963; Razack, supra note 963; Grigg & Manderson, supra note 963; Mosse, supra note 963; Essed, supra 
note 963; Solomos, supra note 963; van Dijk, supra note 963; This literature also demonstrates that such forms of 
language can influence the spread of racist ideas, attitudes, and ideologies, even when comments are made in a 
casual conversation as opposed to a hostile verbal attack on the target of the racism: see, e.g., Guerin, supra note 
963; Davies, supra note 963; Billig, supra note 963; Barnes, Palmary & Durrheim, supra note 963. 
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historical examples such as the Holocaust,1251 the Rwandan genocide,1252 the My Lai 
Massacre,1253 and the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib,1254 support the link between the 
existence of dehumanizing language and the perpetration of crimes against civilians. 
 
Dehumanization is at its most extreme when combatants depict civilians and enemy combatants 
as animals, demons or objects. Dehumanization is the portrayal of other humans as inferior 
beings or objects. Dehumanization can also be achieved through the depiction of others as 
“mindless ‘savages,’ ‘degenerates’ and other despicable wretches.”1255 The use of degrading 
labels and ethnic slurs, such as American servicemen using the term “gook” during the Vietnam 
War to describe the Vietnamese people or the terms “hajis” and “towel heads” to describe Iraqis 
during the second Gulf War (2003-2011),1256 can also be a means of dehumanizing victims. In 
the DRC, combatants are recorded as explicitly telling civilians: "You are not human beings”.1257 
Euphemistic language can also be used to dehumanize civilians in the eyes of combatants. For 
example, killing civilians or enemy combatants may be described as ‘cleaning’,1258 ‘taking out 
the trash’,1259 or ‘pulling up weeds’.1260 In Sierra Leone, the RUF also used the euphemism 
“washing” to refer to killing1261 and one witness before the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
testified that a Kamajor had referred to killing Temne as “weed[ing]”.1262 Dehumanization can be 
 
1251 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23 at 160, 166–69; Herf, supra note 1124 at 1–16, 209. 
1252 See, e.g., Benesch, supra note 1047 at 63–64; Dina Temple-Raston, Justice on the Grass: Three Rwandan 
Journalists, Their Trial for War Crimes and a Nation’s Quest for Redemption (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2008) 
at 29; Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from 
Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998) at 64, 140–41. 
1253 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 307; Grossman, supra note 32 at 187, 191; Kelman, supra note 1193 at 50. 
1254 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 307; Stephen Graham, “Remember Fallujah: Demonising Place, 
Constructing Atrocity” (2005) 23:1 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 1 at 5; Stephanie Decker & 
John Paul, “The Real Terrorist was Me: An Analysis of Narratives Told by Iraq Veterans Against the War in an 
Effort to Rehumanize Iraqi Civilians and Soldiers” (2013) 8:3 Societies Without Borders 317 at 327; Phillip W d 
Mordin, “Why So Many Iraqis Hate Us? Try ‘Towel Head’ On for Size”, (50:57 400AD), online: HuffPost 
<https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-so-many-iraqis-hate-u_b_96330>. 
1255 Bandura, supra note 23 at 84. 
1256 Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 307. 
1257 Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-02/06-T-8-Red-ENG WT 11-02-2014 42/53 SZ PT, supra note 
102 at 41. 
1258 See, e.g., Paul Rusesabagina & Tom Zoellner, An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography (New York: Viking, 2006) 
at 82. 
1259 See, e.g., Adam Lankford, Human Killing Machines: Systematic Indoctrination in Iran, Nazi Germany, Al 
Qaeda, and Abu Ghraib (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009) at 21. 
1260 See, e.g., Alex Alvarez, Genocidal Crimes (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010) at 116. 
1261 Denov, supra note 102 at 127. 
1262 The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Trial Transcript, supra note 102 at 
11. 
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common in conditions of war by virtue of the fact that the enemy and its civilian population are 
often strangers to opposing armed forces. This facilitates depersonalization of victims since 
“[s]trangers can be more easily depersonalized than can acquaintances.”1263 Kelman and 
Hamilton have suggested that “a more extreme degree of dehumanization” is needed for 
sanctioned massacres in war because “the killing is not in direct response to the target’s threats 
or provocation.”1264 This is not, however, necessarily borne out in laboratory experiments 
examining the effects of dehumanization. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that the 
level of violence exhibited by a perpetrator is increased where the perpetrator’s sense of personal 
responsibility is depersonalized and victims are depersonalized and dehumanized.1265 This will 
be addressed further in the following sub-section. 
 
Dehumanization serves to create a psychological distance between perpetrator and victim.1266 It 
minimizes the empathy felt for people who are not part of the perpetrator’s group by severing the 
perceived common bonds of humanity.1267 Dehumanization facilitates the exercise of harmful 
behaviour without the consequence of self-censure. Dehumanization is also self-reinforcing: the 
victimization of victims reinforces the perception of them as less than human, thereby facilitating 
further violence towards them.1268 This is why it is important to capture dehumanization 
upstream. Once direct acts of violence are occurring, dehumanization has long since altered 
combatants’ psyches. 
 
8.2.2 The Use of Demeaning, Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language toward Civilians in 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
The previous section discussed the general effects of dehumanization on combatant psyches. 
This section will provide more detailed examples of the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Fieldwork interviews with 
former combatants and data collection on combatants in Sierra Leone and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) did not reveal the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
 
1263 Bandura, supra note 23 at 201. 
1264 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 19. 
1265 Bandura, supra note 23 at 85; Bandura, supra note 23 at 201; Bandura, Underwood & Fromson, supra note 167. 
1266 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23 at 167. 
1267 See, e.g., ibid. 
1268 Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 19. 
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language. This is unsurprising. As noted in chapter 7, the work of Bryant et al. demonstrated 
that, in the context of the Rwandan genocide, the testimonies of defendants at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda did not contain examples of the technique of neutralization denial 
of humanity.1269 They noted that “denying the genocidal violence or the humanity of Tutsis 
would be deleterious to both [the defendants’] cases and their public image”.1270 Despite the lack 
of evidence of such language in the testimonies, there is ample evidence of the use of these forms 
of language by génocidaires.1271 The absence of dangerous language and forms of speech in 
testimonies from former combatants does not indicate an absence of such language in the 
conflict. Rather, alternative sources must be considered to determine whether such language was 
used by combatants.  
 
In Sierra Leone, RUF combatants were portrayed by civilians as “beasts, animals, bush devils 
and inhuman agents of terror” and the RUF referred to Sierra Leonean elites as an “‘indigenous 
clique of unpatriotic exploiters and leeches’, [who] must be violently cleansed or destroyed along 
with their ‘rotten system’”.1272 The RUF also used the euphemism “washing” to refer to 
killing.1273 One victim testified before the Special Court for Sierra Leone that a CDF combatant 
told her that “they would weed all the Temne from xxx xxx” as they killed a Temne man.1274 
Some combatants in Sierra Leone are recorded as having referred to civilians as being “like 
insects”.1275 Military songs were often sung by combatants in the DRC, such as combatants from 
the predominantly Hema UPC, who sang “songs disparaging or threatening the Lendu”1276 and 
their Lendu opponents who “s[ang] anti-Hema songs”.1277 In one case, demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing songs were recorded being sung “a few months before the actual beginning of the 
 
1269 Bryant et al, supra note 23. 
1270 Ibid at 12. 
1271 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Trial Judgment, 
ICTR-99-52-T, 2 December 2003 at paras 348, 390; Kennedy Ndahiro, “Dehumanisation: How Tutsis were reduced 
to cockroaches, snakes to be killed”, (13 March 2014), online: The New Times 
<https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/73836>. 
1272 note 102. 
1273 Denov, supra note 102 at 127. 
1274 The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Trial Transcript, supra note 102 at 
para 11. 
1275 Keen, supra note 102 at 76. 
1276 Lubanga Trial Transcript ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30-EN 53/195 SZ PT, supra note 102 at 33. 
1277 BBC News, “Congo’s war within a war”, (18 February 2000), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/648044.stm>. 
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massacres.”1278 Other songs sung by combatants in the DRC dehumanized girls by comparing 
them “to food for the leaders and communal cooking pots for the party”.1279 In Sierra Leone, the 
degrading term “iron titty” was used by some combatants to refer to young girls they “took … 
away to Liberia as their wives.”1280 Similarly, combatants in Sierra Leone used the term ‘wife’ to 
“enslave[e] and psychologically manipulate[e] the women and with the purpose of treating them 
like possessions.”1281 A witness at Bosco Ntaganda’s Confirmation of Charges Hearing at the 
ICC testified that “UPC soldiers shouted at the Lendu that they were not human but animals from 
the forest and that they were going to kill them.”1282 Another combatant told this witness, "You 
are not human beings”.1283 A former combatant testified that civilian homes were designated as 
“houses belonging to our enemies” and that combatants “were to destroy them.”1284 A direct 
attack on civilian homes is a violation of existing IHL under the principle of distinction; 
however, reference to civilians as the “enemy” is not currently illegal. 
 
The examples from Sierra Leone and the DRC show that the use of dehumanizing language is a 
problem that is present alongside IHL violations targeting civilians and is not unique to contexts 
in which genocide, ethnic cleansing, or persecution as a crime against humanity is occurring, 
although some examples targeted civilians based on ethnicity.1285 As noted in chapter 7, in the 
context of armed conflict and with the exception of persecution as a crime against humanity, 
there is often very little distinction between crimes against humanity and war crimes. These 
examples demonstrate an ongoing problem, i.e. the dehumanization of civilians, that IHL must 
address in order to provide adequate protection to civilians during armed conflict. 
 
1278 Ibid. 
1279 Ntaganda Trial Transcript ICC-01/04-02/06-T-23-ENG ET WT 02-09-2015 61/67 SZ T, supra note 102 at 61. 
1280 Lucian, Civilian, in Higbie & Moigula, supra note 102 at 103. 
1281 SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 1466. 
1282 Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-02/06-T-8-Red-ENG WT 11-02-2014 42/53 SZ PT, supra note 
102 at 41. 
1283 Ibid. 
1284 Ntaganda Trial Hearing, P-0888 ICC-01/04-02/06-T-105-Red-ENG WT 20-06-2016 51/96 SZ T, supra note 102 
at 58. 
1285 This was sometimes the case in the conflict between the Hema and Lendu in the DRC and between Temne and 
Mende in Sierra Leone: see, e.g., Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-02/06-T-8-Red-ENG WT 11-02-
2014 42/53 SZ PT, supra note 102 at 41; The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu 
Kondewa, Trial Transcript, supra note 102 at 11. 
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8.2.3 International Humanitarian Law and the Use of Demeaning, Degrading or 
Dehumanizing Language 
 
The identification of the problematic use of demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing language 
requires consideration of whether existing IHL addresses these forms of language when used to 
address or refer to civilians. The link between dehumanization and the perpetration of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is firmly established, yet it is not explicitly 
addressed in IHL.1286  
 
Civilians have special protected status during armed conflict.1287 This status flows from the fact 
that “[t]he protection of civilians in times of armed conflict, whether international or internal, is 
the bedrock of modern humanitarian law.”1288 However, as noted in chapter 4, people are equally 
protected from murder, rape, and torture, among other crimes, in peacetime.1289 What renders 
civilian protection particularly critical during armed conflict is that behaviour which is illegal 
during peace (e.g., murder, assault) is, subject to IHL rules, permitted during armed conflict. In 
particular, during armed conflict it is legal, and expected, that combatants directly target, injure, 
and kill enemy combatants.1290 Due to this reality of armed conflict, there is a need to protect 
civilians from (1) being treated as enemy combatants towards whom combatants can legally be 
violent during conflict, and (2) being debased through the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language that will facilitate direct violence towards civilians in contravention of 
existing IHL protections. 
 
 
1286 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23; Bernard, Ottenberg & Redl, supra note 1119; Grossman, supra note 32; 
Staub, supra note 32; Cohen, supra note 32; Waller, supra note 22; Maier-Katkin, Mears & Bernard, supra note 32; 
Baumeister, supra note 32; Smeulers, supra note 32; Haritos-Fatouros, supra note 969. 
1287 See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3; Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 
at Rules 1, 2, 3, 87-103; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 255–73, 337–42; Gary Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016) at 248–49; Hans-
Peter Gasser & Knut Dormann, “Protection of the Civilian Population” in Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 231–57. 
1288 ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, supra note 125 at para 521. 
1289 See chapter 4 section 4.3. 
1290 See, e.g., Dapo Akande, “Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” (2010) 59:1 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 180 at 192; William Fenrick, “ICRC 
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities” (2009) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 287 at 299; 
Michael N Schmitt, “The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis” (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal 5 at 248–49, 269–74. 
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IHL protects civilians from being directly targeted by parties to an armed conflict and prohibits 
many forms of violence towards them;1291 however, it does not explicitly regulate or prohibit the 
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians. That said, it may be 
possible to argue that such use of language is at least partially covered by one or more of four 
existing IHL rules: the requirement of humane treatment, the prohibition on violence to mental 
well-being, the prohibition on torture or cruel treatment, the prohibition on outrages upon 
personal dignity including humiliating and degrading treatment. 
  8.2.3.i Humane Treatment 
IHL requires that civilians be treated humanely. As noted in chapter 4, the term “humane 
treatment” is largely left open to interpretation; however, its scope is given definition through the 
guidance provided by the types of acts designated as being inhumane in Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II 4(2).1292 The ICRC Customary IHL Study provides many examples of 
state practice in the application of the rule of humane treatment.1293 Yet, the many state military 
manuals referencing this rule provide little additional guidance on the interpretation of the rule. 
For the most part, these manuals only repeat the language of “humane treatment”, “treated 
humanely”, or “humanity” without defining the terms.1294 
 
One exception to the standard approach to “humane treatment” in military manuals is the 
Canadian 2001 Law of Armed Conflict Manual, which specifies that protected persons “must be 
humanely treated and protected against all acts or threats of violence, and against insults and 
public curiosity.”1295 Certainly, this would include dehumanizing or derogatory language 
 
1291 See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5 at Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at 
Article 4(2); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5; Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 192–241; Sivakumaran, 
supra note 46 at 255–73, 336–57; Dinstein, supra note 46 at 132–45; Pejic, supra note 71; Igor Primoratz, “Civilian 
Immunity in War” (2005) 36:1 Philosophical Forum 41; Slim, supra note 1177 at 485–86. 
1292 See, e.g., Cameron et al, supra note 226 at 193; Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 255–73; Henckaerts & Doswald-
Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 87; Jean Pictet, ed, Commentary Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: ICRC, 1952) at 53. 
1293 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 2: 
Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at Rule 87. 
1294 Ibid citing the military manuals of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, India, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and 
Zimbabwe. 
1295 Office of the Judge Advocate General, supra note 448 at 10–4, 11–5, 12–5. 
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directed at a protected person; however, this manual is not binding.1296 Thus, barring an IHL rule 
prohibiting dehumanizing or derogatory speech, there would be no binding requirement on the 
Canadian Armed Forces to punish the use of such language directed at protected persons. 
However, a senior member of the Canadian Armed Forces interviewed for this thesis stated that, 
while they would punish such language directed at civilians by a member of their unit, there was 
no requirement across the Forces to do so.1297 Therefore, there is no consistent policy or practice 
regarding the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward a civilian. 
 
Since the enumerated examples of inhumane treatment in Common Article 3 and Article 4(2) of 
Additional Protocol II are not exhaustive, it is possible that the use of demeaning, degrading or 
dehumanizing language directed at a protected person is prohibited under the requirement of 
humane treatment. However, the lack of available evidence to support the existence or 
enforcement of such a rule would seem to suggest this is not the case. Three specifically 
prohibited types of inhumane treatment may capture the prohibition of such language: (1) the 
prohibition on violence to the mental well-being of persons; (2) the prohibition on torture and 
cruel treatment; and, (3) the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment. 
  8.2.3.i.a Violence to Mental Well-Being 
Violence to the mental well-being of persons is generally considered to include “the use of 
threats” to commit any of the prohibited acts under Additional Protocol II Article 4(2).1298 
Sivakumaran has indicated that where such threats are “not aimed at, or issued to, a particular 
individual” they are “unlikely [to] amount to such violence.”1299 By contrast, techniques of 
neutralization, moral disengagement, and obedience to authority demonstrate that it is the 
adverse effect of the use of such language on combatants that contributes to violence toward 
civilians regardless of statements are issued.1300 This suggests that it is also important to protect 
combatants from the psychological harms that stem from the use of these forms of language and, 
in protecting combatants from the deleterious psychological effects of this language to their own 
 
1296 Ibid at i. 
1297 OTT411, Interview, Ottawa, 4 November 2016. 
1298 Sandoz, Swinarski, & Zimmermann, supra note 202 at para 4543. 
1299 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Exclusion Zones in the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea: Evolution in Law and Practice” 
(2016) 92 International Law Studies 153 at 190. 
1300 See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 1193 at 49–50. 
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psyche, it will be possible to also better protect civilians. The prohibition on violence to mental 
well-being has been linked to the use of “mental torture”.1301 However, since it is listed 
separately from the prohibition on torture, acts that fall short of the very high threshold for 
torture or the somewhat lower threshold for cruel treatment could still constitute violence to the 
mental well-being of persons. 
  8.2.3.i.b Torture, Cruel and Inhuman Treatment 
The second category of inhumane acts is torture, cruel and inhuman treatment. The prohibition 
on torture requires that an act be intentionally committed to inflict “severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental”.1302 Further, the act must be committed for a specific purpose, such 
as 
obtaining from [the victim] or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing [the victim] for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing [the victim] or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind.1303 
 
It is under this final purpose – discrimination - that the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language might be captured if it caused severe mental pain or suffering. Where the 
threshold of severity is not met, the use of these forms of language could not be considered to 
amount to torture. In order to constitute cruel or inhuman treatment, a threshold of serious mental 
pain of suffering, which is lower than the severity threshold for torture but still a high threshold, 
must be met. Mental pain and suffering are most frequently identified in conjunction with 
physical acts of torture or cruel or inhuman treatment.1304 There are, however, purely 
psychological forms of torture that may target an individual’s phobias, such as solitary 
 
1301 Sandoz, Swinarski, & Zimmermann, supra note 202 at para 4532. 
1302 Torture Convention, supra note 73 at Article 1 While this is a human rights convention, the ICTY in Furundzija 
relied on this definition to define the elements of torture for the prohibition under IHL:; ICTY Furundzija Trial 
Judgment, supra note 586 at para 162. 
1303 Torture Convention, supra note 74 at Article 1. 
1304 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective 
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Professional Training Series No 8/ Rev1 (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2004); ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at paras 669, 611; ICTR, Akayesu Trial Judgment, 
supra note 310 at para 682; Metin Basoglu et al, “Psychological Effects of Torture: A Comparison of Tortured with 
Nontortured Political Activists in Turkey” (1994) 151:1 American Journal of Psychiatry 71; Frederico Allodi et al, 
“Physical and psychiatric effects of torture” in Eric Stover & Elena Nightingale, eds, The Breaking of Bodies and 
Minds: Torture, Psychiatric Abuse, and the Health Professions (New York: Freeman & Co, 1985) 58. 
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confinement and sleep deprivation, or the sexual taboos of a particular culture.1305 International 
case law also indicates that credible threats to an individual’s life can also cause sufficient 
mental pain or suffering.1306 Psychological torture may include “constant taunting; verbal abuse; 
intimidations; [and] insulting the honour of a family member”.1307 While there is limited 
literature on purely psychological forms of torture, it appears that, absent accompanying physical 
abuse or threats to commit illegal acts of physical abuse, this form of torture does not breach IHL 
protections against torture or cruel and inhuman treatment.1308 Consequently, it would seem 
unlikely that demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language directed at civilians would be 
captured by the prohibitions on torture or cruel or inhuman treatment absent accompanying 
physical abuse or specific verbal threats. 
  8.2.3.i.c Outrages upon Personal Dignity, Humiliating and Degrading Treatment 
The third form of inhumanity - the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment - may be able to capture the use of demeaning, degrading, 
or dehumanizing language directed at protected persons. There is no firmly established threshold 
for the severity of humiliation of degradation under the prohibition of outrages upon personal 
dignity in IHL. The only indication of the appropriate threshold for violating the prohibition on 
outrages upon personal dignity comes from international criminal law, where the war crime of 
outrages upon personal dignity requires that an act be likely to cause “serious humiliation, 
degradation or otherwise would be a serious attack on human dignity.”1309 Sivakumaran has 
suggested that this “serious” threshold only applies to the prohibition under international 
criminal law and that, while a threshold must still be met under IHL, it is likely to be lower than 
 
1305 Hernan Reyes, “The worst scars are in the mind: psychological torture” (2007) 89:867 International Review of 
the Red Cross 591 at 604–11. 
1306 The Prosecutor v Mladen Naletilic, aka “Tuta”, Vinko Martinovic, a.k.a “Stela”, Trial Judgment, IT-98-34-T, 
31 March 2003 at para 367; ICTR, Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 310 at para 682. International case law also 
states that rape and being forced to watch a relative be raped can violate the prohibition on inflicting mental 
suffering in and of themselves: ; Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza, Trial Judgment, ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003 at 
para 149; See also, e.g., Cordula Droege, “In truth the leitmotiv: the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-
treatment in international humanitarian” (2007) 89:867 International Review of the Red Cross 515. 
1307 Reyes, supra note 1305 at 612. 
1308 Ibid; Pau Pérez-Sales, Psychological Torture: Definition, Evaluation, Measurement (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2017) at 326. 
1309 ICTY Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 589 at para 514; ICTY Kunarac Appeal Judgment, supra note 613 at 
paras 161, 163; See also ICTY Haradinaj Trial Judgment, supra note 613 at para 132; ICTR Bagosora Trial 
Judgment, supra note 580 at para 2250; ICTR Renzaho Trial Judgment, supra note 613 at para 809; ICTR, 
Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgment, supra note 103 at para 6178; SCSL Charles Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 569 
at para 431; SCSL RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 579 at para 175; SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at 
para 716. 
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that found in international criminal law.1310 However, no alternative threshold for IHL has been 
stipulated. Examples of outrages upon personal dignity in international criminal law include 
“[I]nappropriate conditions of confinement,” “perform[ing] subservient acts,” being “forced to 
relieve bodily functions in their clothing,” and “endur[ing] the constant fear of being subjected to 
physical, mental, or sexual violence” in detention.1311 The plain and ordinary meaning of 
‘humiliating’ and ‘degrading’ is “to make someone feel ashamed or lose respect for himself or 
herself”1312 and “causing people to feel that they have no value”.1313 Certainly, based on these 
two definitions, the use of dehumanizing or degrading language directed at civilians would likely 
be captured. However, since the threshold for the IHL violation is unclear, it difficult to gauge 
whether, for example, calling someone a “gook” or a “towel head” would constitute a violation 
of the IHL protection. If the threshold under IHL is “serious humiliation, degradation or 
otherwise … a serious attack on human dignity”, like in international criminal law, then it is 
unlikely that the use of terms such as “gook” or “towel head” would be captured by the IHL 
prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity because words alone of this nature are unlikely to 
cause “humiliation … so intense that any reasonable person would be outraged.” 
 
It is possible, even without an explicit prohibition on the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language, that such language could be captured by the IHL requirement to treat 
civilians humanely. However, as noted, the absence of publicly available information on the use 
of such language toward civilians being punished suggests that states either do not, or chose not, 
to consider existing IHL protections for civilians to capture such language absent concurrent 
perpetration of illegal physical acts of violence. Further, although dehumanization was noted by 
the authors of the ICRC study Roots of Behaviour,1314 there was no mention or suggestion that 
the use of language to dehumanize civilians is currently governed by IHL. Where the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the “guardian of international humanitarian law”1315 
 
1310 Sivakumaran, supra note 46 at 264. 
1311 ICTY Kvocka Trial Judgment, supra note 592 at para 173. 
1312 Cambridge English Dictionary, “Humiliate - meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary”, online: Cambridge 
English Dictionary <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/humiliate>. 
1313 Cambridge English Dictionary, “Degrading - meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary”, online: Cambridge 
English Dictionary <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/degrading>. 
1314 Muñoz-Rojas & Frésard, supra note 12. 
1315 ICRC, supra note 971 at 32. 
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and the “main driving force behind the development of international humanitarian law”,1316 is 
silent on the existence of a particular protection for civilians during armed conflict, this is highly 
suggestive that no such legal protection exists. A prohibition or regulation of the use of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians could develop into an act 
captured by existing IHL. However, the power of law to shape behaviour and, in some cases, 
change social norms, relies on actors being aware of the law that seeks to change the perception 
of certain behaviours. This need to for clarity and awareness of a specific rule in order to alter 
behaviour supports the creation of new, clear regulation of the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language directed toward civilians, accompanied by education of the risks of these 
types of language and enforcement. Furthermore, new, explicit regulation of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language targeted at civilians would be consistent with the 
underlying IHL goal of protecting civilians who do not take part in hostilities.1317 
8.2.4 The Use of Demeaning, Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language in International 
Human Rights Law 
 
This section will examine the question of whether international human rights law prohibits the 
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language in armed conflict. The preceding 
discussion indicates that, while it is possible that a prohibition on demeaning, degrading or 
dehumanizing language to address or reference protected persons could be captured by certain 
existing IHL prohibitions, it appears unlikely that they actually do, or are considered to, capture 
such behaviour. Although existing IHL likely does not address this issue, it is relevant to 
consider whether international human rights law applicable during armed conflict already 
captures these forms of language. If the problem is already addressed by international human 
rights law, then a new rule of IHL would be unnecessary.  
 
Within international human rights law, the right which is most relevant to possible regulation of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language is the right to free speech or freedom of 
expression. The right to free speech is codified in many international and regional human rights 
 
1316 Francois Bugnion, “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law” (2004) 5:1 Chicago Journal of International Law 191 at 191. 
1317 See chapter 4 at section 4.1. 
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treaties.1318 It is also widely protected under national laws.1319 Under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),1320 the right to freedom of expression is defined as 
including the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of 
his choice.”1321 Free speech is an important protection for “the quest for truth, the promotion of 
individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the 
participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged”.1322 Free speech is integral to 
“historical research, the dissemination of news and information, the public accountability of 
government authorities”.1323 Protection of freedom of expression is therefore a very important 
task in a democratic society. 
 
On its face, the right of free speech would appear to protect rather than prohibit the use of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language; however, despite the fundamental nature of 
the right of freedom of expression, some restrictions of this right are, if not required, certainly 
permitted under international law.1324 Under international human rights law, the right to freedom 
 
1318 For example, this right is protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4 of Convention Against All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 13 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, and Article 9 of the African Convention on Human and People’s Rights: Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights [UDHR] at Article 19; ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 19; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination] at Article 4; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Council of Europe [European Convention on Human Rights] at Article 10; 
American Convention on Human Rights, Organization of American States [American Convention on Human Rights] 
at Article 13; AU Kampala Convention, supra note 408 at Article 9. 
1319 For example, in Canada, France, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and South Africa: Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] at Section 2(b); Declaration of the 
Right of Man and the Citizen, France, 26 August 1789 [France, Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen] at 
Article 11; Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989, Ireland [Ireland, Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred 
Act, 1989] at Article 40; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, New Zealand [New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990] 
at Article 14; Human Rights Act 1998, United Kingdom [UK Human Rights Act] at Section 12; Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, South Africa [Constitution of the Republic of South Africa] at Article 16. 
1320 ICCPR, supra note 394. 
1321 Ibid at Article 19. 
1322 R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697 (Supreme Court of Canada); Similar pronouncements have been made by the 
U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., New York Times Co v Sullivan, United States Supreme Court; ) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (e.g., Police Dept of City of Chicago v Mosley, United States Supreme Court; Incal v Turkey, 
judgment of 9 June 19, European Court of Human Rights; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France [GC], 
nos 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 45, ECHR 2007‑XI). 
1323 ICTR, Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 1271 at para 1001. 
1324 See, e.g., Navanethem Pillay, “Freedom of Speech and Incitement to Criminal Activity: A Delicate Balance” 
(2008) 14 New England Journal of International & Comparative Law 203 at 203; Mariana Mello, “Hagan v. 
Australia: A Sign of the Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in Customary International Law” (2006) 28 Loyola of Los 
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of expression can be subjected  to certain restrictions. Under the ICCPR, states may legally 
restrict freedom of expression if a restriction is necessary “[f]or respect of the rights or 
reputations of others” and/or “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.”1325 The right to freedom of expression can also be 
derogated from during public emergencies, such as armed conflicts.1326 
 
The right to freedom of expression is qualified by a prohibition in the ICCPR on “[a]ny advocacy 
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence”, which “shall be prohibited by law”.1327 The UN Human Rights Council has 
considered this particular prohibition to be non-derogable, even though the ICCPR does not list 
Article 20 as non-derogable.1328 Where explicit prohibitions like the prohibition on advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred in the ICCPR are not included, freedom of expression 
provisions have often been interpreted to include a prohibition on advocacy of national, racial, or 
religious hatred, which is commonly referred to as ‘hate speech’.1329 However, international 
human rights law merely creates an obligation for states to prohibit hate speech and does not in 
itself create a criminal offence. International human rights law relies on states to implement 
legislation to address hate speech. However, not all states regulate hate speech. Notably, for the 
purposes of this thesis, neither Sierra Leone nor the Democratic Republic of Congo have laws 
regulating hate speech.1330 Therefore, there are countries where there would be no possible 
 
Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 365 at 366; John C Knechtle, “When to Regulate Hate Speech” 
(2006) 110 Pennsylvania State Law Review 539 at 542; Stephanie Farrior, “Molding the Matrix: The Historical and 
Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech” (1996) 14 Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 1 at 62–63; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, “The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American 
and European Approaches” (1999) 7 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 305 at 27–31; Scott J Catlin, “A 
Proposal for Regulating Hate Speech in the United States: Balancing Rights Under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights” (1994) 69 Notre Dame Law Review 771 at 793–99. 
1325 ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 19 Restrictions on freedom of expression are also codified in Article 13(5) 
ACHR and Article 10(2) ECHR: ; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1318; European Convention 
on Human Rights, supra note 1318. 
1326 ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 4(1); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1318 at Article 
15(1). 
1327 ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 20(2). Similar prohibitions are also found in Article 7 UDHR prohibiting 
incitement to discrimination, and Article 13(5) ACHR prohibiting hate speech including “propaganda for war” and 
“advocacy of … hatred…that constitute incitements to lawless violence”. 
1328 UN Human Rights Council, supra note 398 at para 13(e). 
1329 See, e.g., Erbakan v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights. 
1330 US Department of State, “Sierra Leone - 2016 Country Report on Human Rights Practices”, (3 March 2017), 
online: United States Department of State <https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-country-reports-on-human-rights-
practices/sierra-leone/>; Abdul Brima, “Preventing religious conflict in Sierra Leone: a careful balancing act”, (27 
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regulation of hate speech during armed conflict, unless the speech satisfied the elements of the 
international crimes of incitement to genocide or persecution as a crime against humanity.1331 A 
further general issue with relying on hate speech under international human rights law to address 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during armed conflict is that 
international human rights law creates obligations only for some, but not all, armed groups.1332 
This means that many armed groups will have no obligation under international human rights 
law to address hate speech among their combatants during armed conflict. 
 
Hate speech or incitement of hatred under IHRL has been criminalized in many domestic 
jurisdictions.1333 These offences must, rightly so, balance individuals’ fundamental free speech 
rights with the desire to prohibit forms of speech that incite hatred or violence against a 
particular group on discriminatory grounds. As will be discussed below, there is a legal 
distinction in many countries between the free speech rights of civilians and those of members of 
armed forces. The protection of free speech has often necessitated national or regional courts to 
review laws that regulate hate speech.1334 Extreme forms of hate speech have also been 
criminalized under international criminal law as the crimes of incitement to genocide1335 and 
 
November 2017), online: Peace Insight <https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2017/11/preventing-religious-conflict-
sierra-leone-careful-balancing-act/>; US Department of State, “2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, (20 April 2018), online: United States Department of State 
<https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/democratic-republic-of-the-
congo/>. The DRC does provide the High Council for Broadcasting and Communication the capacity to temporarily 
suspend media outlets for publishing or broadcasting hate speech:; Freedom House, “Congo, Democratic Republic 
of (Kinshasa) - Freedom of the Press 2016”, (10 March 2016), online: Freedom House 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa>. 
1331 See, e.g., Rome Statute Article 25(3)(e) (incitement to genocide) and 7(1)(h) (persecution as a crime against 
humanity): Rome Statute, supra note 52. 
1332 See chapter 3 at section 3.4. 
1333 For example, it has been criminalized in Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom: Criminal Code 1913 (WA), Australia [Australian Criminal Code] at sections 77-80; Criminal 
Code, Canada [Canadian Criminal Code] at section 319; Décret n° 2005-284 du 25 mars 2005 relatif aux 
contraventions de diffamation, d’injure et de provocation non publiques à caractère discriminatoire et à la 
compétence du tribunal de police et de la juridiction de proximité, France [France, Décret n 2005-284 dur 25 mars 
2005`] at 5752; Ireland, Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989, supra note 1319; Human Rights Act 1993, 
New Zealand [New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993] at sections 61, 131; Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000, South Africa [South Africa, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 2000] at section 10(1); Public Order Act 1989, United Kingdom [UK, Public Order Act] at 
section 18. 
1334 See, e.g., R v Keegstra, supra note 1322; Perinçek v Switzerland, European Court of Human Rights; 
Brandenburg v Ohio, United States Supreme Court. 
1335 See, e.g., ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 103; Callixte Kalimanzira v The Prosecutor, Appeal 
Judgment, ICTR-05-88-A, 20 October 2010; ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko Appeal Judgment, supra note 103; See also e.g., 
Gregory S Gordon, “A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations: The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and 
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persecution as a crime against humanity.1336 However, hate speech is not prima facie 
criminalized under international criminal law.1337 The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda Appeals Chamber clearly distinguished between “hate speech in general (or inciting 
discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”1338 Similarly, 
the court stated that “not every act of discrimination will constitute the crime of persecution”.1339 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber in Nahimana chose not to 
rule on whether hate speech that is not accompanied by calls for violence could attain the 
requisite threshold of gravity for persecution as a crime against humanity.1340  
 
In domestic, regional, and international case law, four important considerations in assessing 
speech have emerged: (1) context; (2) identity of the speaker and their audience; (3) intent; and 
(4) causation. The first two, context and identity, do not inhibit the use of hate speech laws to 
regulate demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during armed conflict. 
In actuality, context and identity can help to explain why combatant speech merits its own 
unique regulation during armed conflict. However, the intent and causation elements of hate 
speech laws, while appropriately balancing free speech rights and society’s desire to denounce 
the promotion of hatred and violence against identifiable groups, would inhibit the ability to fully 
capture the forms of speech that pose a risk to combatants’ psyches and civilians’ safety during 
armed conflict. The following sub-sections examine these issues. 
  8.2.4.i The Context of Statements and the Identity of Speaker and Audience 
Consideration of context and the identity of speaker and audience do not inherently impede the 
ability of domestic hate speech laws to address demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech 
toward civilians during armed conflict. Words may take on a different meaning or have a 
different impact depending on the context and the identity of speaker and audience. For example, 
 
a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech” (2004) 45 Virginia Journal of International Law 139 at 
168–77; Richard Ashby Wilson, Incitement on Trial: Prosecuting International Speech Crimes (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 34–44. 
1336 See, e.g., MICT, 04/11/2018, MICT, Seselj Appeal Judgment, supra note 103; ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko Appeal 
Judgment, supra note 103; ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 103; See also, e.g., Gregory S Gordon, 
“Hate Speech and Persecution: A Contextual Approach” (2013) 46:2 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 303. 
1337 ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 103 at paras 692, 986-87. 
1338 Ibid at para 692. 
1339 Ibid at para 985. 
1340 Ibid at para 987. 
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the UN Human Rights Council accepted the restriction of hate speech disseminated by a teacher 
of young children.1341 However, comments made by a journalist in the context of a program 
devoted to exposing societal racism, were not legitimate hate speech.1342 Hate speech may take 
on a particularly egregious nature where committed in a context of community violence 
motivated by discrimination,1343 but be permissible where the connection between comment and 
conflict is geographically remote.1344 In the context of the crime of incitement to genocide, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stressed the importance of evaluating alleged 
genocidal speech “in its proper context” because “a particular message may appear ambiguous 
on its face or to a given audience, or not contain an explicit appeal to commit genocide, and 
still… amount to direct incitement.”1345 Context here is extremely important because it means 
that perpetrators cannot hide behind euphemistic language or other forms of coded messages.1346 
This thesis agrees that context is highly important to evaluating speech among combatants; 
however, it argues that the specific context of armed conflict necessitates regulation of forms of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians that, during peace, would 
warrant protection due to free speech rights.  
 
The “standing or influence” of the statement maker can also increase the level of influence their 
statements have on their audience.1347 In particular, statements made by public officials, 
politicians, or “persons with particular status in the society”1348 can have a high degree of 
influence on others and may give the impression, correct or not, that the state itself condones or 
promotes the discrimination and hatred.1349 International criminal case law on incitement to 
genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity has considered the power dynamic 
 
1341 Malcolm Ross v Canada, CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, 26 October 2000 at para 11.6. 
1342 Jersild v Denmark, 36/1993/431/510, 22 August 1994 at para 9. 
1343 Zana v Turkey, Application No 18954/91, 25 November 1997 at paras 9-12, 58-60. 
1344 Incal v Turkey, judgment of 9 June 19, supra note 1322 at paras 9, 58. 
1345 Edouard Karemera & Matthieu Ngirumpatse v The Prosecutor, Appeal Judgment, ICTR-98-44-A, 29 September 
2014 at para 483; See also, ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 103 at paras 700, 701, 703. 
1346 For example, in the Nyiramasuhuko case, ICTR found directives to “sweep the dirt outside” to be incitement to 
genocide because the audience at the time would have “understood the words … ‘sweeping dirt’, to mean they 
needed to kill Tutsis.” ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgment, supra note 103 at paras 6026-27. 
1347 Article 19, Prohibiting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, Policy Brief (London, UK: Article 19, 
2012) at 30. 
1348 Ibid at 31. 
1349 Toby Mendel, Study on International Standards Relating to Incitement to Genocide or Racial Hatred For the 
UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, GT-DH-DEV A(2006)004 (2006) at 65. 
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between speaker and audience in the context of superior responsibility, with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda extending the application of the traditionally military concept to 
civilians.1350 The identity of the statement maker must also be considered in relation to the 
identity of the audience. In some cases, the audience may be “characterized by excessive respect 
for authority” which causes them to be more easily influenced by statements made by authority 
figures.1351 
 
The chain of command in armed groups and effects of authority mean that the use of such forms 
of speech before subordinates could have a powerful and negative impact on the behaviour of 
subordinates toward civilians.1352 The legitimacy of a commander’s authority over their 
subordinates renders subordinates particularly susceptible to the influence of their commanding 
officers.1353 Not only can the demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language contribute to 
debasing the civilians in the eyes of the subordinate, but the impact of the position of authority of 
the statement-maker can have the effect of suggesting that similar behaviour from subordinates is 
condoned or even encouraged.1354 Even where there is no superior-subordinate relationship 
between speaker and audience, there is potential for demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language about civilians to adversely affect how listeners view and treat civilians. Combatants 
usually develop a “powerful sense of accountability to [their] comrades on the battlefield” which 
is “the primary factor that motivates a soldier to … kill[] and [die]”.1355 Fidelity to one’s 
comrades can be so strong that a combatant is willing to kill or die for them and a desire to 
conform and fit in with the group gives combatants power over one another even where they are 
equal in rank.1356 Therefore, the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward 
a civilian can have a more powerful affect among members of an armed group than among other 
people who do not have similar power and influence dynamics. Consequently, armed conflict 
represents a context in which demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language has a greater 
 
1350 Alfred Musema v The Prosecutor, Appeal Judgment, ICTR-96-13-A, 16 November 2001 at paras 9, 371, 880-81, 
936, 951, 967. 
1351 Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to Tackle Violence (New York: World Policy Institute, 2012) at 
4. 
1352 See, e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23. 
1353 See, e.g., Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008) at 219–22; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 16–17; Grossman, supra note 32. 
1354 See, e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23. 
1355 Grossman, supra note 32 at 149. 
1356 Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 264. 
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power to influence how civilians are viewed than in a peacetime context and outside of the 
power dynamics of armed groups. 
  8.2.4.ii Intent and Causation 
Hate speech laws require that the speaker intends to incite hatred and/or violence toward a 
specific group.1357 It has been advocated that that intent should be the decisive element when 
evaluating these statements: the statement-maker must “intend[] not only to share his/her 
opinions with others but also to compel others to commit certain actions based on those beliefs, 
opinions or positions.”1358 Courts and other human rights bodies have repeatedly held that, in 
order to legally restrict free speech, governments must link “liability to the intent of the 
author”.1359 The crimes of incitement to genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity 
carry the very high mens rea thresholds of “genocidal intent”1360 and “discriminatory intent”1361 
respectively. The gravity of these two crimes necessitates a high threshold of mens rea due to of 
the extreme level of moral and social stigma associated with these offences.1362 
 
In addition to an intent to incite hatred and/or violence, hate speech laws require that the speech 
in question actually does result in hatred or violence toward a specific group.1363 Based on the 
 
1357 Article 19, supra note 1347 at 5. 
1358 Ibid at 22. 
1359 Robert Faurisson v France, Communication No. 550/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996), 19 July 
1995 at concurring opinion Evatt, Kretzmer, and Klein, para 9 See also ; UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, Joint Statement on Racism and the Media (London, UK: OSCE, 2001) at 2; ECHR, Jersild 
v Denmark, supra note 1335 at para 30; R v Keegstra, supra note 1315; United States v Priest, (1972) 45 CMR 338 
at 347. 
1360 Callixte Nzabonimana v The Prosecutor, Appeal Judgment, ICTR-98-44D-A, 29 September 2014 at para 121 
See also; ICTR, Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, supra note 1335 at para 155; Simon Bikindi v The Prosecutor, 
Appeal Judgment, ICTR-01-72-A, 18 March 2010 at para 135; ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 103 
at para 677. 
1361 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, 
Vinko Pandurevic, Trial Judgment, IT-05-88-T, 10 June 2010 at paras 968-69; ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, 
supra note 125 at para 621. 
1362 See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 61 at 138–39; Wald, supra note 61 at 627, 629; ICTY, Krstic Appeal, supra note 
61 at para 36; Gregory S Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, Fruition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) at 361; Stuart Ford, “Is the Failure to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime 
against Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis” (2010) 38 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 227 at 275. 
1363 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Incitement to racial and religious hatred and the promotion of tolerance: 
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Right, 20 September 2006, A/HRC/2/6 at para 41; ICCPR, supra note 
394 at Article 20(2) See also, ACHR Art 13(5), which proscribes statements that “constitute incitements to lawless 
violence or to any other similar action” and CERD Art 4(a), which proscribes “incitement to racial discrimination, as 
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts … [and] the provision of any assistance to racist activities, 
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work of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, ‘hatred’ “is a state of mind rather than a specific act.”1364 While “hatred, 
as such, is simply an opinion and is thus absolutely protected under international law”, most 
states accept this standard “because hatred will inevitably find some form of tangible 
manifestation, and groups should not have to wait until concrete acts are perpetrated on them 
before being able to claim some protection.”1365 Even if a definition of ‘hate’ can be agreed 
upon, “it is almost impossible to prove whether hatred per se is or is not likely to result from the 
dissemination of certain statements.”1366 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber clearly distinguished between 
“hate speech in general (or inciting discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement 
to genocide.”1367 Similarly, the court stated that “not every act of discrimination will constitute 
the crime of persecution”.1368 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber 
in Nahimana chose not to rule on whether hate speech that is not accompanied by calls for 
violence could attain the requisite threshold of gravity for persecution as a crime against 
humanity.1369 It would appear, therefore, that under international criminal law, only the most 
extreme forms of hate speech which meet the stringent threshold requirements for incitement to 
genocide (e.g., direct and public; intent to destroy) or persecution as a crime against humanity 
 
including the financing thereof”; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1318; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 1318. 
1364 Toby Mendel, Hate Speech Rules Under International Law (Halifax, NS: Centre for Law and Democracy, 2010) 
at 9. 
1365 Ibid; There are some states, however, who strongly object to banning incitement of hatred, such as the United 
States. Even in the context of preventing genocide, the U.S. has taken the position that “Under Anglo-American 
rules of law the right of free speech is not to be interfered with unless there is a clear and present danger that the 
utterance might interfere with a right of others” (see UN Economic and Social Council, Prevention and Punishment 
of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/623 
(1948)); U.S. courts have repeatedly overturned laws attempting to prohibit certain forms of expression including 
homophobic speech (Snyder v Phelps, (2011) 131 S Ct 1207 at 1220); burning crosses (RAV v City of St Paul, 
(1992) 505 US 377) ; and advocacy of racial hatred (USSC, Brandenburg v Ohio, supra note 1327 at 448–49); The 
position of the U.S. Supreme Court is that statements must be more than offensive to be prohibited (Snyder v Phelps, 
supra note at 1220; Simon & Schuster, Inc v Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd, (1991) 502 US 105 
at 118; Texas v Johnson, (1989) 491 US 397 at 414); However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also stated that “When a 
nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance 
will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional 
right” (Schenck v United States, (1919) 249 US 47 at 52). 
1366 Mendel, supra note 1349 at 39. 
1367 ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 103 at para 692. 
1368 Ibid at para 985. 
1369 Ibid at para 987. 
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(e.g., discriminatory intent to harm, interference with fundamental right, gravity threshold) are 
criminalized. 
 
The elements of existing domestic hate speech laws and the international crimes of incitement to 
genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity fail to fully capture what is truly 
problematic about the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants. 
Social psychology and criminology theories of combatant perpetration of civilian abuses showed 
that dehumanization can facilitate IHL violations regardless of whether there is a specific intent 
to incite IHL violations.1370 The effects of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech on 
both the combatant and their audience can contribute to IHL violations regardless of whether or 
not the combatant intends to incite the emotion of hatred or to incite IHL violations. The problem 
with demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language used by combatants is the language itself 
and the depiction of civilians as inferior beings, rather than on any specific emotion motivating 
the language. The problem with the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by 
civilians is the insidious effect that such language has psychologically on both speaker and 
audience that can contribute to explicit violations of IHL protections, not whether the speaker 
intends to incite hatred or violence against civilians. There is no evidence that reference to 
civilians as ‘gooks’ in Vietnam or ‘sand niggers’ in Iraq were intended to incite the IHL 
violations towards civilians that followed in My Lai in the case of Vietnam and Abu Ghraib in 
the case of Iraq. Yet, these terms have been linked to IHL violations in both cases.1371 Therefore, 
the specific intent to incite hatred or violence required under hate speech regulation would not 
capture all forms of problematic demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech against civilians 
identified by criminologists and social psychologists who have studied the link between 
dehumanization and violence against dehumanized individuals. However, although the intent 
requirement in hate speech offences may not capture all the forms of speech that can contribute 
to violence against civilians, intent cannot be eliminated entirely from a new offence. Thus, the 
new law proposed in section 8.2.5 will include an intent element, but one that differs from the 
intent requirement in hate speech offences.  
 
 
1370 See chapter 7 at sections 7.2.1.viii; 7.2.2.ii; 7.2.2.vi; 7.2.4.i; 7.2.4.v. 
1371 Zimbardo, supra note 1134 at 307. 
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If required as a necessary element of an IHL prohibition on the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing speech, the requirement that actual hatred and/or violence against a group be 
incited or caused would limit, in some circumstances, the extent to which IHL might prevent 
harm to civilians. Part of the harm of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language is that it 
can build and escalate over time. The opportunity to deter and prevent violence against civilians 
will be lost if IHL regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech requires that 
actual incitement of hatred result from a single utterance of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing speech. 
Courts have relied upon social science evidence to demonstrate a link between speech and harm 
and, consequently, justify restrictions to free speech.1372 For example, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has repeatedly held social science evidence of a link between a form of speech and harm, 
even where not fully conclusive, can be relied upon to support restriction of speech.1373 Bandura, 
Underwood, and Fromson have demonstrated a link between the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language and an increased likelihood that individuals will harm other individuals 
that have been dehumanized. Consequently, regulation is supported by this link between the use 
of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and harm. 
The preceding discussion has examined how, under international human rights law, the right to 
freedom of expression can and, in some cases, must be restricted to protect the rights of others 
from violence, hostility, and discrimination.1374 In international human rights law and in the 
implementation of human rights law, a balance is sought between fundamental rights of freedom 
of expression and other rights such as equality and human dignity.1375 The discussion of hate 
speech laws has illustrated that international human rights law is an inadequate vehicle for 
regulating demeaning, degrading or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during armed conflict 
for three key reasons. First, regulation of hate speech relies on national legislation and there are 
states where no such legislation exists. Second, many armed groups do not reach the threshold to 
 
1372 See, e.g, R v Sharpe, [2001] 1 SCR 45 at para 89; Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, [1996] 1 SCR 
825 at para 101; R v Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 452; R v Keegstra, supra note 1322 at Section D. 
1373 See, e.g., R. v Sharpe, supra note 1372 at para 89; Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, supra note 
1372 at para 101; R v Butler, supra note 1372; R v Keegstra, supra note 1322 at Section D. 
1374 See, e.g., Pillay, supra note 1324 at 203; Mello, supra note 1324 at 366; Knechtle, supra note 1324 at 542; 
Farrior, supra note 1324 at 62–63; Douglas-Scott, supra note 1324 at 327–31; Catlin, supra note 1324 at 793–99. 
1375 Pillay, supra note 1324 at 203. 
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have legal obligations under international human rights law, thereby leaving a significant number 
of armed groups unregulated if international human rights law is relied on as the sole means of 
dealing with problematic forms of speech during conflict. Finally, the requirements of intent and 
causation of hatred and violence mean that there are dangerous forms of demeaning, degrading, 
or dehumanizing speech that would not be captured under hate speech laws. 
 
The use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants is not fully captured 
by existing hate speech laws. However, this does not mean that new regulation of the use of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants is possible. Free speech 
remains a fundamental right that cannot be arbitrarily infringed. This thesis argues that the 
specific context of armed conflict and the identity of the speakers as combatants justifies 
regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians that would 
otherwise be an illegal restriction of free speech for civilians and during peace. The following 
section will advance this argument through a discussion of the existing practice and case law in 
Canada, Europe, and the United States that has distinguished the free speech protections afforded 
to members of armed forces from that afforded to civilians. 
  8.2.4.iii Restriction of Free Speech in Military Contexts 
The protection of free speech differs between peacetime and wartime contexts. For example, the 
right to freedom of expression can be derogated from in public emergencies, such as armed 
conflict.1376 This section demonstrates that combatants’ free speech is already regulated 
differently from that of civilians in many jurisdictions. This section examines the differentiation 
between civilian and combatant free speech and the legal grounds identified in national and 
regional case law as justifying greater regulation of free speech among combatants. This 
different treatment of civilian and combatant free speech provides the legal grounds to restrict 
combatants’ use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech toward civilians during 
armed conflict. While the focus of the thesis is on non-state armed groups, this section relies on 
case law addressing domestic regulation of state armed forces. It cannot be definitively said that 
armed groups with obligations under international human rights law would be able to exercise 
and limit rights in the same manner that states exercise and limit rights. The binding quality of 
 
1376 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 394 at Articles 4 and 19(3). 
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international human rights law on armed groups is, in many ways a theoretical or abstract 
concept. Apart from academic analysis, pronouncements from bodies, such as the UN Security 
Council, are usually phrased in general terms, for example, “[d]emand[ing] that parties to armed 
conflicts comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under … human rights law”.1377 
Some academics have, however, suggested that armed groups should only be bound by 
international human rights law to the extent that they have the capacity to protect and respect a 
particular right.1378 In the absence of clear direction on the issue and given that IHL rules apply 
in the same manner to both state armed forces and non-state armed groups, I consider it 
appropriate to rely on the parameters attributed to states’ abilities to restrict the rights of 
members of their national armed forces as a guide for the manner in which non-state armed 
groups may be able to regulate the rights of their own combatants. 
 
Free speech case law from Canada, the European Union, and United States notes that there is a 
difference between the protection of free speech for ordinary civilians and the protection of free 
speech for certain other members of society, in particular members of the armed forces.1379 
Unquestionably, combatants are entitled to, and retain, free speech rights while in uniform;1380 
however, those rights will not be identical to those of a civilian. For example, in the United 
States, civilians may criticize or insult the President, but members of the armed forces can be 
court martialed for the same behaviour1381 or receive a reprimand, be subjected to a fine, and/or 
 
1377 UN Security Council, supra note 433. 
1378 See, e.g., Moir, supra note 46 at 194; Sassoli & Olson, supra note 429 at 622–23; Murray, supra note 73 at 172–
202. 
1379 See, e.g., Parker v Levy, (1974) 417 US 733 at 758; United States v Howe, (1967) 17 CMA 165, 37 CMR 429; 
United States v Brown, 45 MJ 389, 391 (CAAF 1996) at 397; Grigoriades v Greece, (1997) 27 EHRR 464 at para 
45; See also Kazakov v Russia, Application no. 1758/02, 05/06/2009 at para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, Application no. 
25330/07, 12/02/2014 at para 70; Konstantin Markin v Russia, Application no. 30078/06, 22 March 2012 at para 
135; Kalaç v Turkey, Judgment, Merits, App No 20704/92, Case No 61/1996/680/870, ECHR 1997-IV, [1997] 
ECHR 37, (1999) 27 EHRR 552, IHRL 2998 (ECHR 1997), 1st July 1997 at para 28; R v Booth BR (Private), Court 
Martial (Canada); R. v Sharpe, supra note 1372 at para 22 (recognizing the need to sometimes restrict free speech 
for the protection of vulnerable persons); Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, supra note 1372 
(determining that an individual’s position in society, e.g., a teacher, may allow for greater restriction of speech than 
for other persons). 
1380 Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 27; Joksas v 
Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; United States v Wilson, (ACMR 1991) 33 MJ 797 at 799; Parker v Levy, 
supra note 1379 at 758. 
1381 United States v Howe, supra note 1379. 
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be forced into early retirement.1382 Canadian and European courts have allowed for more 
regulation of speech even among civilians because both the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the European Convention on Human Rights allow for the restriction of rights 
where the maintenance of a democratic society necessitates a particular restriction.1383 
Deviation from the civilian standards of protection for free speech is based primarily on reasons 
of national security,1384 maintenance of military discipline,1385 unit cohesion,1386 and troop 
morale.1387 An assessment of whether a regulation violates the freedom of expression rights of 
a member of the armed forces requires decision-makers “to take into account the special 
conditions attaching to military life and the specific ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’ incumbent on 
military personnel”.1388 Further, “in choosing to pursue a military career, members of the 
armed forces have accepted of their own accord a system of military discipline and the 
limitations of rights and freedoms implied by it”.1389 For example, military codes of justice often 
 
1382 Steven Lee Myers, “Military Warns Soldiers of Failure to Hail Chief”, The New York Times (21 October 1998); 
John Loran Kiel, Jr, “When Soldiers Speak Out: A Survey of Provisions Limiting Freedom of Speech in the 
Military” (2007) 37 Parameters 69. 
1383 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 1319 at Section 1; European Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 1318 at Article 10 (2). 
1384 This is the dominant standard employed by the European Court of Human Rights see, e.g., Grigoriades v 
Greece, supra note 1379 at para 39; See also Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 58–59. 
1385 See, e.g., Goldman v Weinberger, (1986) 106 S Ct 1310 at 507; Chappell v Wallace, (1983) 462 US 296 at 300; 
Parker v Levy, supra note 1379 at 744; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra 
note 1379 at para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at pata 70; R v Mader GG (Corporal), 2015 CM 3003 at 
para 2; R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), 2013 CM 3017 at para 23; R v Alcime OJ (Bombardier), 2012 
CM 3021 at para 3; R v Menard JP (Ex-Corporal), 2012 CM 3016 at para 3-4; R v Moriarity, [2015] 3 SCR 485; 
See also James M Hirschhorn, “The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen’s Constitutional 
Rights” (1984) 62 North Carolina Law Review 177 at 246; David E Fitzkee, “Religious Speech in the Military: 
Freedoms and Limitations” (2011) 41:3 Parameters 59 at 61. 
1386 See, e.g., Goldman v Weinberger, supra note 1385 at 507; Chappell v Wallace, supra note 1385 at 300; Parker v 
Levy, supra note 1379 at 744; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 
at para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; R v Mader GG (Corporal), supra note 1385 at para 2; R v 
Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1385 at para 23; R v Alcime OJ (Bombardier), supra note 1385 
at para 3; R v Menard JP (Ex-Corporal), supra note 1385 at paras 3-4; R v Moriarity, supra note 1385; See also 
Hirschhorn, supra note 1385 at 246; Fitzkee, supra note 1385 at 61. 
1387 See, e.g., Goldman v Weinberger, supra note 1378 at 507; Chappell v Wallace, supra note 1378 at 300; Parker v 
Levy, supra note 1372 at 744; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1372 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1372 
at para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1372 at para 70; R v Mader GG (Corporal), supra note 1378 at para 2; R v 
Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1378 at para 23; R v Alcime OJ (Bombardier), supra note 1378 
at para 3-4; R v Menard JP (Ex-Corporal), supra note 1378 at para 3-4; R v Moriarity, supra note 1378; See also 
Hirschhorn, supra note 1378 at 264; Fitzkee, supra note 1378 at 61. 
1388 Konstantin Markin v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 135. 
1389 Ibid. 
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place limitations on combatants’ freedom of expression through the requirement of a uniform, 
regulating hair styles and facial hair,1390 and even prohibiting soldiers in uniform from holding 
hands in public.1391 These restrictions apply equally during peace and war. 
Courts have required that certain standards must be met in order for a restriction on the free 
speech of a military member to be legal. There must be a rational connection between the 
purpose (e.g., “maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale”) and the effects of rules 
restricting free speech of members of the armed forces.1392 Canadian case law has found that 
the “behaviour of members of the military relates to discipline, efficiency and morale even 
when they are not on duty, in uniform, or on a military base.”1393 Actual harm to the military 
mission or military environment is not always a required component of the offence.1394 Laws 
restricting the free speech of military members must also “be formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the persons concerned – if need be with appropriate legal advice – to 
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given 
action may entail.”1395 However, a law may still be “couched in very broad terms” and meet 
these standards.1396  
 
1390 Canada, Canadian Forces Dress Instructions, A-DH-265-000/AG-001, 2017-02-01 at Chapter 2 "Policy and 
Appearance" and Chapter 3 "Religious and Spiritual Accommodation"; United Kingdom, The Queen’s Regulations 
for the Army 1975 (Amendment No 26) at Chapter 5, Part 9, Section 5.366; United States Navy, United States Navy 
Uniform Regulations, NAVPERS 15665I at Chapter 2 “Grooming Standards”. 
1391 Canada, supra note 1390 at Chapter 2 "Policy and Appearance". 
1392 R v Moriarity, supra note 1385. In another Canadian case, a Court Martial Court determined that racist conduct 
by a member of the armed forces could legally be subject to disciplinary action: R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 
1379; American case law has demanded “a reasonably direct and palpable connection between the [restricted] 
speech and the military mission or military environment”: United States v Wilcox, (2008) 66 MJ 442. 
1393 R v Moriarity, supra note 1385. 
1394 United States v Priest, supra note 1359 at 344; United States v Johnson, 39 MJ 1033 at 1037–38. 
1395 Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 37; See also Kononov v Latvia [GC], no 36376/04, § 185, ECHR 
2010 at para 185; Del Río Prada v Spain [GC], no 42750/09, § 79, ECHR 20 at para 79; Rohlena v the Czech 
Republic [GC], no 59552/08, § 50, ECHR 2015 at para 50; Chauvy and Others v France, 29 June 2004, Application 
no. 64915/01 at para 44; Altug Taner Akcam v Turkey, Application no. 27520/07, 25 October 2011 at para 87; Aydin 
v Germany, Application no. 16637/07, 27 January 2011 at para 41; Similar requirements of avoiding ambiguity or 
vagueness exist in American and Canadian case law as well: see, e.g., R v Moriarity, supra note 1385 (addressing 
question of overbreadth of military regulation); Parker v Levy, supra note 1379 (addressing the vagueness of certain 
military regulations). 
1396 Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 38. 
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Broadly worded regulations are common to military codes of discipline.1397 They have 
repeatedly been deemed to satisfy requisite precision or clarity standards in American, 
Canadian, and European case law.1398 For example, codes usually contain regulations 
prohibiting “conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline”.1399 While broadly worded 
offences still usually require a level of intent, courts have considered the language used and 
surrounding circumstances to be demonstrative of an individual’s intent.1400 For example, 
where language was deemed “disrespectful and abusive” under the circumstances of an 
offence of insubordination, the court found this “prov[ed the accused’s] intention to 
be insubordinate.”1401 Intent may also be irrelevant to the determination of innocence or guilt, 
such as in the case of conduct that may discredit the armed forces.1402 However, case law 
indicates that intent will still be relevant to sentencing or determining the appropriate 
punishment for an offence regardless of the degree to which intent factors into determinations 
of guilt.1403 
Dehumanization has a demonstrated a link to violence towards civilians, even without  any 
specific level of hatred in either the statement-maker or the audience.1404 In peacetime, the 
importance of free speech under international and domestic laws requires that government 
ability to restrict speech be limited and that any legal restriction on the speech of ordinary 
citizens be subject to high thresholds of intention.1405 The severity and extreme stigmatization 
 
1397 For example, “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” in US Armed Forces Uniform Code of Military 
Justice [US Armed Forces Uniform Code of Military Justice] at Article 133. 
1398 See, e.g., Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 38; Parker v Levy, supra note 1379; R v Lunn, (1993) 
19 CRR (2d) 291 (CMAC) at 297–98. 
1399 See, e.g., Canada National Defence Act, supra note 543 at s. 129; US Armed Forces Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, supra note 1397 at Article 134; UK Armed Forces Act 2006, supra note 543 at s. 19. 
1400 See, e.g., R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1385 at para 26; United States v Priest, supra 
note 1359 at para 343. 
1401 See, e.g., R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1385 at para 26. 
1402 See, e.g., Parker v Levy, supra note 1379. 
1403 See, e.g., R v Mader GG (Corporal), supra note 1385; R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 
1385. 
1404 See, e.g., Nick Haslam & Steve Loughnan, “Dehumanization and Infrahumanization” (2014) 65 Annual Review 
of Psychology 399 at 401, 418; Allison Abrams, “The Psychology Behind Racism”, (6 September 2017), online: 
Psychology Today <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/nurturing-self-compassion/201709/the-psychology-
behind-racism>. 
1405 See, e.g., R v Keegstra, supra note 1322; Similar pronouncements have been made by the U.S. Supreme Court 
(e.g., New York Times Co v Sullivan, supra note 1322; Police Dept of City of Chicago v Mosley, supra note 1322); 
and the European Court of Human Rights (e.g., Incal v Turkey, judgment of 9 June 19, supra note 1322; Lindon, 
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associated with international crimes of incitement to genocide and persecution as a crime 
against humanity similarly justify exacting thresholds of mens rea. However, in the context of 
armed conflict, the international community has demonstrated a desire to protect civilians 
under IHL as much as possible without excessively inhibiting militarily necessary methods and 
means of warfare.1406 The failure under IHL and international human rights law to address 
forms of speech less extreme than hate speech, incitement to genocide, or persecution as a 
crime against humanity creates a clear gap. This gap permits the use of demeaning, degrading, 
or dehumanizing speech by combatants during armed conflict, which can facilitate the 
commission of IHL violations against civilians – the very type of violations that the international 
community clearly seeks to prevent. 
The specific context of armed conflict is recognized under international law as a situation in 
which state obligations to protect the right to free speech may be derogated from for all 
citizens.1407 This means that speech that would be protected during peacetime may legally be 
restricted during armed conflict.1408 Courts in Canada, the European Union, and United States 
have recognized that, in both peace and war contexts, militaries are entitled to restrict the free 
speech rights of their combatants to a greater degree than a state may restrict the speech of 
civilians.1409 Further, the ability to legally restrict the free speech rights of combatants is 
generally believed to be even greater during an active conflict than during peace.1410 The need 
for discipline, cohesion, morale, and security among combatants is heightened during an armed 
conflict. In addition to posing a threat to civilians, the use of racist language has the potential to 
“corrode the morale and internal cohesion of a [military] unit.”1411 Strong internal discipline 
 
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France [GC], supra note 1322; as well as the ICTR [ICTR, Nahimana Trial 
Judgment, supra note 1271 at para 1001]. 
1406 See chapter 4 at section 4.1. 
1407 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 394 at Articles 4 and 19. 
1408 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, supra note 398. 
1409 See, e.g, Parker v Levy, supra note 1379; United States v Brown, supra note 1379 at 397; United States v Howe, 
supra note 1379; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 27; 
Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; Konstantin Markin v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 135; Kalaç v 
Turkey, Judgment, Merits, supra note 1379 at para 28; R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 1379; R v Rainville JCB 
(Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1385; R v Mader GG (Corporal), supra note 1385; R v Moriarity, supra note 
1385. 
1410 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 1384 at 59; Carlson v R Schlesinger, 511 F. 2d 1327. 
1411 R v Dryngiewicz ZA (Corporal), 2012 CM 1016 at para 7. 
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systems, as discussed in chapter 3,1412 are the primary indicator that an armed group possesses 
a sufficient degree of organization to fulfill obligations under IHL and to be an official party to 
an armed conflict. Internal disciplinary systems are therefore an important source of IHL 
implementation within armed groups.1413 The erosion of fidelity to the laws of war through the 
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward civilians during armed conflict 
is both inimical to the aims of IHL to protect and manage risk to civilians during conflict as well 
as to the discipline essential for the functioning of armed forces and armed groups. This not 
only establishes the need to regulate these forms of speech by combatants during armed 
conflict, it also provides legal justification for these limitations. 
Legal regulation has the power to shift and change existing norms among combatants that 
currently contribute to the dehumanization and denigration of civilians during armed conflict. 
However, this regulation must be clear and must be known to the members of the community 
in which behaviours are sought to be changed. Existing IHL does not provide this clarity. 
However, IHL could become a force for positive norm creation through the adoption of a rule 
prohibiting the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language to describe, refer to, or 
address protected persons. 
8.2.5 A New International Humanitarian Law Rule to Regulate the Use of Demeaning, 
Degrading, or Dehumanizing Language 
 
Given that neither IHL nor international human rights law currently address all the forms of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language that contribute to violence toward civilians 
there is a need for a new IHL rule regulating these forms of speech. A new IHL rule regulating 
the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants toward civilians 
should include and/or address five key components: (1) an inclusive definition of ‘demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language’; (2) the use of euphemistic language; (3) the use of the 
 
1412 See chapter 3 at section 3.1. 
1413 Anne-Marie La Rosa & Carolin Wuerzner, “Armed groups, sanctions and the implementation of international 
humanitarian law” (2008) 90:870 International Review of the Red Cross 327 at 330, 333; Sassoli, supra note 25 at 
31–32. 
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term ‘enemy’ to refer to civilians; (4) a level of intent; and, (5) no requirement for a specific 
result or outcome. This section will discuss each of these components in turn.  
 
The first necessary component for a new IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language is an inclusive definition of ‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language’. An inclusive definition will allow for possible broader interpretation and application 
of the rule by parties to a conflict while not allowing for an interpretation of the rule that is 
narrower than the specific elements included in the definition. This will protect the elements of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language, the prohibition of which is currently 
necessary for civilian protection, but leave room for substantive development of the rule in the 
future. The term ‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language’ should capture many forms 
of dangerous speech, including all the examples provided in subsections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 above, 
such as discriminatory or racist speech, the use of negative stereotypes, and other language that 
serves to cast civilians as a threat, as inferior, or as not worthy of respect or protection. 
 
In addition to language provided in the preceding paragraph, a second component that should be 
included in a new IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language is the inclusion of euphemistic language when it has the effect of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing civilians. The use of euphemistic language can have an equally 
powerful effect on people as explicit language demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
civilians.1414 Although phrases such as “taking out the trash”1415 or “pulling up weeds”1416 may 
have innocuous meanings in certain contexts, where used to refer euphemistically to civilians, 
phrases such as these must be captured by an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language in order to prevent or inhibit the use of dehumanization of 
civilians by combatants to reframe their conceptions of right and wrong and the contribution to 
violence toward civilians that stems from this reframing. 
 
 
1414 See, e.g., ICTR, Karemera Appeal Judgment, supra note 1345 at para 483; ICTR, Nahimana Appeal Judgment, 
supra note 103 at paras 700, 701, 703; ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko Trial Judgment, supra note 103 at paras 6026-27. 
1415 See, e.g., Lankford, supra note 1252 at 21. 
1416 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 1260 at 116. 
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The third necessary component of a new IHL rule regulating demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language is the inclusion of a prohibition on using the term ‘enemy’ to refer to a 
civilian or the civilian population. This is important because combatants are trained to kill the 
enemy and IHL permits combatants to kill enemy combatants. Reference to civilians as the 
‘enemy’ debases the protected status of civilian life and physical integrity by placing the civilian 
in the category of permissible target of violence permitted under IHL. The new rule should, 
however, include a defence of honest and reasonable mistake as to the identity or status of a 
specific civilian. In a NIAC, combatants are not always easily distinguished from civilians and a 
combatant should not be disciplined where there is no intent to place a protected civilian in the 
category of permissible target. An ‘honest mistake’ is a commonly accepted defence to 
regulatory offences and some criminal offences in certain countries.1417 It is a well-accepted 
principle of criminal law that a person should not be punished without some amount of moral 
blameworthiness.1418 Further, there is no necessity for the use of the label ‘enemy’ with regards 
to protected persons in armed conflict: violence is meant to be kept between parties to the 
conflict and civilians, provided they are not actively or directly participating in hostilities, may 
never legally be directly targeted.1419 Consequently, there is no legitimate reason to allow such 
behaviour among combatants. 
 
The fourth necessary component of an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language by combatants should address the level of intent for the offence. The 
IHL offence should require an intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a protected civilian or 
the civilian population on the part of the combatant accused of violating the prohibition. This 
level of intent differs from domestic hate speech laws which require that the speaker intend to 
promote, advocate, or incite hatred. This must be done in order to capture the forms of speech 
that can manipulate the psyche of combatants and debase civilians in a manner that facilitates 
 
1417 See, e.g., Laurie L Levenson, “Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes” (1992) 78 Cornell Law 
Review 401 at 435–51 (discussing good faith defences in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK). 
1418 See, e.g., Richard Card, Card, Cross, and Jones Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 32; 
Itzhak Kugler, Direct and oblique intention in the criminal law : an inquiry into degrees of blameworthiness 
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002) at 24; Hamish Stewart, “Legality and Morality in H.L.A. Hart’s Theory of Criminal 
Law” (1999) 52 SMU Law Review 201 at 205; HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968) at 21; John G Malcolm, “Morally Innocent, Legally Guilty: The Case for Mens Rea 
Reform” (2017) 18 The Federalist Society Review 40 at 46. 
1419 This is the principle of distinction. See discussion in chapter 4 at section 4.2.1. 
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acts of violence towards them. An intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a civilian or the 
civilian population directly links the level of intent to the harm the regulation seeks to prevent. 
The specific harm that needs to be prevented in armed conflict is the debasement of civilians in 
the minds of combatants that facilitates violence toward civilians. In armed conflict it is the 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language itself that that contributes to harm against 
civilians, not the animating emotion behind the speech.1420 Racism, discrimination, and 
otherization of groups that leads to the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
can be motivated by many different things including fear, the need to belong, projection of one’s 
own negative feelings onto others, and emotional incompetence, that is, a failure to “understand[] 
the origins of the negative emotions which, like all of [one’s] emotions, deserve respect and care 
as they are important to [one’s] sense of self.”1421 An intent requirement which rests on an 
intention to provoke a single specific emotion, i.e. hatred, such as in domestic hate speech laws, 
is inadequate to capture many instances of dangerous speech during armed conflict. The unique 
context of armed conflict and combatants has been recognized as one in which greater restriction 
of speech rights is legally permitted and accepted.1422  However, combatants nonetheless retain 
free speech rights.1423 Consequently, intent must remain a component of the IHL offence in order 
to balance the protection of civilians with the protection of combatants’ speech rights. The 
standard of intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a protected civilian or the civilian 
population is consistent with other existing military offences that restrict speech, such as 
insubordination where it must be established that the combatant “inten[ded] to 
be insubordinate.”1424 Since racist language could and has been punished in national armed 
forces as conduct to the “prejudice of good order and discipline”,1425 which is often, if not 
 
1420 See, e.g., Haslam & Loughnan, supra note 1404 at 401, 418; Abrams, supra note 1404. 
1421 Abrams, supra note 1404. 
1422 See, e.g., Parker v Levy, supra note 1379 at 758; United States v Howe, supra note 1379; United States v Brown, 
supra note 1379 at 397; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at 
para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; Konstantin Markin v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 135; 
Kalaç v Turkey, Judgment, Merits, supra note 1379 at para 28; R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 1379. 
1423 Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 27; Joksas v 
Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; United States v Wilson, supra note 1380 at 799; Parker v Levy, supra note 
1379 at 758. 
1424 R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1385 at para 26. 
1425 See, e.g., R c Camiré JJN (Caporal-chef), 2019 CM 4003 (racist comment charged as conduct to the prejudice of 
good order and discipline); R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1378; R v Dryngiewicz ZA 
(Corporal), supra note 1404 (racist comment charged as conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline); R v 
Booth BR (Private), supra note 1372 denial of application arguing that racist conduct could not be charged as a 
service offence]. 
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always, a strict liability offence,1426 requiring an intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a 
civilian during an armed conflict would, in practice, provide a higher level of intent requirement 
for the regulation proposed in this thesis. 
 
The fifth component necessary for an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language by combatants is that the offence should require that the demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language used by a combatant have the effect of debasing a civilian 
or the civilian population in the eyes of the audience. This is another important difference 
between the necessary components of the IHL offence and the common requirements of 
domestic hate speech laws. Domestic hate speech laws seek to prevent discriminatory violence 
and, therefore, in order to contravene hate speech laws, the speech must result in hatred or 
violence toward the target of the hate speech. By contrast, the harm sought to be prevented with 
an IHL rule regulating the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech by combatants 
is the debasement of civilians in the minds of combatants. The debasement of civilians can 
produce increasing levels of dehumanization in the minds of combatants over time,1427 making it 
difficult to alter patterns of violence that begin downstream. This is why it is the debasement of 
civilians that is the harm which must be prevented and why it must be prevented early on.  The 
assessment of whether speech has the effect of debasing a civilian or the civilian population in 
the eyes of the audience should be based on a reasonable person standard: would a reasonable 
person consider the speech to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a civilian or the civilian 
population. One reason a reasonable person standard should be used is due to the difficulty of 
determining whether debasement has occurred in the mind of a specific audience member prior 
to the escalation of the effects of such language which results in physical violence toward a 
civilian. The use of a reasonableness standard to evaluate the conduct of combatants is common 
accepted practice among many national armed forces.1428 
 
 
1426 See, e.g., Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service Law: JSP 830 Volume 1 (Government of the United Kingdom, 
2017) at Chapter 7 "Non-criminal conduct (disciplinary) offences" 1-7-59 & 1-7-60. 
1427 On gradual effects see, e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 19; Bandura, supra note 23 at 203; Diener, 
supra note 1131 at 234–35; Zimbardo, supra note 1134 at 296–99; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 222–25, 307–10. 
1428 For example, this is the case is Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States: see, e.g., Canada National 
Defence Act, supra note 543 at section 129; US Armed Forces Uniform Code of Military Justice, supra note 1397 at 
Article 134; UK Armed Forces Act 2006, supra note 543 at section 19. 
  
262 
Armed conflict is meant to be between parties to the conflict and while civilians and other 
protected persons may indirectly suffer from the conflict, there is no legitimate reason to allow 
for the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language to describe, refer to, or address 
such persons. This section has proposed a new IHL rule to regulate the use of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing speech by combatants. In order to effectively inhibit the effects of 
dehumanization on combatants which contribute to violence toward civilians, this new IHL rules 
must include five components. First, the definition of ‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language’ should be inclusive, but not exhaustive. Second, the rule should include a prohibition 
on the use of euphemistic language where it has the effect of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing a civilian or the civilian population. Third, the rule should include a prohibition on 
referring to a civilian or the civilian population as the ‘enemy’; however, this component should 
include a defense of reasonable mistake. Fourth, the offence should require an intent on the part 
of the speaker to demean, degrade, or dehumanize a civilian or the civilian population. Finally, 
the rule should require, based on a reasonableness standard, that the speech have the effect of 
debasing a civilian or the civilian population in the mind of the audience. Together, these five 
components will provide an IHL rule that balances the protection of civilians with the speech 
rights of combatants, while still having the capacity to inhibit the ability of dehumanization to 
contribute to violence toward civilians during armed conflict.  
8.3 Deindividuation, Depersonalization, and Displacement of Responsibility  
This section will examine the need for a new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by 
combatants. It will provide a brief review of the effects and risks of deindividuation, 
depersonalization, and the displacement of responsibility. It will provide evidence of the use of 
nicknames by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC, which can serve to create a sense of 
anonymity among combatants as well as be a means of creating a separate identity that assumes 
responsibility for acts of violence committed by combatants. This section will examine whether 
the use of nicknames is already addressed by existing rules of IHL. It will also discuss whether 
existing international human rights law, specifically the right to free speech already discussed in 
the context of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech, may actually protect the use of 
nicknames in armed conflict, thereby preventing its regulation. Finally, this section will propose 
a new IHL rule regulating the use nicknames by combatants in armed conflict. 
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 8.3.1 The Effect of Nicknames in Armed Conflict 
The theory of deindividuation demonstrates that the submergence of an individual in a group 
can decrease private self-awareness leading to an impairment of that individual’s ability to self-
regulate their behaviour.1429 In a state of deindividuation, “people may be aware of what they 
are doing but have a reduced expectation of suffering any negative consequences.”1430 This is 
accompanied by a reduced ability to consider long-term consequences and an increased 
susceptibility to the influences of immediate stimuli, emotions, and motivations.1431 The desire 
to conform to and be accepted by a group also influence an individual submerged in a 
group.1432 Anonymity can contribute to diffusion of responsibility.1433 Zimbardo has stated that 
“anything that makes a person feel anonymous … creates the potential for that person to act in 
evil ways – if the situation gives permission for violence.”1434 A link between anonymity and 
antisocial behaviour has been found in social psychology experiments.1435 Contexts in which 
“threats of punishment are a major source of inhibition” for individuals, contexts in which 
individuals sport a costume that conveys an implicit message, and contexts in which group 
members are similar in appearance can all enhance an individual’s sense of anonymity and tend 
to increase disinhibited behaviour.1436 All three of these contexts exist within an armed group. 
First, internal disciplinary systems seek to enforce compliance through coercion and 
punishment. Second, the uniform of a combatant or soldier implicitly conveys power and 
violence.1437 Third, a group in which combatant or soldier wears the same uniform contributes 
to an outwardly similar appearance. Thus, all three contexts that can increase disinhibited 
behaviour are often present among armed groups. 
 
1429 Wortley, supra note 1134 at 194; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, supra note 1135 at 504. 
1430 Wortley, supra note 1134 at 194. 
1431 Diener, supra note 1131 at 211. 
1432 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 1134 at 255; Zimbardo, supra note 993 at 29–31; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 
219, 264; Diener, supra note 1131 at 220–22; Cassel & Bernstein, supra note 1148 at 222. 
1433 See, e.g., Bandura, supra note 23 at 63; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 301–305. 
1434 Zimbardo, supra note 993 at 29. 
1435 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 299–305; Zimbardo, supra note 1134 at 263–69; Diener, supra note 1131 
at 222. 
1436 Diener, supra note 1131 at 222. 
1437 Note some armed groups do not have uniforms or chose not to sport uniforms. However, even where combatants 
do not always have access to or chose to wear uniforms they will often seek to adopt some form of similar attribute 
during battle to avoid killing members of their own group. For example, Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier in 
Sierra Leone has spoken of how group members would wear helmets and green head ties into battle where the 
combatants’ instructions were to kill anyone who did not wear a helmet or green head tie: Ishmael Beah, “The 
Making, and Unmaking, of a Child Soldier”, The New York Times (14 January 2007); Ishmael Beah, A Long Way 
Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
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In addition to the effects of a state of deindividuation, the core theories of techniques of 
neutralization, moral disengagement, and obedience to authority demonstrate that factors which 
serve to decrease an individual’s sense of responsibility, or that allow an individual to attribute 
responsibility for their own actions to another actor, will facilitate their ability to participate in 
crimes.1438 Indeed, these theorists have shown that “[p]eople behave more cruelly under group 
responsibility than when they hold themselves personally accountable for their actions.”1439 
Further, where a diffused sense of responsibility is combined with the use of dehumanization, 
this has been shown to significantly increase the degree of punitiveness expressed by 
individuals.1440 Thus, factors which contribute to individuals’ ability to distance themselves from 
feeling personally responsible for their actions, including acts that cause another person to suffer, 
can facilitate their participation in atrocity crimes. 
 
There are two factors inherent in the organization and function of armed groups that contribute to 
deindividuation and an individual’s ability to separate themselves from a sense of responsibility. 
First and foremost, an armed group is a group, therefore the potential for deindividuation is 
inherent in the existence of an armed group. Since the existence of these groups is an accepted 
reality of non-international armed conflict, a certain amount of deindividuation is both likely and 
unavoidable. Second, armed groups will often, where possible, wear uniforms or some sort of 
other identifying feature.1441 They may do this for reasons similar to those as regular armed 
forces: “[i]dentification, obedience, comradeship and a display of strength” or as a means to 
“gain respectability”.1442 Even where members of an armed group do not have the resources to 
afford or acquire uniforms, they will often attempt to have a common identifying feature among 
the group.1443 For example, a witness in the Bosco Ntaganda case at the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) stated, 
 
1438 See, e.g., Sykes & Matza, supra note 994 at 667; Bandura et al, supra note 1060 at 365; Bandura, supra note 23 
at 62–63; Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 18; Zimbardo, supra note 1134 at 256; Zimbardo, supra note 23; 
Milgram, supra note 23 at 8. 
1439 Bandura et al, supra note 1060 at 365; Bandura, Underwood & Fromson, supra note 167; Zimbardo, supra note 
23. 
1440 Bandura, supra note 23 at 201. 
1441 See, e.g., Pfanner, supra note 1173; Beah, supra note 1437; Beah, supra note 1437. 
1442 Pfanner, supra note 1173 at 102. 
1443 See, e.g., Beah, supra note 1437; Ntaganda Trial Hearing, P-0888 ICC-01/04-02/06-T-105-Red-ENG WT 20-
06-2016 51/96 SZ T, supra note 102; Kleffner, supra note 71 at 334–35. 
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They did wear something to identify them. Some put on 
leaves around their arms, others around their necks. It was a 
something, a sign to identify them so people would know that 
they were defending the village in the case of war, to help. So 
they did wear something to identify themselves. They had 
leaves around their arm or their necks, or sometimes they had 
fabric of a -- of a particular colour. They did have ways of 
identifying themselves.1444 
 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, a former RUF combatant recalled 
Our group was called Born Naked because of our hardness, 
and when we fought we took off our shirts and tied them 
around our waists or wore them inside out. We also did this 
to recognize each other because at that time both rebels and 
soldiers could be wearing combat uniforms.1445  
 
Sometimes armed groups will choose not to wear uniforms, trying to disguise themselves as 
civilians, or wear the stolen uniforms of enemy combatants, trying to have their violent acts 
attributed to the enemy.1446 A uniform has long been the primary means for parties to an 
international armed conflict to fulfill the IHL requirement to wear a “fixed, distinctive sign 
visible at a distance”.1447 From a civilian protection perspective, uniforms or another form of 
“fixed, distinctive sign visible at a distance” should also be worn by parties to NIACs to facilitate 
combatants’ task of distinguishing between non-targetable civilians and legally targetable 
combatants.1448 This is so even though a uniform is not a requirement for an armed group to be 
considered a party to a NIAC.1449 The use of uniforms or other common identifying mark serves 
two very important functions during armed conflict. First, as a matter of military utility, uniforms 
allow combatants to distinguish between members of their own armed group and enemy 
 
1444 Ntaganda Trial Hearing, P-0888 ICC-01/04-02/06-T-105-Red-ENG WT 20-06-2016 51/96 SZ T, supra note 102 
at 43. 
1445 Jasper, RUF Voluntary Recruit, in Higbie & Moigula, supra note 102 at 129. 
1446 See, e.g., Zubairu Wai, Epistemologies of African Conflicts, Violence, Evolution, and the War in Sierra Leone 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) at 102–103; Laurie R Blank & Gregory P Noone, International Law and 
Armed Conflict: Fundamental Principles and Contemporary Challenges in the Law of War, (New York: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2019) at 408; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4, para 430. 
1447 See, e.g., 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 465 at Article 1(2); Geneva Convention III, supra note 5 at 
Article 4(A)(2)(b). 
1448 See, e.g., Pfanner, supra note 1173 at 94, 123; Emily Crawford, “The Principle of Distinction and Remote 
Warfare” in Jens David Ohlin, ed, Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017) 
at 52, 62. 
1449 See, e.g., Pfanner, supra note 1173 at 122; Bassiouni, supra note 1173 at 741–42; Kleffner, supra note 71 at 
320–21. 
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combatants, thereby fulfilling a tactical or strategic function.1450 Second, uniforms are extremely 
important for reducing accidental civilian casualties, as a uniform can serve to distinguish 
combatants from civilians.1451 Although uniforms are not explicitly required under the law of 
NIACs, some distinguishing feature, such as a uniform, is an implicit legal requirement in 
NIACs by virtue of the principle of distinction that, as a rule of customary IHL, binds all parties 
to an armed conflict.1452 Consequently, even though they may contribute to deindividuation, 
uniforms are an essential feature of civilian protection during armed conflict. Unless an 
alternative means of fulfilling the legal requirement of distinction can be found, a prohibition or 
restriction on the use of uniforms would be counter to the aim of civilian protection during 
conflict. 
 
The use of nicknames can contribute to deindividuation, in particular through the creation of a 
sense of anonymity, depersonalization, and distancing the individual from a sense of 
responsibility for their actions. This is because the use of the nickname can allow individuals to 
separate their identity, facilitating depersonalization and disassociation from their actions 
committed under the second identity. This is best described through the concept of doubling.1453 
This is a form of disassociation by which an individual develops a “second self”.1454 The 
individual and their second self “operate autonomously, allowing the participant to function in 
the two irreconcilable worlds of the ‘normal’ and the genocidal.”1455 Doubling has been used to 
explain apartheid era violence in South Africa.1456 Smeulers has referenced doubling more 
generally to explain the type of process perpetrators use to “try to cope with their own roles [in 
violence]”.1457 Preston has made a connection between doubling and the experiences of some 
 
1450 See, e.g., Pfanner, supra note 1173 at 100; Beah, supra note 1437. 
1451 See, e.g., Michael W Lewis & Emily Crawford, “Drones and Distinction: How IHL Encouraged the Rise of 
Drones” (2013) 44 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1127 at 1136. 
1452 See, e.g., APV Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 2d ed (Huntington, NY: Juris Pub, 2004) at 38–41; Lewis & 
Crawford, supra note 1451 at 1136. 
1453 Lifton, supra note 22; RJ Lifton & E Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat 
(New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
1454 Alvarez, supra note 23 at 147. 
1455 Ibid. 
1456 Robert N Kraft, Violent Accounts: Understanding the Psychology of Perpetrators through South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (New York: New York University Press, 2014) at 89–91. 
1457 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 239–40. 
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Ugandan child soldiers trying to reconcile their civilian and their rebel identities.1458 Doubling 
was first used to explain how Nazi doctors participated in the killing of patients: 
Doubling involved the formation of an Auschwitz self, by 
which one internalized many of the patterns and assumptions 
of the Auschwitz environment: the reversals of healing and 
killing, the operative Nazi biomedical vision, the extreme 
numbing that rendered killing no longer killing, struggles 
with omnipotence (deciding who would live or die) and 
impotence (being a cog in a powerful machine), maintaining 
a medical identity while killing, and somehow finding 
meaning in the environment.1459 
 
The use of nicknames by combatants can fulfill a similar function. This makes the choice of 
nicknames particularly meaningful, as often combatant nicknames represent an idealized vision 
of the self as a hero or allude to particularly violent identities or characters. A heroic identity 
could give a combatant a sense of righteous purpose that justifies all of their acts, while a violent 
identity can help propel a combatant to acts of violence. Zimbardo notes that CIA officers 
operating at Abu Ghraib prison, which became notorious when reports revealed egregious 
violations of IHL toward detainees,1460 only used aliases and never their true names.1461 
Therefore, it is not merely physical appearances changes, such as the use of a uniform or war 
paint,1462 that contribute to a separate ‘combatant identity’, but also the use of nicknames. 
 8.3.2 Examples of the Use of Nicknames by Combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC 
The previous section discussed the general effects of deindividuation, depersonalization, and 
displacement of diffusion of responsibility on combatant psyches and how nicknames in 
particular can affect the psychology of combatants. This section will provide more detailed 
examples of the use of nicknames by combatants in Sierra Leone and the DRC. 
 
 
1458 Justin M Preston, “‘If They Abduct You, You Don’t Come Back’: Understanding Ugandan Former Child 
Soldiers in the Context of Their Life” (2015) 21:3 Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 432 at 438, 441. 
1459 Lifton & Markusen, supra note 1453 at 106. See also; Lifton, supra note 22. 
1460 Seymour M Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib”, (30 April 2004), online: The New Yorker 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib>. See also; David P Forsythe, “The 
United States and International Humanitarian Law” (2008) 7:1 Journal of Human Rights 25 at 30–32; CNN, “Iraq 
Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts - CNN”, (4 March 2019), online: CNN 
<https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/index.html>. 
1461 Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 394. 
1462 See, e.g., ibid at 303–305; RJ Watson, “Investigation into Deindividuation Using a Cross-Cultural Survey 
Technique” (1973) 25 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 342. 
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One element that appeared repeatedly in the research and fieldwork interviews and data 
collection conducted for this thesis: the use of nicknames by combatants in both the Sierra Leone 
and DRC case studies. Many of the victim, witness, and perpetrator statements collected from 
the archives of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission contained reference to 
nicknames.1463 However, in-person interviewees in Sierra Leone and the DRC did not reference 
nicknames during our conversations, with one exception. One interviewee in the DRC revealed 
his nickname had been ‘Jack Bauer’, after the lead character on the television series ‘24’, when 
he showed me his demobilization card that had been issued under the name ‘Jack Bauer’ rather 
than his actual name.1464 Indeed, ‘Jack Bauer’ was an extremely common nickname among 
combatants in Eastern Congo.1465 The use of nicknames in both Sierra Leone and Eastern Congo 
has been documented in case law,1466 the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Report,1467 UN Reports,1468 and academic literature.1469  
 
As noted in the preceding section, the use of nicknames by combatants can be particularly 
problematic where they evoke heroic or violent separate identities. The widespread use of the 
nickname ‘Jack Bauer’ in the DRC created an identity that was able to righteously protect the 
country.1470 Violent nicknames in the DRC and Sierra Leone have included ‘First Blood’,1471 
 
1463 SA, TRC Statement, supra note 102; MD, RUF Victim, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [MD, TRC Statement]; SW, SLA child victim, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [SW, TRC Statement]; AA, RUF child recruit, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [AA, TRC Statement]; SM, RUF child recruit, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [SM, TRC Statement]; TR, RUF forced recruit, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [TR, TRC Statement]; MD, AFRC & RUF victim, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [MD, TRC Statement]; TK, RUF child soldier, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Statement [TK, TRC Statement]. 
1464 Tung Yin, “Jack Bauer Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security Law” (2007) 17 Southern 
California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 279 at 279‘24’ was an American television show airing on the Fox 
television network 2001-2010 starring Kiefer Sutherland as the lead character Jack Bauer, a director of field 
operations in a counter terrorist unit. Jack Bauer “routinely violates laws against torture, murder, aggravated assault, 
armed robbery” in order to “save [his] country from terrorists bent on using nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons on U.S. soil.” . 
1465 Strochlic, supra note 102. 
1466 See, e.g., SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 580 at paras 11, 312. 
1467 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 101 at Ch 3, para 473 and Ch 4, paras 52, 239 fn 
124. 
1468 See, e.g., UN Security Council, supra note 102 at para 26; UN Security Council, Midterm report of the Group of 
Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 16 October 2015, A/2015/797 at para 14. 
1469 See, e.g., Vermeij, supra note 102 at 74; Pype, supra note 102 at 264. 
1470 Strochlic, supra note 102. 
1471 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 3, para 473. 
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‘Kill man no blood’,1472 ‘Rambo’,1473 and ‘Terminator’.1474 One Sierra Leonean woman is 
recorded as saying  
When we were with the rebels we saw them capture and kill a 
lot of people. We also saw women raped in front of us. I saw 
everything. I don’t know the real names of any of the rebels, 
only their nicknames. One was called The Killer and another 
was Cobra.1475 
 
This quote demonstrates not only the prevalent use of nicknames in conjunction with IHL 
violations, but also the extent to which these nicknames could allow combatants to be 
anonymous: to the point where possibly no one knows their real name. 
 
Other examples of heroic or aspirational nicknames include the common use of “Superman” in 
Sierra Leone or names of sports heroes such as “Gullit” used by senior AFRC commander Alex 
Tamba Brima, subsequently convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.1476 Other extremely violent nicknames include “Hitler”,1477 “‘Blood 
Never Dry,’ ‘Laughing and Killing,’ [and] ‘The Castrator’”.1478 Another common nickname in 
the DRC has been “Bruce Lee”, a name which, like other names drawn by combatants from 
American wrestling programs or action films, evoke images and identities of people who are 
“virile men, who are self-confident, in control of everything, energetic and dynamic. They 
control their health and are able to confront any physical danger; in a word, they are 
invincible.”1479 Vermeij has noted that “nicknames dissociate[] [people] from the violence they 
carry out and makes it possible for them to function as killing machines without remorse”.1480 
One Jack Bauer in Eastern Congo stated, “‘When this ideology of Jack Bauer comes to me it’s 
 
1472 Ibid at Ch 4, para 52. 
1473 SA, TRC Statement, supra note 102. 
1474 Ntaganda Trial Hearing, P-0888 ICC-01/04-02/06-T-105-Red-ENG WT 20-06-2016 51/96 SZ T, supra note 102 
at 36. 
1475 Baby Seiya, Civilian, in Higbie & Moigula, supra note 102 at 185. 
1476 Ruud Gullit was a famous Dutch football player in the 1980s and 1990s and captained the Dutch national team 
in their European Championship win in 1988. See, e.g., Prosecution Memorandum to Accompany Indictment [Alex 
Tamba Brima], SCSL [SCSL Prosecution Memo [Alex Tamba Brima]] at para 1; SA, TRC Statement, supra note 
102. 
1477 UN Security Council, supra note 102 at para 26. 
1478 Vermeij, supra note 102 at 74. 
1479 Pype, supra note 102 at 264. 
1480 Vermeij, supra note 102 at 74. See also; Peter Singer, Children at War (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2006) at 73. 
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like taking drugs…I have no fear.’”1481 Thus, the use of nicknames allows combatants to create a 
separate identity under which they can participate in acts of violence without jeopardizing, or at 
least minimizing negative effects on, their sense of self. 
 8.3.3 The Use of Nicknames under Existing International Humanitarian Law 
Existing IHL does not explicitly address the use of nicknames by combatants nor is it addressed 
implicitly under existing rules. In fact, the use of nicknames is a widespread, common historical 
and contemporary practice among armed groups and national armed forces in various areas of 
the world.1482 There are two likely explanations for why nicknames are not addressed by IHL. 
First, IHL prohibitions in NIACs are generally aimed at the protection of persons outside the 
armed group, that is, civilians, other protected persons, and, to a more limited extent, enemy 
combatants. Thus, as discussed in the preceding section, IHL is more likely to regulate language 
directed at civilians and other protected persons rather than focus on how combatants within an 
armed group treat each other. Second, the use of nicknames is likely not addressed in IHL 
because nicknames generally appear innocuous, unless they are deemed to constitute verbal 
abuse or bullying.1483 Finally, as a form of speech, any regulation or restriction of the use of 
nicknames must be evaluated in light of the protections for free speech discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Existing IHL is aimed at addressing acts against civilians that are likely to cause 
physical or mental pain or suffering.1484 Most IHL prohibitions and regulations for civilian 
protection address acts that have a close proximal relationship to the pain or suffering of a 
civilian, such as direct acts of torture and cruel treatment or the physical conditions in which 
detainees are kept.1485 However, there are IHL provisions that seek to protect civilians indirectly. 
 
1481 Strochlic, supra note 102. 
1482 See, e.g., Julie Knox, “The Weird World Of Military Nicknames”, (5 October 2015), online: Forces Network 
<https://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/weird-world-military-nicknames>; David Mastey, “Child Soldier 
Narratives and Their War Names” (2018) 99:2 English Studies 166; John Rentoul, “The Top 10: Nicknames for 
Generals”, (14 January 2017), online: The Independent UK <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-top-10-
nicknames-for-generals-a7524171.html>; Strochlic, supra note 102. 
1483 See, e.g., Pernille Due et al, “Bullying and symptoms among school-aged children: international comparative 
cross sectional study in 28 countries” (2005) 15:2 European Journal of Public Health 128 at 128; W Ray Crozier & 
Patricia S Dimmock, “Name-calling and nicknames in a sample of primary school children” (1999) 69:4 British 
Journal of Educational Psychology 505; Evelyn M Field, Bully Blocking at Work: A Self-Help Guide for Employees, 
Managers, and Mentors (Bowen Hill, AUS: Australian Academic Press, 2010) at 17. 
1484 See, e.g., the prohibition on violence to life, physical integrity, and mental well-being, the prohibition on torture, 
cruel and inhuman treatment, the prohibition on outrages upon personal dignity including humiliating and degrading 
treatment, the prohibition on rape and other forms of sexual violence, all found in Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
5 at Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 5 at Article 4(2). 
1485 For example, see the decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Limaj that found “the deplorable conditions of 
detention in both the storage room and the cowshed at the Llapushnik/Lapusnik prison camp, were such as to cause 
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For example, rules requiring particular care to be taken with installations, such as dams or 
nuclear electrical facilities,1486 and prohibiting attacks on “objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population” are rules for the protection for civilians that prohibit acts that do not 
have the same physical proximity to civilian harm as acts such as torture.1487 The effects of 
nicknames on combatants that contribute to IHL violations against civilians, such as the 
production of a sense of anonymity1488 and doubling,1489 are less obvious because they are 
psychological as opposed to physical. Without an understanding of the possible psychological 
effects of nicknames on combatants, the common use of nicknames can seem innocuous. 
 
Decision makers may focus on the more immediately apparent positive effects of the use of 
nicknames. The use of nicknames may not only be viewed as innocuous but can be considered to 
sometimes be a positive tool for “social cohesion”,1490 or for “solidarity, friendship and 
affection”,1491 or may be viewed as merely being humorous.1492 Nicknames may facilitate or 
enhance camaraderie and team esprit de corps within military units.1493 Group cohesiveness is 
extremely important in armed groups and contributes to fostering the feeling of accountability 
 
serious mental and physical suffering to the detainees, and constituted a serious attack upon the dignity of the 
detainees.” (at para 289) These conditions and the mental and physical suffering caused by them to detainees rose to 
the level of cruel treatment (at para 294): ICTY, Limaj et al Trial Judgment, supra note 188. 
1486 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 at Rule 42. 
1487 Ibid at Rule 54. 
1488 The adverse consequences of anonymity produced by nicknames has been discussed often in the context of 
online activities such as aggression online generally, cyberbullying, and cyber terrorism: see, e.g., Michail 
Tsikerdekis, “The choice of complete anonymity versus pseudonymity for aggression online” (2012) 2:8 eMinds: 
International Journal on Human-Computer Interaction 35; Wei Pang Wu & Chung-Cheng Lien, “Cyberbullying: An 
Empirical Analysis of Factors Related to Anonymity and Reduced Social Cue” (2013) 311 Applied Mechanics and 
Materials 533; Marc Rogers, “The Psychology of Cyber-Terrorism” in Andrew Silke, ed, Terrorists, Victims and 
Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and and its Consequences (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd, 2003) at 85. 
1489 See, e.g., Preston, supra note 1458 at 438, 441; Smeulers, supra note 22 at 259. 
1490 Crozier & Dimmock, supra note 1483 at 506; US Military Academy, “Building a Cohesive Team”, Army 
Magazine (April 2013) at 68. 
1491 Crozier & Dimmock, supra note 1483 at 506; V de Klerk & B Bosch, “Nicknames as sex-role stereotypes” 
(1996) 35 Sex Roles 525 at 527; Frederick J Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry” in Franklin D 
Jones et al, eds, Military Psychiatry: Preparing in Peace for War (Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon General, 
US Dept of the Army; Washington, DC & Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 1994) at 4; James K Skipper, 
“Nicknames, Coal Miners and Group Solidarity” (1986) 34:2 Names 134 at 137. 
1492 See, e.g., Crozier & Dimmock, supra note 1483 at 506; de Klerk & Bosch, supra note 1491; D Boxer & F 
Cortés-Conde, “From bonding to biting: Conversational joking and identity display” (1997) 27 Journal of 
Pragmatics 275; US Military Academy, supra note 1490 at 68. 
1493 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 1491 at 4, 12; US Military Academy, supra note 1490; Harvey Meyer, “Military 
Monikers”, (28 October 2011), online: The American Legion <https://www.legion.org/magazine/90376/military-
monikers>; Oliver Brett, “What’s in a nickname?”, BBC News (15 January 2009), online: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7829013.stm> (on nicknames facilitating camaraderie generally). 
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among fellow combatants.1494 Group cohesiveness and morale can have a positive effect on a 
unit’s operational effectiveness.1495 However, while group cohesiveness is important for the 
successful execution of military operations, there is nothing to suggest that the use of nicknames 
to aid in fostering this cohesiveness is necessary to produce group cohesion.1496 Further, there are 
many effective alternatives for building team cohesion such as team sports.1497 
 8.3.4 The Use of Nicknames under International Human Rights Law 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the use of nicknames by combatants is not captured 
by existing IHL rules and prohibitions. In actuality, the use of nicknames is generally seen by 
members of armed forces as playing a positive role in fostering camaraderie and cohesiveness 
within military units.1498 However, social psychology and criminology theories indicate that 
underneath this seemingly innocuous and useful façade, the use of nicknames can contribute to 
an individual’s commission of violent acts towards civilians.1499 IHL seeks to minimize the 
adverse effects of war on civilians,1500 therefore, regulation of behaviour that contributes to 
violence against civilians would be consistent with this objective.  Although existing IHL does 
not address the subject of nickname use by combatants, it is relevant to consider whether 
international human rights law applicable during armed conflict already captures the use of 
 
1494 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 32 at 149; US Military Academy, supra note 1490 at 68. 
1495 See, e.g., US Military Academy, supra note 1490 at 67; John Baynes, Morale: a study of men and courage; the 
Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 1915 (London, UK: Cassell, 1967); Peter J Murphy & Kelly 
MJ Farley, “Morale, Cohesion, and Confidence in Leadership: Unit Climate Dimensions for Canadian Soldiers on 
Operations” in Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau, eds, The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military 
Experience (New York: Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2000) 311. 
1496 King does however suggest that the use of nicknames for objectives, such as naming a particular hill “South 
Kidney” due to its shape, has an important function to “distinguish and individualize anonymous features” and 
conceal objectives from the enemy (at 501-502). This form of nickname is distinct from the personal use of 
nicknames by combatants discussed in this thesis. Anthony King, “The Word of Command Communication and 
Cohesion in the Military” (2006) 32:4 Armed Forces & Society 493 at 501–502. 
1497 See, e.g., Eva Talent, “Military Team Building Activities”, (21 August 2018), online: 
<https://bizfluent.com/13583776/military-team-building-activities>. 
1498 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 1493; US Military Academy, supra note 1490 at 68; Eyal Ben-Ari, Mastering 
Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998) at 29. 
1499 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 259 (linking nicknames to doubling and the perpetration of harm to civilians); 
Preston, supra note 1450 at 438, 441 (linking nicknames to doubling and the perpetration of harm); Kraft, supra 
note 1448 at 89–91 (linking doubling to the perpetration of harm generally); Lifton, supra note 22 (linking doubling 
to perpetration of harm generally); Bandura et al, supra note 1056 at 365 (linking anonymity to the perpetration of 
harm generally); Zimbardo, supra note 989 at 29 (linking anonymity to perpetration of harm generally). 
1500 See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 95 at 161; Samuel Estreicher, “Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part III)?: 
The Intentional Killing of Civilians under International Humanitarian Law” (2012) 12:2 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 589 at 593; Amnesty International, “Armed Conflict”, online: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-
we-do/armed-conflict/>; Yael Ronen, “Avoid or Compensate - Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflections 
during Armed Conflict” (2009) 42:1 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 181 at 184. 
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nicknames or whether it prohibits restriction on the use of nicknames. If the issue is already 
covered by international human rights law, then a new rule of IHL would likely be unnecessary. 
If a restriction on the use of nicknames is prohibited under international human rights law this 
may affect how a new IHL rule is structured. This section will examine whether international 
human rights law regulates or protects the use of nicknames during armed conflict.  
 
The use of nicknames is not explicitly addressed under international human rights law. If 
anything, rather than restrict their use, international human rights law may protect their use under 
the right to freedom of expression. As discussed earlier in this chapter, freedom of expression is 
intended to protect an individual’s right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds…either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of a 
person’s choice”.1501 Freedom of expression has been deemed to include less obvious forms of 
expression such as one’s manner of dress.1502 A nickname can be used to communicate 
something about the person who goes by that nickname. For example, a combatant nicknamed 
“Cobra” may be someone who is stealthy and lethal like a snake.1503 However, not all behaviour 
is protected by freedom of expression: free speech rights are not absolute and may be lawfully 
regulated by governments in particular during armed conflict,1504 and militaries may place 
greater restrictions on the free speech rights of members of the armed forces than they would 
otherwise legally be able to place on the free speech rights of civilians.1505  
 
The use of a nickname may be punished where it breaches other laws, for example, nicknames 
dealing with hate speech, defamation, discrimination in the United Kingdom1506 or nicknames or 
alias used to commit a crime in Canadian criminal law.1507 This means that, even if nicknames 
 
1501 ICCPR, supra note 394 at Article 19(2). 
1502 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of opinion and 
expression, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 at para 12. 
1503 The nickname “Cobra” was reported to be used by at least one rebel in Sierra Leone: Baby Seiya, Civilian, in 
Higbie & Moigula, supra note 102 at 185. 
1504 See discussion in section 8.2.4 of this chapter.  
1505 See discussion in sub-section 8.2.4.iii of this chapter. 
1506 See, e.g., Nolan v CD Bramall Dealership Ltd t/a Evans Halshaw Motorhouse Worksop, [2012] 
UKET/2601000/12; Ruda v Tei, 2 June 2011, Case No1807582/10 [2011] EqLR 1108; Dove v Brown & Newirth 
Ltd, [2016] UKET/3301905/2015. 
1507 The use of a nickname or alias to commit a crime will usually be captured by offences dealing with fraud or 
false pretenses. One common example of crime committed under a false name is identity theft. See, e.g., in Canada, 
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are protected, their use may still be legally restricted for other necessary purposes such as the 
protection of others from discriminatory hatred and violence or to impede crimes of fraud. Many 
states also regulate names by restricting the names parents may give their child, or the names to 
which adults may voluntarily change. For example, parents in Denmark may choose their child’s 
name from a list of 7,000 names or apply for special permission to use a name not listed.1508 The 
Danish law also requires that the “name must show the gender of the child and not be 
unusual.”1509 Meanwhile adults in the United States may not legally change their name to one 
that is considered obscene, a racial slur, or which contains symbols or numerals.1510 Informal 
name changes such as going by a nickname, as opposed to official legal changes, are less strictly 
regulated. In many common law jurisdictions, individuals may easily choose to informally be 
known by a different name. In these jurisdictions “people have a right under common law to be 
officially recognized by whatever name they ordinarily use”;1511 it is simply a matter of choosing 
a name and using it.1512 Name changes in this manner are often a common occurrence. For 
example, someone legally named Edward may go by Ed, Eddie, Ted, or Ned. 
 
Nicknames are therefore neither fully protected nor truly prohibited under international human 
rights law and many domestic legal systems. Certainly, it is clear that they may legally be subject 
to restrictions and regulations. Existing restrictions focus on the protection of other rights and the 
promotion of other social goods, such as the protection of best interest of the child, the 
prevention of hate speech or racial discrimination, and to avoid their use to escape accountability 
for the commission of crimes. However, no existing rules would appear to address their common 
colloquial usage among colleagues in the armed forces or in armed groups. Consequently, the 
 
Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 1333 at Section 362 (false pretense), Section 380 (fraud), Section 402.2 
(identity theft). 
1508 “The Strict Name Laws of Denmark - WorldAtlas.com”, (20 November 2017), online: World Atlas 
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-strict-name-laws-of-denmark.html>. 
1509 Ibid. 
1510 “Are There Legal Name Change Restrictions?”, online: <http://www.lawprofessor.com/are-there-legal-name-
change-restrictions/>. 
1511 Eric Andrew-Gee, “Why and how Ontarians change their names in the 21st century”, (12 November 2017), 
online: The Globe and Mail <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/why-and-how-ontarians-change-
their-names-in-the-21stcentury/article31799805/>. 
1512 Ibid; “Change of Name”, online: Women and the Law in Alberta <https://www.lawforalbertawomen.ca/women-
and-marital-status/change-of-name/>; “Common-Law Name Change”, (2010), online: 
<http://myfamilylaw.com/library/common-law-name-change/?more=yes>; Israel Merolevitz & others, petitioners, ; 
Lindon v First National Bank, ; Christianson v King County, . 
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application of international human rights law in armed conflicts does not currently address the 
problem of the use of nicknames contributing to deindividuation, depersonalization, and the 
displacement of responsibility, which in turn can facilitate the commission of and participation in 
crimes against civilians. International human rights law does, however, protect free speech and 
expression, which includes the use of nicknames. The next section will advocate for a new 
regulation on the use of nicknames within armed groups that could limit these deleterious 
outcomes and will consider whether the restriction proposed would be a legal limit on free 
speech. 
 8.3.5 Regulation of Nicknames in a Military Context 
A new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants during armed conflict is needed 
to prevent the psychological effects of nickname use that can contribute to the perpetration of 
violence toward civilians. Section 8.1 demonstrated the power of law to change behaviour by 
shaping what an individual sees as a positive behaviour by indicating social approval of certain 
behaviours and social disapproval of other behaviours.1513 Further, law is commonly used to 
regulate risky or dangerous behaviours.1514 Behaviours that are socially acceptable, such as not 
wearing a seatbelt, have been dramatically changed through the use of legal regulation.1515 The 
regulation of risk regulation is inherent to IHL, which seeks to limit the risks to civilians during 
armed conflict.1516 Consequently, the regulation of the risk posed to civilians through combatant 
use of nicknames is logical and consistent with IHL efforts to limit risks to civilians during 
conflict. Further, a law is needed to clearly express disapproval of the adverse effects of 
nickname use in conflict in an effort to alter combatant behaviour by inhibiting the reframing of 
combatant decision-making. 
 
Section 8.3.1 demonstrated the effects deindividuation, including anonymity, depersonalization, 
diffusion of responsibility, and doubling can have on combatants which contribute to combatant 
violence toward civilians. The effects of these psychological processes have been linked to 
 
1513 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2034–35; Nadler, supra note 977 at 63; Cooter, supra note 1229 at 7–8. 
1514 See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 977 at 67–68; Geisinger, supra note 1224 at 41, 63; Sunstein, supra note 871 at 
2024, 2052. 
1515 See, e.g., McDermott & Hough, supra note 1244; Ontario Ministry of Transportation, supra note 1244. 
1516 See, e.g., ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, supra note 125 at para 521. 
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increased aggression generally1517 as well as specifically to the perpetration of violence toward 
civilians during conflict.1518 The effects of deindividuation and the use of diffusion of 
responsibility and doubling result in a reframing of the manner in which combatants evaluate 
right and wrong and make decisions about courses of action.1519 When a combatant is operating 
under the effects of these psychological processes, they no longer view their behaviour in the 
same manner they did in peacetime when they followed the law.1520 The effects of these 
processes must be inhibited in order to prevent their contribution to the perpetration of violence 
against civilians. The inhibition of these processes will also render the work of organizations 
which engage with armed groups, such as the ICRC, easier because, assuming compliance with 
the new law, they will not have to undo this harmful reframing before being able to effectively 
engage armed actors. 
 
The enhanced risk produced by the use of nicknames, in particular heroic or violent nicknames, 
is captured by the earlier quote from one Congolese combatant: “‘When this ideology of Jack 
Bauer comes to me it’s like taking drugs…I have no fear.’”1521 An absence of fear or remorse, as 
well as a sense of invincibility,1522 eliminates considerations of responsibility for one’s actions 
during conflict and renders the combatant a threat to civilians and a threat to the internal 
discipline of the armed group or armed forces due to the potential for illegal violence toward 
civilians. When the power of nicknames to contribute to violence against civilians is understood, 
it becomes unsurprising that all new members of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, known for 
targeting civilians, assume a new name upon joining the organization.1523 This thesis 
recommends that a new IHL rule be adopted and implemented to regulate the use of 
anonymizing nicknames that help combatants eliminate feelings of fear and remorse and produce 
a feeling of invincibility among combatants in armed conflict. This new rule would decrease the 
 
1517 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 989 at 29; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 301–305; Bandura, supra note 23 at 63; 
Zimbardo, supra note 1130 at 263–69; Diener, supra note 1127 at 222; Kraft, supra note 1448 at 89–91; Lifton, 
supra note 22; Lifton & Markusen, supra note 1445. 
1518 See, e.g., Smeulers, supra note 22 at 259; Preston, supra note 1458 at 438, 441. 
1519 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23 at 147; Kraft, supra note 1456 at 89–91; Lifton & Markusen, supra note 1453 
at 106; Lifton, supra note 22; Smeulers, supra note 22 at 259; Preston, supra note 1458 at 438, 441. 
1520 For example, doubling allowed Nazi doctors to “maintain[] a medical identity while killing [patients]”: Lifton & 
Markusen, supra note 1453 at 106. 
1521 Strochlic, supra note 102. 
1522 See, e.g., Pype, supra note 102 at 264; Vermeij, supra note 102 at 74. 
1523 Matthew Guidere, “Al-Qaeda’s Noms de Guerre” (2006) 1:3 Defense Concepts 6 at 7. 
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risk of crimes against civilians during armed conflict by inhibiting a source of deindividuation, 
doubling, and displacement of responsibility that contribute to increased violence. This is 
because it would impede a combatant’s ability to create a separate or alternative identity under 
which they could commit these crimes anonymously without facing the same self-sanction they 
would otherwise be likely to feel. In addition, much like the effects of dehumanization, the 
effects of deindividuation, disassociation, and doubling can intensify over time,1524 which makes 
it important to capture and prevent the use of nicknames at the earliest point possible. The 
capture of nicknames upstream is important to prevent the reframing of combatant psyches 
before this leads to direct violence against civilians. 
 
In addition to decreasing the risk of violence toward civilians, the reasonable restriction of 
behaviour contributing to violence towards civilians can protect combatants from the significant 
post-conflict psychological costs associated with harm to civilians and/or prisoners during armed 
conflict.1525 This provides additional support for the regulation of the use of nicknames that 
provide a sense of invincibility and absence of responsibility for both the maintenance of 
discipline critical for military operations during an armed conflict and for the protection of 
civilians that is integral to IHL. 
 
Section 8.3.3 demonstrated that nicknames are not currently regulated by IHL. Furthermore, the 
use of nicknames does not serve an essential military purpose. While nicknames may contribute 
to the development of unit cohesion and morale,1526 there are other ways of producing cohesion 
and morale, such as through team building exercises and team sports.1527 Additionally, basic 
military training in itself is considered one of the primary tools for fostering cohesion and 
bonding among recruits.1528 Unit cohesion may be an important source of operational 
 
1524 On the intensification of the effects of these processes over time see, e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 23 at 
19; Diener, supra note 1131 at 234–35; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 222–25, 307–10; Zimbardo, supra note 1134 at 
296–99; Bandura, supra note 23 at 203. 
1525 See, e.g., Bruce P Dohrenwend et al, “The Roles of Combat Exposure, Personal Vulnerability, and Involvement 
in Harm to Civilians or Prisoners in Vietnam-War-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” (2013) 1:3 Clinical 
Psychological Science 223. 
1526 See, e.g., US Military Academy, supra note 1490 at 68; Skipper, supra note 1491 at 137; Manning, supra note 
1491 at 4. 
1527 See, e.g., Talent, supra note 1497; US Military Academy, supra note 1490. 
1528 See, e.g., Robert A Pape & James K Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and 
How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) at 60; Richard Farnell, “How U.S. Army Basic 
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effectiveness,1529 but nicknames are not a necessary component of the production of group 
cohesion.   
 
Section 8.3.4 demonstrated that international human rights law does not regulate the use of 
nicknames during armed conflict. That section also demonstrated that the use of names and 
nicknames can and is legally regulated under different domestic legal systems.1530 Therefore, 
although international human rights law does not provide helpful regulation of the use of 
nicknames during conflict, it also does not inhibit the regulation of nicknames based on the 
protection of human rights, such as freedom of expression. 
 
In addition to providing protection for civilians under IHL, a new rule regulating the use of 
nicknames could help improve accountability both at the military justice or internal disciplinary 
level as well as under international and domestic criminal law and other accountability 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions. The regulation of nicknames could inherently do this by 
eliminating, in as much as possible, the likelihood that a combatant’s true identity could be 
unknown to others in an armed group. Nicknames can pose practical difficulties for seeking 
accountability for IHL violations under various mechanisms.1531 The use of nicknames can 
complicate or impede the ability of investigators and prosecutors to identify those responsible for 
violations and bring them to account for their actions. This is because a combatant’s true identity 
- their legal name - may be well masked by the use of a nickname. This is demonstrated by a 
victim in the Sierra Leone Civil War, who stated, “I don’t know the real names of any of the 
rebels, only their nicknames.”1532 Also, when many individuals use the same nickname, such as 
‘’Jack Bauer’, it may be difficult to link a specific Jack Bauer to the specific violations being 
 
Training Turns Diverse Groups into Teams”, Harvard Business Review (18 July 2016), online: 
<https://hbr.org/2016/07/how-u-s-army-basic-training-turns-diverse-groups-into-teams>. 
1529 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 32 at 149; US Military Academy, supra note 1490; Murphy & Farley, supra 
note 1495; Baynes, supra note 1495. 
1530 See, e.g., note 1508; Andrew-Gee, supra note 1511; note 1510; note 1512; Israel Merolevitz & others, 
petitioners, supra note 1512; Christianson v King County, supra note 1512; Nolan v CD Bramall Dealership Ltd t/a 
Evans Halshaw Motorhouse Worksop, supra note 1506; Ruda v Tei, supra note 1506; Dove v Brown & Newirth Ltd, 
supra note 1506. 
1531 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 101 at Ch 4, para 239, fn 134; Similarly, the 
prosecution of combatants by the Special Court for Sierra Leone was complicated by the widespread use of 
nicknames, for example, the prosecution of AFRC senior officer Alex Tamba Brima who denied that he had ever 
gone by the nickname “Gullit”: SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 580 at paras 11, 312. 
1532 Baby Seiya, Civilian, Higbie & Moigula, supra note 102 at 185. 
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investigated. This difficulty can be addressed in some cases by issuing arrest warrants and 
indictments listing all known names and aliases of a suspect. This was frequently done at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.1533 In spite of this, identity was an issue in some of this cases, 
such as that of Alex Tamba Brima, who denied having the nickname ‘Gullit’.1534 It will often be 
possible to link nicknames to specific individuals when they are well-known, high-level 
perpetrators and officers; however, it is difficult to do so for lower ranking combatants. This was 
noted by the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which mentioned on more than 
one occasion the inability to identify an individual’s real name due to the use of nicknames.1535 
Thus, addressing the use of nicknames in IHL could have additional benefits for criminal law 
and other forms of accountability for perpetrators of crimes against civilians. 
8.3.5.i A New Rule of International Humanitarian Law to Address the Use of 
Nicknames by Combatants 
 
A new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants needs three components: (1) a 
requirement that combatants be known by their first name or surname; (2) an exception for 
diminutive and derivative nicknames; and, (3) a recordkeeping requirement. This section will 
discuss each of these components in turn. 
 
The first necessary component to the regulation of nicknames under IHL is that the rule should 
require combatants to be known by either their first name or surname. This would prevent 
combatants from using nicknames to create a sense of anonymity, doubling, or to diffuse their 
sense of responsibility for their actions. Consequently, this would prevent combatants from using 
these psychological mechanisms to reframe their decision-making during conflict. 
 
The second necessary component of an IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames is the inclusion 
of an exception to the strict requirement of using only first and last names that would allow 
 
1533 See, e.g., Prosecution Memorandum to Accompany Indictment [Johnny Paul Koroma], SCSL [Prosecution 
Memo [Johnny Paul Koroma]] at para 1; Prosecution Memorandum to Accompany Indictment [Sam Bockarie], 
SCSL [SCSL Prosecution Memo [Sam Bockarie]] at para 1; SCSL Prosecution Memo [Alex Tamba Brima], supra 
note 102 at para 1; Prosecution Memorandum to Accompany Indictment [Morris Kallon], SCSL [Prosecution Memo 
[Morris Kallon]] at para 1; Prosecution Memorandum to Accompany Indictment [Santigie Borbor Kanu], SCSL 
[Prosecution Memo [Santigie Borbor Kanu]] at para 1. 
1534 SCSL AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 581 at paras 11, 312. 
1535 See, e.g, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 102 at Ch 4, para 239, fn 134; ibid at 
Ch 3, para 73. 
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combatants to be known by a derivative or diminutive form of either their first name or surname. 
A rule regulating the use of nicknames must be balanced against the free speech rights of 
combatants outlined in Section 8.2.4.iii above. Therefore, if a rule were to be developed to 
regulate the use of nicknames by combatants, it must not be a blanket prohibition and any such 
rule would need to allow for certain legitimate uses of nicknames. For example, a combatant 
named Edward Jones could go by Ed, Ted, Eddie, or Jonesy. The preservation of the use of 
derivative and diminutive nicknames among combatants would maintain a contribution to group 
cohesion and the fostering of camaraderie. While there is nothing to suggest that a derivative or 
diminutive nickname does not carry the risk of permitting a combatant to form a separate identity 
under which they commit violent acts against civilians, the chances of doubling and diffusion of 
responsibility is lessened due to the link between the combatant’s real identity and nickname. In 
order to balance free speech protections with the IHL’s goal of protecting civilians,1536 only 
nicknames that can anonymize the combatant or provide for a separate identity unrelated to their 
real self should be regulated during armed conflict. Non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames 
fall into this category, in particular aspirational nicknames that portray the individual as a hero, 
and violent nicknames that allow a combatant to create a particularly violent separate identity. 
This was evident in the nicknames used by combatants carrying out severe IHL and IHRL 
violations in the wars in Sierra Leone and the DRC, as outlined above.  
 
The third component necessary for an IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants is 
the requirement that records be kept of all combatants by both first and last name and, if 
necessary, other identifiers. This would diminish the capacity of combatants to create a separate 
identity for themselves as well as diminish the likelihood that a combatant’s true identity could 
be unknown to others in an armed group. Ideally this requirement would be fulfilled through the 
maintenance of a full roster of combatants, but the rule should allow this requirement to be 
fulfilled through the use of full names in reports recording the activities of the unit.1537 This 
 
1536 See, e.g., ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, supra note 125 at para 521. 
1537 The maintenance of these kinds of records has long been common practice among Western militaries: see, e.g., 
The National Archives (United Kingdom), “Unit war diaries”, online: First World War portal 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/first-world-war/centenary-unit-war-diaries/>; US Army Center of Military 
History, “Master Index of Army Records”, online: US Army Center of Military History 
<https://history.army.mil/reference/records.htm>; Library and Archives Canada, “War Diaries, Ship Logs and 
Operations Record Books”, (12 September 2014), online: Library and Archives Canada <http://www.bac-
lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/military-heritage/Pages/war-diaries-ship-logs-operations-records.aspx>. 
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requirement to record the first and last names of combatants would not include a requirement to 
be able to produce such records in any and all circumstances. Not all armed groups have the 
resources to record and store this information in a manner that would protect them from damage 
or destruction during armed conflict.1538 Nonetheless, the requirement to record the first and last 
names of combatants would assist military commanders as well as other individuals such as 
investigators, prosecutors, and truth commissioners, to conduct necessary work to ensure 
accountability for IHL violations during armed conflicts.1539 
 
In sum, this section has identified three key components that a new IHL rule regulating 
anonymizing combatant nickname use should possess: (1) the requirement that combatants be 
known by either their first or last name; (2) an exception to the rule that allows for the use of 
derivative or diminutive forms of first or last names; and (3) the requirement to record the first 
and last names of combatants. A new regulation on the use of non-derivative and non-diminutive 
nicknames would balance free speech with the risk of harm posed to civilians by combatants 
who use such nicknames to free themselves of the moral constraints that normally inhibit their 
capacity to commit violent acts toward civilians. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn on the insights gleaned from theories of techniques of neutralization, 
moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority, in particular it has focused on 
dehumanization, euphemistic language, deindividuation, anonymity, doubling, and the diffusion 
of responsibility. These psychological processes have the power to debase civilians in the eyes of 
combatants1540 and to alleviate combatants of a sense of responsibility for their violent actions 
toward civilians.1541 As a result, processes such as dehumanization and diffusion of responsibility 
 
1538 This is the case not only for poorly resourced armed groups in developing countries such as the DRC but also 
Western Armed Forces. For example, many British war records were lost during German air raids of World War II: 
see, e.g., National Archives (United Kingdom), “First World War - Service records”, online: National Archives 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/service_records/sr_soldiers.htm>. 
1539 For example, extensive records kept by the Nazis during World War II proved to be of immense utility during 
the Nuremberg Trials: see, e.g., Nuremberg Trials Project, “Nuremberg - Documents”, online: Nuremberg Trials 
Project <http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/documents>; National Political Radio, “The Last Nuremberg Prosecutor 
Has 3 Words Of Advice: ‘Law Not War’”, (18 October 2016), online: NPR.org 
<https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/10/18/497938049/the-last-nuremberg-prosecutor-has-3-words-of-
advice-law-not-war>. 
1540 See chapter 7 at sections 7.2.1.viii, 7.2.1.xi, 7.2.2.ii, 7.2.2.iv, and 7.2.4.v. See also chapter 8 at section 8.2.1. 
1541 See chapter 7 at sections 7.2.1.i, 7.2.1.xi, 7.2.2.iv, and 7.2.3. See also chapter 8 at section 8.3.1. 
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have been linked to violence committed against civilians in World War II,1542 the Vietnam 
war,1543 the Rwandan genocide,1544 and the Iraq war in 2003.1545 This chapter further identified 
dehumanization and displacement of responsibility in the contexts of the Sierra Leone civil war 
and series of conflicts in the DRC. This chapter has discussed the manifestation of 
dehumanization and displacement of responsibility – as demonstrated in Sierra Leone and the 
DRC - through two forms of speech commonly used by combatants: (1) demeaning, degrading, 
or dehumanizing language toward civilians, and (2) non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames 
used by combatants. The use of these forms of speech by combatants during armed conflict 
drives the neutralization of, and disengagement from, social norms that would otherwise inhibit 
violence toward civilians.1546 The effects of these forms of speech are particularly insidious and 
dangerous to civilians and combatants during armed conflict because their effects generally build 
over time until they result in extreme forms of violence that constitute IHL violations during 
armed conflict.1547 The cumulative effect of these acts are extreme violations of IHL protections 
for civilians such as assault, murder, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity.1548 This chapter 
argues that there is a need to address demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language toward 
civilians and non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames, in particular heroic or violent 
nicknames, used by combatants before they result in the reframing of combatant conceptions of 
right and wrong and violent acts toward civilians. In addition to the established link between 
dehumanization and diffusion of responsibility with respect to violence toward civilians,1549 this 
chapter has grounded its argument in (1) the power of law to change behaviours; (2) civilian 
 
1542 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 23 at 160, 166–69; Herf, supra note 1124 at 1–16, 209. 
1543 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 307; Grossman, supra note 32 at 187, 191; Kelman, supra note 1193 at 50. 
1544 See, e.g., Benesch, supra note 1047 at 63–64; Temple-Raston, supra note 1252 at 29; Gourevitch, supra note 
1252 at 64, 140–41. 
1545 See, e.g., Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 307; Graham, supra note 1254 at 5; Decker & Paul, supra note 1254 at 
327; Mordin, supra note 1254. 
1546 See chapter 7 at sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. 
1547 On the gradual effects of these behaviours, particularly through moral disengagement, deindividuation, see, e.g., 
Minor, supra note 1008 at 301; Albert Bandura, “Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency” 
(2002) 31:2 Journal of Moral Education 101 at 111; Bandura, supra note 23 at 203; Zimbardo, supra note 23 at 223, 
258, 309; Smeulers, supra note 32 at 243, 247; A real life example, the development of state torturers in Greece, is 
examined in detail in the work of Haritos-Fatouros: Haritos-Fatouros, supra note 969. 
1548 As, previously noted, these IHL violations and others have been linked to dehumanization and displacement of 
responsibility in World War II, the Vietnam War, the Rwandan Genocide, and the 2003 Iraq War: see, e.g., Alvarez, 
supra note 23 at 160, 166–69; Grossman, supra note 32 at 187, 191; Gourevitch, supra note 1252 at 64, 140–41; 
Graham, supra note 1254 at 5. 
1549 See, e.g., C Haney, W Banks & P Zimbardo, “A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison”” (1973) 30 
Naval Research Review 4; Bandura, Underwood & Fromson, supra note 167; Bandura et al, supra note 1060 at 365; 
Zimbardo, supra note 23. 
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protection as the foundational concept of IHL; (3) the common use of law to regulate risk, 
including the centrality of risk regulation for the protection of civilians in existing IHL; and (4) 
the difference between free speech protection in peace and for civilians as compared to free 
speech protection in war and for combatants. 
 
Law plays an important role in altering human behaviour.1550 Behaviours that were once seen as 
socially acceptable, such as the non-use of seatbelts,1551 can be drastically changed over time 
through legal regulation. Education about the reasons for new regulation of previously accepted 
behaviours or activities can enhance the effectiveness of behavioural change through law.1552 
While some militaries regulate the use of offensive or racist speech,1553 it remains prevalent in 
other militaries.1554 Furthermore, regulation of armed forces under domestic military law not 
only varies between countries but also its application does not extend to armed groups or any 
entity outside the national armed forces.1555 The use of nicknames, on the other hand, is not 
currently subject to regulation and their harmful effects during armed conflict do not appear to be 
common knowledge. Clear legal regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
toward civilians during armed conflict as well as nicknames could have a positive effect on 
preventing or reducing the use of these practices to commit violent acts toward civilians during 
conflict. Both the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and the use of 
nicknames must be captured upstream in order to ultimately prevent these behaviours from 
allowing combatants to alter their psyches in a way that leads to direct violence toward civilians. 
The prevention of direct violence toward civilians requires that behaviours which make a critical 
 
1550 See section 8.1 in this chapter. 
1551 See, e.g., McDermott & Hough, supra note 1244; Ontario Ministry of Transportation, supra note 1244; Wittlin, 
supra note 1224. 
1552 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 871 at 2034–35; Nadler, supra note 977 at 64. 
1553 See, e.g., R c Camiré JJN (Caporal-chef), supra note 1425; R v Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra 
note 1385; R v Dryngiewicz ZA (Corporal), supra note 1411; R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 1379. 
1554 See, e.g., Shannon E French & Anthony I Jack, “Dehumanizing the Enemy: The Intersection of Neuroethics and 
Military Ethic” in David Whetham & Bradley J Strawser, eds, Responsibilities to Protect Perspectives in Theory 
and Practice (Leiden, NLD: Brill Nijhoff, 2015) at 188–90; Sebastian Junger, “We’re all guilty of dehumanizing the 
enemy”, (13 January 2012), online: The Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-all-
guilty-of-dehumanizing-the-
enemy/2012/01/13/gIQAtRduwP_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6699dad88171>; Lt Col Peter Fromm, Lt 
Col Douglas Pryer & Ly Col Kevin Cutright, “The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves (and the Harm These Myths 
Do)” (2013) Military Review 57. 
1555 See, e.g., Georg Nolte & Heike Krieger, “Comparison of European Military Law Systems” in Georg Nolte, ed, 
European Military Law Systems (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 2003) at 130–75; Eugene R Fidell, “A World-Wide 
Perspective on Change in Military Justice” (2000) 48 Armed Forces Law Review 195. 
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alteration to combatant decision-making are inhibited before they can begin to change 
combatants from ordinary individuals into law-breaking combatants. 
 
As well, the argument for IHL regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
directed toward civilians and of non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames used during 
conflict finds support in the foundational aims of IHL. Civilian protection during war is the 
“bedrock of modern humanitarian law.”1556 Protection of civilians from harm and the adverse 
consequences and impacts of armed conflict not only undergirds existing IHL, it drives the 
ongoing development of this body of law.1557 Consequently, civilian protection provides a strong 
impetus for further IHL regulations of behaviours that endanger civilians during armed conflict. 
 
Admittedly, the forms of speech discussed in this chapter – demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language and nicknames – do not directly inflict physical harm on civilians. 
Rather, these forms of speech create an increased risk of violence directed toward civilians 
during an armed conflict. The regulation of risk through law is not uncommon; in fact, it is often 
an important function of governments, both in practice and in the public perception of the duty of 
governments to manage certain risks in society.1558 While there is no global government, the 
international community of states creates law through treaties and through their practice and 
opinio juris.1559 States also frequently use international law to regulate risk.1560 The management 
of risk is a central component of IHL, which seeks to limit the risks of war to civilians, including 
military operations and combatant actions. Risk regulation is a common function of law 
 
1556 ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, supra note 125 at para 521. 
1557 For example, the successful campaigns for treaties to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster 
munitions have been driven by the desire to increase protection for civilians during armed conflict: see, e.g., Ramesh 
Thakur & William Maley, “The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms 
Control?” (1999) 5:3 Global Governance 273 at 296–97; John Borrie & Maya Brehm, “Enhancing civilian 
protection from use of explosive weapons in populated areas: building a policy and research agenda” (2011) 93:883 
International Review of the Red Cross 809; Pascal Bongard, “Engaging armed non-state actors on humanitarian 
norms: reflections on Geneva Call’s experience”, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (2017). 
1558 See, e.g., David Garland, “The Rise of Risk” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds, Risk and Morality 
(Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2003) 117 at 59–62; Violaine Roussel, “New Moralities of Risk and Political 
Responsibility” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds, Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2003) 117 at 118–19; Reza Lahidji, Summary of Discussion on Risk and Regulation at the Meeting of the Group on 
Regulatory Policy, 1-2 December 2008 (OECD, 2008) at 7. 
1559 See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, “The Sources of International Law” in Malcolm Evans, ed, International Law, 3d ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 95. 
1560 For example, the risks of nuclear weapons possession or the risks of hazardous waste disposal: Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1235; Basel Convention, supra note 1236. 
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generally and an integral component of IHL. Thus, I argued that the use of IHL to regulate the 
increased risk of violence posed to civilians by combatant use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language and nicknames during armed conflict is not only consistent with the 
aims of IHL, but it is also consistent with the manner in which law is used to protect civilians 
through risk management. 
 
There is a recognized difference between protections afforded to the free speech rights of 
civilians and during peace as compared to those of combatants and during war. This chapter 
demonstrated how both national and regional courts of countries with very strong protections for 
free speech recognize that free speech restrictions which exceed those legally permissible for 
civilians in peace are often legal within armed forces.1561 Combatants retain some free speech 
rights, but they differ from those accorded to civilians.1562 One of the primary legal justifications 
for limitations on the free speech of combatants is the need to maintain discipline within armed 
forces and armed groups.1563 Internal discipline is one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring 
internal compliance with IHL. The erosion of fidelity to the laws of war through the use of 
demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language directed toward civilians and non-derivative or 
non-diminutive nicknames by combatants is both inimical to the aims of IHL to protect and 
manage risk to civilians during conflict as well as to the discipline essential for the functioning of 
armed forces and armed groups. 
 
There is a need for new IHL rules to inhibit the use of dehumanization, euphemistic language, 
anonymity, doubling, and diffusion of responsibility by combatants that allows them to reframe 
 
1561 See, e.g., Parker v Levy, supra note 1379 at 758; United States v Howe, supra note 1379; United States v Brown, 
supra note 1379 at 397; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at 
para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; Konstantin Markin v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 135; 
Kalaç v Turkey, Judgment, Merits, supra note 1379 at para 28; R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 1379; R. v 
Sharpe, supra note 1372 at para 22; Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, supra note 1372. 
1562 See, e.g., Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 27; 
Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; United States v Wilson, supra note 1380 at 799; Parker v Levy, 
supra note 1379 at 758. 
1563 See, e.g., Goldman v Weinberger, supra note 1385 at 507; Chappell v Wallace, supra note 1385 at 300; Parker v 
Levy, supra note 1379 at 744; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 
at para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; R v Mader GG (Corporal), supra note 1385 at para 2; R v 
Rainville JCB (Master Warrant Officer), supra note 1385 at para 23; R v Alcime OJ (Bombardier), supra note 1385 
at para 3; R v Menard JP (Ex-Corporal), supra note 1385 at para 3-4; R v Moriarity, supra note 1385; See also 
Hirschhorn, supra note 1385 at 246; Fitzkee, supra note 1385 at 61. 
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their conceptions of right and wrong, which can lead to violence toward civilians during conflict. 
Section 8.2 of this chapter argued for a new rule to address the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language by combatants. Dehumanizing and euphemistic language could be 
captured, in theory, by existing IHL rules prohibiting inhumane treatment, in particular the 
prohibition on humiliating and degrading treatment. However, the lack of evidence that these 
forms of speech toward civilians during armed conflict is considered prohibited,1564 in particular 
from the International Committee of the Red Cross, is highly suggestive that no such legal 
protection currently exists under IHL. Existing national laws governing hate speech are 
insufficient in the specific context of armed conflict and with regard to the specific harm posed 
to civilians by the combatant use of dehumanizing and euphemistic language. Further, because 
the limitations on the restriction of free speech in peacetime do not apply in the same way during 
war or to combatants,1565 speech regulation that is more restrictive than that permitted in the 
peacetime context of hate speech is possible during armed conflict.  
 
A new IHL rule to regulate the use of demeaning degrading, or dehumanizing language by 
combatants requires five components. First, the rule should have an inclusive definition of 
‘demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language’ that includes forms of speech that serve to 
debase civilians, such as language which casts civilians as a threat, as inferior, or as not worthy 
of respect or protection. Second, the rule should include the use of euphemistic language that has 
the effect of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing civilians. Third, the rule should extend to 
prohibit the use of the term ‘enemy’ to refer to a civilian or the civilian population. Fourth, the 
level of intent for the new offence of using demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
should be an intent to demean, degrade or dehumanize a civilian or the civilian population. 
Finally, the new rule should require that the demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
used by a combatant have the effect of debasing a civilian or the civilian population in the eyes 
of the audience based on a standard of reasonableness. Together, these five components provide 
a rule that will inhibit demeaning, degrading, and dehumanizing speech from serving to reframe 
 
1564 Although the international crimes of incitement to genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity can 
capture the most extreme forms of hate speech during conflicts, there is no clear regulation under IHL instruments. 
1565 See, e.g., Parker v Levy, supra note 1379 at 758; United States v Howe, supra note 1379; United States v Brown, 
supra note 1379 at 397; Grigoriades v Greece, supra note 1379 at para 45; Kazakov v Russia, supra note 1379 at 
para 27; Joksas v Lithuania, supra note 1379 at para 70; Konstantin Markin v Russia, supra note 1379 at para 135; 
Kalaç v Turkey, Judgment, Merits, supra note 1379 at para 28; R v Booth BR (Private), supra note 1379. 
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conceptions of right and wrong in the minds of both speaker and audience. This will inhibit the 
ability of dehumanization and euphemistic language to contribute to the perpetration of violence 
toward civilians.  
 
Section 8.3 of the chapter argued that a new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames by 
combatants is needed. A new rule regulating the use of nicknames is required in order to impede 
the ability of nicknames to produce a sense of anonymity, a separate combatant identity, and the 
diffusion of responsibility in a combatant that can contribute to the perpetration of violence 
toward civilians. In particular, heroic or violent nicknames have been linked to combatants’ 
losing their fear, remorse, and a sense of accountability. Civilian protection warrants regulation 
of the risk of combatant violence posed by nicknames. Nicknames are not regulated under 
existing IHL, nor do they serve an essential military function. The human right to freedom of 
expression does not prevent the regulation of names and nicknames during peace and greater 
regulation of forms of expression is permitted during armed conflict and with regards to 
combatants. Therefore, international human rights law does not bar the regulation of nicknames. 
Further, regulation of risk is a key aspect of IHL and the power of law to change common or 
socially accepted behaviours, such as seatbelt use, militate in favour of the regulation of 
nickname use by combatants to alter current practices and minimize existing risks. 
 
A new IHL rule regulating the use of nicknames requires three components. First, the rule should 
require combatants to be known by either their first or last name. Second, the rule should provide 
an exception for the use of derivative or diminutive nicknames based on a combatant’s first or 
last name. This exception is intended to balance the risk of harm that stems from anonymity 
and/or the creation of a separate combatant identity with the free speech rights of combatants. 
The risk of anonymity or the creation of a separate combatant identity is less likely to occur 
when a combatant uses a derivative or diminutive form of their own name as compared to a non-
derivative or non-diminutive nickname, particularly heroic or violent nicknames. Third, the rule 
should require a record to be kept of combatants’ first and last names, such as recording this 
information in unit reports, in order to decrease likelihood of combatant anonymity and increase 
the likelihood of combatant accountability. Together, these components of a new rule regulating 
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the use of nicknames would inhibit the ability for nicknames to produce anonymity, doubling, 
and diffusion of responsibility that can contribute to the perpetration of violence toward civilians. 
 
Together, the two recommendations in this chapter demonstrate how theories that examine 
factors that can contribute to violence toward civilians can be applied to NIACs in order to 
identify behaviours that pose a risk to civilians but are not regulated under existing IHL. These 
recommendations demonstrate how behaviours that may be harmless, relatively harmless, or 
subject to limited regulation in peacetime, may pose an increased risk of harm to civilians during 
armed conflict and, consequently, warrant IHL regulation. Law may be used to limit the risks to 
civilians posed by behaviours such as the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
language and the use of non-derivative and non-diminutive nicknames. These laws can serve to 
inhibit psychological processes contributing to violence toward civilians.  
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Chapter 9 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has discussed the protection of civilians during NIACs with an emphasis on 
violations of IHL by members of non-state armed groups directed against civilians. In the many 
NIACs over the last three decades, civilians have been subjected to widespread violence at the 
hands of combatants in direct contravention of IHL.1566 Studies have demonstrated that the 
perpetration of this violence cannot be attributed to psychological deficiencies on the part of the 
perpetrators: “the perpetrators are ordinary people within extraordinary circumstances.”1567  
 
I began my research wondering how law-abiding citizens during peace become law-breaking 
combatants during armed conflict. This question was only reinforced in my mind by 
conversations I had with many kind and friendly people I met in Sierra Leone and the DRC and 
who I came to learn had been members of armed groups that violently attacked civilians during 
conflicts in both of these countries. I, as well as this thesis, have been driven by the premise that 
in order to prevent crime it is necessary to understand crime. Through this thesis, I have begun 
the process of considering how combatant psychology can help to develop conflict-specific ways 
of improving civilian protection, rather than relying on the same regulation of specific 
behaviours for civilian protection in conflict as are used to protect individuals in peacetime. 
 
This closing chapter restates the research problem and summarizes the approach, findings, and 
recommendations advanced in the thesis. It will also address some limitations of the work and 
propose areas for further research. 
 
This thesis advanced the claim that there is gap between the regulation of behaviour for the 
protection of individuals in peace and the regulations needed to protect civilians from combatant 
 
1566 Examples of NIACs in which civilians have been victims of widespread IHL abuses include the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (1996-ongoing), Rwanda (1990-1994), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), South Sudan (2013-ongoing), 
Sudan (2003-2013), Syria (2011-ongoing), Yemen (2015-ongoing), and the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999).  
1567 Smeulers, supra note 22 at 234. 
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violence during war. Social psychology and criminology theories can help to develop the 
necessary conflict-specific behavioural regulations because they explain how combatant 
deviance is adversely affected by psychological processes that reframe combatants’ conceptions 
of right and wrong and, in so doing, fundamentally alter the way in which combatants view the 
IHL rules intended to protect civilians. 
 
War is an exceptional context with different legal demands than peace. In war, there is no 
blanket prohibition against killing and no blanket prohibition that protects individuals from being 
killed. Frequent incidences of violence toward civilians committed by members of armed groups 
exist. Efforts to improve civilian protection in NIACs requires addressing the IHL violations 
committed by these combatants. The binding obligations of IHL on armed groups and their 
members exist regardless of whether an armed group consents to be bound by these rules. Armed 
groups and their members are bound by current IHL by virtue of both the ability of states to 
assume legal obligations on behalf of their citizens and by the limited international legal 
personality bestowed on armed groups based on Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. 
Consequently, armed groups would likely be affected by the new IHL regulations proposed in 
this thesis. Although international human rights law applies during armed conflict, only a limited 
number of armed groups that act as de facto authorities on a territory will have legal international 
human rights obligations. IHL protections for civilians are very important tools for governing 
combatant behaviour, but the specific prohibited acts for civilian protection (e.g., murder, 
violence to physical integrity, torture and rape) are acts that are equally prohibited in most 
countries during peace. Similarly, while the existence of widespread IHL violations directed 
toward civilians in Sierra Leone and the DRC - the case studies employed in this thesis - 
indicates ongoing threats to civilian protection in spite of existing IHL protections, knowledge of 
these violations alone does not necessarily provide any insight into the combatant psychology 
leading to violence toward civilians. 
 
There are three attempts in legal theory to draw on human behaviour to explain compliance or 
deviance: Law and Economics theory, Behavioural Law and Economics theory, and 
Socialization and International Law theory. These three theories fall short of providing the depth 
and nuance necessary to understand and explain combatant violence toward civilians during 
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armed conflict. I turned to theories of social psychology and criminology not because I believe 
legal theory to be an inferior discipline but because I believe it is unrealistic to expect one 
discipline to possess all of the answers to all of the problems in a complex and multi-dimensional 
world. Specific theories to explain how ordinary individuals come to commit violations of IHL 
exist in the disciplines of social psychology and criminology. Further, social psychologists and 
criminologists have scientifically demonstrated a link between specific behaviours, such as 
dehumanization or anonymity, and the expression of aggression and violence. Within this body 
of literature, I identified four dominant theories that were repeatedly relied on by different 
scholars: techniques of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to 
authority. Within these four theories, I identified two dominant themes: (1) the dehumanization 
of civilians through the use of dehumanizing or euphemistic language and (2) the diffusion of 
responsibility through deindividuation, anonymity, and doubling. Dehumanization poses a risk to 
civilians because it debases civilians in the eyes of the speaker and their audience and the 
assumption that that the dehumanized civilian does not need to be accorded the same humane 
treatment as other humans. Diffusion responsibility produced through deindividuation, 
anonymity, and doubling poses a risk to civilians because it allows combatants to 
psychologically abdicate personal responsibility for their violent actions. 
 
I have argued that, guided by criminological and social psychological insights, specifically the 
effects of dehumanization and diffusion or displacement of responsibility, there are behaviours 
which, although legal during peace, should be regulated during war due to the risk they pose to 
civilians. I argued that the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech, although 
necessarily protected for civilians and during peace due to the fundamental human right to free 
speech and expression, should be regulated during armed conflict when used by combatants 
toward a civilian or the civilian population. While existing IHL could potentially capture these 
forms of speech as inhumane treatment, the absence of evidence that demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing speech directed toward civilians is currently considered illegal indicates that a 
clear regulation of these forms of speech may be necessary in order to change how these forms 
of speech are currently viewed and treated. I have argued that hate speech as criminalized in 
some national jurisdictions fails to fully capture the harms that stem from the demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language itself and an intent to demean, degrade, or dehumanize 
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rather than from a feeling of hatred and a desire to provoke violence. Consequently, I have 
proposed IHL regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech by combatants 
directed toward civilians during armed conflicts where the speaker intended to demean, degrade, 
or dehumanize and where a reasonable person would view the speech as debasing a civilian or 
the civilian population. Such a regulation would inhibit the ability of dehumanization to 
contribute to violence toward civilians. 
 
The second recommendation I have made is for the IHL regulation of the use of heroic or violent 
nicknames, as these nicknames provide combatants with a sense of anonymity and a separate 
identity on which to place responsibility for harms committed against civilians. While uniforms 
also contribute to deindividuation, they are necessary during armed conflict in order to facilitate 
the application of the principle of distinction, which protects civilians by requiring combatants to 
distinguish between enemy combatants and civilians. The use of nicknames is also a form of free 
speech or expression that receives significant protection under human rights law during 
peacetime in many national jurisdictions. However, I argued that the risk posed by the use of 
nicknames, particularly heroic or violent nicknames, during armed conflict warrants regulation 
for the protection of civilians. Ultimately, through the examples of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language and heroic or violent nicknames as seen in both historic contexts of 
violence toward civilians (e.g., World War II, Vietnam, Rwanda and Iraq) and in the case study 
conflicts of Sierra Leone and the DRC, I have demonstrated that there are specific behaviours 
which, in an armed conflict situation, pose a risk to civilians and, consequently, require 
regulation under IHL. 
 
Although there may seem to be a problematic internal tension in the advocacy of new IHL laws 
as a means of addressing non-compliance with existing laws, I have demonstrated that there is a 
critical difference between the way individuals think, act, and make decisions before the use of 
psychological processes, such as dehumanization or displacement of responsibility, and after. In 
order to prevent direct acts of violence against civilians downstream, new IHL rules addressing 
the psychological processes that contribute to these acts of violence must be enacted upstream as 
a preventative measure. Failure to intervene prior to the perpetration of direct acts of violence 
against civilians allows a psychological obstacle to compliance to develop in the psyches of 
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combatants. This is why it is important to capture both the use of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing language and the use of nicknames at the earliest point possible in order to prevent 
the alterations to combatant psyches that lead to direct violence. Enforcement will only be 
optimally effective when the right laws exist. I have argued that the right laws for civilian 
protection must address the psychology of combatant violence toward civilians and, in particular, 
the use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and the use of nicknames. It is in 
removing these obstacles to compliance that meaningful progress may be made in the prevention 
of direct harm toward civilians in armed conflict. 
 
Chapter 1 introduced key constructs and concepts central to the thesis as well as established the 
scope of the thesis. First, the primary focus of this thesis has been IHL, drawing where necessary 
or relevant from international criminal law, international human rights law, and domestic 
military justice systems. The chapter distinguished between IHL and international criminal law, 
bodies of law which, due to many areas of overlap, are often conflated. Within the field of IHL, 
the focus was identified as non-state armed groups in the context of NIACs. The research was 
situated within the existing literature which has largely focused on engagement with armed 
groups on issues of compliance and education based on existing IHL. This thesis contributes to 
existing IHL literature in four important ways: (1) by introducing an in-depth examination of 
combatant psychology into the IHL literature; (2) by identifying a gap within current IHL 
regulation and literature on the protection of civilians; (3) by demonstrating that there are ways 
that IHL protection for civilians can and should be substantively developed; and, (4) by 
developing and recommending new IHL regulations to address the use of demeaning, degrading, 
or dehumanizing language by combatants during conflict as well as the use of non-diminutive 
and non-derivative nicknames by combatants during war. 
 
Other scholars have begun to apply social psychology and socio-legal approaches to international 
criminal law.1568 For example, Smeulers has recently used social psychology, including cognitive 
dissonance and crimes of obedience, to discuss the defence of superior orders codified in Article 
33(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal and the reasons why this defence, currently 
 
1568 See, e.g., Smeulers, supra note 84; Aksenova, supra note 969; Harrendorf, supra note 1043; Harrendorf, supra 
note 84. 
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only available with regards to war crimes, should possibly be extended to crimes against 
humanity and genocide.1569 Other scholars have applied socio-legal approaches and social 
psychology to examine international criminal law issues of individual responsibility,1570 to 
discuss the role of the Malabo Protocol to make changes to the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights,1571 and to explore the differences in the application of international and national 
criminal law.1572 These scholars are demonstrating the value of using social psychology and 
criminology to think about law, specifically international criminal law. This thesis is the first 
work to demonstrate how an approach based on social psychology and criminology can be used 
in the substantive development of IHL.  
 
Chapter 2 set out the methodological approach of this thesis. This thesis uses primarily legal 
doctrinal methodology, which relies on the authoritative texts of international law – treaties, 
custom, general principles, case law, and scholarly literature – to develop normatively persuasive 
arguments that are grounded in the realities of the international legal system. This thesis has 
relied heavily on interpretation; however, in doing so it drew on research from the social sciences 
as supporting evidence. The thesis also used qualitative case study analysis based on conflicts in 
Sierra Leone and the DRC to demonstrate the current status quo of IHL in practice and to find 
evidence in practice of the behaviours identified within the social psychological and 
criminological theories and studies employed in the thesis. Chapter 2 provided details on the 
research and data collection conducted for both of these case studies. Though this thesis drew on 
work from the social sciences and included the use of case studies, it remained motivated by the 
“normative perspective of ‘the law’.”1573 
 
Chapter 3 focused on identifying the legal actors whose behaviour was the subject of focus in the 
thesis: armed groups and their members. This chapter clarified the legal concept of ‘armed 
 
1569 The defence of superior orders under the ICC statute is currently prevented in the case of crimes against 
humanity and genocide (Article 33[2]). Smeulers, supra note 83; Rome Statute, supra note 51. 
1570 Carlson, supra note 84; Houge, supra note 84; Harrendorf, supra note 84. 
1571 van Sliedregt, supra note 84. 
1572 Gawronski, supra note 84; Barbara Hola & Amani Chibashimba, “Punishment in Transition: Empirical 
Comparison of Post-Genocide Sentencing Practices in Rwandan Domestic Courts and the ICTR” in Marina 
Aksenova, Elies van Sliedregt & Stephen Parmentier, eds, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological 
and Socio-Legal Approaches in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2019) 137. 
1573 Kool, Emaus & van Uhm, supra note 134 at 79. 
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group’ and demonstrated that both armed groups and their members are bound by existing IHL. 
It argued that the binding obligations of IHL on armed groups and their members exist regardless 
of whether an armed group consents to be bound by these rules and questions of compliance 
should not be conflated with questions of the binding quality of law. Armed groups and their 
members are bound by current IHL by virtue of both the ability of states to assume legal 
obligations on behalf of their citizens and by the limited international legal personality bestowed 
on armed groups based on Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Consequently, armed 
groups would likely be affected by the new IHL regulations proposed in this thesis. However, 
although IHL applies to all armed groups, this chapter argued that international human rights law 
only creates binding obligations for a limited number of armed groups that act as de facto 
authorities on a territory will have legal international human rights obligations. The chapter 
concluded that, because armed groups are bound by IHL, and in some cases by international 
human rights law, this means that the application of new IHL regulations, such as those 
developed in chapter 8, would be likely to affect armed groups. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the rules and principles to which organized armed groups are subject in 
NIACs for the protection of civilians. First, it discussed the concept of humanity that is the 
driving force undergirding much of IHL, in particular its core treaties: the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols in 1977. It argued that the humanitarian 
goals of IHL warrant ongoing consideration of civilian protection and ways civilians might be 
better protected during armed conflict. It then turned to more specific rules of IHL for the 
protection of civilians, such as the principles of distinction proportionality, and precaution. 
Combatants are required to distinguish between combatants and civilians as well as military 
objectives and civilian objects and it is prohibited to directly target civilians or civilian objects. 
However, they may be indirectly injured or killed in an attack on a legitimate target if that 
attack’s anticipated military advantage is proportional to the incidental civilian damage that will 
be caused by it. Further, IHL protects civilians from inhuman treatment in all circumstances. 
Inhuman treatment is not exhaustively defined in IHL, but examples of acts that are inhuman 
treatment as explicitly prohibited are provided: for example, violence to life, torture and cruel 
treatment, humiliating and degrading treatment, and pillage. However, this chapter observed that 
there is little to no difference between these specific prohibited acts for the protection of civilians 
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during armed conflict and peacetime legal protections for individuals. It suggested that the 
unique context of armed conflict in which some people may legally kill and be killed may 
demand regulation of behaviours that, in peace, would be legal but in war pose a threat to the 
safety of civilians. 
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the prevalence of IHL violations of civilian protections in practice 
through the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC. The chapter provided some brief 
background information on the case study conflicts: Sierra Leone’s civil war and the many 
conflicts in the DRC since the mid 1990s. This chapter focused on the types of IHL violations 
committed against civilians in both Sierra Leone and the DRC. The existence of ongoing 
violations demonstrates the possible need for greater regulation of combatants during armed 
conflict. This chapter argued that, while the existence of widespread IHL violations toward 
civilians in Sierra Leone and the DRC demonstrate the persistence of threats to civilian 
protection in spite of existing IHL rules, knowledge of these violations alone does not 
necessarily provide any insight into the combatant psychology leading to violence toward 
civilians. Consequently, it is necessary to look beyond mere awareness of the existence of IHL 
violations to understand how law-abiding civilians become law-breaking combatants who 
commit acts of violence against civilians.  
 
Chapter 6 examined whether behavioural models developed in the legal theories of Law and 
Economics, Behavioural Law and Economics, and Socialization and International Law provide 
an adequate understanding of human behaviour to explain the perpetration of violence by 
combatants during armed conflict. It argued that Law and Economics theory provides an 
inadequate behavioural model due to its flawed assumptions about human rationality, self-
interest, preferences and goals. Behavioural Law and Economics theory has advanced a 
behavioural model that addresses many of Law and Economics’ flawed assumptions; however, 
this chapter argued that Behavioural Law and Economics also falls short of providing an 
adequately nuanced model of human behaviour because as it aims for the broadest application 
possible it focuses solely on a limited number of aspects of human psychology in ordinary, day-
to-day life. Consequently, it fails to appreciate that unique context of war and how this context 
affects combatant psychology. Finally, this chapter examined Socialization and International 
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Law theory, which draws upon some theories from the social and behavioural sciences to 
understand how law influences states. It argued that Socialization and International Law theory is 
inadequate for understanding combatant perpetration of violence for one important reason: the 
theory provides a very limited look at one psychological process affecting compliance, 
acculturation, and leaving open whether there are other theories of explanations that might be 
useful to explain individual behaviour. 
 
Chapter 7 turned to theories of social psychology and criminology and highlighted the fact that 
the perpetration of violence toward civilians cannot be dismissed as psychological deficiencies. 
These perpetrators were law-abiding civilians in peacetime who become law-breaking 
combatants during armed conflict. The chapter identified four theories that have been repeatedly 
used by scholars to explain how ordinary individuals come to commit violent acts against 
civilians during conflict: (1) techniques of neutralization; (2) moral disengagement; (3) 
deindividuation; and, (4) obedience to authority. These theories demonstrate that individuals are 
not inherently disposed to commit violent acts against civilians. Rather, certain patterns of 
thought can inhibit self-regulation and allow individuals to neutralize or disengage their so-called 
moral compass, thereby facilitating their participation in IHL violations. These patterns of 
thought may take the form of justifications, denial or displacement of responsibility, or blaming 
the victim. The theory of deindividuation demonstrates that submergence in a group and 
anonymity can produce disinhibited behaviour, in part because it also provides a means of 
displacing individual responsibility onto the group. Finally, obedience to authority demonstrates 
that individuals are more inclined to commit violent acts under orders or authorization from a 
legitimate authority, even where the orders themselves may not be legitimate. Through 
discussion of these four theories, this chapter identified two dominant processes contributing to 
violence toward civilians: (1) dehumanization and (2) diffusion of responsibility. 
 
Chapter 8 identified the use of the psychological processes of dehumanization and diffusion of 
responsibility in combatant behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC: the use of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language and the use of nicknames. Both of these behaviours serve 
to alter the minds of combatants and create an obstacle to compliance with IHL rules prohibiting 
direct violence against civilians. Further, the effects of both of these behaviours which lead to 
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direct violence against civilians intensify over time. It is necessary to capture these behaviours 
upstream at the earliest point possible in order to prevent the creation of this obstacle to 
compliance. This chapter recommended two new IHL rules to regulate the use of these 
behaviours by combatants. The chapter began by positing that law has the power to change risky 
or dangerous behaviours, such as those examined in chapter 8, even where these behaviours were 
previously socially acceptable or tolerated. Furthermore, risk regulation is an inherent 
component of IHL, which seeks to regulate and limit risks to civilians during armed conflict. It 
argued that, at minimum, where a risky behaviour is identified during armed conflict, it is worth 
considering whether it may be possible to legally regulate that risky behaviour for the protection 
of civilians. Part two of the chapter argued the need for IHL regulation of the use of demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language by combatants. It reiterated the risks associated with the 
dehumanization of civilians, in particular, the reframing of combatant perceptions of right and 
wrong contributing to violence toward civilians. It provided examples from Sierra Leone and the 
DRC of combatant use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language. It argued that the 
use of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech, although necessarily protected for 
civilians and during peace due to the fundamental human right to free speech and expression, 
should be regulated during armed conflict when used by combatants toward a civilian or the 
civilian population. While existing IHL could potentially capture these forms of speech as 
inhumane treatment, the absence of evidence that demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing 
speech toward civilians is currently considered illegal indicates that a clear regulation of these 
forms of speech may be necessary in order to change how these forms of speech are currently 
viewed and treated. Limitations placed on the ability of states to regulate free speech in 
peacetime do not apply in the same manner during war or to combatants. Consequently, 
international human rights law does not prevent the regulation of demeaning, degrading, or 
dehumanizing speech during conflict. It argued that a new IHL rule regulating the use of these 
forms of speech should include five components: (1) an inclusive definition of ‘demeaning, 
degrading, or dehumanizing language’; (2) a restriction on the use of euphemistic language that 
demeans, degrades, or dehumanizes; (3) a restriction on the use of the term ‘enemy’ to refer to a 
civilian or the civilian population; (4) a requirement of an intent to demean, degrade, or 
dehumanize on the part of the speaker; and, (5) a requirement that the speech have the effect, 
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based on a standard of reasonableness, of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing a civilian or 
the civilian population in the mind of the listener. 
 
The third part of chapter 8 examined the deindividuation of combatants and the production of a 
sense of anonymity, doubling, and diffusion of responsibility among combatants. It argued that, 
while the use of uniforms can contribute to deindividuation, uniforms are an inherent necessity 
during armed conflict in order to facilitate the application of the principle of distinction which 
protects civilians by requiring combatants to distinguish between enemy combatants and 
civilians. The chapter focused on the widespread use of nicknames by combatants which can 
contribute to a sense of anonymity, facilitate the diffusion of responsibility and permit 
combatants to create a separate identity under which they commit violent acts. It argued that the 
use of nicknames is appropriate for regulation as their use is neither a military necessity nor an 
existing means of aiding in the protection of civilians. Further, due largely to the seemingly 
innocuous nature of nicknames, neither IHL nor international human rights law currently 
regulate the use of nicknames. The use of nicknames is, however, a form of free speech or 
expression that receives near absolute protection under human rights law in many national 
jurisdictions. The unique risk anonymizing heroic or violent nicknames pose to civilians during 
armed conflict warrants regulation of these forms of nicknames, since they provide combatants 
with a feeling of invincibility contributing to increased violence and aggression. Finally, this 
chapter recommended that a new rule regulating the use of nicknames by combatants should 
include three components: (1) the requirement that combatants be known by their first or last 
name; (2) an exception this requirement for the use of derivative or diminutive nicknames based 
on a combatant’s first or last name; and, (3) a requirement to record the full name of combatants. 
 
Ultimately, through the examples of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language and 
heroic or violent nicknames as seen in both historic contexts of violence toward civilians (e.g., 
World War II, Vietnam, Rwanda and Iraq) and in the case study conflicts of Sierra Leone and the 
DRC, this chapter demonstrated the potential to use combatant psychology in the ongoing 
development of IHL. Combatant psychology provides not only a means of identifying combatant 
behaviours that pose a particular risk to civilians during armed conflict, it also offers a guide for 
developing new substantive rules to inhibit behaviours contributing to violence toward civilians 
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during armed conflicts. The regulation of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language 
toward civilians and the use of non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames by combatants 
provides a means of contributing to IHL’s aim of civilian protection. Further research and 
fieldwork may identify additional combatant behaviours that could be addressed to manage risks 
to civilians during armed conflict. Combatant psychology can help people to understand some of 
the causes of violence directed toward civilians during armed conflict and, through this 
understanding, it is possible to begin to imagine new ways to prevent harm to civilians during 
war. 
 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, this thesis was driven by the premise that, in order to 
prevent crime, it is necessary to understand crime. I have argued that the theories of techniques 
of neutralization, moral disengagement, deindividuation, and obedience to authority can provide 
a significantly deepened understanding of the context of IHL abuses directed against civilians 
during armed conflict. In turn, the understanding of how dehumanization and displacement of 
responsibility contribute to violence against civilians has led me to identify the problematic 
usage of demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing language as well as non-derivative or non-
diminutive nicknames in the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC. I have used this 
knowledge to propose two new IHL regulations to prevent the ability of these behaviours to lead 
to IHL violations of civilian protections. The inhibition of the dehumanization of civilians 
through a prohibition on demeaning, degrading, or dehumanizing speech will reduce risks of 
violence directed toward civilians during conflict by inhibiting the reframing of combatant 
perceptions of right and wrong that contributes to this violence. The inhibition of 
deindividuation, doubling, and the abdication of personal accountability for one’s actions 
through the regulation of non-derivative or non-diminutive nicknames will similarly reduce risks 
of violence directed toward civilians during conflict by inhibiting the reframing of combatant 
perceptions of right and wrong that contributes to this violence. Unfortunately, the inhibition of 
these behaviours will not eradicate the problem of IHL abuses of civilians entirely because the 
complex realities of armed conflict make it impossible to reduce all IHL violations to two 
psychological causes. However, I intend for the two regulations I have proposed to serve as a 
starting point from which combatant psychology can be used to develop further ways to diminish 
violence directed toward civilians during armed conflicts. Further, the inhibition of the 
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dehumanization of civilians and the production of anonymity and doubling will allow the work 
of organizations, such as the ICRC, which engage with armed groups to be more effective. 
 
Looking forward, there is room to expand data collection within Sierra Leone and the DRC as 
well as extend data collection to other conflicts. While I identified the two themes of 
dehumanization and displacement of responsibility and addressed two manifestations of these 
themes in the context of Sierra Leone and the DRC, there were other behaviours identified in the 
criminological and social psychological theories used in this thesis that could be utilized to 
evaluate existing IHL protections for civilians.1574 Further, there will likely be more ways that 
displacement of responsibility manifests itself in combatant behaviour and possibly other acts 
that serve to debase civilians in the eyes of combatants. Understanding combatant psychology 
can provide insights not just for those seeking to develop new regulations to improve civilian 
protection during conflict, it can also help commanders better understand and manage the 
behaviour of their subordinates in a way that promotes the high levels of discipline necessary for 
IHL compliance more broadly. The utility of combatant psychology is not limited to the 
regulation of armed groups. The proposed regulations in this thesis may also be of utility for 
state armed forces where my, albeit limited, anecdotal evidence suggests that dehumanization by 
combatants during armed conflict exists within Western militaries.1575 The regulations I have 
proposed could help to prevent some of the types of civilian abuses committed, for example, by 
U.S. forces in Iraq.1576 
 
1574 For example, the theories discussed in chapter 7 emphasize the power of authorization and routinization, which 
allow combatants to displace and diffuse responsibility for their own actions onto superior officers and/or their 
fellow combatants. Although the chain of command plays an important role in the functioning of armed groups as 
well as state militaries, it might be possible to develop ways of mediating the effects of the chain of command on the 
sense of responsibility combatants feel for their own actions. There may also be additional manners in which 
dehumanization, anonymization, or the abdication of personal responsibility is manifested in combatant behaviour 
during armed conflict that could be identified through further fieldwork and/or the extension of fieldwork to 
different case study conflicts. 
1575 For example, the torture and murder of a Somali teenager by Canadian soldiers in 1993. The official report 
explicitly records racism within the ranks and among the Canadian Armed Forces members responsible: 
Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of 
the Somalia Affair (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997); See also, e.g., JL 
Granatstein & Dean F Oliver, “The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History” (2013) 
22:4 Canadian Military History 59; Richard Foot, “Somalia Affair”, (5 November 2018), online: The Canadian 
Encyclopedia <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>; Alexander John McKinnon, 
Torture of the Other - Racism as an Element of Torture in Contemporary Military Operations Carleton University, 
2006) [unpublished]. 
1576 The most well known example is the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison: see, e.g., Hersh, supra note 1460; 
However, Abu Ghraib is not the only recorded incident of IHL violations committed by US troops: see, e.g. Raffi 
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This thesis has sought to contribute to a better understanding of combatant psychology and to 
identify a way this understanding can be put to practical use within IHL. Dehumanization and 
displacement of responsibility provide paths to civilian suffering and I have argued that legal 
regulation can block combatants’ path to IHL violations. 
9.1 Limitations 
This thesis establishes a strong case for the substantive development of IHL based on insights 
into combatant psychology. However, like all works it is not without limitations. First, as 
addressed in chapter 2, the case study fieldwork was limited by the size and scope of the 
fieldwork data collection as well as by practical, security and logistical limitations on interviews 
in the field. Another limitation of this thesis is that it provides limited discussion on the 
enforcement of IHL. Its primary focus is on developing a new approach to thinking about the 
development of IHL and the types of behaviours that are regulated by this body of law. Thus, it 
addressed the utility of a new approach that considers how combatant psychology contributes to 
IHL violations and identified theories that provide this information. It then applies the theory of 
combatant psychology to existing IHL based on the recent and ongoing armed conflicts in Sierra 
Leone and the DRC. It demonstrated the utility and applicability of a combatant psychology 
approach in the development of IHL and took this as a logical end point. Enforcement is a 
natural correlate of law-making and issues of compliance and deviace but approaches the 
problem of IHL violations from a different direction than that which was the focus in this thesis. 
Consequently, the thesis leaves for future research questions of enforcement. The premise of 
these thesis is that IHL must have new rules in place to prevent the psychological reframing of 
conceptions of right and wrong before any remaining issues regarding compliance and 
enforcement are examined. 
9.2 Future Research 
Over the next five years, I intend to focus on two projects stemming from the research and 
fieldwork conducted for this thesis. First, I will build on the links I began to develop between the 
military justice systems and the regulation of armed groups. This project would conduct a study 
of state military justice systems as well as a study of the internal disciplinary systems of armed 
 
Khatchadourian, “The Kill Company”, (2 June 2009), online: The New Yorker 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/07/06/the-kill-company>. 
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groups. The aim of the project will be to identify practices within state military justice systems 
that might be adopted and adapted for the internal regulation of non-state armed groups. The goal 
would be to produce different models of disciplinary best practices targeting different sizes of 
armed groups with different levels of organization. These models would provide a useful tool for 
armed groups as well as for international organizations engaging with armed groups. The second 
research project will examine topics raised by field interviews, but which fell outside the scope 
of this thesis. In particular, the issue of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was very 
important to former combatants I spoke to in Eastern DRC. My discussion with these ex-
combatants highlighted for me the effect disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
programs can have on both incentivizing current combatants to disarm and demobilize, but also, 
where programs leave ex-combatants dissatisfied or in precarious living conditions, this can 
contribute to re-enlistment and the disincentivization of participation in these programs to 
combatants. This problem arises in contexts like the DRC where disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration programs operate alongside ongoing conflict. Consequently, there is an 
interesting overlap between IHL and post-conflict regulation, sometimes referred to as jus post 
bellum (or law after war), that requires further study. 
9.3 Conclusion 
In sum, the protection of civilians during conflicts requires rules targeting the particular risks 
posed to civilians during war. The use of social psychology and criminology theories help to 
identify what these conflict-specific risks to civilians are by providing insight into the 
psychological processes that lead law-abiding citizens to become law-breaking combatants who 
perpetrate acts of violence against civilians. My hope is that this improved understanding of 
violence toward civilians can continue to be used to develop new ways to protect civilians during 
conflict and to advance IHL’s humanitarian objectives. 
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